A case for institutional investigations in economic research methods with reference to South Africa's agricultural sector by Mbatha, Cyril
A Case for Institutional Investigations in 
Economic Research Methods with reference to 
South Africa’s Agricultural Sector    
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
   
 
 
         RHODES UNIVERSITY 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
 
CYRIL NHLANHLA MBATHA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Prof. G.G. Antrobus 
 
 
 
November 2007 
 
 
 
 
 ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I would like to thank the following people and institutions for their 
assistance and personal help in completing this work: 
 
Prof. G.G. Antrobus, supervisor (Department of Economics and Economic 
History, Rhodes University) 
 
Dr Backeberg of the Water Research Commission (WRC) for his valuable 
secondary supervisory role 
 
The financial assistance from the Water Research Commission (WRC) and the 
National Research Foundation (NRF) 
 
The people of the Kat River Valley, who gave their valuable time, sometimes for 
no pay, to make it possible to complete the thesis  
 
The most valuable research assistance from Mrs L. Haigh, Mr N. Somani Mr 
G.M. Kahundahunda, Mr S. Ndzotho, Mr M. Mashiyi  
 
The supporting spirit of my late and dearest friend, Mauriccette. You are 
always 
  
Opinions expressed and recommendations arrived at are those of the author and 
are not to be attributed to any of the above institutions.   
 
I acknowledge that all references are accurately recorded and that, unless 
otherwise stated, all work herein is my own. I certify that this thesis has not 
been submitted for a degree at any other university. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii
 
 
A Case for Institutional Investigations in General 
Economic Research and South Africa’s Agricultural 
Policymaking Sector  
 
Cyril Nhlanhla Mbatha 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Economic development remains elusive for many world economies, but especially 
those of African countries. The current global inequalities in terms of GNP per capita 
and human living standards between developed and developing nations have ensured 
that the challenges of food insecurities are only some of the many negative 
experiences of underdevelopment in the African continent. Hence, delivery pressures 
are increasing on policy makers and researchers to provide tangible and timely 
economic solutions to the resilient state of underdevelopment.  
 
In the policy fights against the challenges posed by a lack of development in South 
Africa, the agricultural sector has in the past and continues in the present to play a 
central role. Such is the case because the majority of citizens rely on agricultural 
production activities for their livelihoods. For instance, even though the sector only 
contributed four percent towards the national Gross Domestic Product in 2006, in the 
Eastern Cape Province, more than seventy percent of the total population resided in 
rural areas. Moreover, in 2004 more than sixty percent of the national formal and 
informal employment levels were found in the sector. These economic indicators do 
not only reinforce the assertions that high levels of geographical and sectoral  
inequalities exist in the country’s economy, but they also illustrate the importance of 
the agricultural sector in public policy attempts, which are aimed at achieving food 
security alongside long-term developmental objectives.  
 
Some economists, especially the proponents of institutionalism, have argued that most 
of the recommendations to public policy interventions from mainstream economic 
research endeavours are not adequately helpful. The recommendations generally lack 
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well considered and socially effective ideas, mainly because there remains some level 
of ignorance about the impacts that institutions have on economic and social systems. 
Some argue that this ignorance is reflected in (flawed) hedonistic and rationalist 
assumptions made about economic actors and in the methodological thinking of many 
research designs and economic analyses. The misuse of formal tools and statistical 
methods, for example, are some of the important factors, which have led to failures of 
the discipline of economics to provide effective policy solutions to problems of 
underdevelopment and poverty, especially in poor country environments.  
 
The thesis, having taken account of the majority of criticisms levelled against the 
classical and new-classical economic schools of thought, argues that the discipline as 
a whole lacks a paradigmatic integration of institutional and new-classical economic 
perspectives to offer appropriate guidelines for a methodology aimed at achieving 
socially responsive research outputs. The lack of this integration has resulted in a 
skewed selection of methods by economists, which are employed in research without 
a supportive and in-depth understanding of institutional and social factors. To support 
the thesis, a more effective and integrated framework for economic research is 
developed and presented with case study illustrations in a cumulative manner. The 
20th century history of agricultural policies in South Africa, the agricultural and 
institutional case studies from the Eastern Cape Province alongside reviews of other 
agricultural studies are all used in presenting a case for rigorous institutional 
investigations in general economic research. These are also used in developing the 
proposed integrated framework, which aims to give guidance in developing research 
methods, which are more socially responsive.  
 
Having shown the usefulness of the proposed research framework, the thesis 
recommends that public policy interventions (at national and local levels) should aim 
to eliminate all types of institutions which have high associated transactional costs. 
The interventions should also encourage the emergence and growth of the types of 
institutions, which present the lowest costs to initiatives of economic development. In 
the primary case studies from the Eastern Cape Province, the insecurity of land tenure 
and the various local initiatives of business ventures are highlighted as two examples 
of the types of institutions, which respectively present high and low transactional 
costs to local initiatives of agricultural and economic development.  
 v
A Case for Institutional Investigations in General 
Economic Research and South Africa’s Agricultural 
Policymaking Sector 
 
Cyril Nhlanhla Mbatha 
 
 
Section LIST OF HEADINGS Page 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 The Research Context 2 
1.3 A Brief Review Of South Africa’s Agricultural Policy 
Challenges  
5 
1.4 A Preview Of Chapters  7 
   
 CHAPTER TWO  
Economic Development for Developing Countries  
 
2.1 Introduction  10 
2.2 Why Economic Development? 11 
2.3 Economic Development: Growth Versus Development  12 
2.4 Development Theories And The Debates Of The 20th Century  18 
2.4.1 The Early Theories Of Development: A Focus On Economic 
Growth 
20 
2.4.2 The Neo-Marxist Theories: The Need For Government 
Sovereignty 
24 
2.4.3 The Resurgence Of Neoclassical Economics And The Call For 
Free Market Reign 
26 
2.4.4 The New Growth And Institutional Theories: Negotiating The 
Middle Ground 
28 
2.5 Conclusion 30 
   
 CHAPTER THREE  
Institutionalism: Critique and Possibilities 
 
3.1 Introduction 32 
3.2 The Arguments By Institutionalism In 20th Century 34 
3.2.1 The Rationality Assumption  34 
3.2.2 Formalism In Economics  35 
3.3 Institutions: What Do They Mean To Society, Economics And     
Development? 
37 
3.3.1 Defining Institutions 38 
3.3.2 The Evolution Of Institutions 40 
3.4 Economic Methods: Positivism And Institutionalism  43 
3.4.1 The limitations of an institutionalist approach 52 
3.5 Research Framework: A Review Of Some Tools In Irrigation 
And Development Applications 
 
53 
 vi
3.5.1 A Framework For Analysing Information Asymmetries For 
Development 
54 
3.6 Concluding Summary 58 
   
 CHAPTER FOUR 
Research Methods 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 59 
4.2 Inception Phase 60 
4.2.1 Case Study One: Business Partnerships In Irrigated Agriculture - 
A Case Of Black Commercial Farmers 
63 
4.2.2 Case Study Two: Economic Externalities In Water Allocations – 
A Case Of White Citrus Farmers In The Middle And Lower Kat 
River Reaches    
65 
4.2.3 Case Study Three: Political And Business Institutions – A Case 
Of Subsistence Farmers 
67 
4.3 The Analysis Of Data 68 
4.4 Concluding Summary 70 
   
 CHAPTER FIVE 
An Overview of South Africa’s Agricultural Sector 
 
5.1 Introduction 72 
5.2 Agriculture And The South African Economy 73 
5.3 The History Of Agricultural Policies In South Africa 74 
5.3.1 The Marketing Policies 75 
5.3.2 The Water Policies 78 
5.3.3 The Land Policies 80 
5.3.4 Tabulated Summary Of Historical Events And Policies   84 
5.4 Conclusion 85 
   
 CHAPTER SIX 
Case Studies on Irrigated Agriculture from the  
Kat River Valley 
 
6.1 Backgrounds And Introduction 86 
6.1.1 A Brief Political History Of Population Settlements And 
Resource Conflicts Of The KRV 
89 
6.2 A Case Of Black Citrus Farmers And Locally Initiated Business 
Partnerships  
93 
6.2.1 Introduction 94 
6.2.2 The Black Citrus Farmers  95 
6.2.3 The Documented State Of Business Affairs On White Owned 
Citrus Farms  
99 
6.2.4 The Review Of Agricultural Public Policies And Its Relevance 
To The KRV Citrus Farming  
104 
6.2.5 The Integrated Departmental Approach (CCAW) To Public 
Policy Support 
112 
6.2.6 Themes For Discussion And Analysis Within An Institutional 
Framework  
114 
6.3 A Case Of Water Abstractions Using The Illustrative Physical 
Externality Model  
120 
 vii
6.3.1 Introduction  121 
6.3.2 The Investigation Of KRV Farmers Using The Physical 
Externality Model  
123 
6.3.3 The Water Allocation Policies And Practices In The KRV 131 
6.3.4 The Upper KRV’s Institutional Challenges To Development 137 
6.3.5 Summary Of Isolated Themes For Further Analysis Using An 
Institutional Framework  
140 
6.4 A Historical Case Study Of The Upper Krv Farming Businesses 144 
6.4.1 Introduction  145 
6.4.2 The Geographical Location  146 
6.4.3 The Early History Of Hacop 147 
6.4.4 The Current Business Operations Of Hacop In Fairbairn  153 
6.4.5 Political And Leadership Challenges  165 
6.4.6 Isolated Themes For Analysis Within An Institutional 
Framework 
167 
6.4.7 Summary And Way Forward 169 
   
 CHAPTER SEVEN  
Discussion and Analysis 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 171 
7.2 An Institutional Analysis Of The KRV Case Studies  172 
7.2.1 The Case Of Black Citrus Farmers 173 
7.2.2 The Case Of Water Allocation Tensions Among Irrigators 180 
7.2.3 The Case Of Emerging Schemes 185 
7.2.4 A Qualitative Evaluation Of Social Transaction Costs Of 
Institutional Factors 
189 
7.3 Evolution And Developmental Path Implications 195 
7.3.1 An Historical Account Of Economic Transactions 196 
7.3.2 The Political Process Of Negotiating Rules For Engagement  201 
7.4 The Implications From Institutional Discussions 202 
7.5 A Framework For Holistic Economic Research 205 
7.5.1 The Possession Of Private Land Rights Leads To A Higher 
Status Of Economic Development 
208 
7.6 Comparative Case Reviews 213 
7.6.1 Review Of A Study On The Land Reform Policy In Zimbabwe 213 
7.6.2 A Review Of A Study Of The Productivity Effects Of Farming 
Techniques In The Former Homeland Of Bophuthatswana  
218 
7.7 The Implications For Debates On Methods 223 
   
 CHAPTER EIGHT 
Summary and Recommendations to Policy and Research 
 
8.1 Introduction 226 
8.2 Some Implications For Policy At A National Level 227 
8.3 Implications For Policy At A Kat River Valley Level 232 
8.3.1 Selected Recommendations By History, Contribution And 
Prevalence 
233 
8.4 Recommendations For Future Research  235 
8.5 Concluding Note And The Way Forward  237 
   
 viii
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 239 
  
Figure LIST OF FIGURES Page 
   
3.1 The whole system with sub parts and a 
number of connecting themes 
50 
3.2 A watercourse with individual water abstractions 55 
3.3 Inefficient resource allocations in agricultural production 56 
4.1 The whole system with sub parts and a number of connecting 
themes 
62 
6.1 The debt-trap exit business strategy as proposed by Riverside 101 
6.2 The structure of proposed black owned joint venture by 
Riverside Enterprises. 
102 
6.3 Procedural framework approving grants at CCAW 113 
6.4 The interconnectedness of institutional factors affecting the 
development of black citrus farmers 
118 
6.5 A watercourse with individual water abstractions 123 
6.6 Inefficient resource allocations in agricultural production 124 
6.7 Kat River Dam water readings 2002 to 2005 136 
6.8 Management Structure: 2005/2006 Fairbairn Branch (Hacop) 155 
6.9 Figure 6.10 A fish-bone structured system of communication 157 
6.10 A system for cabbage production 158 
7.1 Williamson’s (2000) Institutional hierarchy 173 
7.2 The self reinforcing institutional waves 199 
7.3 The institutional-neoclassical economic research methodology 
interface 
206 
   
 
 
Table LIST OF TABLES Page 
2.1 The 1982 WDR economic growth indicators for selected Low and 
Middle income countries   
14 
5.1 Estimated population and GGP per industry distributions by S.A. 
provinces   
73 
5.2 Growth of maize and wheat output between 1904 and 1930 76 
5.3 The summary of the historical and remedial policies of the 20th 
century in South Africa’s agricultural sector 
84 
6.1 Land use division and extent 89 
6.2 The KRV farm’s market prices and sizes (Source: DLA, 1999) 97 
6.3 The racial and gender representation of Riverside Enterprises in 
2004 
103 
6.4 Phased-out grants on operation and maintenance, WRM and 
depreciation charges 
108 
6.5 Sliding scale of grants at given contributions, as examples for 
illustration 
11 
6.6 Sliding scale of grants at given contributions, as examples for 
illustration  
112 
6.7 Areas under cultivation in each river reach (ha), 1989 127 
6.8 Estimated land areas under citrus cultivation with and without 
water scheduling (hectares) 
128 
 ix
 
6.9 Monthly water releases (Mm3) from Kat Dam required to meet the 
full irrigation and domestic requirements  
132 
6.10 Farm ownership and associated water scheduling 134 
6.11 Irrigation roster (three hours per person or nine hours per day) 160 
6.12 Cabbage log for October 2005  162 
6.13 Hacop Income from land activities by each member in 2005 163 
7.1 Table 7.1 Institutional themes from the case of black citrus farmer 174 
7.2 Institutional themes from the case of water allocations  181 
7.3 Institutional themes from the case of emerging farmers  186 
7.4a A qualitative evaluation of the case of Black Citrus Farmers’ 
institutions to social transaction costs and development 
191 
7.4b A qualitative evaluation of the case of Water Allocation 
institutions to social transaction costs and development 
192 
7.4c A qualitative evaluation of the case of the Upper KRV’s Emerging 
Farmers’ to social transaction costs and development 
193 
7.5 A summary of significant institutions and their history 197 
7.6 Land distribution at and after independence  215 
7.7 Socio economic characteristics of an average household in the 
study area, 2001 
220 
7.8 Minimum area of land required to ensure food security for an 
average household in the study area for different production 
220 
8.1 Summary of pertinent policy and research recommendations 237 
 
 
Map LIST OF MAPS Page 
4.1 The KRV farming communities 61 
6.1 South Africa and water catchment areas with the KRV in the 
Eastern Cape 
86 
6.2 The Kat River Valley reaches and villages  88 
6.3 The Buffer Zone between The Great Fish and the Keiskamma 
Rivers 
90 
6.4 The Kat River and its tributaries (alternative sources of water) 126 
6.5 Hacop and its villages in the former Ciskei  146 
6.6 The Mpofu Magisterial District 152 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 x
 
Appendix LIST OF APPENDICES Page 
   
1 Guideline questions for recorded interviews with KRV 
(commercial) citrus farmers: September 2005 
254 
2 Guide questions for emerging farmers (new  and old irrigation 
schemes): 
258 
3 The constitution of Hacop 261 
4 Agenda for the Hacop workshop held on the 20th of January 2006 264 
5 The Katco Enterprise Budget  265 
6 Riverside’s estimated production output of different citrus fruit 
(over the next ten years) from black citrus farms 
267 
7 The total debt of the KRV black farms by 1999 and their 
topographic representation along the Kat River  
268 
8 Neglected and abandoned black farms  270 
9 Good versus poor farm management 271 
10 Abbreviated Agenda of the Alice Kat Riverside Workshop 13 
July 2005 
273 
11 The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry’s application form 
for grants to emerging farmers 
274 
12 Map of KRV weirs and boundary river reaches 275 
13 Map of the three Upper KRV villages  276 
14 Successful Hacop irrigation farms in 1996 277 
15 Pictures of Hacop meeting/workshop  278 
16 Appendix 16 Layout of division of land plots in Fairbairn 
(vegetable side): Hacop (2005) 
279 
17 Table of electricity payments: contributions September 2004 to 
2005 
280 
18 Discussion review of Ostrom (1990), Dales (1994) 281 
19 The 2004 KRV Household Survey Tool 286 
20 A technical explanation of the Lewis Two-Sector model 303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi
 
 
ACRONYMS 
AGRITEX Agricultural, Technical, and Extension Services 
CAB Ciskei Agricultural Bank 
CASP Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme 
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis 
CCAW Coordination Committees on Agricultural Water 
CCSIS Coordinating Committee on Small-Scale Irrigation Support 
CF Catchment Forum 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CMA Catchment Management Agency 
CV Contingent Valuation 
DLA Department of Land Affairs 
DoA Department of Agriculture 
DoL Department of Labour 
DWAF Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
HACOP Hertzog Agricultural Cooperative 
HDIs Historically Disadvantaged Individuals 
HSIU Heath Special Investigation Unit 
IAC Irrigation Action Committee  
IDA Institutional Decomposition Analysis 
IDC Industrial Development Corporation 
IDP Integrated Development Plan 
IOA Input-Output Analysis 
IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management 
KRV Kat River Valley 
KRV WUA Kat River Valley Water User Association 
LRAD Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development 
NGO Non Governmental Organisation 
 xii
NIE New Institutional Economics 
NWA National Water Act 
NWP National Water Policy 
NWRS National Water Resources Strategy 
OIE Old Institutional Economics 
O&M Operations and Maintenance  
SADT South African Development Trust 
SMME Small Medium and Micro Enterprise  
WC Ward Council 
WDRDC Water Department of the Rural District Council 
WMA Water Management Area 
WRC Water Research Commission 
WRM Water Resource Management 
WUA Water User Association 
 
 
 
 
Key words: 
Economic research methods, institutional economics, development economics, agricultural policy in 
South Africa, the Kat River Valley, agricultural businesses, the Former Ciskei 
 1
CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are generally increasing pressures for economists to provide policy makers with 
useful recommendations from their research outputs within limited resource and time 
constraints. In developing countries, especially, public planners are often in desperate 
need of expert input in areas where their own knowledge is very limited. However, 
the recommendations to policy formulation processes from some economic research 
and thinking processes have only contributed negatively to general economic, social 
and political spheres. For instance, Eicher (1999) discusses a number of failed 
agricultural projects in African countries due to poor policymaking based on ignorant 
economic thinking about the effects of institutions.  
 
Institutional economists throughout the 20th century have always argued that many of 
the assumptions made in classical economic thought, for example the assumed 
hedonistic and rationalistic mentality of actors in economic transactions, have been 
inaccurate at best (Rutherford, 2001:175). Moreover, the use of scientific methods of 
research in economics has in most cases been inappropriate and ineffective because 
the methods are not particularly suited to social science investigations (Evensky, 
2004). Hence, a big portion of the faith placed by policy makers on the majority of 
economic research outputs is arguably unwarranted. However, in the same breath, the 
critics of mainstream economic research thinking, methods and conclusions have not 
provided any convincing alternative solutions to the criticisms (Coase, 1998). 
 
In the light of the challenges to public policy planning and their need for support from 
economic research, which is not adequate especially in developing countries, it is 
apparent that a new way of thinking about economic questions is required. In African 
countries, like South Africa, whose majority of citizens rely on agricultural 
production activities for their livelihoods, the new way of thinking in the sector would 
be most useful. Hence, the thesis proposes an integrated framework for economic 
research, which enables an institutionalised context for the use of selected formal 
economic methods by researchers within South Africa’s agricultural sector. An 
explanation of the framework and its motivation are presented in the following 
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section. A historical review of agricultural policies in South Africa is outlined in 
section three. A preview of thesis chapters is presented in section four.  
 
1.2 THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
The most significant challenges for economic development that are facing the South 
African economy at present include household income inequalities, especially in 
terms of geographical location. Simkins (2004) reported a gini coefficient of 0.67 
between 1995 and 2000. In 2006, the poorest regions in terms of Gross Geographical 
Product (GGP) per capita were the Limpopo and the Eastern Cape provinces with 
GGP per annum figures of 3.3 and 5.3 thousand rands per capita per year respectively 
(Stats S.A., 2006a)1. The two provinces also had some of the highest rural populations 
in the country. For example, the Eastern Cape’s population living in rural 
environments was reported at seventy percent in 2006. Moreover, while the national 
unemployment rate stood at above twenty six percent, using the narrow definition 
(Black et al, 2005:216), the figure was at sixty percent in some rural areas (Eastern 
Cape Government Report, 2004). The indications from the statistics are that high 
levels of underdevelopment exist in areas whose economic activities are mostly 
dependent on agricultural production. Nieuwoudt et al. (2004:162) reported that sixty 
percent of the national formal and informal employment was in the agricultural sector, 
which may reinforce the argument that the agricultural sector remains crucial in South 
Africa’s fight against poverty and food security. The sector employs the highest 
number workers in the country. Hence, a research focus on the agricultural sector for 
economic development purposes is strongly motivated.  
 
However, agriculture as a subject of research and policymaking has always posed 
great challenges to analysts and public planners, especially in African countries. 
Eicher (1999:1) reported that agricultural projects in the continent have been 
characterised by inefficiencies and failures, which have exacerbated the experiences 
of food shortages. He argued that “the primary cause of Africa’s challenges 
(especially in agriculture) is a seamless web of internal and external factors rather 
                                                 
1 The richest province was Gauteng with 18.9 thousand rands per capita per annum  
 3
than a single source2 such as colonialism, geography, a lack of technology”, etc. 
Therefore the planning of agricultural projects aimed at improving productivity has 
come short primarily because of a misplaced focus on particular sources of 
efficiencies instead of seeking solutions from well-coordinated and multi-policy 
responses to equally match the challenges stemming from a complex ‘web’ of 
institutional factors. 
 
The same failures of policy efforts to invest on discovering institutional solutions in 
public planning are the same failures that institutional economists argue are facing 
mainstream economic research endeavours. Meanwhile, there is an extensive history 
of fierce debates in the field of development economics regarding even the definition 
of the concept of economic development (Hirschman, 1960, Sen, 1982, etc.) and the 
extent to which such development could be achieved with and/or without public 
interventions (Domar, 1957, Myrdal 1957, Sen, 1982, Lal, 1983, Griffin and Gurley, 
1985, etc.). In reaction to the debates, the ‘new’ institutionalists argue that such has 
been the case mainly because the methods and tools of interrogating knowledge in 
economics have been inadequate for a social science discipline (Evensky, 2004). The 
use of formal methods, like axiomatisation and statistics, without any basis from an 
institutional understanding of the investigated area has been the subject of historically 
documented criticisms from ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutional economists alike. For these 
and similar reasons, Coase (1998:73) quipped that the discipline of economics had 
become a study of blood circulation without a body and to an extent that “economists 
think of themselves as having a box of (mathematical) tools, but not the (actual) 
subject matter”. Hence, from this brief discussion it should not be a surprise that 
policy formulation processes (especially in African agricultural projects), which have 
been informed by economic research have had widely documented failures (Eicher, 
1999). 
 
On the other hand, with all the criticism levelled against formal methods in new 
classical economics, institutionalists have not provided much in terms of useful 
methodological propositions as solutions. Of the ‘old’ institutionalists (e.g. Veblen, 
1904 and Coase, 1998:72) argued that even though these scholars were of great 
                                                 
2 My emphasis 
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intellectual stature, they were essentially anti-theoretical, “without a theory to bind 
together their collection of facts, they had very little that they were able to pass on”. A 
similar view was expressed by Williamson (2000) that institutionalists still await a 
universal and unifying theory of their own work.  
 
Therefore, the primary aim of the thesis is to propose and discuss the usefulness of a 
unifying theoretical framework for conducting economic research (with a specific 
focus on agriculture) which pays extensive attention to the core criticisms of 
institutionalists levelled against mainstream economics and the misuse of formal 
methods. The framework forms an ‘interface’ between the new institutional and 
classical economic methods of research. It identifies the position and usefulness of 
formal methods in institutionally based economic research with contextualised social 
meanings for public policymaking. The broad argument that is adopted from the 
‘new’ institutionalism is that most contemporary economic thought lacks a 
methodological and paradigmatic integration of institutional and new classical 
economic arguments to research. The lack of integration has especially resulted in a 
generally skewed selection of formal methods and tools in the majority of mainstream 
economic research projects. Such adoptions have been without a foundation, which is 
adequately supported by an understanding of institutional factors in given 
geographical areas.  
 
To illustrate the thesis, historical policy and quantitative data from South Africa’s 
agricultural sector and the Eastern Cape’s Kat River Valley (KRV) water catchment 
are presented for discussion and analysis. The 20th century history of South Africa’s 
agricultural policies and three primary case studies from the KRV provide an 
institutional foundation for discussing and demonstrating the use of the proposed 
integrated framework. Survey data from the KRV is used to illustrate selected 
potential uses of formal tools in research, which is firmly grounded on institutional 
understandings and arguments. Hence, throughout the thesis, issues of agricultural 
development are discussed with criticisms of and recommendations for various 
policies in the sector being provided.  
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1.3 A BRIEF REVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA’S AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
CHALLENGES  
 
Many of South Africa’s challenges with regard to unequal development, high levels 
of poverty and unemployment, especially in rural areas are due to systematic and 
inefficient public policies of the last century. There are landmark legislations in the 
history of the country, which formed and cemented the foundations of an unequal 
society marred by an inequitable distribution of agricultural resources such as land 
water and market access. The legislations include the Natives Land Act (27 of 1913), 
which was the major and first in a series of legal statues that promulgated an unequal 
distribution of land resources by racial grouping. The legislation led to a scheduling of 
land in the form of reserves for occupation only by ‘native’ populations. The reserves 
formed only eight percent of the country’s total land area, which was demarcated for 
occupation by more than eighty percent of the country’s total population (Isaacs and 
Hersoug, 2002:143-144).  
 
The Marketing Act (26 of 1937) on the other hand, became law due to the lobbying of 
government by powerful commercial farmers because of negative international 
experiences of unstable agricultural markets after the First World War. The Act 
resulted in strong government interventions in almost each and every crop market and 
institution. It entailed that the farms owned by those favoured by the state-supported 
institutions would grow in size and level of capitalisation (de Swardt, 1983) with 
long-term negative economic consequences, especially for emerging farmers and 
consumers3 (Vink and Kirsten, 2002).  
 
In the irrigation water sector, the Water Act (54 of 1956) promulgated riparian water 
rights in South Africa, where abstraction rights could be linked to farm positions and 
sizes along a watercourse. Hence, the law ensured that the majority of the landless 
subsistence farms were technically denied equitable water access and use. Ultimately, 
these historical laws ensured that the majority of the population were systematically 
left without adequate land, market access and water resources, which are today some 
                                                 
3 A more detailed historical discussion of the Marketing Act (26 of 1937) and related effects is 
presented in chapter five 
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of the biggest challenges facing the public policymaking processes in the agricultural 
sector.  
 
Throughout the 1990s, numerous laws and amendments were enacted to redress the 
inequalities and inefficiencies stemming from the historical legislations in the sector. 
The Restitution of Land Rights Act (22 of 1994) was one of the first laws to be passed 
“to provide for the restitution of rights in land to persons or communities dispossessed 
of such rights after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices”. Other related laws pertinent to the land reform process are discussed in 
more detail with subsequent challenges from their implementation in coming 
chapters. The Marketing of Agricultural Products Act (47 of 1996), some of whose 
aims are to increase market access to all participants and promote efficiency of 
marketing products, was a redress policy response from the government, which has 
had some successes as well as unintended failures, which will also be discussed later 
in the thesis. In the water sector, the National Water Act (NWA, 36 of 1998) and 
other related Acts were passed with aims to “ensure that water resources (were) 
protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in ways which take 
into account amongst other factors”, a promotion of equitable access, redress of past 
racial and gender discrimination, and promotion of efficient, sustainable use of water 
resources (NWA, 1998:10-11).  
 
These are only some of the current laws that have been passed by the present 
government to confront the challenges of underdevelopment in agriculture. However, 
the technical formulation and implementation strategies of these laws, as will be 
discussed in the thesis, have not always been successful. In many instances, this has 
been a result of ignorance about important institutional factors, with which the 
primary argument of the thesis is concerned, in terms of both economic research 
designs and public policy formulation. Therefore, the presentation and discussion of 
past and current policies with case study data and the policy recommendations, which 
are presented later in this document, are centred on an integrated theoretical 
framework, which was developed to form an interface between the ‘new’ institutional 
and classical economics methods of research.  
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1.4 A PREVIEW OF CHAPTERS  
 
The thesis is composed of eight chapters: a) the present introduction, b) a review of 
historical debates in the sub-discipline of development economics, c) a review of 
institutional criticisms levelled against ‘new’ classical economic thinking and 
research methods, d) a description of methods used to collect and analyse data for the 
thesis, e) a discussion of the 20th century agricultural policies in South Africa and 
their economic impacts, f) a presentation of primary case study data from the Kat 
River Valley in the Eastern Cape province, g) a discussion and analysis of primary 
data and policy as well as a review of secondary data in developing an integrated 
research framework, and h) a presentation of selected policy recommendations with a 
concluding note. 
 
Chapter two first reviews definitions of economic growth and development and how 
the two relate to each other (e.g. Sen, 1982). The adopted definitional stance for the 
thesis is one that positions the process of development at a mental and attitudinal 
level. In this perspective a critical mass of the population should have the right mental 
attitude that is conducive for the developmental process as encouraged by policy 
intervention to take place. It is an expansion of Hirschman’s (1960) ‘societal images’, 
where societies should have an image of themselves that compliments the type of 
development that is encouraged by external forces. For this type of development to be 
effective, a holistic and well-coordinated policy approach to the process needs to be 
adopted. Secondly, historical neo-Marxist and pure-market theories of economic 
development are reviewed highlighting the economic values of focussing on 
institutional coordination. Overall, the review systematically illustrates the importance 
of cultural and institutional values as complementary conditions to external 
interventions that are not particularly obsessed with achieving one critical condition 
for the development process to take place, for example the right level of capital 
accumulation or technological growth. However, the focus is on a well-coordinated 
institutional effort as ultimately crucial in attempts to achieve economic development 
in a given geographical and political context.  
 
A historical review of ‘new’ and ‘old’ institutionalism is presented in chapter three. 
The early criticism of classical economic thought, methods and policy approaches are 
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reviewed with references made to the works of Thorstein Veblen (1898 and 1904), 
Wesley Mitchell (1923) and John Commons (1924). Although the ‘old’ 
institutionalists made valid criticisms against some of the dominant economic 
thoughts, ultimately as argued by Coase (1998) they failed to provide any alternatives. 
Hence, the works of the ‘new’ institutionalists (e.g. North, 1990) are reviewed as 
having acknowledged and retained some of the valuable insights from the ‘new’ 
classical economics. However, it is also demonstrated that what still lacks within the 
‘new’ institutionalism is a universally acceptable theory of institutions. The review 
concludes by presenting a theoretical framework for the thesis’ main discussion 
chapter.  
 
A description of research methods for collecting and analysing data from the KRV 
case studies is presented in chapter four. The methods used in each of the three case 
studies are described alongside those used in the statistical analysis of quantitative 
data from the 2004 KRV household survey.  
 
Chapter five presents historical information and a description of South Africa’s 
pertinent agricultural policies throughout the 20th century. First, the history of how the 
sector assumed its growth at the turn of the century is presented, followed by the early 
government interventions when the sector, alongside mining, became important for 
the country’s whole economy. The reviewed policies are those that had various 
historical effects on the distribution of land and water resources as well as the 
marketing of agricultural products. Finally, the chapter presents a detailed description 
of current agricultural policies and their objectives in terms of redressing the current 
economic challenges, which were inherited from the past. A discussion of how the 
new policies have fared in the last ten to thirteen years is presented, which signals a 
need for the adoption of an institutional approach to research in implementation 
strategies. 
 
In chapter six, a demographic description of the Eastern Cape Province is provided, 
followed by a detailed historical presentation of the Kat River Valley (KRV) 
population settlement and agricultural resource patterns of distribution. It is made 
apparent that the history of South Africa as a country is well reflected in local events, 
which took place in the KRV during the 20th century. Finally, three detailed 
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ethnographic case studies of irrigation socio-economic systems and farming groups 
are presented with particular attention paid on formal and informal institutions, which 
have predominated the access and allocation of agricultural resources.  
 
Using Williamson’s (2000) and Saleth’s (2004) hierarchical and evolutionary 
frameworks of analysis respectively, chapter seven discusses the most significant 
institutions from each of the three KRV cases. Williamson’s (2000) framework is 
used to discuss and analyse the KRV institutions according to three hierarchies of 
importance. Saleth’s (2004) framework is used to discuss the same institutions 
according to their contributions to economic transactional cost (North, 1990 and 
1992) in attempts to achieve development. From the discussions and classifications, 
the political events and processes, which led to the emergence and evolution of 
significant institutions are analysed. Most importantly, a framework that integrates 
institutional and formal research methods is presented. To demonstrate the value of 
the framework, a review of agricultural research papers, with a predominantly formal 
inclination and a neglect of institutional considerations is presented. Finally, 
implications for theoretical debates and economic research methods is presented. 
These are supplemented with a presentation of policy recommendations to national 
and local policymaking processes in chapter eight.  
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CHAPTER TWO – ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES  
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION  
 
Global inequalities in terms of GNP (Gross National Product) per capita and human 
living standards between developed and developing nations remain the biggest 
motivations for economic development in the third world. The search for development 
has encouraged an emergence of varied definitions of underdevelopment in the last 
fifty to sixty years. As a result, different and often competing models of development, 
sometimes based on ideological beliefs, for instance the neoclassical economics 
(Domar, 1957) versus neo-colonial (Myrdal 1957) models of development were 
proposed as solutions.    
 
The chapter will present a discussion of the historical evolution of these models, 
detailing the rich debates, which led to their formulation and modifications. It will be 
illustrated how a middle ground has been under negotiation for the past ten to fifteen 
years, with the emergence of the new growth theories (e.g. Barro, 2002:103-124). It 
will be argued, however, that the negotiated middle ground is still not adequate in 
dealing with the other important institutions, besides government, that determine the 
various developmental paths taken in developing countries, especially where market 
externalities are rife. Hence, a proposal will be put forth arguing for the definition and 
discussion of economic development to be placed at a mental and attitudinal level, 
which determines the economic practices of individuals within societies, as once 
pioneered by Hirschman (1960) and Sen (1982 and 1983).            
          
In section two, the motivations for the rise of economic development discussions will 
be presented. Section three will discuss the definitions of economic development 
using the growth versus development perspectives. A historical overview economic 
growth and development models will be presented in section four. Section five will 
summarise and conclude.        
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2.2  WHY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT? 
 
The wide divide in terms of human living standards between developed and 
developing countries has been the primary concern of the work of Development 
Economists after World War II (WW II) (Stern, 1991:122), the works of Lewis 
(1954), Rostow (1960), Hirschman (1960 and 1981), Sen (1982 and 1983), Todaro 
(1997), etc., being a few good examples. Concerning inequalities, Todaro (1997) 
points out that the minority of the world’s citizens, who reside in developed nation-
states and constitute only a quarter of the world’s total population, live in relative 
security with regard to food supplies, access to shelter and health services, life 
expectancy, whilst the rest of the world’s population, that is “more than 5.8 billion 
people … have little or no shelter and an inadequate supply (of life’s necessities). The 
majority has low or no basic literacy skills; are unemployed, and their “prospects for a 
better life are bleak or uncertain at best” (Todaro, 1997:3). In response to these 
challenges various economic development theorists have been - for the last sixty years 
- proposing a number of solutions, some of which have been in opposition. It is 
noteworthy that only some of these solutions have managed to achieve both academic 
and political prominence due to their perceived contributions to reported development 
achievements in some parts of the developing world, while others have in fact been 
criticised and even blamed for exacerbating the state of underdevelopment in other 
developing regions (Hirschman, 1960; Lal, 1983; Myrdal, 1957 in Potter et al., 2004).  
 
The debates about which ideas or economic models would be appropriate in tackling 
specific challenges of underdevelopment in various geographical contexts have 
ensured a refinement, in some cases a modification, of the early theories in response 
to criticisms from differing quarters. Hence, to outline an historical evolution of major 
classes of development theories alongside mitigating factors would be a useful 
undertaking in grasping the slippery meaning of economic development and the 
essence of the debates with important issues at stake (Sen, 1983:745-762; Todaro, 
1997:7-19; Hirschman, 1960:1-28). A detailed enough outline would not only ensure 
a deeper understanding of the issues but would also guide decision making when 
choosing appropriate theoretical frameworks for discussions investigating agricultural 
contributions to economic development in a South African setting. However, before 
the outline is presented, the contentious conceptualisations and definitions of 
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economic development itself would need to be expanded upon. Sen (1983:754) 
highlighted one aspect of these definitional contentions when he postulated that, 
“perhaps the most important thematic deficiency of … development economics is its 
(infatuation with) national products, aggregate income and total supply of particular 
goods (as important measures) rather than (a focus) on ‘entitlements’ of people and 
the ‘capabilities’ these entitlements generate”. The assertion illustrates that the 
definition of economic development should encompass an inquiry into citizens’ 
constitutional rights, which must promulgate and guarantee the citizens’ 
‘entitlements’ to a level of acceptable living conditions.                
 
2.3 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH VERSUS DEVELOPMENT   
 
It would seem that in instances where a distinction between economic growth and 
development has been blurred or ignored, intentionally or otherwise, the struggle for 
economic development is lost. Hirschman (1960:1-22), Sen (1983:745-757), Todaro 
(1997:3-19), etc., presented an insightful discussion regarding the historical factors 
leading to the omission of this distinction. The Marshall Plan’s4 focus on, a) capital 
transfers to European economies destroyed by the war, and b) the promotion of free-
market economies and western democratic values, especially in Asia and Africa at the 
height of the Cold War, was to a large degree successful in its economic revival of 
European economies and the fight against the proliferation of communism in the East. 
However, to then use the Marshal Plan (with its focus on capital accumulation) as the 
rational basis for formulating economic development models for application in third 
world countries, Hirschman (1960:1-28) argued, is irresponsible - if not completely 
futile. Such is the case because capital transfer models, such as Rostow’s (1960) 
Stages of Growth Model and the Lewis Two Sector Model discussed in Fei and Ranis 
(1964) overlooked the vastly different institutional landscapes - operational in third 
world nations - in which the models were applied. In Europe for instance, besides the 
missing capital, other prerequisite factors thought to be suitable for the development 
process of rapid industrialisation could be found in abundance in the form of human 
                                                 
4 After the WW II economists in industrialized nations were suddenly faced with a growing interest for 
development in poor nations, but had no readily available tools to study these nations. “But they did 
have the recent experience of the Marshall Plan, under which massive amounts of U.S. financial and 
technical assistance enabled war torn countries of Europe to rebuild (themselves) in a matter of few 
years” (Todaro, 1997:71). The attraction to this historical information gave rise to the first group of 
development theories, which were growth oriented.       
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and cultural capital, industrial entrepreneurship, other public infrastructure, etc. 
However, these factors could not be found in most underdeveloped countries 
(Hirschman, 1960:1-7). The important point is that, economic development models, 
which focus on factors such as capital accumulation as necessary conditions for 
development come from an economic growth orientation, and they are only easily 
applicable to mature capitalist economies. On the other hand, an economic 
development orientation in theory and policy is required for underdeveloped nations. 
In noting the third world’s economic performance expectations of economic ‘growth’ 
model exponents, Sen (1983:748) commented that, “these countries have been 
expected to perform like wind-up toys and ‘lumber through’ the various stages of 
development single-mindedly”. The expectations are unreasonable.  
 
Regarding standard economic measures of growth, unlike Hirschman (1960 and 
1981), Sen (1983) was, however, more positive about the performances of ‘growth’ 
oriented models in developing countries. He concluded: “(t)raditional development 
economics has not been particularly unsuccessful in identifying the factors that lead to 
economic growth in developing countries. In the field of causation of growth, there is 
much life left in traditional analyses” (Sen, 1983:760). This is the case precisely 
because economic growth does not mean the same thing as economic development. In 
a somewhat emotive attempt to clarify the distinction, Brinkman (1995:1171) states: 
Given the paradigmatic boundaries of mainstream economics, it is assumed 
that the quantitative statics of economic growth are synonymous with the 
processes of economic development. Problems and questions relevant to the 
dynamics of institutional adjustment, to the transformation of values, and to 
the impact of technology on cultural evolution, among others, are kept 
outside the boundaries of analysis and policy formulation.         
 
Economic growth is easier and faster to achieve than economic development. In the 
third world growth is not an end in itself but only an aspect or a means to achieve the 
long-term objectives of actual development. Unfortunately, the growth-oriented 
economic models put too much emphasis on only one aspect of development whilst 
neglecting other long-term goals. The use of these models (e.g. those focussed on 
capital accumulation) in explaining or predicting economic growth indicators has, on 
the other hand, been a successful activity as illustrated by the World Development 
Report’s (WDR) (1982) data presented and discussed by Sen (1983:748-754). Despite 
its date of collection, the data, presented in a modified state in table 2.1, is useful in 
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clarifying the arguments made so far. In the table, developing countries are grouped 
into two streams, the Low versus Middle-income countries, with related GNP per 
capita, GNP growth rates, percentages of domestic investments (i.e. capital 
accumulation) and the level of industrialisation – illustrated by the industry’s share of 
total GDP. 
 
Table 2.1 The 1982 WDR economic growth indicators for selected Low and Middle 
income countries   
Country GNP per capita 1980 gross domestic 
investment 
1980 share of 
industry in GDP 
 1980 Value ($) 1960 – 1980 growth 
(%) 
(% of GDP) (%) 
Low income     
Bangladesh 130 1..3 17 13 
Ethiopia 140 1.4 10 16 
Zaire 220 0.2 11 23 
Mozambique 230 -0.1 10 16 
India 240 1.4 23 26 
Sri Lanka 270 2.4* 36 30 
China 290 3.7* 31 47 
Pakistan 300 2.8* 18 25 
Sudan 410 -0.2 12 14 
Middle income     
Ghana 420 -1.0 5 21 
Thailand 670 4.7 27 29 
Philippines 690 2.8 30 27 
Morocco 900 2.5 21 32 
Turkey 1 470 3.6 27 30 
S. Korea 1 520 7.0* 31 41 
Malaysia 1 620 4.3 29 37 
Brazil 2 050 5.1 22 37 
South Africa 2 300 2..3 29 53 
Romania 2 340 8.6* 34 64 
Yugoslavia 2 620 5.4* 35 43 
  (Adapted from Sen, 1983:749) 
 
Firstly, the analysis of low-income nations suggests that a positive relationship 
between growth and domestic capital investments exists. For instance, of the top three 
nations in terms of GNP per capita growth between, i.e. China (3.7%), Pakistan 
(2.8%) and Sri Lanka (2.4), two of them (Sri Lanka and China) also have the highest 
capital accumulation. Even though Pakistan comes low in terms capital investments, it 
still features among the top half of the group. Again, a positive relationship is 
observed regarding growth and industrialisation. Secondly, when looking at the 
middle-income nations, the top three countries in growth terms are also the top 
performers in capital accumulation terms, i.e. Yugoslavia (35%), Romania (34%) and 
S. Korea (31%). These countries are also top performers in terms of industrialisation - 
if South Africa is ignored.  The data suggests that indeed in 1982, capital 
accumulation had a positive relationship with both economic growth and levels of 
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industrialisation. It supported Sen’s (1983) argument that growth-oriented models are 
useful in explaining economic growth trends. However, as previously stated and as 
reiterated by Brinkman (1995), economic growth is not economic development. It was 
earlier pointed out that the problem of underdevelopment has to do with issues of 
insecurity regarding food, shelter, employment, life expectancy, etc., which all 
contribute to a general lack of acceptable living human conditions affecting a majority 
of the world’s population (Todaro, 1997). Moreover, additional data and arguments 
exist which illustrate that most of these issues, related to living standards, may not be 
resolved merely through capital acquisition associated with high economic growth 
rates; in fact sometimes the opposite is true where high growth may occur alongside a 
general decline in living standards. For instance, growth may be achieved without 
rising employment levels. This may also depend on the liquidity of foreign capital in 
developing countries. When such happens, it invalidates the propositions of Lewis’ 
Two Sector Model of development (Fei and Ranis, 1964 and Todaro, 1997:79). 
Capital liquidity, a state that is often found in developing countries, easily lends itself 
to foreign capital flight (Hirschman, 1960:20). Sen (1983:754) provided data 
indicating that countries with high GNP per capita figures may have comparable, and 
sometimes worse, figures regarding life expectancy. For instance, Sri Lanka and 
China with GNP per capita figures of 270 and 290 U.S. dollars respectively (table 
2.1), had life expectancy figures of 66 and 64 years respectively. These figures were 
also similar to those of Brazil and Mexico (63 and 65 years respectively) even though 
the latter had GNP per capita figures almost ten fold higher (i.e. over 2050 dollars 
each) than Sri Lanka and China. Hence, that suggests that economic growth indicators 
do not necessarily translate into acceptable human living conditions that indicate 
adequate levels of development. As such, the application of growth models should not 
be foolishly extended into explaining third world economic development challenges, 
trends or development policy formulations (Todaro, 1997:79).  
 
Now that growth has been defined only as a short to medium-term goal of the long 
drawn-out process of development, it is appropriate to present the various 
complementary and competing definitions of economic development as suitable for 
developing countries. In somewhat vague terms, Todaro (1997:8) saw development as 
a process that would be concerned with economic, cultural, and political prerequisites 
for bringing about structural and institutional change that would benefit whole 
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societies. In fact, in such a view, he saw a larger role for government in policy 
coordination. The view is similar to one presented by Hirschman (1960:24-28), of 
externally induced and policy-synchronised mechanisms targeted at all noted critical 
factors for development. With regard to the prerequisite conditions of appropriate 
cultural and political institutions for development to take place, Sen (1983:757) 
declared that the answers lie “beyond the narrow limits of economics altogether”. 
 
The course of economic development may be monitored through a number of 
measurable indicators or variables such as levels of GNP values (in growth-focussed 
perspectives), literacy, employment, life expectancy, etc. In this study, it is argued, 
however, that the basis for development should be located at a mental, attitudinal and 
emotional level. In this sense, experiences of positive and negative freedoms, for 
example, form important foundations for economic development. This postulation 
also seems to be closely related to the ideas and arguments put forth by Hirschman 
(1960 and 1981) and Sen (1983).          
 
The ‘ideas of images of change as obstacles to change’, for instance, as discussed by 
Hirschman (1960:11-19) have to do with society’s mental picture of itself. The picture 
may refer to cultural values, morals and judgements about what behaviour is right or 
wrong, acceptable or unacceptable, etc., which would determine whether a society 
could sustain itself. The values or morals are institutionalised explicitly and/or 
implicitly in formal and/or informal ways. Individual behaviours that maintain or 
promote the culture’s values are rewarded through structured incentives. On the other 
hand, any behaviour perceived to be destructive of the ‘right’ image of society is 
punished, directly or indirectly. The conclusion from Hirschman (1960:11-19) was 
that these images can act either as obstacles or as conduits in allowing the process of 
economic development to take effect. He argued, for example, that: societies with a 
group focussed image of themselves, where members had a specific role to play, a 
place to occupy, and were resistant to any change that would modify established 
hierarchies, would find it a big challenge to embrace any idea of economic 
development. Such is the case because, as has been shown by Europe’s history of 
industrial development, promulgations of development can emerge from any industry 
or sector, with high returns accruing initially only to specific sectors. McCloskey 
(1985) also shares the idea that any sector could catalyse economic development in 
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her statement that even a ‘chewing gum’ industry can spur a very successful 
economic development cycle. In any case, the point is that, initially, development 
affects members of a society inequitably and therefore there is always a chance that 
societal hierarchies would be modified. If there were a possibility for such 
modification to occur, group focussed societies would block development from 
occurring. Hirschman (1960:13-14) believed that the resilient conditions of 
underdevelopment - in traditional (e.g. in rural communities of India’s 1950s) and in 
communist societies (e.g. the Russian intelligentsia of the 19th century) - stood as 
evidence of the deliberate blockages of development processes. The analysis, 
however, did not conclude that, at the other end of the spectrum, individualistic 
societies were more receptive to being successfully developed. Latin America’s 
competitive and individualistic values, which often led to civil conflicts, were cited as 
evidence for possible failures of extremely individualistic virtues (Hirschman, 
1960:14). Such an analysis also reiterates the proposition that: the foundations of 
economic development should be located at mental, attitudinal and emotional levels, 
i.e. “beyond the narrow limits of economics”.             
 
In line with the ‘mental location’ idea, Sen (1982:29-38 and 1983:754-762) proposed 
a theory of ‘entitlements’ in defining measures of economic development. His 
definition seems instrumental in nature. He proposed that an individual’s budget 
constraint (i.e. endowment of commodities) and the possibility to trade (i.e. economic 
and political freedom) determine his or her level of ‘entitlements’. With the right level 
of ‘entitlements’, individuals could acquire capabilities to obtain food or shelter, for 
instance. As Sen (1983:755) put it, “(t)he process of economic development can be 
seen as a process of expanding the capabilities of people”. It must be obvious that 
Sen’s (1982 and 1983) ideas of ‘entitlements’ are founded on a positive meaning of 
freedom, where acquiring ‘entitlements’ led to greater individual and hence societal 
freedoms. On the other hand, Hirschman’s (1960:11-19) discussion of cultural 
‘images’ seems to have been based on negative meanings of liberty, in a sense that an 
individual would have to fight against societal pressures, i.e. structural penalties, to 
acquire the benefits of economic development. Sen’s (1982 and 1983) positive 
freedoms, it seems, are facilitated by an external environment of appropriate 
institutions (for instance, he cites India’s relatively democratic order or free press as 
good examples as opposed to China’s lack thereof). Hirschman’s (1960 and 1981) 
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negative freedoms, on the other hand are permitted or disallowed by the trajectories of 
resilient historical and cultural institutions. The main conclusion is that both 
definitions are institutional in nature. Whether the institutions are tangible or mental, 
formal or informal, explicit or implicit depends on the context of discussion. 
Ultimately, institutions as freedoms, identities of self in cultural hierarchies and 
capabilities from entitlements (legal or ethical) all have an important role in 
modifying the collective psyche of societies to block or nurture development 
initiatives. Hence, the argument that the basis for economic development should be 
located at a mental and emotional level is made plausible. A more detailed analysis of 
the meanings of these types of institutions is discussed in detail in the following 
chapter.  
 
So far, the discussion has, a) presented a historical impetus for development 
economists to seriously engage the subject of development in the third world after 
WW II, b) argued and presented evidence for a distinction to be made between 
economic growth and development, where growth may only form part of the long 
term process of development, and c) proposed that the definition of economic 
development should revolve around institutions affecting the psyche or mentality of 
individuals and collectives. The definition, as argued, is closely related to Sen’s (1982 
and 1983) ‘entitlements’ and Hirschman’s (1960 and 1981) ‘images’. It should, 
however, be kept in mind that not all development economists would ascribe to such 
definitions, less likely would be the exponents of economic growth models (e.g. 
Rostow, 1960; Fei and Ranis, 1964; and more recently Kosempel, 2004; etc.). The 
point can be well illustrated by a brief historical overview of the debates among 
prominent development theories of the last 50 to 60 years. 
       
2 4  DEVELOPMENT THEORIES AND THE DEBATES OF THE 20th CENTURY  
 
As suggested in section 2, a majority of the early theories on economic growth and 
development surfaced in the fifties and early 1960s. The 1970s and early 1980s, Stern 
(1991:122) argues, was a lull period. That may be true with regard to theories founded 
on neoclassical economic frames, but it was certainly not the case regarding ‘neo-
Marxist-type’ theories. For example, a movement of neo-colonial dependency 
theories (e.g. Myrdal, 1957; Baran, 1975; Griffin and Gurley, 1985:1089-1143), 
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which were highly critical of economic growth models based on neoclassical 
assumptions, received much attention and support, especially from third world 
economists and policy makers during the 1970s. In the 1980s, however, the economic 
neoclassical growth models resurfaced in what Todaro (1997:86) and Sen (1983:747) 
called the ‘neo-classical counter-revolution’ or ‘the resurgence of neoclassical 
economics’ respectively. The theory’s central argument was that: resource 
misallocations, incorrect pricing, and too much government intervention (e.g. Lal, 
1983:5-16) were the real reasons for the third world’s underdevelopment - not western 
imperialism - as argued by neo-colonial dependency theorists. In any case, the 1990s 
witnessed a toning down of the conservative discourse when arguments were made by 
endogenous growth models about the important roles governments could play in 
reducing externalities and encouraging technological growth (Barro, 2002 and 
Helpman, 1992).  
 
From the discussion, it is clear that development theories and models do not arise ‘out 
of the blue’. They may be inspired by major events, for instance wars or newly found 
data. At a theoretical level, they may reflect a constructive and positive dialogue 
among committed scholars, but yet again at the extremes, they may flourish because 
of knee-jerk reactions from diabolically opposed perceptions, with little or no 
conversation taking place. Hence, it makes sense that different commentators use 
different narratives in their presentation of historical debates and theories in the field 
of economic development. Sen (1983:746) for instance, used what may be described 
as the requisite conditions for development to take place in mapping out the evolution 
of development theories. He claimed that the strategic themes that have been pursued 
since the beginning of the subject have been: a) industrialisation, b) rapid capital 
accumulation, c) mobilisation of surplus labour and d) government economic 
planning. Once again, his proposition seems instrumental and hence more objective 
compared to Hirschman’s (1981) classification of ‘mono-economics’ versus mutual 
benefit claims. Hirschman (1981:3) simply pitted orthodox economics ideas against 
neo-Marxist theories. On the other hand, Todaro’s (1997:70-95) historical 
presentation was primarily concerned with a presentation (or lack) of scientific data or 
newly found evidence, working against or sustaining any dominant theory at any 
point in time over the past 60 years. None of these perspectives holds the whole 
historical truth on its own, and hence the following discussion tries to incorporate 
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most of these views in presenting an overview of the theoretical debates from various 
models.   
 
2.4.1 The early theories of development: a focus on economic growth 
 
It has been mentioned that many of the early neoclassical economics models of the 
1950s and 1960s focussed on some prerequisite condition that would be needed for 
economic growth to take place. Their focus mainly on economic growth, as discussed 
had limitations, since growth is only one of the many goals of development. However, 
as Sen (1983) also indicated, and as illustrated in section three, these theories have a 
lot of usefulness and hence their discussion is important. A focus on natural resources 
endowment as a necessary condition for development to take place was apparently 
popular until the late 1920s. When it became obvious that this condition was not 
enough the focus shifted to capital accumulation (Hirschman, 1960:1-2). As early as 
the 1950s the United Nations began advocating increases in managerial skills, which 
entailed more investments in human capital (UN, 1955 in Hirschman, 1960:2). A 
related discussion focusing on the relationship between investments in education and 
economic growth in the U.S. (post WW II) can be found in Becker et al. (1990:12-
37). Their study concluded that the U.S.’s economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s 
was accelerated by massive investments in human capital (e.g. education). While 
emphases on specific conditions were shifting, with the exception of some Asian 
countries (e.g. South Korea), economic growth and development was not being 
achieved in many developing nations. The observation led Hirschman (1960:4) to 
criticise traditional development theories by commenting that “whenever any theory 
was propounded that considered a given value system a prerequisite of development, 
it could usually be effectively contradicted on empirical grounds; development had 
actually taken place somewhere without the benefit of the prerequisite”. He then 
proposed that perhaps the nature of development is so dynamic that policy cannot just 
focus on one particular factor but rather on their interactions.                   
 
Capital investment based models 
 
One of the most important riented models to emerge during the cold war period was 
Rostow’s Stages of Growth model, which he claimed was based on sweeping 
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historical observations (Rostow, 1960:1). He proposed that there were five stages of 
development, and claimed that all advanced nations, at some point, had gone through 
these stages in their course of development. In that sense, the process is linear. The 
stages cannot be sidestepped in achieving sustainable economic development. 
Moreover, “(i)t is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as 
lying within one of five categories” (Rostow, 1960:4). The stages were: a) the 
traditional society, b) the preconditions for take off, c) the take off, d) the drive to 
maturity, and e) the age of mass consumption. According to Rostow (1960:4), Britain 
was the first country to escape the traditional society stage in approximately 1780; 
most of the other European countries did this in the 1800s.  Of interest to the 
discussion is the model’s stipulation of necessary conditions for the take off stage. For 
take-off to happen, foreign and domestic capital would have to be mobilised for 
technological growth and political power would have to be in the hands of a group 
that fully embraced modernisation and free trade. More specifically, “(d)uring the 
take-off stage, the rate of effective investment and savings may rise from, say, 5% of 
the national income to 10% or more” (Rostow, 1960:8). Although the specification of 
capital investment rates may seem crude or arbitrary, it should be kept in mind that 
the model was based on historical evidence from various regions in the world. Hence, 
it relied less on theory and more on empiricism.   
 
The Harrod-Domar Growth Model took the levels of required capital investments for 
the take-off stage forward. It proposed that, an economy has to save a specific 
percentage of its GNP, first, for it to maintain its existing infrastructure, and second, 
to grow economically (Todaro, 1997:72). Domar (1957:6-7) argued that the limitation 
of Keynes’ model of aggregate national income was that investments only augmented 
capital stocks, their effects on income generation were not spelled out. Hence, he 
hypothesised that “the more productive investment is, that is, the less capital is 
required per unit output, the faster will growth take place”. This meant that capital 
saving, as opposed to labour saving, was more conducive for achieving economic 
growth in developing countries. Hence, the model’s primary conclusion was that the 
rate of growth as measured by GNP was determined by savings and capital-output 
ratios: 
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That is: GNP = s/k ………………………………(1)  
Where: 
s:   savings ratio (savings as a proportion of national income) 
k:  capital ratio ( total capital divided by national income)  
 
In equation 1, without external intervention, growth is positively related to (s), which 
means that higher savings would lead to higher levels of economic growth. On the 
other hand, a higher capital ratio would lead to lower levels of growth. The 
implications are that: economies should save and invest at some specified level for 
them to grow at predictable rates (Todaro, 1997:73). This conclusion is similar to the 
one made by Rostow (1960:8) concerning the take-off stage of development. For 
example, according to both models, if a developing country had a capital-output (k) 
ratio of 3 (a figure characteristic of developing nations), it would need to save 15% of 
its GNP to grow at 5%. Hence, capital accumulation from domestic and foreign 
sources should be vigorously encouraged for the development of poor countries. 
However, and as argued by Hirschman (1960:1-21), a point also reiterated by Todaro 
(1997:74), capital formation might be a necessary condition for economic growth, but 
unfortunately, evidence has shown that it is not a sufficient one. Therefore, Rostow’s 
Stages of Growth and the Harrod-Domar models did not provide complete 
explanations for resolving the challenges of economic growth, let alone the mystery 
of development. As previously discussed, according to Hirschman (1960), such 
solutions ignored the dynamic interactions between all the necessary conditions. For 
Sen (1983) they were narrowly focussed on growth, which is only one of the goals 
towards development. Todaro (1997:75) argued that the models ignored institutional 
factors such as “managerial competence, skilled labour, and the ability to plan and 
administer a wide assortment of developmental projects”. They ignored institutional 
factors.  
 
The Lewis Theory of Development 
 
Another widely discussed theory of development (Nurkse, 1958; Fei and Ranis, 1964; 
Todaro, 1997; Kirkpatric and Barrientos, 2004; etc.) is the Two Sector Model by 
Lewis (1954:139-191). Although the model has an economic growth orientation, it 
did not focus on one particular condition as the necessary one for development to take 
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place. It explained the transition process from an agricultural economy – with 
unlimited supplies of labour – into industrialisation by describing labour migrations 
from overpopulated rural settings to growing urban sectors (Lewis, 1954:40). 
According to the model, urban sectors would expand to absorb surplus rural labour 
because of locally invested profits, as these would ensure capital growth and a change 
in technology (Todaro, 1997:75-80). These sectors would expand to a point where the 
wage incentives, which encouraged labour migrations, no longer existed. In 
explaining labour migrations and urban sector growth, the model specified a number 
of assumptions pertaining to the rural as well as urban sectors. It assumed that, a) 
initially between eighty to ninety percent of the country’s total population reside in 
rural areas, b) labour is the only input in the agricultural sector with a constant level 
of technology, and c) technology is allowed to vary in the urban sector (Todaro, 
1997:75-80 and Fei and Ranis, 1964:10). A detailed technical explanation of this 
model, and its thesis on labour migrations, is presented Appendix 20. Its primary 
conclusion is that capital growth leads to a self-sustaining modernization process of 
the urban sector. The process continues until all surplus labour from the rural sector 
has been transferred to the modern sector. Additional labour migration beyond that 
point would occur at a cost to food outputs in the rural sector. In any case, once all 
surplus labour has been absorbed by the urban sector, the country’s economy would 
have been industrialised and would be producing modern goods and services. 
 
Obviously, if the real world worked precisely in the fashion described by Lewis 
(1954) – half a century ago – there would be fewer underdeveloped nations today. 
The biggest criticisms of the model revolved around what was termed ‘its unrealistic 
assumptions’. Firstly, the assumption that labour-transfers and rising employment in 
the modern sector occur proportionally to increasing capital investments could never 
be accurate in cases where producers do not reinvest profits in labour intensive 
production methods (Todaro, 1997:79). If indeed they reinvested into the local 
economy, which as cautioned by Hirschman (1960:20-24) in his discussion of liquid 
capital preferences, was far from being true in developing countries. The fact that it 
makes sense for profit maximisers to reinvest their profits in technologically intensive 
productions where higher profits are likely, means that the economy would most 
probably experience economic growth without increasing employment levels. Such 
jobless growth does not fit the definition of development as discussed and proposed in 
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section two, for example, in terms of people’s ‘entitlements’ or capabilities. Secondly, 
if capital were not to be reinvested into the local economy, then there would not even 
be local economic growth to begin with (Todaro, 1997:80). In the light of these 
counter arguments, Lewis’ (1954) Two Sector Model was of limited use.  
 
The model’s core assumption of unlimited rural labour surplus, which existed 
alongside full employment in urban areas, also became highly questionable. Historical 
evidence showed that even though there may be high levels of unemployment in 
traditional sectors, the urban sectors of developing countries were also characterised 
by high unemployment rates. “(B)y and large, development economists today agree 
that the assumption of urban surplus labour is empirically more valid than Lewis’ 
(1954) assumption of rural surplus labour” (Todaro, 1997:80). Finally, when 
describing the urban sector, many inferences and conclusions were drawn based on 
the assumption that the urban labour market was competitive. On the contrary, urban 
wages are often sticky in developing countries, including South Africa, where high 
levels of unionisation exist leading to various forms of market failure (Bocarro and 
Moll, 1997 and Fryer, 1998). 
 
Even though not all traditional models of development economics have been 
discussed in this section, it is clear that most had serious limitations and were met 
with much theoretical and empirically based criticism from many angles, but 
especially from the neo-colonial dependence theorists like Myrdal (1957), Baran 
(1975) and others. The models were criticised for being too simplistic in their 
assumptions and approach, e.g. for ignoring important factors in development 
processes, such as the role of informal and formal institutions in economic 
transactions for growth and development. Hence, it should not be surprising that in 
the 1970s there was a decline of interest in the discussion of neoclassical models, 
logically this was accompanied by a rise in neo-Marxists theories.         
   
2.4.2 The neo-Marxist theories: the need for government sovereignty 
 
In the background of poor performances of traditional development theories, 
economists like Myrdal (1957 in Potter et al., 2004:97) argued that capitalist oriented 
development would inevitably deepen regional and individual inequalities across and 
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within nations measured in terms of GNP per capita and social welfare. Although, as 
proposed by models of capital accumulation, through multiplier effects the fruits of 
economic growth would trickle down or spread over time, without interventions such 
trickle down effects would be limited to agricultural markets and the process of 
capital development would ultimately favour the northern-core nations (i.e. the 
developed countries) and a few individuals, i.e. elite groups, in underdeveloped 
countries. Myrdal (1957 in Potter et al., 2004: 97) concluded that “given unrestrained 
free-market forces, these spread effects (of growth to the poor) would in no way 
match the backwash effects (of underdevelopment)”. Hence, the main thesis of neo-
colonial dependence theorists revolved around government’s sovereignty in ensuring 
through independent planning that the benefits of economic growth had positive and 
equitable benefits to all citizens.   
 
The neo-colonial dependence ideas advocated the rise of many radical models and 
planning for development. These included the ‘bottom-up approaches’, where 
development could be initiated and managed at a local level without the exploitative 
influences of external forces such as foreign governments and multinationals. The 
more extreme examples were the advocacy of revolutionary withdrawals of 
underdeveloped nations from global capitalist systems, as observed in the actions of 
some Latin American and African governments, e.g. Tanzania, in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s (Potter et al, 2004:107).  
 
However, these movements did not last long, as evidence emerged indicating that 
most of the countries that chose economic isolation began performing worse in terms 
of growth than those that chose the neoclassical economic models for their 
development. Some neo-colonial counter arguments were presented explaining that 
the observed economic failures were mostly due to poor government plans as opposed 
to the revolutionary ideas themselves. At a theoretical level, criticism was levelled at 
neo-Marxist ideas for failing to provide formal treatments in “explanations of how 
countries initiate and sustain development” (Todaro, 1997:82). Nevertheless, it seems 
that the bad experiences of experimental applications of many radical ideas 
throughout the 1970s only led to the rise of more conservative neoclassical models 
with a complete rejection of government roles in development planning. The 
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conservative ideas in the early 1980s advocated a completely free reign of the market 
throughout development processes.    
 
2.4.3 The resurgence of neoclassical economics and the call for free market reign 
 
In an emotive paper arguing against government intervention in economic policy, Lal 
(1983:5-16) called neo-colonial theories, including Keynesian ideas of development, a 
‘blind dogma’. He argued that development economics, referring to both classical and 
neo-colonial theories, had neglected useful insights from general micro-economic 
ideas of price mechanisms and their role of market regulation as well as welfare 
economic applications.  Although Lal’s (1983:8) arguments were specifically 
motivated by what he considered to be a neglect of the ‘role of the price mechanism’ 
in underdeveloped countries because of missing markets for many commodities in 
developing nations, he was part of a larger movement of ‘counterrevolutionary’ 
neoclassical economics, whose aims according to Todaro (1997:86) were to overhaul 
the 1970s’ dominance of neo-colonial ideas in the discipline of development 
economics.  
 
The counterrevolutionary movement reintroduced some of the neoclassical economic 
ideas such as public choice theories (Buchanan, 1957:114-123) and radical market 
oriented approaches to development debates. Most of those new ideas were supported 
by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (e.g. World Bank, 1993). “In 
more developed nations, this counterrevolution favoured supply side macro-economic 
policies, rational expectations theories, and the privatisation of public corporations. In 
developing countries (they) called for freer markets and the dismantling of public 
ownership, statist planning, and government regulation of economic activities” 
(Todaro, 1997:86). In line with Lal (1983), the counterrevolutionary theories argued 
that “underdevelopment results from poor resource allocation due to incorrect pricing 
policies and too much state intervention by overly active Third World governments”. 
In validating their arguments the proponents pointed out as examples of the successes 
of free market economies, countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, etc. 
Ironically, the neo-colonial dependence exponents also used the same countries as 
examples of successful cases of strong state intervention (Sen, 1983 and Todaro, 
1997).        
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More specifically, Lal (1983:10-11) argued that the dominant ideology in 
development economics of the 1970s had rejected welfare economics, firstly, because 
of a general ignorance about the applicability of microeconomics in development, and 
secondly, because the assumptions made by welfare economic models on consumers’ 
tastes and producers’ technology were perceived to be irrelevant to the real world. 
The rejection on these grounds did not make sense because welfare economics, 
according to Lal (1983:10), provides “the grammar of arguments about policy” and 
hence those advocating external intervention would be better off using this grammar. 
On the other hand, he argued that ‘second best’ welfare economics came about 
because of developmental challenges, from which the state’s role in the redistribution 
of resources and correction of market externalities were made clear.  
 
Crudely put, welfare economics is primarily concerned with, a) the economy’s 
optimal performance (i.e. the Production Possibility Frontier), b) the tension between 
efficiency and equity, and c) government instruments (e.g. taxes and subsidies) to 
improve (a) and (b) (Black et al., 2005:58-68). Hence, if the neo-colonial theorists 
were really concerned about the extent and type of role governments could play in 
managing the process of development they would employ welfare economics as the 
basic framework of discussing the problem. If that had to happen, the price system as 
a mechanism for achieving “the so-called optimum conditions for production and 
exchange required for an efficient allocation of resources” would also find a place in 
the broader discussions (Lal, 1983:11).          
 
Unfortunately, the counterrevolutionary models could not escape the old criticisms 
labelled against their predecessors. Stewart’s (1983:282-292) direct attack on Lal 
(1983) is evidence of that. The perceptions remained that neoclassical assumptions 
were unrealistic and non-compatible with developing country markets. The facts that 
in these countries, a) competitive markets did not exist, b) consumers were not 
independent in their decision making processes, c) information remained limited and 
asymmetric, d) market externalities were wide spread, and e) many of the economies 
were neither formalised nor monetised, still posed a challenge to the applicability of 
most market oriented approaches including those presented in the 1980s (Todaro, 
1997:89-90). Therefore, with the ideological boundaries sharply defined between pro 
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market and neo-Marxist theories, a new wave of theories proposing a middle ground 
emerged or began to catch the attention of many scholars in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. These included the New Institutional Economics (NIE) (e.g. North, 1990; 
Rutherford, 2001 and others) and New Growth Theories such as Endogenous Theories 
of Growth by Barro (2002), Helpman (1992), etc. These movements promoted a 
broader discussion of explicit roles of governments and other external agencies, such 
as formal and informal institutions, in facilitating technological growth and market 
transactions for development respectively.  
  
2.4.4 The new growth and institutional theories: negotiating the middle ground 
 
The classical economic growth models, for example Lewis’ Two Sector model, 
treated technology as an exogenous factor to economic growth in the urban sector. 
According to these models, economies should converge to some long-term 
equilibrium position as influenced only by capital-labour ratios. This meant that in the 
absence of external shocks or changes in technology all economies would converge to 
zero growth rates. Hence, “it is impossible to analyse the determinants of 
technological advance because it is completely independent of the decisions of 
economic agents. And the (theories) fail to explain large differences in residuals 
across countries with similar technologies”. In short, the New Growth Theories 
presented a frame for analysing “the system governing the production process rather 
than forces outside that system” (Todaro, 1997:90-91).  The theories analysed 
external factors, such as government investments and general planning, which 
contributed towards increases in technology for long-term economic growth rates. 
 
Barro (2002:103-124) provides one such analysis of technological growth. Building 
on old growth models, which postulates that diverging paths exist between private and 
social returns to government expenditures, where private returns may be falling even 
though social gains may be increasing. Barro (2002:104) proposes that “because of 
familiar externalities associated with government expenditures and taxes, privately 
determined values of saving and economic growth may be sub-optimal”. Using the 
Cobb-Douglas function and secondary cross-sectional data from various developing 
countries, he sought to illustrate that an increase in government expenditure, which 
led to high productive services (as opposed to consumption) would lead to higher 
 29
social (as opposed to private) returns measured by some representative household’s 
utility function (Barro, 2002:122-124). For instance, optimal government spending on 
services, such as transportation, water, electric power, police services, education, 
would positively influence private investments and in turn have a positive impact on 
economic growth as a whole. 
 
In general, many of the New Growth Theories focussed their attention on the roles 
played by positive “externalities in determining the rate of return on capital 
investments” (Todaro, 1997:92). Contrary to assumed diminishing returns to scale in 
production functions of old growth models (e.g. in figure 1), the growth theories argue 
that the positive externalities, from smart public spending, “generate external 
economies and productivity improvements that exceed private gains by an amount 
sufficient enough to offset diminishing returns” (Todaro, 1997:92).  
 
Even though the New Growth Models have adopted a number of traditional ideas, 
unlike the counterrevolutionary theories of the 1980s, they argue for appropriate roles 
of government agencies in internalising negative and positive externalities for more 
optimal economic outputs. It is interesting that, even though Lal (1983) did not 
specifically discuss economic externalities as an impetus for creating a space for 
government intervention in economic development, his call for an inclusion of 
microeconomic ideas, e.g. welfare economics, seems to have been heeded by the New 
Growth models.  
 
However, government is only one of many agencies that have a potential role to play 
in market transactions and development processes. Therefore, a more inclusive 
discussion has to involve the significant roles of all relevant institutions. This means 
that the biggest challenge facing development economists today should be an 
identification and understanding of institutions that matter in addition to an 
understanding of historical neoclassical economics and neo-Marxist models for 
economic development. An understanding of all kinds of institutions and their 
interactions with the market economy should help clarify the relationships between or 
the influences of, for instance, cultures, languages, ethical rules, liberties, legislation, 
on the processes of development. Ultimately, this would be an understanding, which 
locates any country’s development process at the nation’s collective psyche (i.e. the 
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dominant cultural systems and beliefs). In that regard, the following chapter presents 
an historical discussion and understanding of political, cultural and economic 
institutions as well as an analysis of their potential roles in developing the agricultural 
sector based on irrigation and water management. Moreover, the discussion of 
institutions, especially of the informal nature, is necessitated by the fact that the 
challenges of non-competitive markets, asymmetric information, externalities, as 
magnified in neo-Marxist criticisms, are more pronounced in developing countries.  
 
2.5. CONCLUSION 
 
In the light of vast inequalities in terms of GNP per capita and human living standards 
between developed and developing nations, the argument for economic development 
was put forward. For instance, it was reported that a third of the world’s population 
have no basic literacy skills, have inadequate shelter and limited food supplies 
(Todaro, 1997:3).  
 
In search of economic development, various competing definitions of what constitutes 
underdevelopment have been proposed over the past fifty to sixty years. Based on 
these definitions a number of economic models emerged on how to tackle the 
challenge of underdevelopment. In presenting these models it was illustrated that 
heated debates, often based on ideological beliefs, around the challenges were the 
main driving force behind many theoretical propositions over the years. The main 
ideological lines along which economic models were proposed were based on 
neoclassical economics and neo-Marxist views. The former had their main focus fixed 
on economic growth indicators such as GNP per capita, which they argued could be 
increased if certain conditions, such as capital stock accumulation, were met (e.g. 
Rostow, 1960). The neo-Marxist theories, on the other hand, argued that the 
implementation of neoclassical models in developing countries had only exacerbated 
the income inequalities between the core and periphery nations (Myrdal, 1957 in 
Potter et al., 2004:97). However, it was shown that in the last ten to fifteen years, in 
light of criticisms from all quarters, development economic theorists have been 
negotiating a middle ground, where support for market oriented solutions were 
encouraged alongside government roles in policy coordination where market 
externalities were rife (Barro, 2002:103-124). The discussion concluded that the move 
 31
was a positive one, however, since government was not the only institution playing a 
significant role in the market for development, a broader discussion of various types 
of institutions was also needed. It was proposed that such a discussion would locate 
the process of development in its rightful place, i.e., at the collective psyche of 
individuals in different societies as once pioneered by Sen (1982 and 1983) and 
Hirschman (1960).            
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CHAPTER THREE – INSTITUTIONALISM: CRITIQUE AND POSSIBILITIES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Ronald Coase (1998: 73) reflected on the direction the discipline of economics has 
taken since Adam Smith as having become the study of blood circulation without a 
body.  “What this comes down to is that economists think of themselves as having a 
box of tools, but not the subject matter”.  Institutionalists like Coase, charge that 
economics lacks an understanding or an interrogation of factor-coordination in a 
complex interrelated structure, which is the whole national economy. The criticism is 
not a recent one and has been articulated differently throughout the 20th century by 
economists from varying sub disciplines as illustrated in the discussion of 
development economics in chapter two. In the institutionalism doctrine, it was first 
articulated within what is now referred to as old institutionalism, whose founding 
fathers are thought to be Thorstein Veblen, Wesley Mitchell and John Commons 
(Rutherford, 2001 and Coase, 1998).  
 
Rutherford (2001) contended that between the First and Second World Wars the old 
institutionalists’ arguments held sway in the imagination of many economists and 
policy makers, especially in the American public sector. However, after the Second 
World War they lost most of their influence, as it became clear that their promise of 
reinventing the discipline of economics was not to be achieved soon. Veblen (1904), 
for instance, was not only a proponent of an analysis of the whole economy with its 
institutions, but also argued that the underpinnings of most neoclassical economic 
theories were flawed, because they were based on inaccurate rationalistic assumptions 
about the psychology of human behaviour. He, like many institutionalists of the time, 
believed that the new instinct and habit theories of the early 20th century in the 
discipline of psychology would provide a solid base for new economic thinking. 
However, it was later realised that that would not happen as more behaviourist 
theories in psychology emerged in the post Second World War period (Rutherford, 
2001:183). Coase (1998:72) stated that men like Veblen were of “great intellectual 
stature, but were anti-theoretical, and without a theory to bind together their collection 
of facts, they had very little that they were able to pass on”. Hence, the fundamental 
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difference between the so-called old and new institutionalism lies in how each sub 
discipline has viewed the usefulness of neoclassical economic theories in application.  
 
Ronald Coase himself is viewed as the founder of the new institutionalism. His 
discussions of transaction costs, for example in The Nature of the Firm (1937), proved 
to be foundational to the works of prominent institutionalists like North (1990; 1991 
and 1992), Hodgson (1998 and 2006), etc., (Coase, 1998:72). “In contrast to the many 
earlier attempts to overturn or replace neoclassical theory the new institutional 
economics builds on, modifies and extends (the) theory to permit it to come to grips 
and deal with an entire range of issues heretofore beyond its ken” (North, 1992:3). 
Hence, even though many institutionalists remain opposed to the rationalist 
behavioural assumptions of neoclassical economics, they are however, tolerant to the 
use of some neoclassical models within a broader institutionalist framework. The 
nature of current arguments and perspectives put forth by various institutional 
economists are varied. Most spend considerable amounts of effort looking at issues of 
macro economic development through political institutions, using the neoclassical 
ideas of transaction costs, uncertainty, externalities, collective benefit, etc., (e.g. 
North, 1990; 1991 and 1992; Eggertson, 1990, Richter, 1998). Others, like 
McCloskey (1985, 1990a, 1990b), Evensky (2004), and Ramstad (1986), concern 
themselves with the lack of sensibleness in some usage of formalist and related 
methods, like econometric methods, in the general discourse and research endeavours 
of economics.  
 
The chapter presents many of the discussions and criticisms of neoclassical 
economics by the old and new institutionalism, structured more in terms of the 
theoretical assumptions and methods as opposed to any chronological order. The 
discussions are presented, with examples, in a way that exposes the epistemological 
underpinnings and the broad framework for the thesis. The linkages to the primary 
research question and discussion of economic development issues, with a focus on 
irrigated agriculture, are also illustrated. Section two presents the progression of the 
institutionalist critique of neoclassical economic theories and methods in the 20th 
century. In section three, a logical structure of the debated meanings of institutions 
and their evolution are discussed alongside their meanings for economic development 
as a whole. In section four, the eclectic institutionalist methods of research are 
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explained alongside the limitations of positivism for application in social systems. 
The institutionalist framework for the thesis is argued for in section five. Section six 
concludes.     
 
3.2. THE ARGUMENTS BY INSTITUTIONALISM IN 20TH CENTURY 
 
3.2.1 The rationality assumption  
 
In the late 18th and early 19th century, Veblen (1898 and 1904) was perhaps the 
greatest critic of classical economic thinking and business enterprise.  The criticism 
against classical economics, which still resonates with current day institutionalists, 
was at the discipline’s assumptions about rational human behaviour. In the light of 
poor business practice in America, he criticised business for failing to incorporate 
new technological innovations to enhance the public benefit due to an inappropriate 
legal, social and economic institutional framework (Veblen, 1904). The existing 
institutions were deemed bad for business. Hence, the failure of classical economists 
to analyse the role such institutions played on economic performance was equally 
bad. At the core of many of the early institutionalists’ criticism of the discipline was 
“the hedonistic and rationalistic psychology implicit in marginal utility theory and 
(they) pointed to an alternative based on instinct and habit formation” (Rutherford, 
2001:175).  The concept of habit formation later became the universal thread in 
definitions of various kinds of business, social and cultural institutions (e.g. Diesing, 
1971; North, 1992; Williamson, 2000, Rutherford, 2001 and Ramstad, 1986).  
 
What institutionalists have argued against the rational behaviour of economic actors is 
that such an assumption is limited where high levels of uncertainty exist due to 
limited information about consumption and production possibilities in many sectors. 
In short, where markets are not perfect, as they often are, actors could not be expected 
to behave in a rational manner postulated in classical economics. The criticism is a 
serious one because many classical economic models, for instance the Coase theorem 
of zero transaction costs, are based on perfect information and markets as well as 
rationality assumptions (North, 1992:1-8). For these reasons Shubik (1975:545) and 
Demsetz (1969) in Rutherford (2001:186), “once called the General Equilibrium 
Theory a ‘conceptual straightjacket’” and the classical economic approach to policy 
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appraisal a ‘nirvana’ approach, respectively. Even within an institutional framework, 
North (1990) argued that “the simple fact is that a dynamic theory of institutional 
change limited to strictly neoclassical constraints of individualistic, rational purposive 
activity would never allow us to explain most secular change ranging from the 
stubborn struggle of the Jews in antiquity” to the passage of the Social Security Act of 
1935 in the US (Rutherford, 2001:188).      
 
Within development economics, a similar criticism of neoclassical economics has 
been presented when advocating an inclusion of an institutional analysis in 
developing countries, especially by the neo colonial camp as discussed in chapter two. 
More specific and within an institutional framework what that entails, according to 
North (1992:1-8), is that economic development in the developing world should be 
analysed institutionally because of greater than zero transaction costs, uncertainties in 
transactions, externalities, etc., for the maximisation of public benefit. To a degree, 
the proposal resonates with Veblen’s (1904) criticism of inefficiencies of American 
businesses in the early 1900s. Nonetheless, the institutionalist criticism of classical 
economics has extended beyond the rationalist realm.   
 
3.2.2 Formalism in economics  
 
Perhaps the most ironical set of criticisms of narrowly applying formal or 
mathematical methods of analysis in neoclassical economics has come from 
McCloskey (1985; 1990a and 1990b). In addition, Weintraub (2006) has had a direct 
response to McCloskey’s (1990a) discussion on Formalism in the Social Sciences; 
Rhetorically Speaking. Beyond the criticism of misunderstanding and misapplication 
of the significance test (t-test) in econometrics, McCloskey (1985) further argues that 
economists have adopted the use of existence theorems and their proofs without much 
rhetorical interrogation for useful application in real life economic problems 
(McCloskey, 1990a:12-19):  
From everywhere outside of economics except the Department of Mathematics the 
proofs of existence will seem strange. They do not claim to show that an actual 
existing economy is in equilibrium, or that the equilibrium of an existing economy 
is desirable…They show that certain equations describing a certain blackboard 
economy have a solution, but they do not give the solution to the blackboard 
problem, much less to an extant economy.      
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Even in Weintraub’s (2006) argument that only through axiomatisation5 (i.e. 
formalisation) can a vigorous interrogation of economic problems be made possible it 
should, however, be asserted that McCloskey (1990b:1127-1130) is not against the 
use of mathematics in economics6. She only discusses and demonstrates its misuse in 
social science, because unlike physics, economics investigates phenomenon and 
problems within social systems. The chain of mathematical arguments in physics are 
corroborated and moved forward through experimental observation, where such 
observation is limited in social systems. Hence, the question that has always been a 
focus of many institutionalist arguments (e.g. Wilber and Harrison, 1978; Ramstad, 
1986 and Evensky, 2004) is that of whether formal methods are indeed appropriate for 
the discipline of economics7 and if so to what extent are they?  
 
Evensky (2004) contends that economics as a discipline has been faced with a rising 
level of criticism, partly, because of its relatively low rates of successfully predicting 
future economic events. Many argue that the majority of these inaccurate predictions 
stem from the inappropriate adoption of formalist methods (Wilberand Harrison, 
1978; Ramstad, 1986). The misuse of formal or scientific methods in such systems 
has not only led to methodological discrepancies, but as argued by Evensky 
(2004:197-211), has led to the discipline of economics being excluded from the social 
science scholarly body of inquiry. In addition, McCloskey (1990b) reckons that the 
misuse of statistic rhetoric by many economists has not only led to presentations of 
non-substantive arguments or inaccurate predictions, but has also ensured a decrease 
in economic audience. This has further isolated the discipline from other forms of 
rhetoric inquiry.  
 
At this point it seems that the majority of neoclassical economists, who in 
development economics, are criticised for favouring free market oriented paths - with 
unrealistic assumptions - to development (e.g. Lewis, 1954; Nurkse, 1958; Fei and 
Ranis, 1964, etc.) are further criticised for misapplying formalist methods in social 
                                                 
5 In loose terms this may be a postulation of relationships among chosen economic variables, with 
certain assumptions made, for a theoretical and mathematical modeling of the general economy.     
  
6 “I don’t object to (the use of mathematics) at all. It’s that the wrong kind of math  is being used, that 
of the department of Mathematics instead of the Department of Physics” (MCloskey, 2008). 
  
7 A social science discipline. 
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systems (e.g. the Harrod-Domar Growth Model, The Lewis Two-Sector Model, etc). 
Such is the case because, the postulated free markets, which are devoid of institutional 
burdens or transaction costs8, due to assumptions of rational actors and perfect 
information flows (North, 1992:1-8) are perfectly suited for mathematical treatments 
or axiomatisation. As demonstrated in the review of debates in development 
economics literature, the high generation rate of free market economic models in the 
20th century has not been matched by successful economic development trends, 
especially in the developing world. However, the same conclusion holds true for neo 
colonial or radical arguments, whose only focus is narrowly based on political issues.  
 
3.3 INSTITUTIONS: WHAT DO THEY MEAN TO SOCIETY, ECONOMICS AND     
DEVELOPMENT? 
  
At the turn of the 19th and early 20th century Veblen (1898 and 1904) and later 
Mitchell (1923) and Commons (1924 in Rutherford, 2001:173-194) wrote mainly 
about institutions of a formal kind. Veblen (1904) was critical of business institutions, 
and Mitchell (1924) influenced by such criticism attempted to illustrate how 
institutions in money transactions could be better understood and enhanced using 
empirical data, as opposed through what he thought were limited theoretical 
postulations of neoclassical economics. While Veblen (1898 and 1904) attacked 
rationalist assumptions of neoclassical economics from a psychological perspective, 
Commons (1924 and 1934) approached the subject matter from a legal perspective 
(Rutherford, 2001). Hayek (1945:519-530) on the other hand, who was not 
particularly opposed to outcomes of a free market system, in his understanding of the 
workings of the market economy emphasised the accumulation of local knowledge 
over time to be reflected in community practice. During this time, clear distinctions 
between formal versus informal institutions and rule-governed practices versus 
organisations had not been explicitly made. These distinctions were pointedly 
discussed in depth at a later stage, for example by Quiggin (1988) whose focus on 
informal institutions was the collective behaviour of traditional societies in the use of 
public resources. The present discourse on institutionalism, however, seems a lot 
more concerned for such distinctions to be made. In the works of North (1990, 1991 
                                                 
8 North (1992) argues that the presence of transaction costs is a reflection of the fact that costs are 
always greater than zero in real life economic activity, hence institutions with the lowest costs should 
be favoured by societies with preference for high efficiency.     
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and 1992), Eicher (1999), Hodgson (1998 and 2006), Williamson (2000), etc., the 
discussion of the meanings of institutions is predominated by differences between 
intangible rules and practice, like property rights, versus tangible organisations as 
well as nuances between formal versus unwritten and informal cultural conventions. 
Hence, even though or precisely because, more attention has been given to the 
subject, the definitions of institutions remain highly contestable. This also means that 
different ideological camps exist within institutional economics. Various opposing 
and sometimes complementary propositions, in the way of understanding what 
institutions are and how they work economically have been presented in recent 
literature.  
 
3.3.1 Defining institutions 
 
Veblen in Paarlberg (1993:823) basically defined institutions as “settled habits of 
thought common to the generality of men” and Commons (1934) defined the sub 
discipline of institutional economics “as collective action controlling, liberating, and 
expanding human action”. According to North (1990 in Eicher, 1999:3-4), however, a 
distinction should be made between institutions and organisations where he defines 
institutions as “the rules (the legal system, financial regulations, and property rights) 
that nurture, protect, and govern the operation of a market economy”. He emphasises 
the point that these are abstract concepts as opposed to tangible organisations, which 
may refer “to universities, cooperatives … that carry out specific missions in society” 
(Eicher, 1999:3). Such institutions form because of incomplete and asymmetrical 
information in market transactions. “Human beings, in consequence, impose 
constraints on human interaction in order to structure exchange” (North, 1992:1), but 
this does not guarantee that a resultant exchange would be efficient, because to begin 
with the very presence of institutions signals the fact that transaction costs are 
positive. In any case, even though various institutionalists do make the distinction 
between the abstract social rules and the tangible organisations whose role is usually 
that of enforcing the rules, some still refer to organisations as institutions, although 
defined as institutions of a higher level. In making the distinction between the two, 
North (1990:3-6) in Hodgson (2006:9) writes that: 
Institutions are the rules of the game in society, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints (with costs) that shape human interaction. In consequence, 
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they structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or 
economic. Conceptually, what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from 
the players. The purpose of the rules is to define the way the game is played. 
Modelling strategies and skills of the team as it develops is a separate process 
from modelling the creation, evolution, and consequences of the rules9.       
  
From the extract it is clear that according to North (1990) institutions (the rules) are 
not organisations (the team), however, Hodgson (2006:9-13) argues that this is not the 
case, saying that North (1990) “simply establishes his own primary interest in 
economic systems rather than the internal functioning of individual organisations”. 
Such is the case because Hodgson (2006:10) himself sees organisations as a special 
type of institutions. He argues that organisations are actors only at a national economy 
level of analysis, but it would be foolish to define them as actors for all analytical 
purposes, because they too have internal conflicts.  
 
In any case Williamson (2000:595-613), draws a distinction between formal and 
informal rule against institutions and organisations which is close to North’s (1990) 
when presenting a hierarchy of society’s institutions with four levels, namely: 
a) the embedded norms, customs, mores, and traditions. These are not directly 
observable, but are transferable from one generation to the next, and form the 
foundations for all other institutions in society as well as the base for the 
rational behaviour of individual actors,  
b) the formal rules of social organisations, including “constitutions, laws, 
property rights, etc.” as described by North (1991:97). These rules open up the 
opportunity to first order political or constitutional behaviour. That is getting 
the formal rules of the game right. The game refers to political and economic 
transactions between individuals and groups.  
c) the play of the game. This involves “second order economising, getting the 
governance structures (e.g. contract) right”, and 
d) the level at which resource allocation is determined. This means getting the 
marginal condition right. 
 
                                                 
9 My emphasis, the concept of modelling for different types of investigation using Saleth’s (2004) 
topography of institutional evolution will be explored further in the coming sections.  
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In Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy of institutions, an historical evolution of unwritten 
and often tentative rules towards established, universal and explicitly stated 
regulations is traceable. Such an evolution, Evensky (2004:197-211) argues depicts 
the invisible boundary between the socio-political sphere of inquiry from the 
economic one, even though such a boundary is actually superficial as it often limits 
the application of economic investigation into real life issues (McCloskey, 1990a).              
 
3.3.2 The evolution of institutions 
 
Institutions are not everlasting. They change, however at a slow pace and in a specific 
direction, and that makes them path dependent. Over time, not only have institutions 
been defined differently, but also the forces behind their evolution have been seen 
differently. It also seems that various ideologically driven economists have employed 
different models or theories for specific outcomes. Various theories in institutional 
economics have been proposed for analysing change at various levels of the 
evolutionary process. Saleth (2004:6-7) presents the topography of these theories 
from perspectives that are appropriate for each level of the evolution. She groups the 
main theories into three categories namely: 
a) market based theories, which emphasize institutional selection through 
market competition (e.g. transaction cost (North, 1992));  
b) evolutionary theories, which explain the emergence of social conventions 
(e.g. Demsetz, 1967, Quiggin, 1988:1071-1087, and Sethi and Somanathan, 
1996:766-787); and 
c) bargaining theories, which explain institutions in terms of asymmetries of 
powers (e.g. Commons, 1924 and Ostrom, 1990)10. 
 
Because institutions, especially informal ones, are varied and based on “different 
perceptions of the world and how it works” (North 1992:2), like accumulative 
knowledge when perceptions of the surrounding environment changes they too 
evolve. In this thesis, the goal to limit transaction costs is what drives the gradual 
selection of more suitable institutions. Hence, scarce resources and competition is at 
the core of such institutional change. “The concept of transaction costs was implicit in 
                                                 
10 See Appendix 18 for additional discussions of Demsetz (1967), Quiggin (1988), Ostrom (1990), etc. 
 41
some of the older institutionalist literature, and its more recent explicit development 
has generated an explosive growth of literature on organisations, contracts, and the 
role of institutions in economic development” (Rutherford, 2001:187). However, an 
opposing force to such change exists in the form of path dependency. When 
bargaining power is unevenly distributed among economic actors, existing institutions 
could be maintained to serve the interests of powerful sectors, even when such 
institutions are not efficient (North, 1992:3). Such an argument reaffirms Veblen’s 
(1904) critique of the business enterprise.  
 
Regarding economic development, North (1992) postulates that one of the reasons 
why economic growth remains hard to achieve in developing countries is because 
institutional change is difficult where vested interests of the powerful polity lie in the 
maintenance of prevalent institutional frameworks. Is such contexts information is 
also unevenly distributed. The technological innovations that were observed by 
Veblen (1904) as not being incorporated by business for improving public interests, 
North (1992) argued could have made it easier for the powerful sectors to cheat in 
these environments using a game theoretic framework. Such is the case because in 
game theory, cooperative solutions would be achievable where, a) the game is played 
repeatedly, b) information on past actions of players is readily available, and c) a 
small number of players are involved. When prevailing institutions do not ensure that 
an introduction of new technologies promotes these conditions, exploitative 
relationships and corruption are entrenched. Hence, the incompatibility of institutions 
with newly available technologies could actually foster underdevelopment, as 
economies are open to global market transactions of many players, unstable 
relationships, and uncertainties.        
 
Buchanan’s (1991) discussion of constitutional economics offers a framework for an 
analysis of institutional change that explores collective behaviour in the realm of 
politics (i.e. public choice theory). The interrogation could be located at the 
evolutionary phase of Saleth’s (2004) topography. Such behaviour is believed to lead 
to a creation of social contracts (i.e. social norms) as well as contextualised rational 
individual behaviour, which is a form of constrained rational choice in the realm of 
neoclassical economics. In the development of these political contracts, Buchanan 
(1991) believed there is a greater economic incentive for individuals to set aside their 
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selfish interests for the establishment of fair rules for justice and equity. Such a 
foundation needs to be laid out prior to the commencement of economic bargaining, 
i.e. Saleth’s (2004) third evolutionary phase, which is based on narrow, selfish 
interests. Buchanan’s (1991) beliefs as articulated by Evensky (2004:199) are thought 
to have existed in Adam Smith’s discussion of moral philosophy. “Smith’s purpose 
was to explain the virtues and the prerequisites of the ‘liberal plan of equality, liberty 
and justice’” (Smith, 1976:664 in Evensky, 2004:205) and to describe how 
humankind has evolved towards this ideal prospect. Accordingly, in Smith’s 
discussion people are not homo economicus, but social and sovereign at the same 
time. Such is an institutional view of the environment in which economic actors 
bargain and transact.  
    
Of course, in the real world the formulated institutions need not be fair and just, the 
same way that North’s (1992) institutions were sometimes efficient or unsuitable for 
economic development. Such is the case because the political process of setting up the 
long-term social contracts (an institutional polity) is in itself not necessarily immune 
from rent seeking and manipulation from powerful vested interests. Nonetheless, 
when individual benefits to create the appropriate type of social contracts 
(institutional framework) are explicitly greater than the costs they would be created. 
“There is (always) a justification for both individualised and collective efforts to 
promulgate, maintain, and transmit … ethics throughout culture (and) 
intergenerationally” (Buchanan 1991: 177). Hence, social institutions (informal to 
formal) have always formed the parameters within which individual rational choice 
could be realised. Whether the institutions established in this manner would allow 
economic development would depend on whether they are economically efficient 
(North, 1992) and promote public interest (Veblen, 1904).   
 
The next phase of bargaining in the topography of institutional evolution by Saleth 
(2004) is well illustrated in Ostrom’s (1990:1-21) discussion of transferable property 
rights. The presumption for fair outcomes is that such rights form a socially just 
contract. The discussion illustrates their enforcement using a game theoretic 
framework. Ostrom’s (1990) definition of the rights shows a clear boundary created 
between those who can and cannot be part of the bargaining process in established 
communities with identifiable members.  The illustration also reiterates Adam 
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Smith’s (1976: 664) assertions (in Evensky, 2004:205) of socially just, but also 
sovereign self-interested actors in economic transactions. In the bargaining process, 
the individually perceived costs and benefits are what drive the behaviour of utility 
maximising actors. Once again, cooperative outcomes or the efficiency and 
sustainability associated with such an institutional framework are dependent on 
bargaining power and informational distributions similar to those discussed by North 
(1992). Where information and power are evenly distributed among actors the 
institutional framework would be well positioned to provide efficient outcomes, 
otherwise the opposite is true.  
 
3.4 ECONOMIC METHODS: POSITIVISM AND INSTITUTIONALISM  
 
Historically, the criticism levelled against the body of neoclassical economics by 
institutionalists has mainly been threefold. In the early stages economics was 
criticised for its neglect of incorporating institutions11 in investigations of economic 
transactions and for an over reliance on theoretical postulations with unrealistic 
assumptions against limited empirical testing (e.g. Veblen, 1904; Paarlberg, 1993; 
Evensky, 2004; etc.). At present, it would seem that the criticism is mainly focussed 
on the misuse of statistical and formal methods (e.g. McCloskey, 1985, 1990a, 1990b; 
Paarlberg, 1993; and Williamson, 2000). On the other hand, the reactionary criticism 
that has been levelled against institutionalism has been placed at its blind use and 
analysis of empirical data, without a well-developed body of theory and tools for a 
vigorous interrogation (e.g. Hodgson, 1998 and Weintraub, 2006). Institutionalists, 
however, it seems have been always been aware of their own limitations, especially 
with regard to a lack of a unifying theory of institutions (Oosthuizen et al., 2005:75). 
For instance, Williamson (2000:595 in Evensky, 2004:198) opened his discussion of 
the new institutional economics (NIE) with a confession, an assertion, and a 
recommendation. What he confessed was that economists have remained ignorant 
about institutions. The assertion was that even though the past quarter century had 
witnessed enormous progress in the study of institutions, the discipline, however, still 
awaited a unified theory accepting of pluralism, where such a theory would contribute 
to economics’ reintegration with other social sciences. Hence, a presentation and 
                                                 
11 This entails historical documentations of rules, practices, etc., which have resulted in a present 
institutional framework within a chosen system.    
 44
discussion of the various alterative investigative methods proposed by some 
institutionalists would enhance an understanding of the debates, contributions and 
gaps in such knowledge.  
 
McCloskey (1990b:1124) provides a compelling reason for economics to tell a well-
informed story, which means to tell it accurately. “Most of what economists do is tell 
stories about the recent past (i.e. history), explaining why the Corn Belt went bankrupt 
in the early 1980s or why agricultural policy favours bigger farmers (in America for 
instance). To do so sensibly, they need to know what they are talking about” 
(McCloskey, 1990b:1124). Essentially this also entails a good knowledge, 
understanding and description of historical events. Hence, most of what 
institutionalist methods are concerned with is story telling, a historical narrative. 
Because “groups, power, change, multidisciplinary subject matter, and qualitative 
considerations are the substance of institutional economics” (Paarlberg, 1993:823), 
the methods of institutional economics rely on case-study documentation for 
providing explanations of the past, not so much predictions, of economic events as 
will be illustrated in this section. In fact, it could be argued that the biggest 
ideologically motivated difference between institutional and neoclassical economics 
methods of investigation lies in the explanation-prediction (history-future) 
dichotomy.      
 
Wilber and Harrison (1978:61-89) analyse and compare some of the models of 
explanation and prediction underlying both institutionalist and neoclassical economics 
methods respectively. In their discussion, what resonates well with a social science 
discourse is that institutionalist methods are said to be discovered, i.e. not prescribed 
as they argue is normally the case with methods of neoclassical economics. The 
institutionalist methods are not prescribed from some reservoir of mostly unrealistic 
theoretical postulations for which neoclassical economics stands accused. Standard 
economics uses formal methods, which include logical positivism and a priori 
rationalism for understanding, interpreting and explaining the subject matter of social 
systems. The axiom and proof is one example of such formal methods. The fallibility 
of such a method as Marshall (1920:773 cited in McCloskey, 1990a) cautioned is that 
“the function then of analysis and deduction in economics is not to forge a few long 
chains of reasoning (in a mathematical language), but to forge rightly many short 
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chains and single connecting links”. In positivist methodology, the subject matter may 
change, but not the method of investigation. In contrast, institutionalist methods such 
as the holistic documentation of case studies, the recurrent event patterns or themes 
are discovered from the subject matter for description and then explanation before 
theories can be presented. As Wilber and Harrison (1978:61-62) put it “holism, 
including pattern models and storytelling, expresses the belief that a change in subject 
matter requires a change in method”. Institutionalist methods are premised on this 
ideological belief. On the other hand, “formalism is a method that consists of a formal 
system of logical relationships abstracted from any empirical content it might have in 
the real world. For example the theory of the firm … is characterised by the use of 
mathematics (at least implicitly) and by the development of an axiomatic, deductive 
structure” (Wilber and Harrison, 1978:62). In such methods, models are constructed 
from a set of postulates and definitions, deductively specifying the likely 
relationships, which may exist among them. Sometimes already existing models are 
imported for assistance in investigations, using new empirical evidence for the 
validation of old and new theories. In constructing a new model, the postulates are put 
forth and thereafter an inherent dynamic system of logical arguments is deduced. 
“Rules of interpretation do make a truth claim; they claim that the structure of 
relations in a calculus is the same structure that exists in some part or aspect of the 
empirical evidence” (Diesing, 1971 in Wilber and Harrison, 1978: 63). Law-like 
statements could then be deduced, for example: that a firm will buy inputs, produce 
and sell to a point where marginal costs equal marginal revenues. However, such 
statements are often hard to falsify using empirical data, because social systems are 
dynamic, and always require that the ceteris paribus qualifier be invoked. As noted by 
Hodgson (1998:168), such an approach driven by the objective to discover law-like 
statements or theories is premised on the belief that social systems are similar to those 
of a physical kind as investigated in disciplines like physics. However, 
institutionalists who pursue “specific and historically12 located approaches to 
analyses” hold the belief that social systems behave more like evolutionary biological 
systems, where patterns may emerge explaining the behaviour of organisms in a 
specific environment.        
 
                                                 
12 My emphasis.  
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The biological view hence may explain why the dynamism of social systems has 
required neoclassical economists to invoke the ceteris paribus qualifiers if they were 
to solely rely on the internal logic (pure reasoning) of theoretical postulations. Such 
was the case until the development of econometrics in the 1950s. Wilber and Harrison 
(1978:63) argue that economists like Veblen and Commons dissented from positivist 
neoclassical economic methods because they held an institutionalist view of an 
economic system. Formal models also suited a neoclassical economics doctrine that 
relied on rationalistic behaviour of atomised actors, which paid less emphasis on 
custom, norms, ethics, habit formation, etc. 
 
Nevertheless, economists like Paul Samuelson and Friedman (Wilber and Harrison, 
1978:64) argue in defence of the positivist approach by showing that “empirically 
falsifiable propositions could be derived from formal models”, from general laws and 
specified conditions hypotheses could be stated and subjected to empirical testing, and 
from test results, hypotheses could be rejected or accepted as true. Moreover, the 
success rates at predicting economic events would be justification for the use of such 
methods. By the way of responding, institutionalists (especially) with regard to the 
theory of the firm argued that, “standard assumptions concerning the behaviour of 
entrepreneurs were (actually) contradicted by empirical evidence and (hence mostly 
proven to be) unrealistic” (Wilber and Harrison, 1978:66-67). Their verdict as already 
indicated was that “(s)uccessful predictions of economic phenomenon (using 
positivist methods) had been consistently lacking over the years”.   
 
At a philosophical level, a) the efficacy of applying logical positivist methods to the 
study of human behaviour was inappropriate, and b) the failure of neoclassical 
economics to reject its core body of assumptions despite numerous instances of 
repeated prediction failures was absurd, if not driven by ideology (Fryer, 2004) or self 
interest on the part of researchers (McCloskey, 1990a). These speculations are also 
given weight in the face of McCloskey’s (1990a:12) contention that a majority of 
mathematical equations (on blackboards) of most economists have little to do with 
providing practical solutions of real economic challenges. It seems that the final 
verdict for the discipline as a whole is a sad one. As argued by Wilber and Harrison 
(1978:69), it is not taken too seriously as a scientific explanation of ‘what is’. “Rather, 
(too much) attention is focused on the development of a set of ‘engineering tools’ – 
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linear programming, Input – Output Analysis (IOA), Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), 
and so on”. This focus could be criticised for having less to do with the core business 
of economics; of fully understanding the subject matter (a dynamic human system) 
from which various stories (historical narratives) could then be told, by isolating and 
describing recurring themes for an explanation of economic events of the past.   
 
In developing a method of investigation that is more appropriate for the subject 
matter, institutionalists build on psychological, anthropological, historical, 
sociological and other research in explaining context specific human behaviour 
(Hodgson, 1998:169). The research enables them to be “engaged in a systematic form 
of storytelling that Abraham Kaplan calls a ‘pattern model’” (Wilber and Harrison, 
1978:71). In developing such models, qualitative case study methods are used, for 
instance as discussed by Oosthuizen et al. (2005:71-76). The models are aimed at 
identifying relational patterns among parts that form a whole system (e.g. relations 
among individuals in a community). The changes in the relations define changes in 
societal hierarchies and hence potential redistributions of economic power and 
resources. A changing institutional framework of social contracts at a political level 
would enable changing patterns of economic distribution to form at local and 
individual levels. In this sense, economics is embedded in an evolving social 
structure13 (Wells in Oosthuizen et al, 2005:71-76). Hence, the models aimed at 
explaining a local economic event must define a prevalent institutional framework, 
the relations among parts that make up the whole systems and the conflicting forces, 
which encourage or prevent any institutional change. A new technological innovation 
or vested interests of corrupt sectors could form such forces (North, 1992).     
 
Following Saleth’s (2004) topography of institutional evolution, the models should 
historically describe; 
a) the slowly evolving status quo - made up of cultural norms, ethics, traditions, 
etc., at a local level,  
                                                 
13 Hodgson (2006:3), however, does not fully agree with this definition, because for him “social 
structures include sets of relations that may not be codified in discourse, such as demographic 
structures in … human societies before any understanding of demography”. 
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b) the political processes of creating new social contracts by consensus (i.e. as 
informed by public choice theories), which often lead to an establishment of 
formal institutions such as constitutions or property rights, and  
c) the ensuing competition of choices among self interested individuals (as may 
be analysed through game theory).  
At all three levels the distributions of information and power, the strategic behaviours 
of actors and external forces from the surrounding environment, should be identified 
and their effects explained as drivers of constant change. Such information would 
provide the most useful backdrop for understanding historical and current economic 
events as well as their narration. When neoclassical economists have attempted to 
consider any role of institutions in their discussions or arguments, albeit without the 
ideological inclinations or rigour of institutionalism, their tendencies have been to 
focus more on formal institutions, to the neglect of informal ones, such as cultural 
norms and traditional practices.  
 
However, because institutionalists acknowledge the important roles that are played by 
informal institutions in human relations, what in neoclassical economics may be 
considered as irrational behaviour is often understood within context in institutional 
analyses and therefore factored into systematic models of storytelling. Such inclusions 
also make it possible for the discipline of economics as a whole to be reintegrated into 
the discourse of social sciences and a more pluralistic inquiry. It is, for instance, more 
possible to investigate and discuss issues such as “technology, power, the state of the 
working class, instrumentalism, pragmatism, conflict and resolution, social forces, 
resource distribution, social evolution, philosophical-ethical relativism, or absolutism, 
cultural progress, contextualism, economic organisation and control … deliberate 
social control and/or industrialisation, humanism, and inter alia economic planning, 
etc.” (Samuels in Wilber and Harrison, 1978:72), within such a framework. However, 
and possibly because of the breadth of such topics, institutionalism as a sub-discipline 
of economics has not developed an elaborate corpus of analytical tools (similar to the 
theory of the firm or marginal utility theory in microeconomics). What has been 
developed is a method without rigid or prescriptive guidelines that often lead to a 
dangerous determinism (Merriam, 1988 in Oosthuizen et al., 2005:71-72). A mode of 
investigation, rather than a box of prescriptive tools, informs the institutionalist 
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method. Such a mode, Wilber and Harrison (1978:73) argue, is holistic, systematic 
and evolutionary.  
 
The holistic pattern model, as a term, is borrowed from the physical science theories 
of a non-Euclidean, non-Newtonian and non-mechanistic nature (e.g. Darwin’s theory 
of evolution). Hodgson (1998:168) contends that this mode of investigation also 
informed the core of Veblen’s economic inquiries. In this mode, it is probabilities that 
characterise the relativist explanations and/or propositions. Even though the parts of a 
system may be studied in separation, they are always presumed to be related somehow 
at a holistic or systematic level. Hence, their interrelatedness makes them useful in 
explaining (past and current) economic events. For instance, an event is explained by 
identifying its relational position in the pattern of change. The explanation of a 
cumulative causation, rather than of prediction, is one that is given the highest 
priority. The method “strives for a depth of understanding as an end in itself, not as an 
attempt to predict what may happen in the future, or to generalise (through some 
general law) to a universe” (Oosthuizen et al., 2005:72).  
 
The participant-observer14 method illustrates best the construction and application of a 
holistic pattern model of explanation in the social sciences (e.g. in ethnographic 
research). The subject matter under observation needs to be a unified system. 
Moreover, it is not the magnitude but the wholeness of the system that makes it. The 
system could be as small as a particular household or some organisation, or as big as a 
national or global economy (Wilber and Harrison, 1978). In constructing pattern 
models, the observer needs to be socialised into the system s/he is describing. The 
norms and traditions of the system need to be impressed upon him or her, for example 
the important economic ceremonies, conspicuous consumption, dowry payment 
rituals, and the observations of social status in various contexts. Procedurally, the 
observer divides the systems into parts and sub-parts looking out for themes that are 
most recurrent as well as connected to others already identified. The procedure is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. Such themes would then highlight and validate the system’s 
unity and uniqueness. From the historical facts that gradually allow self-narration, the 
                                                 
14 In the method the researcher is embedded in the subject matter that s/he is investigating. For 
instance, s/he observes the same local practices in which s/he is also a participant (i.e. ethnographic 
research). 
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researcher would construct preliminary descriptions and interpretations of the 
relations of the parts to one another and to the whole system (Ramstad, 1986; Wilber 
and Harrison, 1978). In this manner, the current institutional framework as inherited 
from the past, the processes of negotiating future social contracts and the economic 
outcomes from strategic actions of individual players are identified, understood and 
described15.   In Figure 3.1, A, B and C represent the parts of a unique system. t1, t2 
and t3 represent recurrent themes such as ritual economic practices (e.g. dowry) of the 
parts (actors). The lines connecting the parts represent the relations among parts as 
reflected in observed practices. It is through the relations that the parts form a unique 
and a unified system.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 The whole system with sub parts and a number of connecting themes 
(Source: Ramstad, 1986:1072) 
 
Being able to describe a system in this manner enables the observer to identify the 
underlying dominant institutions. However, there may be other external forces acting 
upon the system, for example an introduction of a new technology or outside policy. 
An observer should document these forces as potential modifiers to a local 
institutional framework over time, obviously with internal resistance from those 
sectors that benefit from the current status quo. The more time is spent inside the 
system and the more themes that can be related repeatedly across the various parts, 
the more likely that an observer would discover a more fine tuned and accurate 
                                                 
15 At this point it should be remembered that North (1990:3-6) stressed that the “modelling strategies 
and skills of the team as it develops is a separate process from modelling the creation, evolution, and 
consequences of the rules”. Describing the existing institutional framework, for instance, would be 
modelling the current rules of the game, the investigation and description of public choice processes in 
creating new social contracts would be modelling the evolution of the rules, and an analysis of 
bargaining processes among actors (e.g. using game theory) would be modelling the strategies and 
skills of actors within existing rules.      
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representation of a local institutional framework This process is referred to as a 
deeper form of socialisation (Oosthuizen et al., 2005:72).  However, and as already 
mentioned, it would not be possible to present a truly accurate framework, since the 
system under observation is dynamic and evolving, hence the main aim of the 
modelling exercise is to discover probabilities.  
 
With the most accurate description of the institutional framework in place and 
depending on what aims the researcher has in mind more standard economic models, 
e.g. transaction cost theories (e.g. North, 1992), game theory (e.g. Ostrom, 1990) or 
public choice theories (Buchanan, 1991) could be applied for specific investigations. 
However, the interpretation of results from such investigations should always relate to 
the described institutional framework, which would be one of the ways in which they 
could relate and be useful in understanding a real economic system. For instance, 
Ostrom (1990 and 1992) used game theoretic approaches to investigate bargaining 
processes in the management of irrigation water resources within an institutional 
framework, with the future aim of establishing a better and more socially efficient and 
sustainable framework.  
  
Nevertheless, a few points to keep in mind about this type of constructing an 
institutional model, as argued by Diesing (1971 in Wilber and Harrison, 1978:77), are 
that:  
           “The nature of human subject matter (re)-produces the incompleteness of 
pattern. Human systems are always developing and always unfinished; they 
always retain inconsistencies, ambiguities, and absurdities. Belief systems never 
achieve complete rationality and consistency; personalities and groups are always 
in the process of resolving old conflicts and sharpening new ones; accumulations 
of power are always crumbling and being rebuilt; ceremonies are being elaborated 
or simplified. Consequently, a faithful model of a particular system at a particular 
time will itself include inconsistencies, ambiguities, and exceptions. How many of 
these are due to the inconsistencies of the subject matter and how many to the 
looseness of the method is difficult to say.”                
               
Essentially, what this means is that:  
a) there are hardly any universal laws in human systems (including economic 
ones),  
b) the idea of atomised, well informed and rational individuals does not have a 
place in real economic systems, and  
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c) the use of formal models in economics should be carried out within well 
described institutional frameworks, and within which there is a two way 
communication.    
 
3.4.1 The limitations of an institutionalist approach 
 
At theoretical and practical levels, research remains an on-going process, especially 
because progress in finding lasting solutions to real life challenges is slow. The 
statement applies equally to institutional research. Because, pattern models do not 
have a scientific precision, the use of holist concepts and data should be monitored 
continuously and crosschecked against new observations, cases and examples. 
Otherwise, the body of knowledge generated by institutionalists could be as 
relativistic as its methods and as ambiguous in its meanings. A very serious limitation 
of the method is that the process of constructing holistic models is prone to theorist-
biased preferences. Because researchers have to observe even their participation in 
their research, the challenge posed by the observer’s paradox16 is also enhanced. 
Moreover, the impreciseness of concepts makes the verification process of the 
accuracy of descriptions more difficult (Stone, 1978; Merriam, 1988 in Oosthuizen et 
al., 2005:75). These are the reasons why an institutionalist would avoid attempting to 
discover general laws, as his or her theories are continuously evolving. His or her 
definitions are most likely to be long and open-ended, which could be confusing, 
especially to scientifically inclined researchers. For these reasons, institutional 
economists should guard against overemphasising vagueness and suggestiveness, as 
these would lead to uncontrollable speculation beyond empirical testing. For any 
method of research, a balance needs to be struck between precision and rigour, as 
overemphasised in formal methods (Weintraub, 2006), and suggestiveness for 
creativity in social research (Wilber and Harrison, 1978:83-84). Regarding scientific 
rigour in case-studies, “(t)he following are some of important elements relevant (or 
guidelines to the) process: a) identifying the intent of the case, that is, whether the 
research is testing and modifying existing theory or (is it) exploratory research, b) 
including explicit discussion of relevant theories and published literature on the 
                                                 
16 This is an idea that the act of observation interferes with the subject matter and hence what is being 
observed is also altered during the act, which means that the description of the matter could not be 
accurate.   
 53
phenomenon being studied, just as any empirical analysis that uses quantitative 
methods to test theory, i.e. being careful with data, d) (incorporating) analytical aids, 
e) using multiple sources of data for as many variables as feasible, f) telling a good 
story, being sure that the manuscript is (close to) complete and (is) logically 
constructed, g) being forthright about (the) limitations and questions for further tests, 
empirical or logical” (Oosthuizen et al., 2005: 76).      
 
3.5 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK: A REVIEW OF SOME TOOLS IN IRRIGATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT APPLICATIONS 
 
Since the primary focus of the study is on economic development issues in irrigated 
agriculture and the use of institutionalism as a framework for analysis, it is 
appropriate at this point to review some theoretical and practical models that have 
been used in institutional research. However, to be consistent with the line of 
argument presented so far, especially the critique against the inappropriate use of 
positivist methods, the present discussion should demonstrate restraint in the use of 
empirically falsifiable propositions as its main method. What this entails is that the 
broader framework adopted in the study is one that follows, a) the discussion and 
analysis of institutional hierarchies (Williamson, 2000), and b) the institutional 
evolution presented in section four (Saleth, 2004). As argued in the last section, 
various other tools and methods, even formal models, can be used in institutional 
research. However, the use must directly inform the objectives of a broader 
framework of, a) presenting an historical account of prevalent institutions, b) 
discussing the political processes through which societies negotiate new rules and 
practices, and c) analysing the strategies used by individual actors in competition 
games played within socially agreed upon rules. The framework should then first 
allow an institutional discussion and application of:  
a) competition and transaction costs (i.e. market based theories),  
b) public choice theories (i.e. political processes), and  
c) the distributions of power and information which may lead to conflict (i.e. 
economic and political bargaining) and, second, the use of formal tools for 
verification of hypothesis as discovered from institutional research.  
Such theories will be discussed and applied to varying degrees throughout the study 
and within the broader discussion of an institutional evolution of development issues 
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in irrigated agriculture. Hence, the section presents one of such analytical tools with 
an illustration of its institutional application as will be used in the forthcoming case 
studies and institutional discussion.                       
 
3.5.1 A framework for analysing information asymmetries for development 
  
Bromley (1982) formulated a Physical Externality Model (PEM) with supporting data 
gathered from case studies documented from river basins in developing countries like 
Mexico, Sudan, and Pakistan. The model incorporated institutional and formal 
elements in its research approach. It could be argued that the main point of Bromley’s 
(1982) study was to illustrate an important characteristic of path dependency17 of 
informal and unwritten institutions. As illustrated through the model and in support of 
North’s (1992) argument, the economic development path that institutions may take 
does not necessarily have to be an efficient one. Such is especially true in cases where 
information asymmetries and bargaining power disparities exist. Bromley (1982) 
showed that uncertainty led to sub optimum production outcomes, and unequal 
bargaining powers sustained these outcomes. Looking at river basins, with a special 
geographical design, which allow a certain type of water diversions and allocations to 
take place, through the model he argued that the primary source of uncertainty along a 
river (a type of watercourse) is its physical design. The decisions taken within the 
uncertainties, over time become the operational rules and practices that become 
particular to that system. The resultant economic outcomes from the rules are 
persistent production and market inefficiencies. The conclusion drawn was that the 
formulation of public policies (i.e. external institutional intervention) should 
understand and factor in the primary sources of these inefficiencies prior to any 
prescription of redress actions. Because the real cause of the problem is a 
geographical one, which might be difficult to resolve without technocratic solutions, 
the alternative solutions would be institutional in nature. The aim of institutional 
policies in these cases should aim at reducing the levels of uncertainties created by the 
physical design of the watercourse to encourage more efficient markets. This 
argument is based on, a) limiting transaction costs with the establishment of better 
institutions for better information flows (e.g. North, 1992), and b) the continuous 
                                                 
17 This means that once established institutions are resistant to change. 
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bargaining strategies (e.g. Ostrom, 1990) of farmers (often actors with unequal 
economic powers) who divert water inputs from the watercourse.    
 
In illustrating the nature of the production inefficiencies that are prevalent in the 
system, Bromley (1982) borrowed analytical tools from the general equilibrium of 
welfare economics (Black et al., 2005 and Fryer, 2004). An Edgeworth box diagram 
was used to depict production inefficiencies. The use of the PEM in this study 
illustrates the way in which an institutional research approach could borrow tools 
from formal methods, however, but with the overall purpose of discussing the 
evolution of local institutions, in this case the operational rules in allocating irrigation 
water.             
  
Formally, the Physical Externality Model (PEM) postulates that the geographical 
positions of farm units along a watercourse in which water is diverted individually 
(figure 3.2) give rise to technical inefficiencies that adversely affect the production 
outputs of, especially, downstream farmers, cet. par. Data from case studies from 
selected developing countries indicate that the farm units, which are located at 
upstream positions, tend to be bigger in size and their owners tend to have a bigger 
political influence on decision-making institutions that govern allocations and output 
market prices. The inefficiencies arise because of uncertainties regarding how much 
water would be available for the next cycle of production. Figure 3.2 illustrates a 
watercourse in which uncertainties intensify as one moves from the most upstream 
(A) to the most downstream (B) location.  
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  Figure 3.2: A watercourse with individual water abstractions  
 
According to the PEM, the farmer located at B is economically disadvantaged 
compared to the one at position A. This is because his/her decisions with regard to 
basic inputs, especially water resources, are dependent on how much water is 
abstracted upstream, by the farmer located at A, hence how much water is available to 
him/her. In the model it is assumed that the farmers are naturally risk averse, hence, a) 
farmer B’s allocated budget for production inputs - within an environment of 
heightened uncertainty - would be conservative, and b) farmers rely on the last 
production cycle’s data to make decisions for the current cycle.  
 
In Figure 3.3, the production inefficiencies are illustrated using an Edgeworth Box 
diagram, where finite levels of water inputs are represented on the horizontal axis and 
all other inputs on the vertical axis. The figure only depicts a 2 x 2 economy with only 
two producers (farmer A and B); however, the results extend to an n-farmer and n-
sector economy.    
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Figure 3.3: Inefficient resource allocations in agricultural production 
Source: Bromley (1982:13) 
 
The PEM also postulates that after an initial round of bargaining between the farmers 
and after decisions have been taken on input allocations, due to prevalent 
uncertainties, farmer A ends up producing at point K, and B at point J. Both of these 
positions are inefficient, because as seen in the diagram they lie outside the contract 
curve AB, which represents efficient productions (Black, et al. 2005:17-19). 
Moreover, the illustration shows that farmer B’s share of resources is much smaller 
than Farmer A’s, as s/he operates on a much lower isoquant. This illustrates the 
dominant economic position of upstream farmers.       
 
The PEM highlights the deleterious effects of information asymmetries, which 
prevent efficient markets from forming and reinforce unequal distributions of 
economic and political power that may already exist. Institutionally, the reliance on 
data from past production cycles form part of an ingrained and self-sustaining cultural 
practice (of self-regulating rules) that govern the behaviour of the whole system (a 
farming community) (Bromley, 1982, North, 1991).  
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How public policy proceeds in resolving these inefficiencies depends on, first, how it 
regards technology (that may physically reconfigure the watercourse design) as an 
important solution compared to the persistent institutions that sustain the uncertainties 
and unequal power distributions. For instance, institutionalists interested in economic 
development would think of institutions as the core solution to the problem and 
technology as a supporting factor. On the other hand, supply economists would be 
inclined to prioritise the technological solution as the singular engine for improving 
the system, by thinking of prevailing institutions only as a constraint (transaction cost) 
in adopting new technological innovation that would redesign the water system 
(Bromley, 1982:31). Such thinking would lead to the construction of dams, canals, 
control structures, etc., without paying much attention to the operational rules. 
However, as shown by historical evidence technological solutions are not always the 
brightest solutions in resolving irrigation problems in developing countries (Eicher, 
1999). The failure of many technological agricultural projects in Africa as highlighted 
by Eicher (1999) supports this argument. Moreover, Bromley (1982:36) contended 
that “(i)t is for this simple reason that the traditional (technocratic) approach to 
irrigation agriculture has created a number of unsuccessful projects. It is not sufficient 
to construct the engineering works and ‘get the water flowing’ with only vague and 
general rules governing water allocation and maintenance of the system”.  A historical 
account and description of prevailing institutions as discussed in this chapter would 
form the basis for making any technocratic decision, however, within an institutional 
framework. On the other hand, the establishment and/or encouragement of better 
institutions to evolve should not equate itself to the importation of institutions from 
other environments or countries in the hope of short-circuiting the time consuming 
process of encouraging indigenous institutions (Eicher, 1999:5). These points are 
illustrated with evidence from the Kat River Valley case studies to be presented in 
chapter five.  
  
3.6 CONCLUDING SUMMARY  
 
The main points from the chapter are that the understanding of institutions is the key 
to all economic thinking and research. The neoclassical economic assumptions of 
rational, atomised individuals who are free from institutional constraint remain 
unrealistic. Economic theorising that is founded on these assumptions would always 
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be out of touch with real economic transactions. Any economic models that are 
premised on these assumptions would remain the ‘conceptual straightjacket’, as 
referred to by Demsetz (1969 in Rutherford, 2001:186).  
 
The alternative solutions proposed by institutionalists are different; however they are 
not too foreign to other social sciences, and hence require a mental shift in the way 
economists think about economic issues and general research. Nevertheless, the 
solutions are far from being fault free. However, their application especially in 
research would allow a more realistic engagement of the economic issues by the 
discipline. As Coase (1998) would have it, they would bring the study of the blood 
circulation closer to its body. On the other hand, following the new institutionalist 
tradition, an economist would not have to throw away all of the neoclassical economic 
tools from the box. However, s/he would have to learn to use them more responsibly 
and appropriately as required within an institutional framework. One of the aims of 
this study is to illustrate how such a framework is designed using irrigated agriculture 
as a vehicle for economic development in a well-demarcated and local context. 
Hence, in the following chapter the methods used in designing the research approach 
to the study, collection and analysis of data from KRV case studies are set out more 
fully.        
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CHAPTER FOUR – RESEARCH METHODS 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The methods used in collecting and analysing data for this research were mostly 
ethnographic and institutional in nature. For the main phase of the project, three 
primary case studies were documented from the Kat River Valley (KRV), and local 
and international cases from environments similar to the KRV were reviewed for 
comparative analyses. Scientific as well as technical data were collected from 
academic, government, business reports and from minute records of meetings of 
various organizations in and outside the KRV that formed part of the research. 
Guidelines for documenting social science case studies by Oosthuizen et al. (2005) 
and a checklist of questions from Wilber and Harrison (1978:77) were continuously 
used throughout the documentation of the KRV cases to ensure that the narratives in 
the studies were the most plausible ones. The data analysis phase was based on the 
framework of institutional evolution (Saleth, 2004), which was presented in the 
previous chapter.   
 
The present chapter explains the specific methods, and the reasoning behind them, 
that were used in the two main phases of the research process between 2004 and 2006. 
The methods that were used for documenting each of the case studies in 2005 and 
2006 are also explained separately. Overall, the chapter presents the process of data 
collection and analysis, which is in line with arguments made in the previous chapters 
of employing institutional methods in economic research in general, and in 
developing country contexts specifically. It also explains how questions relating to the 
debates on economic development as presented in chapter two were interrogated in 
the study.  Hence, section two of the chapter explains the methods used in the 
preliminary phase of the research and those used in each of the KRV case studies. In 
section three, the framework used in analysing both primary and secondary data is 
explained. Section four summarizes.     
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4.2 INCEPTION PHASE 
 
The initial work for the research began in 2004. Based on the requirements for 
implementing the water resource management objectives of the National Water Act 
(NWA, 36 of 1998) in the Kat River Valley (KRV) catchment, a systematic-random 
universal sample (Stoker, 1984:3-9) of 234 household observations was drawn from 
three socio-economically different communities18. The primary aim of the household 
questionnaire survey was to establish a basic understanding of the area’s demographic 
patterns. From this preliminary survey and discussions of the NWA’s (1998) 
implementation process it was concluded that one of the ways in which the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) could economically develop and 
empower the local rural population for their participation in local water management 
institutions was through skills development in incentive driven business projects. 
Hence, from the conclusions the premise was established in the main phase of the 
research for investigating an irrigated agriculture-based and river basin-wide 
development programme. The various community group tensions and conflicts with 
respect to water allocations found in the valley were used as vehicles through which 
to interrogate economic development themes similar to those discussed by Ostrom 
(1990) and Bromley (1982). Such an approach was guided by investigations of social 
and economic transaction costs (from the prevailing local conflicts) as they affected 
economic development in the same vein as discussed by North (1990 and 1991), 
which was presented in the previous chapter.    
 
From the preliminary survey and meetings19 with the KRV farmers throughout 2004, 
at least three social systems or communities were demarcated for investigation using 
the Ramstad (1986) framework illustrated in figure 4.1. These systems were identified 
for their homogeneity with regard to variables like farming and business activities, 
historical patterns of settlement, geographical location within the KRV, political 
                                                 
18 Rural villages and Seymour township were divided into five and three zones on maps used for town-
planning by the Nkonkobe Municipality. The zones containing a proportionate number of houses were 
systematically identified for interviews. Moreover, ten black and white Commercial farmers were 
selected for questionnaire-guided interviews. Ultimately three sub-samples of, a) commercial farmers, 
b) rural villagers and subsistence farmers and c) township residents formed the universal sample 
(Mbatha, 2005:58) These communities are represented in Map 4.1 
 
19 Almost on a monthly basis. 
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leverages at local water management institutions, etc. The communities are 
identifiable in Map 4.1, namely a) the group of white commercial farmers in the 
Middle to Lower reaches of the valley, b) the black commercial farmers and 
subsistence farmers in villages of the Upper reaches. 
 
Map 4.1 The KRV farming communities20 
 
Notably, most of the social and geographical characteristics used in demarcating the 
communities also mirrored their different economic attributes. For instance, the 
                                                 
20 Distance scale may not be accurate due to map fitting on page.  
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groups with higher political influences at local water management institutions 
happened to be relatively more economically empowered, as they owned bigger and 
more profitable farms for instance. Hence, by employing an institutional approach in 
investigating the social systems, the characteristics also formed the basis for 
identifying the themes of investigation as discussed in chapter three and illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. For example, an attribute like farming business operations was studied 
within and across the three sub-systems as a theme represented by t1 or t2 in Figure 
4.1., where part a or b or c in the actual cases would represented a specific group of 
farmers, for example commercial citrus farmers. 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.1 The whole system with sub parts and a number of connecting themes 
(Source: Ramstad, 1986:1072) 
 
Following Oosthuizen et al.’s (2005) guidelines21 on documenting case studies or 
holistic stories, the KRV communities were studied from the year 2005 to 2006. The 
specific methods used in documenting each of the KRV cases are presented separately 
in the following sub-sections. Moreover, throughout the data collection and analyses 
processes as well as during the write up phase of each of the cases a checklist 
developed by Wilber and Harrison (1978:77) was used as a guide in discovering the 
most plausible narrative lines. These questions were asked: 
a) are the facts and theories correct? 
b) are important facts or theories omitted? 
c) can one find other stories, which use the facts and theories employed in the 
given story? 
                                                 
21 It was ensured that the studies were, a) particularistic, b) descriptive, c) heuristic and d) their internal 
cohesion mostly relied on inductive reasoning. Merriam (1988 in Oosthuizen et al., 2005:71) explains 
the meanings of these characteristics as, a) focused on a particular event or programme, b) being rich in 
the description of the event, c) presenting new meanings to known phenomenon, respectively.      
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d) are the facts and theories relevant or essential to the story; that is, can no other 
hypothesis be used to tell as good a story about the facts? 
e) do experts in various parts of the story believe the story itself? 
f) are cultural values correctly stated?           
g) are all cultural values included in the story? 
 
With regard to the KRV case studies, the purpose of going through the questions, 
more than once, was to ensure that the data collected from various methods was 
useful in creating the most coherent story, as different stories, with vested interests, 
were presented to researchers by many of the respondents in the field.  
     
4.2.1 Case study one: business partnerships in irrigated agriculture - a case of 
black commercial farmers 
  
The data collection process for the case study was conducted in two phases over a 
period of a year and a half between 2004 and 2005. In the preliminary phase of the 
research, basic data of a qualitative and quantitative nature were obtained through 
questionnaire interviews with fifteen black and white commercial farmers (out of a 
total of thirty) and through attending the KRV Water Users’ Association (WUA) bi-
monthly meetings and workshops organised by water specialists from Rhodes 
University. The data from that period formed the basis for designing the second phase 
of the research, with the data collection-process taking place during 2005 (Appendix 
1). The methods used in 2004 were mostly conventional and included a Contingent 
Valuation (CV) survey component. The methods used in 2005, however, were heavily 
influenced by institutional economic discussions by Wilber and Harrison (1978), 
Ramstad (1986) and Oosthuizen et al. (2005), etc., some of which were presented in 
the last chapter. The methods entailed that various research approaches, for example 
the observer-participant, formal questionnaire guided interviews, attendances of 
business meetings, reviews of documents, be concurrently22 employed in the 
collection and analysis of data. The overall aim of these methods was to recreate 
various political, historical and economic narratives of the citrus industry as it 
affected the black commercial group of farmers in the KRV.   
                                                 
22 “By using a combination of observations, (e.g. interviewing and document analysis) the field worker 
is able to use different sources to validate and crosscheck findings”, which may also be contradictory as 
no one source of information is deemed to the most accurate (Patton in Oosthuizen et al, 2005:72). 
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Moreover, preliminary and follow up formal interviews were conducted with relevant 
chief planners and engineers23 from four provincial government departments and two 
statutory bodies, namely, the provincial DWAF, Department of Land Affairs (DLA), 
Department of Agriculture (DoA), the Land and the Water Research Commissions. 
The purpose of these interviews were to acquire documents with official historical 
information from the government as well as unofficial and often off-the-record, 
accounts of how some of the officials perceived the political and business proceedings 
that affected the black citrus farmers in the KRV and elsewhere in the province. The 
gathering of unofficial data included informal discussions about the history of the 
various departments’ difficulties on political engagements with the emerging farming 
community in general and the black KRV citrus farmers specifically. During such 
discussions, off-the-record views and attitudes of officials responsible for public 
policy implementation processes were highly valued and noted for later use in 
analyses of sustained institutional conflicts in the valley. The views were also used as 
guidelines in formulating questions and points of discussions with farmers during on-
field observations of farm operations. Government archives were searched for policy 
documents, historical records, etc., that were relevant to the KRV area and the topics 
under discussion. Selected minutes from meetings (in the past five years) of the 
provincial DWAF regarding the NWA (1998) implementation process with 
institutional structures set up for that specific purpose were also studied. The 
documents were analysed to identify some of the sources of policy challenges as 
reported by officials during the actual interviews.  
 
In the field, formal to informal discussions were conducted with farmers and farm 
workers and dwellers. Farmers were encouraged to give presentations on their 
business ideas for future development ventures and some provided minutes from 
meetings they had held with government officials, for example from the DLA, and 
private investment officials from the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC). The 
objectives of field visits were often open-ended to ensure that farmers had the 
opportunity to present and discuss issues of conflict that were most crucial to them.  
                                                 
23 Provincial DWAF: Senior Water Engineer, Regional Office in Cradock, 2005     
  Provincial DLA: Chief Land Planner Regional Office in Port Elizabeth, 2004 and 2005  
  Provincial DoA: Senior Engineer, Regional Office in East London, 2005 
  Provincial Office: The Land Commission, Land Commissioner  in East London, 2006 
  National Office: The Water Research Commission (WRC) in Pretoria, 2004 - 2006  
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Finally, significant themes or factors gathered from the presentations of current 
business activities, discussions on points of local conflicts, reading of minutes, 
analyses of future business plans and official policy documents were isolated for 
further inquiries within a transactional cost framework (North, 1992), which was 
presented in the previous chapter. The themes that received the greatest attention and 
were most recurring in most data, for instance land tenure insecurities, farm debts, 
mismanagement of citrus farms, provided the orientation for presenting, discussing 
and evaluating the important factors regarding the developmental prospects of black 
commercial farmers as well as the valley on the whole.  
 
4.2.2 Case study two: economic externalities in water allocations – a case of white 
citrus farmers in the middle and lower Kat River reaches    
 
More than one method was used in collecting data for the case study, and a more 
formal approach was adopted in the analysis of both historical and technical 
information that was gathered. The historical patterns of water allocation rules and 
conflicts were presented and analysed alongside quantitative measurements of 
abstracted water quantities and quality throughout the period under study. The 
approach entailed an application of Bromley’s (1982) Physical Externality Model 
(PEM) (which was presented in chapter three), where, a) the actual water quantities 
and quality of water abstractions, b) the water storage practices, and c) the sizes of 
land developments were analysed alongside the observed and reported tensions 
among competing groups of farmers.     
 
Between 2004 and 2005, six meetings of the Water User’s Association were attended. 
Ten semi-formal and formal interviews (Appendix 1) were conducted (where some 
were tape-recorded) with white commercial farmers from the different sections of the 
KRV. Selected sections of the recorded interviews were transcribed and used in 
recreating anecdotal historical accounts of settlement patterns in the valley and of the 
evolution of water allocation rules and business activities. Large citrus farms and 
small irrigation crop schemes were continually visited, between 2004 and 2006, for 
on-site observations of how water resources were abstracted, used and stored on farms 
from the Kat River system. In 2004 and 2006, water management and irrigation 
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business workshops were facilitated for small-scale farmers and domestic water users. 
The workshops formed a platform for a two-way exchange of water policy related and 
agricultural business information. Once again, interview meetings with officials from 
the provincial government departments, i.e. the DWAF, DLA and the Land 
Commission, were conducted in 2005. Archival data from the KRV WUA and DWAF 
pertaining to water allocation rights and records of payments in the past ten years 
were acquired for comparative investigations. Transcribed minutes of the KRV WUA 
meetings between the years 2001 and 2004 were acquired for the same analysis. 
Interviews and workshops organised by water scientists at Rhodes University, 
working in the Kat River system, were conducted and attended respectively to collect 
scientific data. Documents on water quality measurements in the KRV system from 
2003 and 2004 were analysed against data from technical government reports as well 
as against historical data from interviews.   
 
In 2005, four research assistants were dispatched to collect data by observing the 
business operations of small irrigation schemes over extended periods.  The 
researchers spent from five to ten consecutive days in the field recording observations 
and conducting interviews. In addition to the observations made, questions that 
researchers used during in-field stays were prepared in advance in questionnaire 
format (see Appendix 2), but some were formulated as required on the spot. 
Subsistence farmers in irrigation schemes were encouraged to recount their, 
sometimes conflicting, versions of historical events and these were recorded without 
alteration for later analysis. At the same time, data from business documents, for 
example the Hacop constitution (Appendix 3) and business reports, were collected to 
be studied at a later stage. From the data, the research process once again identified 
recurrent themes (as illustrated in Figure 4.1), of a technical, geographical and 
historical nature for an institutional analysis of water allocation conflicts using the 
Physical Externality Model as framework. The data were analysed for conformity, or 
lack thereof, to the model. The main policy discussions in this case, however, were 
framed within an institutional approach, which focussed on political power 
distributions and conflicts.  
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4.2.3 Case study three: political and business institutions – a case of subsistence 
farmers 
 
The focus of the case study was micro in the sense that a small irrigation scheme, 
which used less than seventy hectares of land and had thirty active members in 2005, 
formed the subject of investigation. Hence, an even more ethnographic approach in 
documenting the case was employed. Between 2004 and 2007, intermittent interviews 
with the scheme’s leadership were held on a continuous basis (at least at three 
monthly intervals) with an aim of monitoring and gathering information regarding the 
business and marketing opportunities as well as external support that was available (or 
lacking) to the scheme. In late 2005 and over a period of ten consecutive days, two 
researchers monitored24 the scheme’s operations on a daily basis.  Two weekly 
meetings of the scheme that took place during the ten days were attended, after which 
on-the-spot interviews with twenty members of the scheme were conducted. The 
majority of the questions asked were related to the daily operations of the scheme and 
the proceedings at the weekly meetings. Documents of a technical and business nature 
were studied and compared to the actual activities as observed in practice. The 
primary aim of the research methods employed at Hacop were, a) to tell a political 
and economic story of the scheme since its inception in 1994, b) to identify factors 
that gave rise to its establishment and sustainability for over ten years, and c) the 
political and business oriented struggles that prevented it from growing in numbers 
and in economic activity. Hence, a highly detailed and descriptive tone was 
deliberately used in documenting the case. In line with social science writing, the way 
in which conclusions were drawn from discussions and analyses of events and factors, 
were for the most part, inductive in nature. An emphasis was also placed on the 
“direct concern with experience as it (was) lived or felt or undergone (by the Hacop 
members)” (Sherman and Webb in Oosthuizen, 2005:72). In addition, media reports 
and academic articles written about the scheme were reviewed during and after the 
collection of field data. To make more sense of the information gathered in field, a 
workshop was facilitated with the scheme members and leadership to clarify, accept 
and/or refute the interpretations of events and data as recorded by researchers, (see 
Appendix 4 for the meeting’s agenda). Moreover, the workshop was held to provide 
                                                 
24 This entailed daily observations and noting of interesting and odd operations in the field and business 
practices.   
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farmers with an outsider’s understanding of their business activities, and to exchange 
knowledge about some of the government’s policies, for example the NWA (1998) 
and the legal implications of setting up a Trust Fund as a potential vehicle for 
conducting the scheme’s formal businesses25. Scheme members requested this 
information beforehand. The workshop proceedings were a prototypical example of a 
situation in which researchers became active participants during the process of 
collecting data. After the workshop, meetings with the DLA and the Land 
Commission were conducted to establish an official view on the future prospects of 
the scheme’s survival especially with regard to land tenure issues.     
 
4.3 THE ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
Since the majority of the primary data gathered for all case studies and discussions 
were historical and institutional in nature, the main framework of analysis that was 
later used was institutional. This framework adopted from Saleth (2004) was 
discussed in the previous chapter. However, in the second case study, the scientific 
and economic data, especially with regard to allocation rules of water quantities and 
quality and associated economic externalities, a more formalised analysis employing 
the propositions of the Physical Externality Model (PEM) was employed. In the 
discussions and measurements of water abstraction rules, the research sought to verify 
whether the data confirmed or disputed the PEM propositions as presented in chapter 
three and illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.3. Hence, the historical data with regard to 
participation trends and voice dominance of certain groups at local water management 
institutions were studied against the backdrop of more scientific data, i.e., on volumes 
of abstracted water, land sizes developed for irrigation business, production outputs, 
available markets and geographical positions of farmers. The analysis also looked at 
how external political agents had historically influenced the status quo for the period 
under analysis. Based on the results of how the data fared against the PE model 
propositions, institutional factors judged to have been crucial for the development 
process of the KRV, but missing in the PEM propositions, were identified for 
discussions on remedial policy options.            
 
                                                 
25 The majority of the information presented during the workshop in this regard was acquired from the 
Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
 70
To illustrate the complimentary values of an institutionally founded knowledge, and 
the usefulness of the research framework proposed in chapter seven, in the design of 
contextualised formal research questions, the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is used 
to investigate two hypothetical questions with regard to the effects of land insecurity 
on the process of development. Simple and linear regression models, which 
investigate the relationships between selected institutional variables, such as the 
effects of private land tenure rights on average income earnings and acquisition of 
formal years of education for some individuals in the 2004 KRV sample are 
investigated.  
 
Overall, a predominantly institutional framework of analysis was applied to all the 
KRV cases and those used for comparative analyses, which were documented from 
developing countries such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe. In that regard, Saleth’s (2004) 
three-stage topography of institutional evolution, which was reviewed in chapter 
three, was used to guide the discussion. Firstly, data from the KRV case studies were 
analysed for how competing forces among various cultural institutions may have led 
to their rise and/or demise. The exercise entailed an isolation of economic 
in/efficiencies of formal and informal water institutions that were most dominant in 
the 20th century. The resilience of especially inefficient institutions was discussed 
with connections made to the external political environments that may have supported 
them, where fair economic competition may have led to their elimination. The 
analysis employed North’s (1992) theoretical propositions in discussions of 
transaction costs and the long-term survival of social and economic institutions. 
Secondly, an analysis and discussion was presented on how local institutions deemed 
to be economically inefficient survived as a result of prevalent social conventions and 
without any external support. The analysis was framed around Quiggin’s (1988) 
discussion of communal rules on the use of natural resources and Hirschman’s (1960) 
propositions of ‘the ideas of images of change as obstacles to change’ that were 
discussed in chapter two. Thirdly, the display of power as it manifested itself at 
institutions like the KRV WUA was analysed from data gathered especially from 
meeting attendances and minutes. That analysis entailed an investigation of the rules, 
especially with regard to water allocations, that were dominant in the KRV WUA 
operations, and if the rules indeed favoured the more economically and politically 
powerful farmer groups in KRV. Questions on how the present public policy 
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environment challenged or supported the political status quo in the KRV were also 
investigated.    
               
At a theoretical level, data was used to explore questions and debates posed in chapter 
two, which pertain to issues of economic development in developing country 
contexts.  At this level results and recommendations for policy from other local and 
international case studies with irrigated agricultural themes, compiled using more 
formal methods were presented and comparisons were made on how these differed 
from the methods, conclusions and recommendations made in present research. 
Hence, the comparative discussions formed a platform for proposing a case for the 
unique contributions of institutional investigations to economic research in general 
that may be missed in strictly formal approaches.           
 
4.4 CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
 
The chapter explained how the research process was divided into two phases. The 
preliminary phase was more formal in nature and used a questionnaire survey to 
establish a basic understanding of social, political and economic indicators. It was 
emphasised that the most important phase of the research, from 2005 onwards, 
employed a multiple of research methods, especially in the collection of data for the 
writing of the KRV case studies. The main phase of the research was also heavily 
grounded in institutionalism and was informed by Oosthuizen et al.’s (2005) 
propositions for documenting sound social case studies. A checklist of questions from 
Wilber and Harrison (1978:77) ensured that stories told in the case studies were the 
most plausible. The methods used in collecting data for all case studies were also 
explained separately.   
 
In the data analysis phase, the chapter explained how Saleth’s (2004) topography of 
institutional evolution was used as a guide framework. It was explained how results 
and conclusions from similar case studies documented locally and internationally 
were used in presenting arguments in support of the inclusion of institutional 
investigations in economic research, but more specifically in research conducted in 
areas similar to the KRV area. Lastly, the context in which questions and debates on 
economic development could be related to the KRV area was engaged. In the 
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following chapter an overview of South Africa’s important agricultural public policies 
in the water, land and marketing sectors during the 20th century is presented. The 
presentation provides a history of the external policy environment in which the KRV 
case studies and all other data in the study were embedded.                      
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CHAPTER FIVE – AN OVERVIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA’S AGRICULTURAL 
SECTOR 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since human developmental challenges, such as the inequitable distribution of 
physical and human resources in the South African economy and in the agricultural 
sector specifically have persisted, if not grown, more than twelve years into the 
‘democratic’ political dispensation of 1994, the relevant public policies need serious 
interrogation. In line with the institutional framework for the thesis, the chapter 
provides a brief overview of the South African economy and an historical presentation 
of policies in the agricultural sector26. An argument for the sector’s importance in 
overcoming the current challenges of underdevelopment in rural settings is put 
forward. Moreover, the current agricultural policy struggles or even failures at 
redressing the issues are explained within a presentation of historical policies from 
which robust institutions encouraging of underdevelopment were inherited. The 
underlying argument in the chapter (and the thesis) is that the current agricultural 
policies of the new government aimed at achieving development have lacked the 
institutional insights in their formulation and implementation design. Hence, the 
institutional baggage of historical policies is made clear and forms the backdrop from 
which the Kat River Valley case study data are presented and the institutional 
discussions and arguments for achieving development in irrigated agriculture are 
made in the thesis.  
 
In section two, an overview of the South African economy and the important position 
of the agricultural sector in tackling the challenges of underdevelopment are 
presented. A historical presentation and discussion of institutional events and 
influential policies in the sector, with associated negative impacts, are presented in 
section three. Section four summarises and concludes.        
             
 
 
                                                 
26 The policies under discussion are targeted at the marketing of agricultural products and management 
of land and water resources.  
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5.2 AGRICULTURE AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
 
Among various economic development challenges, in 2006 the South African 
economy was marked by high race-group and geographical income inequalities, high 
levels of unemployment and low levels of formal education. For instance, the gini 
coefficient measured in terms of per capita household income was estimated at 0.67 
between 1995 and 2000 (Simkins, 2004 in Black et al., 2005:216). The 
unemployment levels were reported at more than twenty six percent, using the official 
and narrow definition (Black et al., 2005:216). These problems were pronounced in 
less developed and rural regions, due to a history of unequal industrial development 
across provinces and between urban and rural areas (Nattrass, 1981:23-32 and de 
Swardt, 1983:1-28). For instance, in parts of the Eastern Cape Province, 
unemployment levels were as high as fifty percent (narrow definition) (Eastern Cape 
Government Report, 2004). Table 5.1 illustrates the extent of income inequalities as 
well as a skewed distribution of industrialization across provinces. On average, the 
poorest provinces in terms of Gross Geographic Product (GGP), for instance the Free 
State, with the exception of the Western Cape have a sizeable agricultural sector 
compared to other industries.       
 
Table 5.1 Estimated population and GGP per industry27 distributions by S.A. 
provinces   
Provinces Total 
population  
million 
Total GGP 
in billion rands 
GGP per 
capita in 
thousand 
rands 
Agriculture 
GGP   
in billion rands 
Manufacturing 
GGP  
in billion rands 
Mining GGP  
in  million 
rands 
Gauteng 9.5 180 18.9  0.9 39.1 7 400  
Kwa-Zulu Natal 9.9 72   7.2 3.2  16.5  1 000 
Western Cape 4.7 68   14.5 3.5  12 .4  100 
Eastern Cape 6.9 36  5.2  1.5 7. 0 43 
Northern Cape  1.0 10  10 1.1 0.3 1 900 
Free State 2.9 30  10.3 2.5  3 .4 4 700 
Mpumalanga 3.5 40  11.4 2.4 7.8  6 400  
North West 3.3 27  8.2 1.9 2 .0 8 600  
Limpopo 5.4 18  3.3  1.1 1.0 2 800 
TOTAL 47.1 481  10.1 18.1 82 500  32 943 
Source: Stats South Africa. (2006a) and van Riet et al., (1997) 
 
The implication from the data is that, even though South Africa was a fairly 
industrialized28 country ranked higher than Argentina by the World Bank (2006:208), 
                                                 
27 Stats South Africa (2006:4) data on GDP indicate that the financial sector’s relative size is the 
biggest at 19.8 percent of national GDP, followed by the manufacturing and retail sectors at 16.3 and 
14.0 percent respectively. The agricultural sector’s is the second smallest, estimated at 2.4 percent, only 
higher than the electricity and gas at 2.2 percent.        
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in its poorest provinces - where inequalities were also highest - the agricultural sector 
remained at the core of many economic solutions aimed at achieving economic 
development and an improved quality of life.  For instance, in 2004, more than fifty 
percent of South Africa’s formal and informal employment (of probably the lowest 
paid workers29) could be found in the agricultural sector (Nieuwoudt et al., 2004:162). 
The evidence further justifies the focus of the research on agriculture in tackling 
developmental issues within an institutional framework and a rural context. Hence, a 
basic understanding of the history of the agricultural sector and public policies that 
have shaped it in the past hundred years are important.  
 
5.3 THE HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Since 1994, three significant policies have been enacted into law by the South African 
government with the objectives of, a) promoting efficiency and development in 
agriculture, b) redistributing agricultural resources, and c) efficiently managing 
environmental water30. Firstly, the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act (47 of 
1996) is the government’s deliberate attempt at liberalising the sector from past state 
interventions of price and output quantity controls. With the enactment of the Act, 
government hoped that limits on the state’s involvement in fixing product prices 
would allow emerging farmers, mainly from previously disadvantaged groups, access 
to previously protected and big commercial farmer dominated markets as well as 
create competition for the benefit of consumers (Marketing Act Commission Report, 
1994:3). Secondly, and regarding access to land resources, it could be argued that 
political considerations, more than economic ones, were the main drivers in the 
formulation and implementation of land redistribution and restitution policies. Hence, 
the objective of the Restitution of Land Rights Act (22 of 1994) is to redistribute land 
to previously disenfranchised black groups who may have suffered forced removals as 
propagated mainly by the Natives Land Act (27 of 1913) and other subsequent 
                                                                                                                                            
28  In 2000, South Africa’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was at US $ 164 billion (constant 1995 
prices). The figure constituted close to fifty percent of Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP (EarthTrends, 2003) 
and nearly a quarter of the whole continent (African Development Bank Report, 2000:214). The 
indication is that South Africa has long passed the “take-off” stage in Lewis’ (1954) Two Sector model 
of economic development.    
29 The South African government set farm workers’ minimum wage at R713.65 per month for the 
2004/05 financial year 
30 Water found in rivers, lakes, estuaries, etc.   
 76
discriminatory land legislation. Since 1994, various other laws and policies have been 
formulated aimed at improving both the formal and informal agricultural use of land 
resources. For example, the Communal Land Rights Act (11 of 2004) and the Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) Programme of 2004 were 
formulated for a legal transfer of land resources to rural communities as well as for 
promoting agricultural businesses. The land redistribution process has so far been 
plagued by many difficulties. The fact that since 1994 there have been more than five 
amendment bills to the Restitution of Land Rights Act (22 of 1994) is one indication 
of the legal, economic and practical difficulties facing government and other 
stakeholders in the implementation process. Political and economic conflicts have 
actually been reported in the process, some of which have turned into court battles 
against government agencies (e.g. Isaacs and Hersoug, 2002:148 and Independent 
Papers, 2005). Thirdly, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) 
formulated a National Water Policy (NWP, 1997) guided by the principles of 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), which was subsequently enacted 
into the National Water Act (NWA, 36 of 1998). One of the policy’s main objectives 
was the management of “the quantity, quality and reliability of the nation’s water 
resources (for) optimum, long-term, environmentally sustainable social and economic 
benefit of society” (NWP, 1997:12). However, in 2006 the department was also 
caught in a difficult process of implementing the policy by creating nineteen 
Catchment Management Agencies (CMAs), countrywide. The process has particularly 
been a challenge because eight years after the NWP (1997) was enacted into law only 
one such agency had been successfully established by 2006. The following sub-
sections present a more detailed description and explanation of the historical events 
and policies, which contributed to the emergence and mood of the current agricultural 
policies, aimed at remedying the high levels of underdevelopment.        
 
5.3.1 The marketing policies   
 
Diamond and gold mining between 1865 and 1915 in regions presently known as the 
Northern Cape and Gauteng Provinces transformed the South African economy from 
agricultural dependency, with limited international exports, into the level of 
industrialisation described in section two (Nattrass, 1981:23-24). The establishment of 
mines ensured an increased demand for mass transportation of agricultural products, 
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equipment and fuel. The demand for transportation marked the beginning of the 
development of railway lines from coastal areas into the interior of the country, where 
market oriented agricultural activities were previously limited. A more detailed 
history of this industrial development is discussed by Viljoen (1983:29-59). 
 
The rapid growth of the industrial sector, with high demands for agricultural products, 
had positive spin offs for the agricultural sector. Table 5.2 presents data illustrating 
these spin offs, from the period starting from 1904 to 1930, with respect to maize and 
wheat production.   
 
Table 5.2 Growth of maize and wheat output between 1904 and 1930 
 
Years 
Maize average output 
(in ’000 of 200 lbs) 
 
Rate of Growth  
(%) 
Wheat average output 
(in ’000 of 200 lbs) 
 
Rate of Growth 
(%) 
1904 – 1915 8 731  1 878  
1916 – 1920 10 112 15.8 2 202 17.30 
1921 – 1925 12 366 22.3 2 080 -5.5.0 
1926 – 1930 13 575 9.8 2433 17.0 
Source de Swardt (1983:4) 
 
The growth in output was significant during and shortly after the First World War, 
especially in maize production, as rising world inflation leading to the economic 
recession of 1920s boosted it.  Thereafter, it fluctuated with good years followed by 
exceptionally bad ones. The recession led to fluctuating prices of agricultural and 
other products (Marketing Act Commission, 1976:5). Price volatility was rife to an 
extent that from 1921 to 1923 the price maize31 dropped by more than fifty percent, 
from around twenty shillings to ten shillings32. The decline in prices was further 
exacerbated by over-production, due to inertia effects from the early years of good 
economic growth prior to the 1920s (de Swardt, 1983:5).  
 
The economic effects of unstable markets encouraged the creation of new and the 
strengthening of old institutions, which were supported by government. Such 
institutions, mainly agricultural cooperatives and boards, single-channelled the 
outputs of producer-members with the effect of creating and maintaining above 
market prices. The challenges posed by market instability continued leading to the 
                                                 
31 In bag units. 
32 Equivalent to a drop from two to one S.A rands.   
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active lobbying of government by powerful farmers33 into intervening in almost each 
and every crop market and related institutions. Ultimately, the strong rise of 
government intervention in the sector was cemented by the enactment of probably the 
most enduring piece of legislation in the form of the Marketing Act (26 of 1937). One 
of the impacts of the protectionist legislation was that, farms owned by those favoured 
by the state supported institutions increased in size and level of capitalisation (de 
Swardt, 1983) with negative consequences, especially, for consumers and emerging 
farmers34.  
 
Hence, in the early 1990s with government officials having fully acknowledged the 
economic effects stemming from the Marketing Act (26 of 1937) (e.g. Marketing Act 
Commission Report, 1994), new deregulation legislation for the sector was proposed. 
The Marketing of Agricultural Products Act (47 of 1996), whose political aims were 
to a) increase market access to all participants, b) promote efficiency of marketing 
products, c) optimise export earnings from agricultural products, and d) to enhance 
the viability of the sector, bore evidence to the radical economic stance of the post 
1994 government35 for the agricultural sector. However, huge implementation 
challenges of the Act have remained, especially with regard to developmental issues. 
For instance, according to Vink and Kirsten (2002); and Hobson (2006), even though 
the deregulation process has encouraged a higher Total Factor Productivity36 and 
profitability, with export growth especially in horticulture, unskilled farm workers, 
low income earners in urban and semi urban areas, historically disadvantaged 
commercial farmers, and emerging and small farmers have not benefited from the 
developments. Ironically, these groups were the ones that the new policies and laws 
are aimed at empowering. Instead, their exclusion only entails a deeper entrenchment 
of economic inequalities.     
 
 
                                                 
33 Especially through the Farmers Union. 
34 Similar trends from similar protectionist policies, however with different political motivations, were 
also observed in developed countries for the same period, for example in Europe (de Swart, 1983).   
35 It is fair to conclude that the adoption of most of these policies was highly political motivated during 
such a period of radical political change and hence the stated economic aims in formal policies would 
need a cautious interpretation.    
36 The output growth in horticulture has increased its share of total farm output by ten percent between 
1978/79 and 2000/01. 
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5.3.2 The water policies 
 
Because irrigated agriculture is the biggest user of water resources in South Africa37  
(Nieuwoudt et al., 2004), a discussion of water policies of the 20th century illustrates 
the almost exclusive access of white commercial farmers to these resources. The 
Water Act (54 of 1956) was the most significant piece of legislation that affected 
irrigated agriculture. The Act’s main focus was on accounting for water quantities. It 
provided for riparian water rights, where water abstractions for irrigation purposes 
could be linked to the positions (along a watercourse) and sizes of farms to be 
irrigated. The establishment of irrigation schemes was linked to potentially available 
quantities that could be held in storage dams and other reservoirs. Scheme members, 
with access to water rights, would contribute to the construction38 and maintenance of 
such dams through monthly repayment fees. Hence, the water ‘scheduling’ rights 
were based on estimated annual quantities of water resources needed for irrigating 
specifically sized land areas. The tedious planning involved in establishing schemes 
for water scheduling was described in the Water Matters Commission Report 
(1970:163). The report’s aim was to give recommendations on “all aspects of water 
provision and utilisation in the Republic”. It also gave a detailed list of which groups 
of stakeholders were considered important contributors to the planning processes. 
Other than the local municipalities, more than eighty percent of these contributors 
were the marketing and irrigation boards as well as big commercial farmers (Water 
Matters Commission Report, 1970). The institutions involved in water planning 
matters were exactly the same institutions that had high responsibilities in the 
marketing and distribution of agricultural products, i.e. agricultural boards and big 
commercial farmers. Such was a double exclusion of subsistence and emerging 
farmers, many of whom were black.    
 
The political transition and radical move towards agricultural liberalisation as 
experienced in the early 1990s, however, introduced a new thinking on water resource 
management issues39. It also sought to restructure the status quo in the accessibility of 
                                                 
37 Agriculture in the Eastern Cape province uses more than fifty percent of environmental water 
resources (DWAF, 2005a)   
38 The majority of the construction costs were still borne by government  
39 Based on the IWRM principles. 
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such resources. It advocated a decentralised40 participatory approach to issues of 
managing environmental water, not only for irrigation, but for other purposes as well. 
Following the deliberations involving government officials, water practitioners, 
environmentalists, and local stakeholders, the NWP (1997) followed by the enactment 
of the NWA (36 of 1998). Through this legislation, and alongside the deregulation 
process and dismantling of old institutions, the group of commercial farmers had lost 
significant political and economic sway in the water sector. The NWA (1998) created 
a potential voice for representation of many competing voices, such as environmental 
concerns, rural and domestic water users, as well as subsistence farmers versus the old 
interests of commercial farmers. Broadly, the main purpose of the NWA (1998) was 
to “ensure that water resources (were) protected, used, developed, conserved, 
managed and controlled in ways which take into account amongst other factors: 
a) meeting basic human needs of present and future generations; 
b) promoting equitable access to water; 
c) redressing the results of past racial and gender discrimination; 
d) promoting the efficient, sustainable and beneficial use of water in the public 
interest; 
e) facilitating social and economic development; 
f) providing for growing demand for water use; 
g) protecting aquatic and associated ecosystems and their biological diversity; 
h) reducing and preventing pollution and degradation of water resources; 
i) meeting international obligations; 
j) promoting dam safety; 
k) managing floods and droughts;  
and for achieving this purpose, to establish (new and) suitable institutions … with 
appropriate community, racial and gender representation”  
(NWA, 1998:9-10). 
 
The mood of the new water legislation does not ameliorate the political position of 
agricultural interests (hence of commercial farmers) in water management and 
decision making processes. Most notably, access to water resources, for any purpose, 
is no longer automatically associated with land position and ownership, as was the 
                                                 
40 Where the national Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) would relinquish its local 
responsibilities to locally based institutions.  
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case with riparian rights. The economic development of poor and marginalised users 
and the protection of the environment have high consideration. The legislation has 
potentially promoted a decentralised and deregulated market for water transactions 
albeit with some protection for weaker participants. Nonetheless, the KRV case 
studies in the forthcoming chapter still illustrate that from as radical starting positions 
as that of 1956, the attempts at implementing the NWA (1998) have posed big 
institutional challenges to government and stakeholders. For instance, the question of 
equitable voice representation at policy implementation processes, based on current 
economic leverage, has remained unresolved, which has perpetuated skewed 
stakeholder participation. Such challenges are also complicated by the current land 
reform issues, which are discussed below.    
 
5.3.3 The land policies 
 
 Adams et al. (1999:17-18) argue that in the late 1800s, African family farming was 
successful at responding to the growing demand for agricultural crops from the newly 
emerging mining towns. During that time, Africans farmed around eighty three 
percent of land, which was subsequently owned by white commercial farmers during 
the Apartheid period. The black family “farmers adopted new agricultural 
technologies, entered new industries and out-competed large scale settler farming in 
some of the emerging agricultural markets”. The competition alongside an expanding 
economy, which increased demand for cheap labour as required by a rapidly growing 
mining sector in industrialising areas, probably formed the economic rationale for 
passing the ‘most insidious’ of racial segregation laws in the form of the Natives Land 
Act (27 of 1913) (Wolpe, 1974 and Isaacs and Hersoug, 2002:14). It is possible that 
singularly this law had the biggest impact on introducing and sustaining the economic 
underdevelopment of the racial groups, which were targets of discrimination.  
 
Under the Native’s Land Act (1913) limited land was demarcated as scheduled native 
land to which the movement and settlement of black South Africans was restricted. 
Referring to land outside the scheduled native areas, the Act stipulated that, “a) a 
native shall not enter into any agreement or transaction for the purchase, hire, or other 
acquisition from a person other than a native, of any such land or of any right thereto, 
interest therein, or servitude thereover; and a person other than a native shall not enter 
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into any agreement or transaction for the purchase, hire, or other acquisition from a 
native of any such land or any right thereto, interest therein, or servitude thereover” 
(Natives Land Act (27), 1913:2).  
 
The scheduled land formed only eight percent of South Africa’s total land area, and 
the law ensured that it would be occupied by as much as eighty percent of South 
Africa’s total population (Isaacs and Hersoug, 2002:143-144). The occupants would 
not be able to move out of the demarcated areas without rigorous monitoring or to buy 
and sell any piece of land in the rest of the country. 
 
Naturally, the scheduled land areas eventually became the overpopulated reserves for 
cheap mine-labour, a process that was formalised with the passing of the Promotion of 
Bantu Self-Government Act (46 of 1959), and subsequently the Bantu Homelands 
Citizenship Act (26 of 1970). The Acts created separate governments for segregated 
Bantu Homelands. It is noteworthy that in such homelands a dual system of rights was 
encouraged, where chiefs were given the full custodianship over designated 
jurisdictions, which in practical terms were ultimately administered and owned by the 
state. A system of individual rights and private ownership of land was never allowed 
(Adams et al., 1999:16). This ensured that insecurity of land tenure in the former 
homelands remained one of the trickiest obstacles to the land reform process as well 
as development plans up to 2006. 
 
To date, there are no documented studies that have tried to estimate the net economic 
effects of segregated land settlements on South Africa’s potential development 
process. However, the current impoverished state of many black occupied land areas, 
especially in the former homelands, indicates that the net costs have been high. The 
former homeland areas are characterised by, a) a lack of industrial sectors, b) poor 
agricultural markets, c) a lack of public infrastructure and provision of services, d) 
high levels of unemployment as indicated in section two, and e) a high dependency on 
government security grants (Mbatha, 2005). The burden of paying for these social 
costs, it seems, has fallen squarely on current and future generations. Moreover, the 
public costs of implementing the remedial government policies, some of which have 
been discussed here, are only a fraction of such a burden.                     
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Since 1994, pieces of legislation have been enacted to deal with the land reform 
challenges. Of these, the Restitution of Land Rights Act (22 of 1994) remains, 
probably, the most significant one. In its first year in power the African National 
Congress (ANC)-led government passed the law with the broad purpose “to provide 
for the restitution of rights in land to persons or communities disposed of such rights 
after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices” 
(Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994). Some of the reformative policies that 
have been formulated under the Act include the land redistribution and tenure reform 
programmes. In addition, the Communal Land Rights Act (11 of 2004) has since been 
enacted to guide the reformative process of such common rights, as they are most 
prevalent in the former homelands. The land restitution process has entailed that 
individuals and communities lay claims on land from which they were forcefully 
removed before June; otherwise, they could access the Land Claims Court for legal 
recourse. From the land redress process claimants could, a) have their land rights 
restored, b) be offered alternative land, or c) be given alternative compensation in the 
form of government housing and land development assistance (Isaacs and Hersoug, 
2002:144). However, as has been mentioned, the process has been difficult, plagued 
by backlogs, conflicting claims and court disputes, of which all are institutional 
problems.  
 
It is also important to note that since 1994 the government has been required to pay 
compensation, at market value, to land occupants required to move from reclaimed 
land under the new regime of legislation. However, since some of the land valuation 
exercises and outcomes have been disputed, by either government or occupants, 
deadlocks in some negotiations have been reached. It is also interesting that the 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA) announced in 2006 that the ‘willing buyer willing 
seller’ principle, which has guided the compensation process, would be reviewed in 
order to fast track the backlogs of claims (Independent Papers, 2006). What 
implications the announcement entails is not clear, however, it could be argued that 
government is considering a policy option where it unilaterally determines the 
compensation values. In such a process, where government is the agent that pays out 
the compensation values, it is most likely that such values would be set lower than 
market prices.  
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The challenges of determining the future governance and an appropriate system of 
rights to redistributed land resources have also been noted and are pertinent to the 
present discussion. When land policy gives preference for redistributed land to be in 
private ownership, in the hope of stimulating market activity, such a system should 
also be the culturally preferred and historically practiced mode of governance, with 
the lowest transaction costs, for it to be successful. The KRV case studies provide 
evidence that if the locally preferred institutions of governance are different from 
those proposed by policy; the land reform process would be likely to break down. The 
different institutional understandings of property rights systems could not only retard 
the land reform process but also other developmental initiatives, which are reliant on 
successful transfers of private ownership rights.  
 
Hence, in the case studies and the main discussion chapter, the institutional problems, 
as unaffordable transaction costs, of implementing the marketing, land and water 
resources policies in a local context, are described and analysed. The history of how 
such policies have affected the local group communities, their business and water 
abstraction practices as well as long-term development process are explained, with 
possible economic solutions interrogated for policy recommendations.       
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5.3.4 Tabulated summary of historical events and policies   
 
The following tables form a basic summary of the chapter presentation. The most 
important events and dates with associated laws in the discussion are presented.  
 
Table 5.3 The summary of the historical and remedial policies of the 20th century in 
South Africa’s agricultural sector 
 The historical policies 
 Marketing of 
agricultural products 
Land resource policies Water resource policies 
Event/s Mining and agricultural 
growth 
Racial segregation and Apartheid Riparian principles 
Period Late 1800s and early 1900s 1800 – 1990 1956 - 1998 
Repercussions * World depression of 1920s 
* Agricultural market 
instability 
Competition from African farmers   Water access link to land 
ownership and position  
Significant 
policies/laws 
Marketing Act of 1937 * Land Act 1913 
* Native Gov. Act 1959 
Water Act 1956 
Major effects * Strong regulation 
* Rise of agric boards 
* Rise of economic & 
political blocks  
* Lack of private rights affecting 
black 
* Chiefdom governance in homelands 
* Further racial/regional inequalities  
* Central (national)  management 
of resources 
* Strengthening of commercial 
farmer blocks  
* Inequitable access 
    
 The remedial polices 
 Marketing of agricultural 
products 
Land resource policies Water resource 
policies 
Event/s * Political transition 
* Opening of world economies 
Period 1989 -1994 
Significant 
policies/laws 
Marketing of Agricultural Products Act 
1996 
* Restitution of land Act ‘94 
* Security land tenure Act ‘97 
* Land redistribution and 
development policy ‘04 
* National water policy  NWP 
1997 
* National Water Act NWA 36 
1998 
* National Water Resources 
Strategy 2004 
Broad  
objectives of 
policy regime 
* Promote market deregulation  
* Establish decentralized water management  (19 CMAs) 
* Establish markets for agricultural resources & private use and ownership of resources  
* Promote economic development  
*Promote equitable access to resources  
Effects & 
challenges 
* GATT 1993: most tariffs dropped  
    (and within bands) 
* Price controls dropped 
* Export market growth 
* Fluctuating exchange rate  
*Equitable access to benefits? 
* Land market difficulties 
*Underutilization of land 
resources 
* Conflicts between 
government agencies and 
sellers 
*Conflicts between 
community claimants 
* Private versus common rules  
* Slow participation  
* Slow implementation 
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5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The chapter has presented the background agricultural policies as an historical context 
for discussing, first, the institutional challenges for achieving developmental goals 
through public policy, and second, the KRV research supported arguments 
extrapolated for the main thesis. The argument that remedial policies in agriculture 
have faced difficulties for lacking an understanding of institutional insights in their 
formulation and implementation phases is made obvious by the KRV cases in the 
following chapter throughout the thesis. Hence, many of the discussion points 
presented in forthcoming chapters will assume some knowledge or familiarity with 
the discussion of the policies introduced thus far.  
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CHAPTER SIX – CASE STUDIES ON IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE FROM THE 
KAT RIVER VALLEY 
 
6.1 BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, the Eastern Cape was the second poorest 
province in terms of GGP per capita, and in 2000 it was reported to be the poorest in 
terms of monthly expenditure (Stats South Africa, 2006a). Unemployment levels were 
estimated at over fifty percent in the narrow definition. The agricultural sector 
contributed ten percent towards total formal employment (Eastern Cape Government 
Report, 2004). The figure would have been much higher if informal and seasonal 
employment was included (Nieuwoudt et al., 2004:162). A significant contributing 
factor to the poor economic state and skewed levels of development in the province 
was the 1994 political re-incorporation of two former homelands, namely the Transkei 
and Ciskei, into the Republic of South Africa and Eastern Cape Province. 
  
The Kat River Valley (KRV) is found in the Eastern Cape Province with its northern 
parts located in the former Ciskei homeland. It covers approximately 1700 to 1800 
km2, and is located on the eastern part of the Fish to Tsitsikamma Water Management 
Area (WMA) number 12 in the Eastern Cape Province (see Map 6.1) (Motteux, 
2002).  
 
 
 
The 
KRV 
Source: Faysee (2004:60) 
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Map41 6.1: South Africa and water catchment areas with the KRV in the Eastern Cape  
 
The area falls into the Amatole Climatic Zone, with rainfalls ranging from 500 mm 
per annum to 1200 mm in the highest mountains (Department of Land Affairs (DLA), 
1998:7). The Kat River with its tributaries was the main source of water that was 
drained into the Kat Dam (near Seymour in map 6.2).  
 
The dam had a yield of 11.88 million m3 per annum. One thousand five hundred 
hectares of land were scheduled for irrigation water under the custodianship of the 
KRV Water User Association (WUA), with gross water requirements of an estimated 
11.44 million m3 per annum. (DLA, 1998).        
 
Map 6.2: The Kat River Valley reaches and villages (KRV WUA, 2004)  
                                                 
41 Fitting the map on the page may have altered the scale.  
The KRV 
Upper 
Kat  
Middle Kat 
Reaches 
Lower Kat 
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Several agricultural land and water uses characterised the valley. Historically, these 
included citrus production, which was the most intensive of the land and water uses in 
the middle to lower reaches. “The conditions in the area (favoured) citrus production, 
particularly soft citrus, which also (showed) very high returns” (DLA, 1999:5). Also 
practiced were stock and game farming, small-scale community farming (a wide 
range of staple crop vegetables) and commercial forestry in the most upper reaches 
(refer Map 6.2). The demarcated land sizes in hectares for the various uses, which are 
illustrated in the Map, are also presented in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1: Land use division and extent  
Type of use/ownership Land size (hectare) 
State owned land 85 000 
Nature reserve and forestry 30 000 
Agricultural land superfluous to state disposal 
(redistribution purposes) 
50 000 
Privately owned 5000 
Total 170 000 
(Source: Loets, 2005) 
 
The town of Fort Beaufort (centre of Map 6.2) was the biggest urban centre. Seymour 
and to some extent Balfour towards the northern parts were semi-urban. 
Approximately 36 rural and informal settlements were located close to the banks of 
the Kat River, because the river’s water was one of the most valuable input resources 
to households’ consumption and food production. The third case study presented in 
this chapter is dedicated to a political and economic description of the water-based 
businesses in these villages (KRV WUA, 2004 and Motteux, 2002). 
 
6.1.1   A brief political history of population settlements and resource conflicts of 
the KRV   
 
The nature of present day settlement patterns and resource distributions in the KRV 
could be traced to the frontier wars of the 1800s between the Xhosa versus the 
coloured people and British settlers. In 1829, the British army forced the Xhosa Chief 
Maqoma and his subjects out of the valley. Thereafter parts of the area were 
designated for coloured settlers, of the ‘Khoi-San and ‘freed slave’ origin. The 
 90
coloured people were strategically settled to form a barricade zone between the 
British/Dutch farmers and the Xhosa enemy (e.g. Motteux, 2002; Nel, 1997). This 
zone, also known as the ‘no-man’s land’, stretched between the Great Fish to the 
Keiskamma Rivers (in Map 6.3). It was characterised by constant battles over land 
and other resources from 1820 to 1870.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Map 6.3 The Buffer Zone between The Great Fish and the Keiskamma Rivers 
(Source: Motteux, 2002:50)  
 
In the late 19th century, several citrus producing white farmers settled on the lower to 
middle reaches of the valley, not far from the town of Fort Beaufort (Motteux, 
2002:52-62). In 2007, the descendents of some of the farmers, who have continued 
farming citrus, were members of the Riverside S.A. or Katco packinghouses. These 
are the two big marketing and distributing agencies in the KRV and the former’s 
business initiatives provide key factors for analysis in the first case study presented in 
the present chapter.  
 
The enactment of the Land Act (27 of 1913) and the Bantu Homelands Citizenship 
Act (26 of 1970), discussed in the last chapter, formalised and cemented the racially 
segregated settlements, which were found in the valley in 2007. When the 
Stockenstrom region, part of which falls in the KRV, was transferred to the former 
 91
Ciskei (established in 1971) some of the citrus producing white and coloured owned 
farms in the area were expropriated for consolidation into the homeland by the South 
African Development Trust (SADT) (DLA, 1998:1). In the opinions of local farmers, 
in many instances below market prices as compensation were paid for the 
expropriation (e.g. Roberts, 2004). On the other hand, around 1800 km2 of land was 
transferred to dislocated farmers who could prove to have been victims of forced 
removal in the forming of homelands under auspices of the Boedel Erven Act (11) of 
1975 (Motteux, 2002:50). 
 
After the departure of coloured and white farmers in various parts of the KRV, which 
fell under the jurisdiction of the new Ciskei, black farm workers were left without 
formal and/or legal support for continued economic sustenance. There was 
uncertainty with regard to the time limits they would occupy the farms. According to 
the local magistrate, the affected population was approximately 19 000 in 1990 (DLA, 
1998:1-2). This number should have increased markedly by 2007. Some of the former 
workers emigrated, but those who remained on the land made use of some of the 
abandoned farm resources. They began crop farming and kept livestock but in 2005 a 
majority of them mainly survived on social transfers and remittances (Mbatha, 2005). 
These subsistence farmers are subjects of the third case study presented in this 
chapter. 
 
In 1981, the Ciskei government, increased its support for the agricultural sector and 
established the ‘large scale and externally managed’ parastatal Ulimocor (Magingxa, 
2004:456-466 and Motteux, 2002:52). One of the ‘dubious’ accomplishments of the 
parastatal was to allocate land leases for previously white owned citrus farms to 
partisan civil servants in various regions of the Ciskei. The regions included the KRV 
(in the Stockenstrom district), Victoria East and Peddie. The land transactions 
between the civil servants and the Ciskei government were performed as ‘lease-to-
purchase agreements’ (Motteux, 2002:52). Thirty such farms (eighteen of which were 
situated in the KRV) were transferred to new black owners, who form the subject of 
case study number one in the chapter. 
 
A closer historical inspection of each of the three main KRV farming communities 
revealed that separate formal and informal rules as well as cultural practice governed 
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water allocation matters, individual and collective use of resources as well as business 
transactions. The formal rules for each group were mostly in written form, for 
example, business constitutions, rules for the dam’s technical operation, etc. Informal 
and non-written rules were also followed and especially enforced in the upper Kat 
rural villages (refer Map 6.2). Some of these management rules and practices 
alongside their economic development implications are isolated for discussion in the 
forthcoming case studies.       
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6.2 A CASE OF BLACK CITRUS FARMERS AND LOCALLY INITIATED 
BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS  
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6.2.1 Introduction 
 
It has been indicated that citrus farming is the biggest and most capital intensive 
agricultural business in the Kat River Valley (KRV). The Katco42 Enterprise Budget 
in Appendix 5, illustrates the magnitudes of production outputs, costs and markets 
projected over a ten year period for at least eleven varieties of citrus fruit, which were 
produced in the Valley. However, not all citrus farms were being used productively or 
to their potential. In fact some of the farms were completely abandoned by farmers, 
especially those previously under the administration of Ulimocor. A number of factors 
contributed to their state of affairs, for example poor government policies with regard 
to occupation lease agreements, bad in-farm planning and resource mismanagement. 
The group of black citrus farmers from the former Ciskei homeland, which are listed 
in Table 6.2 and Appendix 7, did not have land title-deeds and had collectively 
incurred huge debt to the former Ciskei Agricultural Bank (CAB) before 1994. Some 
of their debt of close to twenty two million Rands was owed to the Katco cooperative. 
The insecurity of tenure and unpaid debt were factors that made it impossible for the 
farmers to access credit loans from financial institutions, which was a rampant 
phenomenon in other similar regions (Magingxa, 2004). At the time of research, the 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA), a group of more successful white commercial 
farmers (i.e. Riverside S.A) in conjunction with the Independent Development 
Cooperation (IDC) were formulating a business plan to establish a partnership venture 
from which title-deeds could be transferred to ex Ulimocor farmers. Such transfers, it 
was hoped, would happen at market prices and the venture would act as a vehicle for 
the farmers to repay their debt (Mbatha, 2005).    
 
It is ironic that while the black citrus farmers struggled, in the late 1990s the South 
African citrus industry was experiencing a boom with increased and unmet export 
demands for products in European markets (Roberts, 2005 and Appendix 6). 
However, because citrus farming was capital intensive and required high financial, 
land and water resource investments, the more successful farmers were unable to 
develop new land and acquire water assurances at a fast enough rate that would enable 
them to fully exploit the growing export opportunities. In that regard, the big farmers 
                                                 
42 A citrus cooperative in the valley.  
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proposed to the DLA that in return for assisting the ex Ulimocor farmers with 
technical, financial and management skills within a business contract signed by 
government and private investors they would access the underutilised citrus farms to 
meet the higher output demands. The acceptableness of the conditions of the contract 
remained uncertain and highly dependent on the levels of trust among various 
stakeholders at the time of the research. For instance, the willingness of black farmers 
to change their old and deeply entrenched ways of doing business had to be high 
enough before contracts could be signed. Incidentally, those were historically and 
culturally rooted practices.  Hence the case study presents:  
a) A history of black citrus farming in the KRV and that of selected and locally 
relevant public policies, which contributed to the dichotomous business 
practices between black and white commercial farmers,  
b) A description of local business initiatives, with underlying motives, aimed at 
improving the local business environment,  
c) A map of current public policy programmes aimed at supporting emerging 
farming, and lastly 
d) Isolated institutional themes for analysing the feasibility of potential business 
solutions for the whole KRV citrus industry43.              
 
6.2.2 The black citrus farmers  
 
Officially, within the ‘lease-to-purchase agreements’ between Ulimocor and the black 
citrus farmers, the former Ciskei government hoped to groom a group of successful 
black commercial farmers and to eventually allow the farmers to buy the leased land, 
thus disposing of its micro management responsibilities. Between 2004 and 2005 the 
farmers claimed that the agreements were intended to last for a period of five years, 
and thereafter would be reviewed, where a good history of rental payments would 
automatically entitle them private ownership (Mpukane, 2003 and Nahamba, 2005). 
The detail information on the farmers’ financial status is presented in Table 6.2 and 
Appendix 7 indicates their exact locations. As mentioned previously, many of the new 
lessees originated from outside the KRV, and because their appointments as civil 
servants were mostly unscrupulous, most of their income was received from outside 
                                                 
43 The actual analysis of the business environment will be performed in chapter seven.  
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farming activities (DLA, 1998:2). However, the official rationale provided for 
allocating leases to these tenants was that because they had other income sources 
“they could afford the lease payments”, as opposed to the poor resident farm labourers 
(DLA, 1998:6). From this reasoning it would seem that from the start the former 
Ciskei government did not quite expect the leased-out farms to be economically self-
sustaining.  
 
Upon arrival, tensions brewed between the new tenants and the resident ex-farm 
labourers. The tenants complained that they could not farm the land while the 
labourers used the farms’ resources. The tensions eventually led to the development 
of semi formal, semi-urban and relatively high-density areas in Balfour (Map 6.2), to 
which many, but not all, of the labourers were relocated. Some of the KRV land claim 
conflicts within the land restitution programme under the Land Reform Labour 
Tenants Act (3 of 1996) stemmed from this history of relocation (DLA, 1998).  
 
South Africa’s political transition of 1994 meant that the former Ciskei ceased to exist 
and consequently the Ulimocor offices shut down. In the mid to late 1990s, 
Ulimocor’s operations underwent a process of liquidation with legal investigations by 
the Heath Special Investigation Unit (HSIU). At the same, the black farmers (in the 
KRV and other regions) faced serious financial difficulties; as many could no longer 
afford the lease repayments of state loans of up to 1.9 million rands, having lost their 
civil employment in the former Ciskei. Moreover, they had accumulated a lot of debt 
from financing organisations such as the Ciskei Agricultural Bank and Katco (DLA, 
1999:7). In 2005, the DLA had failed to trace and locate records of any rental 
payments made by the farmers towards other lease agreements since the date of 
occupation and had failed to trace records of repayments towards any loans. The main 
reason the records could not be traced was because in 1998 the Ulimocor offices and 
any records kept inside were completely destroyed by “accidental” fire. Hence, these 
factors contributed to difficulties faced by the DLA in processing and/or finalising 
any of the KRV farms’ tenure status (Loets, 2005). 
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The documented state of business and social affairs on black citrus farms  
 
The farmers reported that because of insecurity of tenure they faced a lack of access 
to credit loan facilities from private institutions such as banks. What they thought 
would be the best solution to the problem was a free donation of occupied farms by 
the government (Nahamba, 2004 and 2005; Mpukane, 2004). The DLA, however, was 
adamant that the farms would only be transferred at market prices, which were 
determined by independent land evaluators as presented in Table 6.2. Arrangements 
for affordable terms of payment would be put in place with the Minister of Land 
Affairs and Agriculture having signed documents motivating the handover at 
determined prices (Loets, 2005).     
 
Table 6.2 The KRV farm’s market prices and sizes   
(Source: DLA,  1999) 
 
From the table it can be seen that more land on the farms was water scheduled than 
was under cultivation, and on all farms only a small fraction of the land area was 
developed for citrus production. For instance, in Lidell (Farm No. 1323) only around 
10% of the land was under cultivation, which meant (especially for non-irrigated 
Farm name Property description Size  
(hectares) 
Citrus 
cultivation  
(hectares) 
Land with water 
scheduling 
(hectares) 
Market value  
(2005) 
(in thousands of 
Rands) 
Lessee 
Liddell (r) The farm Liddell No. 1323 112..2 22.9 24.5  360 Mfecane 
Leta’s # (k) Portion 2 of the farm No. 1319 85.8 7.9 17.5  175  Dyonase 
Cranford (k) The farm No. 1338 62.6 8.1 22.0  195  Mbeleshe 
Jerusalem (k) The farm venture No. 1331 66.6 36.5 37.0  490  Futese 
Eden ~ (k) The farm N. 1325 26.8 17.0 15.0  230  Nohamba 
(Lukhalo) 
The farm Konzi No. 1326 Konzi (k) 
Portion 17 of the farm No. 966 
42.4 22.7 26.0  350 Nohamba 
The farm Jerico No. 1328 Jericho (k) 
Portion 16 of the farm No. 966 
51.7 19.5 21.0  260 Mpambane 
Jordan (k) Portion 2 of the farm No. 897 61.6 21.4 22.0  350  Ndlangalavu 
White’s The farm White’s No. 1310 42.9 16.5 21.0  330  Mpukane 
Torties (r) The farm Cottage No. 1327 57.1 30.0 39.0  420  Skotile 
Oakdene# (k) The farm Oakdene No. 1309 63.4 6.5 18.0  160  Siko 
Gonzana (r) Portion 4 of the farm Gonzana 
No.950 
53.0 21.1 24.5  350  Maqoma 
Top Kat *# (k) Portion 1 of the farm No. 3119 69.2 0 N/A  290 Metula 
Krila *# (k) Farm Krila N. 1311 126.5 0 N/A  230  Skotile S.D. 
Production costs per hectare : R 16 987                                         Development costs per hectare (excl. land) : R 45 000     
Values are quoted for the year 2004  
*Will not to be considered for lease renewal by Department of Land Affairs for poor farm management 
# Abandoned farms  
~ Farms taken over by new farmers when previous ones ( ) abandoned them   
(k) packing of fruit used to be done by Katco 
(r) packing of fruit done by Riverside Enterprises   
Orange Grange farm was liquidated by CAB in 1998  
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agriculture), that a high potential existed for further land developments. However, it is 
also clear that with regard to citrus development, at R45 000 per hectare and with 
production costs estimated at R17 000 per hectare (DLA, 1999), very high 
investments costs would be required. At reported average income returns of R50 000 
per black KRV farm per annum (Roberts, 2005), such development costs would not 
be affordable44. These factors formed part of the explanation why many of the farms 
stood neglected and in some cases abandoned (e.g. Picardy in Appendix 7 and 8).  
 
Most of the irrigation equipment, i.e. sprinklers, drips, weirs, canals, etc., that were 
used on the farms had hardly been replaced and/or serviced since the take over in the 
early 1980s. During visits of farms, which were still in operation, observations were 
made of canals in disrepair, and pipe sprinklers either leaking or broken. Some of the 
orchards had not been replanted since occupation. In fact, on farms where production 
had completely ceased, orchards were used as a source of firewood by farm 
residents45.   
 
Loets (2005) 46 reported that the growing population of residents, estimated at 355 
households, with a total of 1252 of unemployed people living on the farms, had made 
it harder for the farmers to produce citrus. The residents ran more than 700 cattle and 
over 500 small-stock on the land. Cases of crop theft had risen to an extent that stolen 
crop was sold in informal markets. The problems of theft, a growing population 
coupled with old tensions between farm residents and citrus farmers had led to a local 
government proposal for establishing a second high-density location near Amherst 
(refer to point six on map in Appendix 7) (Loets, 2005). Concerns regarding more 
crop theft were however raised with government officials by farmers living close to 
the area of Amherst.   
 
Some of the conclusions that could be drawn from these cases were that black citrus 
farmers were in urgent need of technical and business support. State officials as well 
as farmers viewed the lack of security of land tenure as the most imperative factor that 
needed to receive the highest priority. Both parties hoped a resolution on tenure issues 
                                                 
44 Related local marking costs are presented in  Appendix 6  
45 A group of former farm labourers that were not moved to high density areas like Balfour  
46 A chief land planner at the provincial DLA 
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would enable immediate access to the much-needed financial support from various 
private and public organisations as well as new business opportunities. Moreover, it 
was in the interest of the state’s policy objectives that the issues be resolved without 
unnecessary damage to the welfare of emerging farmers. One other motivation for the 
state’s interest and active involvement in seeking a low cost resolution had to do with 
the welfare of about a hundred employees on these citrus farms and their families who 
would otherwise become a burden to the state’s social security (DLA, 1999:18). In 
any case, the state of citrus business and associated problems in the KRV did not 
affect black farmers in isolation. Some of the problems that black farmers were faced 
with directly also affected the economic interests of their neighbouring white 
commercial farmers. Hence, some discussion of the white farmers’ proposed solutions 
to problems highlighted are presented in the following subsection.         
 
6.2.3  The documented state of business affairs on white owned citrus farms   
 
It seemed that a business solution to some of the problems facing the former Ciskei 
farmers had been found in the form a business proposal from Riverside S.A., one of 
the two white run citrus packing and marketing houses. Hence, an investigation and 
description of white owned farm businesses, as they affected the case of former Ciskei 
farmers and the nature of their proposed economic solutions are necessary.  
 
In 1999, the former Ciskei farmers were shareholders of at least twenty two percent in 
Katco packing and marketing co-operative based in Fort Beaufort (see Map 6.2). It 
was apparent that it was in the business interests of Katco to seek business solutions 
to problems facing black farmers, because losses in their output contributions, for 
instance, if their production were to stop completely, would mean among many things 
an increase of packing costs to every other member of the cooperative. On the other 
hand, by ensuring that the black farmers remained in operation, Katco stood a better 
chance of recovering the R 685 150 owed to it by these farmers (refer to Appendix 7). 
“Further (Katco held) on behalf of the farmers some six million Rands in funds from 
Outspan and a million Rands of accumulated bin levy funds. Neither these funds nor 
the share holding can be liquidated in the sense that a private company (could) apply 
its funds” (DLA, 1999:11). These were business attachments that made it necessary 
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for Katco to seek both technical and business solutions to problems affecting its black 
members. However, solutions to the problems were not only proposed by Katco. 
 
The proposed business solutions by Riverside S.A. 
 
In 1998 another packing and marketing co-operative (Riverside S.A.) was established 
in the valley, with a shed located just outside the town of Fort Beaufort. The founding 
members of Riverside S.A. were a breakaway group of white farmers from Katco, 
who collectively owned more than 300 and managed over 500 hectares of land under 
citrus cultivation. Riverside S.A., however, was only half the size of Katco in terms of 
production quantities, and did not have as many members (black and/or white). 
However, in size and business terms, compared to the former Ciskei farmers, it was 
by far better resourced and financially successful. Hence, in 2005, four Ciskei 
farmers, for example Farm Cottage No. 1327 in table 6.2, were under the technical 
and business mentorship of Riverside S.A. The black farmers also used Riverside 
S.A.’s packing-shed and marketing networks (Roberts, 2005). During in-farm visits, a 
marked difference with regard to the maintenance of orchards and infrastructure was 
observed between black owned farms under the management of Riverside S.A. and 
the rest of former Ciskei farms (see Appendix 8 and 9).  
   
Riverside S.A. marketed more than seventy percent of its first grade products in 
European countries, most notably in the UK and Belgium, which meant that 
throughout the growing season, orchards had to be carefully managed for the trees to 
bear fruits of the quality required in those markets. To that effect, the company had an 
ISO 1401 accreditation, which at least on paper, meant that their production processes 
complied with environmental policy requirements. Financially, however, this also 
meant that higher costs of production inputs and in-farm management expertise would 
be required.  
 
In terms of higher export market demands, Riverside S.A. was faced with the 
challenge to increase its output levels. More land developments and technical 
expertise were needed for the higher outputs. Alternatively they could acquire more 
output from their neighbouring farms, such as the less productive former Ciskei 
farms. The acquisition and development of new land would, however, be more 
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expensive and risky, especially with insecure future guarantees for water scheduling, 
taking into account that the Kat Dam’s yield was scheduled at close to a hundred 
percent – (11.44 of 11.88 million per m3) in 2005. Hence, the alternative option of 
acquiring output through forming business and mentoring partnerships with a higher 
number of black citrus farmers seemed more viable (Roberts, 2005). Hence, that was 
the motivation for Riverside S.A. to draft a proposal for a production schedule of 
different types of citrus fruit from an additional number of former Ciskei farms (refer 
to Appendix 6). Such would be done through a new jointly owned company named, 
Thembani cc. The proposal was pitched for support to the DLA and the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) emphasising its business strategy of getting the black 
farmers out of debt. The agenda in Appendix 10 illustrates the proposal’s plan of 
action. Two critical business conditions were set in that proposal, namely, that: a) the 
black farmers interested in joining the venture would have to accept to pay market 
prices, as set by the DLA, for the occupied farms and, b) the black run farms would be 
wholly managed by Riverside S.A. (technically and financially) until such time that 
all debt was settled. Figure 6.1 illustrates the business model as proposed by Riverside 
S.A. The IDC would invest in setting up the new company to be jointly-owned by all 
groups of farmers. However, it would also act as the ‘custodian’ of the black farmers’ 
interests, which meant that it would own 49% of Thembani c.c.’s shares on behalf of 
black farmers. Riverside S.A., on the other hand, would own the rest of the 51%. 
Once a black farmer had settled his/her debt, s/he would then be allowed to buy a 
portion of the 49% owned by the IDC (Riverside, 2005).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The debt-trap exit business strategy as proposed by Riverside 
(Source: Riverside Enterprises, 2005) 
 
 
   Jointly owned     
      Thembani 
cc.
  Riverside owns     
   51% of shares 
         IDC owns  
       49% of shares 
Black farmer 
          1   
Black farmer 
          2 
Black farmer 
          n 
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A secondary business idea, still at its inception phase during the time of research, also 
proposed to the DLA by Riverside S.A. in 2003 was to establish a jointly-owned 
venture with employees - as an Historically Disadvantaged Group component - 
forming the majority of shareholders. During that time some of the employees 
awaited outcomes on land restitution claims, and such land, if received, would be 
developed for citrus farming. The business motivation for the proposal was that with a 
black majority shareholding in the venture, Riverside S.A. would provide farming 
expertise, packing and marketing skills, and the business would have political access 
to the government’s support in the form of grants and subsidies targeted at black 
majority owned companies. Figure 6.2 illustrates the nature of the proposed business 
structure to the DLA, and the distribution of risk between Riverside S.A. and its 
employees with regard to the use of land as collateral. According to the business 
model, both partners would carry the same weight of such risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
       Figure 6.2: The structure of proposed black owned joint venture by Riverside 
       Enterprises. (Source: Riverside Enterprises, 2005) 
 
In addition, Table 6.3 presents the racial employment profile of Riverside S.A. in 
2005 and indicates the racial group demographics, which would potentially benefit if 
such a black majority owned venture were to be successfully established. 
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Table 6.3  The racial and gender representation of Riverside Enterprises in 2004 
Male Female Occupational 
levels African Coloured White African Coloured White 
Total 
 
Top 
management 
0 0 3 0 0 0 3 
Senior 
management 
0 1 3 0 1 1 6 
Professional, 
management, 
etc. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Technicians, 
academically 
qualified, 
etc.  
8 4 0 0 4 3 19 
Semi-skilled 8 1 1 15 7 0 32 
Unskilled 57 0 0 16 0 0 73 
Total 
permanent 
73 6 7 31 12 4 133 
Non 
permanent 
37 53 0 126 153 0 369 
Total 110 59 7 157 165 4 502 
No Indians were reported 
(Source: Riverside Enterprises, 2004) 
 
However, the DLA was opposed to the proposal on the grounds of its risk distribution. 
The 100% use of black owned land as collateral did not conform to the government 
policy objectives (Loets, 2005). The DLA’s policy in supporting any project 
involving black land owners were to ensure that, increasingly, agricultural land 
ownership that was redistributed to Historically Disadvantaged Individuals (HDIs) 
(Restitution of Land Right Act (22), 1994) was at least thirty percent of the total 
agricultural land over the next fifteen years starting from 2005. Hence, the proposed 
risk distribution in the venture was seen by the DLA as potentially jeopardising to 
such objectives. Moreover, the availability of water resources to support new land 
developments remained another huge unexplored constraint.    
   
The presentation of various proposals in the KRV makes it clear that both Riverside 
S.A. and to some extent Katco, realised that there potential business opportunities for 
their own benefit existed in investments in black commercial citrus farming. The 
cooperatives were actively seeking ways in which such opportunities could be 
exploited. The economic and political motivations behind the searches, within the 
national and provincial agricultural policy framework were also made obvious. 
However, owing to the reported slow progress, and sometimes failures, in realising 
the potential opportunities, which have been presented thus far, it would seem that the 
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public policy framework aimed at promoting black farming businesses was not very 
effective. The following sub-section describes the provincial policy framework, which 
affected the irrigated agricultural businesses with connections made to the KRV data 
in illustrating the shortcomings.       
 
6.2.4 The review of agricultural public policies and its relevance to the KRV 
citrus farming  
 
From the interviews with respective provincial officials of DWAF, DLA and DoA 
and public as well as internal documents containing policy information on how each 
department dealt with the developmental process and support for irrigation projects, it 
was apparent that the departments mostly worked in isolation of each other. However, 
there was an interdepartmentally endorsed approach to deal with bulk water irrigation 
projects. With regard to this approach, there was a committee set up comprising of 
representatives from the various departments, at a provincial and national level, that 
convened at regular intervals to discuss issues related to irrigation schemes. The 
recognition that “agricultural production is a multifaceted process and depends for its 
success on the simultaneous availability of land rights, access to water, access to 
markets, etc.,” (DWAF, 2002:2) had encouraged the establishment of such a 
committee. However, the funding for different aspects of irrigation schemes still 
remained the responsibility of each department.  Separate regimes for the 
management of grants and subsidies for which aspiring and resource-poor farmers 
could apply were also internally formulated.                
 
From the policy documents and interviews, it became clear that internal and 
interdepartmental policies, procedures and committee structures concerned with land 
and irrigated water projects were continually changing, in structure and label. It was 
obvious that such change had created a number of confusions and uncertainties with 
regard to an understanding and application of the most appropriate and/or current 
procedures. In some instances, the same committees were referred to using different 
names in various documents and versions. For example, the Coordination Committees 
on Agricultural Water (CCAWs) in DWAF (2002) were referred to as the 
Coordinating Committee on Small-Scale Irrigation Support (CCSIS) or the Irrigation 
Action Committee (IAC) in DoA (2005:1). The confusion created by the different 
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labels was evident when a provincial DLA Chief Land Planner (Loets, 2005) reported 
to have had no knowledge of the CCAW structure, which according to the DWAF 
policies formulated the guidelines for approving agricultural grants and subsidies 
(Mullinuex, 2005). Hence, it could be argued that such structural inconsistencies 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of the agricultural policy framework for supporting 
local business initiatives such as the ones proposed by Riverside S.A. in the KRV. 
Nevertheless, the following sub-sections describe the internal funding policy 
strategies and grant structures formulated within each of the three departments.   
 
A description of the provincial DWAF support for irrigation projects  
 
It has to be mentioned that even though agricultural policy strategies were formulated 
and documents were available at the provincial DWAF offices, at the time of the 
research the position for executing the strategies was vacant. Understaffing and a 
general lack of human skills at the provincial office as well as the restructuring 
process within the DWAF were cited as factors responsible for the vacancy 
(Mullinuex, 2005). Hence, it could be argued that during the research period the 
strategies existed only on paper. 
 
Nevertheless, in its 2002 strategy document for the Uplifment and Local Economic 
Development through the Transformation of State Support for Agricultural Water 
Use, the provincial DWAF explained its support strategies. These were aimed at 
supporting six sub-sectors of agricultural water use to achieve equity, good 
governance, competitiveness and sustainability. The targeted sub-sectors were: 
a) low risk household production for food security,  
b) market based Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise (SMME) development (of 
farmers and agricultural service providers),  
c) revitalisation and local integration of former government smallholder 
irrigation systems,  
d) transformation of commercial parastatal schemes (formerly of Bantu 
homelands),  
e) land reform beneficiaries that may or may not have access to irrigation water, 
and  
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f) joint ventures between resource limited farmers (or labourers) and established 
commercial partners.  
 
Four of the policy targeted sub-sectors, namely b,d, e and f, could be found in the 
KRV and therefore the business initiatives involving the former Ciskei, white 
commercial farmers and their workers were relevant to the current discussion. 
According to the policy strategy document, the support for SMME development was 
premised on the belief that, for black farmers to be successful in farming businesses 
they had to be independent. That meant that support mechanisms had to be put in 
place for them to a) adapt to deregulated agricultural markets at a global level, b) to 
have access to land resources, and c) to have access to the established support 
industry, as discussed in chapter five.  
 
With regard to commercial agricultural schemes, which were managed by homeland 
parastatal agencies (for example Ulimocor), the DWAF had earmarked them for 
privatisation. The department’s objective was to support them into becoming 
financially independent entities. In order to achieve the privatisation goals, plans had 
to be put in place to:  
a) offer training to farmers in areas of business skills, conflict management as 
well as farm management, and 
b) build institutional support for farmers.  
However, such support would be weighed against the opportunity costs (economic 
and political) of investing similar amounts of money into other agricultural water 
uses. Nonetheless, the core policy challenge for the DWAF was to be able to 
“structure business ventures around the productive capacity on these schemes that 
would attract (outside) investment and expertise” (DWAF, 2002:8). Considering that 
most of the schemes were small business units, the policy formulation process 
recognised the difficulties entailed in trying to make the schemes attractive to external 
investments.          
 
The DWAF was aware that, historically, joint ventures had been undertaken between 
black and white farmers in terms of sharecropping, rental and labour tenancy, 
however, joint ownerships, such as the ones proposed between Riverside S.A. and its 
employees, for instance, were not as pervasive (DWAF, 2002:9). In creating an 
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environment for the joint ventures to be established, the DWAF’s policy support was 
aimed at ensuring that black farmers had water rights and land security through grant 
and subsidy schemes. The grants would enhance the bargaining powers of emerging 
farmers at negotiations with big commercial farmers and other businesses in 
establishing joint ventures. Hence, application forms and guidelines for applying for 
grants and subsidies (see Appendix 11) as well as guidelines for writing business 
plans and annual reports were available at provincial offices.  
 
On paper the support mechanisms seemed plausible and adequate in meeting the 
financial requirements of small farmers. To receive funding, all that the farmers were 
required to do was to write sound business plans and fill-in the right application 
forms. During the time of the research, a similar channel of support had actually been 
used by a group of black citrus farmers in the Alice area (outside the KRV) and it was 
reported that they had received more than a million Rands in the form of grants 
(Roberts, 2005). It was, however, not clear whether the funds were received only 
through the DWAF schemes or in conjunction with other support channels from other 
departments. In any case, a concern was raised that the farmers, who did not have 
access to the right information on these funding schemes and about how to apply for 
them, would not be in good stead to receive such support. However, to eliminate such 
possibilities, the policy stipulated that resources (human and financial) had to be made 
available to support emerging farmers to access the right information. However, a 
secondary problem stemming from the availability of this support was that the number 
of applications for funds was out growing the department’s resources (Mullineux, 
2005).  
 
With regard to the business initiatives from the KRV, for example the proposed joint 
shareholding between Riverside S.A. and its workers, the policy guidelines for issuing 
support grants were not explicit as to whether such initiatives could in fact be 
supported. Since the objectives of the policy were to keep all supported farmers 
independent of outside interests, Riverside S.A. would not have been in a position to 
apply for the grants, as it would hold more than fifty percent (51%) of total shares.    
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A technical description of the DWAF support  
 
Since the provision of the DWAF grants and subsidies were targeted at the economic 
development of emerging farmers and female participation, certain policy conditions 
were put in place in deciding their receipt. Technical requirements in terms of farm 
sizes and years for which grants could be applied were clearly spelled out in policy.       
 
Mandated by the National Water Act (NWA, 36 of 1998), the DWAF can offer, 
contingent to budgetary constraints, six different types of grants and subsidies to 
emerging farmers upon receipt and processing of applications. These are grants:  
a) on capital costs for the construction and upgrading of irrigation schemes to 
farmers who are members of legal organisations (e.g. WUAs). With the grants, 
consultant services for needs assessments, technical planning and design, 
water yield studies, legal requirements, economic feasibility studies, etc., can 
be undertaken (at the rate of the proportional share percentage of annual water 
allocations) of the beneficiaries in the grantable investment, or R15 000 per 
scheduled hectare of poor farmer, or R75 000 per scheduled HDI farmer,   
b) or subsidy on operation and maintenance (O & M) of waterworks and 
WRM and depreciation charges, at rate in table 6. 4: 
 
Table 6.4 Phased-out grants on operation and maintenance, WRM and 
depreciation charges  
Years Grant on O & M 
and WRM charges 
% 
Grant on depreciation 
charge (if applicable) % 
1st 100 100 
2nd 80 100 
3rd 60 100 
4th 40 100 
5th 20 100 
6th 0 100 
7th 0 0 
                   (Source: DWAF, 2005e) 
 
c) for the acquisition of water entitlements for irrigation, based on the lowest 
value of: i) 75% of the minority value water entitlement and bulk water 
supply, ii) R7 500 per scheduled hectare of water entitlement, and iii) R37 500 
per individual member on the water entitlement purchased, 
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d) for preliminary or remedial socio-economic viability studies, at the following 
rate: proportional share of beneficiaries, or R500 per scheduled hectare of the 
beneficiaries, or R2 500 per scheduled beneficiary member,    
e) for training of management committees of WUAs or other approved legal 
entities, at the rate of R1 800 (per management committee per board member 
per annum) or 90% of the course fees per annum for a total of five years,   and 
f) for rain-water tanks (an expected 1 000 tanks would be built per annum from 
the DWAF budget of R 5 million per annum). 
 
A funding formula to encourage a non paternalistic relationship and over dependency 
on government support by farmers the following formula was used to guide the 
process:   
 
 
Where: 
R (%): is percentage reduction in total grant  
F (%): is percentage of irrigated area on a scheme, which is under control of 
           female HDIs (as decision makers) 
C (%): is proportion of female HDIs on the management committee of relevant 
         WUA or other approved legal entity 
Therefore, no reduction is applicable to total grant if (C= or > F). 
 
It is clear from the formula that over and above the requirement for female 
representation on water governing bodies, the value of the grants was also dependent 
on the area that needed to be cultivated as well as the farmers’ own contribution to the 
total value of the purchase or service. At the start of the projects, a higher level of 
support was offered (also refer to Table 6.4), which diminished at some rate over 
time. Moreover, the monetary values available from the DAWF support as presented 
in presented documents seemed too low to form an adequate financial support for 
citrus farming, which is capital intensive and generally an expensive activity.                                             
     
Based on these guidelines and requirements, applying on its own Riverside S.A. 
would not qualify for any of the DWAF grants. However, it is possible that if they had 
succeeded in establishing a joint venture with a black shareholding majority as their 
   R =  ½ (F-C) 
 110
workers, they may have been eligible for a fraction of some of the grants, possibly 
with the risk distribution specifications altered. On the other hand, the black citrus 
farmers from Alice, as reported (Roberts, 2005), were successful in securing some 
funding from the DWAF because they were the targeted group for the support and 
hence they met some of the requirements. With respect to the Thembani c.c., it was 
also not clear whether the DWAF would have supported such an initiative. In any 
case, it was the DLA (not the DWAF) that took part in the negotiations to establish 
this joint partnership venture. It would be interesting for future research to see how 
the DWAF would have responded to requests for funding the business.           
 
A description of the provincial DLA and DoA policy support for irrigation 
projects  
 
As mentioned in the DWAF (2002:2) policy, land resources, besides water, form an 
integral part of multifaceted inputs to the success of agricultural production systems. 
Hence, the land reform process in South Africa is crucial in the discussion of public 
policy support for the success of agricultural schemes and businesses.    
 
The reform process had three readily identifiable components in 2005, namely, land 
restitution, tenure security and the redistribution process. The land reform for 
agricultural purposes fell mainly within the scope of redistribution, in the programme 
for the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD, 2005). The scope 
and objectives of the programme were the transfer of agricultural land resources to 
specified individuals and commonage projects handled by local municipalities and/or 
tribal authorities. The LRAD for land transfers to individuals was designed in a 
manner, which enabled financial grants and subsidies from the DLA to be made 
available to black South Africans for access to land resources for agricultural use 
(DLA, 2005:5).   
 
Similar to the DWAF (2002) support policies with aims to discourage a culture of 
over-reliance on government support, potential beneficiaries had to have their own 
contributions to the grant totals (i.e. R5000 minimum) before they could receive 
funding ranging from R20 000 to R100 000. However, compared to the requirements 
for the DWAF grants, the LRAD programme had more flexible conditions, for 
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instance, where not only groups could apply for funding but individuals as well. The 
proposed projects for which grants could be made available included those within the 
following themes, a) food safety-net projects, b) equity schemes, c) production for 
markets, and d) agriculture in communal areas (DLA, 2005:5). A sliding scale of 
grants based on the ‘own contribution’ component is illustrated in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5 Sliding scale of grants at given contributions, as examples for illustration  
Own contribution Matching grant Proportion of total costs (%) 
R R Own contribution Grant 
5 000 20 000 20 80 
35 000 40 871 46 54 
145 000 68 888 68 32 
400 000 100 000 80 20 
(Source: DLA, 2005:8)  
 
From the table it can be seen that the grant structure was regressive in nature in a 
manner that favoured poor farmers, for example, the smaller the ‘own contribution’ 
portion was, the bigger the shares of government grants would be and vice versa.   
 
The DoA’s support programme (i.e. the Comprehensive Agricultural Support 
Programme (CASP)) was, on the other hand, not very dissimilar to the DLA’s. 
Emphasis was explicitly placed on the support to develop farmers, who were land 
reform beneficiaries and common land-holders, into independent entrepreneurs. Most 
of the grants were also offered within the Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) of 
local municipalities, to promote cooperation between the national departments and 
local governments (DoA, 2005:2).      
 
The DoA’s CASP grants were offered for the development of agricultural 
infrastructure, such as fencing, stock water provisioning, stock handling facilities and 
dipping services, etc. The sizes of the grants on their sliding scale are illustrated in 
Table 6.6. Compared to the DLA grants they were more lucrative, ranging from R100 
000 to R800 000 maximum. However, for these grants the minimum ‘own 
contribution’ component was also a hundred percent higher at R10 000. 
 
 
 
 
 112
 
Table 6.6 Sliding scale of grants at given contributions, as examples for illustration  
Funding Scale (R) Own contribution (R) 
500 000 50 000 
400 000 40 000 
300 000 30 000 
200 000 20 000 
100 000 10 000 
(Maximum grant = R 800 000) 
          (Source DoA, 2005:10)    
 
6.2.5 The integrated departmental approach (CCAW) to public policy support 
 
The focuses of the DWAF, DLA and DoA grant support systems that have been 
discussed are on different aspects of irrigation farming. However, since there were 
overlaps among these aspects, especially with regard to infrastructural funding from 
the DWAF and DoA, to avoid duplication inefficiencies, a centrally coordinated 
approach for approving applications was in place. The Coordination Committees on 
Agricultural Water (CCAW), controlled by the DoA, was a policy initiated 
interdepartmental forum, whose main mandate was to approve the dispensing of 
funds, based on the tested feasibility of the proposed projects. Nonetheless, even 
though in principle the DLA was part of the forum it seemed that their participation 
on the forum was limited, if not non-existent (Loets, 2005). This point illustrated one 
possible area in which policy coordination failure in the grants and subsidies policy 
framework had arisen. Nevertheless, the rigorous procedure through which the 
CCAW approved applications for project funding is illustrated in the Figure 6.3. The 
illustration depicts an hypothetical scenario from the point where a community or 
individual decided to build a scheme or undertake a project to a point where a subsidy 
application was approved for consideration for funding by  
the relevant government department. 
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Figure 6.3: Procedural framework approving grants at CCAW  
(Source: adapted from DWAF, 2005d) 
 
 
From the illustration, the DWAF played a crucial role in conducting the feasibility 
studies, through the Water Users Associations (WUA), where they existed. It is also 
CCAW  sub-com. investigates viability of scheme: Is it viable? 
The Provincial Dept informs CCAW 
They approach Prov: Agric, DWAF or Land Affairs 
Community decides they want to build a scheme 
Sub-com liaises with DWAF on  
possible water availability 
 Sub-com liaises with DLA on 
possible land availability 
Sub-com liaises with DoA on agricultural 
aspects 
Availability of resources and viability of scheme considered 
CCAW defines TOR and appoints task team or 
consultant to complete viability study 
Does scheme have a (fair) chance to succeed? 
If yes: CCAW holds community meeting for discussions 
DLA appoints land valuator and community 
facilitator 
Does a WUA or Trust or other legal entity consisting 
mainly of HDIs exist? 
Is scheme viable in all aspects? 
Tenders invited, and selected, CCAW holds meeting with community body 
or WUA: considering total costs from best tender
Does WUA or legal community body still want to continue?
DWAF (appoints WUA or consultants) for 
ecological and socio-economic impact 
DWAF co-ordinates the establishment of 
WUA 
WUA appoints consultants for ecological and 
socio-economic impact assessment 
Subsidy is applied for from DWAF, DoA or 
DLA 
Scheme is abandoned 
IF NO 
NO 
YES 
NO 
IF NO 
No 
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important to note that even though some other legal entity (i.e. besides the WUA) 
representing the communities could apply for funding, such an entity would, however, 
not be able to conduct these studies. Instead, the DWAF preferred to appoint a 
consultant or establish a new WUA to conduct the study, at a later stage. In the former 
homelands like the Ciskei and Transkei, where very few WUAs were established, 
consultants were employed, e.g. Argus Gibbs (DWAF, 2005b) and MBB (DLA, 
1999). In the KRV, however, the Water Users Association would be able to undertake 
feasibility studies in terms of the CCAW’s approval process, even though there was 
no evidence that such studies had ever been conducted. It could be argued that such 
was the case, because most of the KRV WUA’s stakeholder representations were 
those of big white commercial farmers, where emerging black farmers were under-
represented in comparison. On the other hand, the business projects of joint-ventures 
that were locally proposed were mainly those initiated by large white farmers as 
private business proposals. Such origins placed the proposals in a peripheral position 
for consideration using the focus of the government funding policies as yardstick. 
Those are some of the reasons why the available public funds, it seemed, were not 
readily applied for or even accessible for the proposed projects that in one way or 
another had an involvement of black citrus farmers.          
  
6.2.6 Themes for discussion and analysis within an institutional framework  
 
Following North’s (1990) definition of institutions as the rules, such as property rights 
and cultural practice and norms, which are path dependent and which govern human 
economic transactions, the most useful way to isolate themes for discussion from the 
case of KRV’s black citrus farmers would be one based on history. The documented 
challenges of economic development with regard to emerging farmers had a historical 
trajectory. Hence, the descriptions of these businesses and social challenges should be 
well complemented by presentations of their historical origin/s. On the other hand, the 
proposed business and policy solutions from local large commercial farmers and 
government also had a historical path that needs identification. 
 
The reported underdevelopment of black citrus farms may have owed part of its origin 
to South Africa’s past policies, which promoted unequal development, i.e. the Natives 
Land Act (27 of 1913), however, the resilience of the status quo may be partly 
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explained by inherited institutions of corruption. These originated from or flourished 
in the former Ciskei homeland. The settlement of citrus farmers in the KRV was not 
based on objectives to achieve fully efficient economic outcomes, but mostly on 
political patronage. The farmers became the last settler group in the valley, and with 
other commitments outside the farming activities, such as civil service, they could not 
have had fully vested interests in the successes of the farm units they suddenly 
occupied. The fact that they occupied the farms within easy or even seemingly 
unenforceable repayment arrangements was a further disincentive to ensure that the 
farms were run on successful economic terms. Furthermore, the inefficiency of the 
repayment arrangements between the ex-Ciskei government and the farmers ensured 
an inheritance of insecurity of tenure and high debt. The discussion showed that the 
lack of tenure later prevented farmers from having access to external financial 
support, for example from private banks, which in turn prevented business 
developments but on the other hand ensured that farmers remained in their increasing 
debt. Such is a classic illustration of a poverty trap, which is self sustaining in a 
similar manner described by North (1990) in a discussion of sustained economic 
under-development, even with high transaction costs, in some third world societies.  
 
At a social level, the black citrus farmers, as a new group of settlers in the valley, 
were not very welcome by the local farm residents, who were previously farm 
workers. The growing population of the residents became an additional obstacle in the 
farms’ day-to-day production activities, with reported growing thefts of crops. Such 
social problems even led to the establishment of high-density settlements in the area. 
However, since many of the residents continued residing on the farms, probably 
because of the farmers’ lack of ownership rights to the land, which may have entitled 
them some legal leverage to expel unwanted dwellers, the challenges from the 
cohabitation remained obvious. This social problem contributed to the sustainability 
of underdevelopment of KRV’s black citrus farmers.      
 
The proposed business solutions from internal and external actors, like Riverside S.A. 
and the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) also had historical origins and attributes 
of embedded-ness. Firstly, the actions by Riverside S.A. were clearly those of rational 
economic actors. The deregulation of international markets in the early 1990s had 
opened growth in horticulture, which encouraged growing citrus export demands. The 
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need to expand production outputs to meet these increasing demands, within a 
favourable exchange rate environment, was the main motivation for the business 
proposals for partnerships with under-utilised black farm units and for further land 
developments where such was likely. With Katco (the main local competitor) not 
actively seeking to use its relationships with black farmers, it seemed logical for 
Riverside S.A. to attempt to secure future outputs by forging partnerships that would 
strengthen its future competitive positions. Secondly, the DLA in its attempts, a) to 
settle the black farmers’ land debts, inherited from the former Ciskei, and b) to 
support the development of emerging farmers as prescribed in current policies, its 
actions were in the main a reaction to past institutional and political challenges. 
Where some of the motivations from both Riverside S.A. and the DLA coincided with 
mutual benefits to be had, it seemed solutions were most likely to be found, for 
example, in the establishment of Thembani c.c. However, where the Riverside S.A.’s 
business motives were not complementary to some of the policy objectives, such 
partnerships were not supported by the DLA, irrespective of whether they made any 
economic sense. For example, the proposal to form a business partnership with 
Riverside S.A. employees was not supported by the DLA based on ‘dubious’ risk 
shares.  
 
With the exception of the reported case of black farmers from Alice, the external 
policy support from other government departments, like the DWAF, seemed to be out 
of touch with locally proposed solutions. It seemed that, a) the KRV environment did 
not readily lend itself to the possibility of generating government policy oriented 
solutions, and b) the policy formulation process was not based on information 
pertaining to the black and/or white farmers’ needs and vested interests at a local 
level. In the main, the potentially available funding from government agencies was 
not being applied for because the requirements and conditions put in place for 
applications did not match the business development needs of citrus farmers on the 
ground. Hence, an argument that policy coordination failure had occurred could be 
put forth for this particular case. Nonetheless, as irrelevant to the condition of black 
citrus farmers the presented public policies seemed to have been, their formulation 
was still rooted in history. They were concerned with the national development of 
emerging farmers, as a group that was historically disadvantaged, despite the fact that 
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they may not have been the most appropriate for the KRV activities during the time of 
research.   
 
It is interesting and important to note that while it seemed that Katco had an economic 
premise to support the development of its black members, for instance to help them 
repay their debt to the cooperative, there was little evidence to suggest that this was 
done or planned. Perhaps Katco as a group of many more farmers had a more diverse 
internal voice, which landed itself in conflicting perspectives on how to approach the 
development question when compared to Riverside S. A., which was smaller and a lot 
more cohesive. Nonetheless, the case showed that even though there were potential 
economic incentives and opportunities for Katco to be part of the development 
process of black citrus farmers, the mentioned factors on their own were not enough 
to catalyse the process. There is likelihood that an external agent would have been 
more suitable to perform that function.  
 
Flowing from a consideration of the KRV black farmers, some of the questions that 
may have needed urgent answers in the policy formulation processes aimed at 
developing emerging actors from historically disadvantaged backgrounds were as 
follows:  
a) Would it be highly likely for such emerging farmers to draw sound and 
independent business proposals to meet the policy standards aimed at 
promoting economically sustainable businesses without external assistance or 
partnerships?   
b) Would it ever be possible for most outside support, from successful 
businesses, to come forth without vested private interests and conform to most 
policy conditions? 
If answers are mainly ‘no’ for at least one of the questions, then some of the policy 
requirements for applying for funding from government agencies may need some 
alteration. For instance, the promotion of independent black-run businesses at any 
stage of the development process may need reconsideration.   
 
The foregoing discussion isolated several themes from the case study that need a 
rigorous interrogation using the institutional framework. It would be helpful at this 
stage to point out the ways in which the themes were not only embedded in history 
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but also how they functioned in an interconnected manner to an extent that it would 
not have been possible to find a successful solution/s that did not have a holistic 
approach to the challenges of the citrus farming community as whole. The 
interconnectedness47 and the loop mechanisms with which some of the themes 
affected the development process and communicated with one another are illustrated 
in Figure 6.4.  
 
 
 
As illustrated in the figure, not only are the factors affecting the KRV’s development 
process, but they also affect one another internally and externally. For instance, the 
external environment of growing export demands was not only contributing positively 
towards the KRV’s citrus industry, but it also generated interests to form business 
partnerships, both at local and national levels. Hence, an argument for interventions 
                                                 
47 It is also worthwhile to note how the lessons from the case study could also be related to 
Hirschman’s (1960) discussion of the urgent need to consider coordination as crucial in policy 
formulation to deal with complex conditions required for development processes to take off.     
The Economic 
Development of 
KRV citrus 
Farmers Process 
Positive 
Institutional factors 
 
Internal: 
*Vested economic 
interests 
*Growing export 
demands   
*Need for further land 
developments 
*Business partnerships 
*Smaller cohesive 
interests/voices  
 
 
 
External: 
*Public policy drive for 
HID empowerment 
*Growing export 
demands 
*Business partnerships 
 
Negative 
Institutional factors 
 
Internal: 
* Corruption/political 
patronage 
* Outside commitments 
* Insecurity of tenure 
* Debt 
* Lack of access to 
finances 
* Poverty trap 
* Crop theft/social tensions 
* Land & water resources 
constraints 
*Diverse interests/voices 
 
 
 
 
External: 
*Inadequate/non specific 
policies 
* Policy coordination 
failures 
*Lack of business 
Figure 6.4: The interconnectedness of institutional factors affecting the development of 
black citrus farmers  
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(i.e. public policies and business initiatives), which are sensitive to such interactions, 
is illuminated. In chapter seven a more rigorous interrogation of factors depicted in 
Figure 6.4 will be presented within an institutional framework, which was discussed 
in chapters three and four.  
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6.3 A CASE OF WATER ABSTRACTIONS USING THE ILLUSTRATIVE 
PHYSICAL EXTERNALITY MODEL  
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6.3.1 Introduction  
 
The Kat River is the main tributary of the Great Fish River (see Map 6.3). It is also a 
watercourse from which water is diverted individually by irrigators. In such a 
watercourse, and as discussed in chapter three, Bromley (1982) proposed that 
economic externalities exist due to: a) different levels of water quantities available to 
farmers located at different positions in the watercourse, and b) increased levels of 
uncertainty in production at downstream locations. Higher levels of water quantities 
and lower levels of uncertainty exist at upstream positions, which entails that 
downstream positions are progressively disempowered both politically and 
economically over time. These institutional postulations were investigated by 
profiling three groups of commercial irrigators situated along the Kat River, 
identifiable by their geographical locations and socio-economic conditions. These 
were the Middle and Lower (downstream) large commercial farmers and subsistence 
farmers, who were located upstream (see Map 6.5). Bromley’s (1982) postulation of 
unequal distribution of economic and political power which favour upstream located 
farmers was supported by the 2005 evidence from the Middle and Lower Kat 
locations, however, it was in fact ironic that the most disadvantaged (in economic and 
political terms) of the KRV farmer groups was one located upstream (i.e. in the Upper 
Kat). However, historical and institutional factors presented in the case study could 
explain most of the deviation. Evidence also showed that the Lower Kat group was to 
some extent disadvantaged in terms of productivity and political power when 
compared to the most successful group, which was located at a relatively more 
upstream position in the Middle Kat reaches. The Middle Kat farmers appeared to 
have a competitive advantage over other groups in terms of water assurances as well 
as political influence on decision-making institutions such as the KRV Water User 
Association (WUA). Therefore, most of the KRV data on large commercial farmers 
conformed to Bromley’s (1982) theoretical expectations, but this was not the case 
with regard to subsistence farmers who were located in more advantageous areas in 
terms of water resource availability. 
 
The case illustrates that the institutional effects of political interventions, South 
Africa’s water and education and training policies of the 20th century had a 
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considerable role to play48 in influencing and explaining, especially, the deviation of 
empirical data from the postulations. For instance, the political creation of the former 
Ciskei government, which was discussed in the preceding case study, led to a decline 
in levels of productivity of the Upper Kat reaches, and it ingrained both ethnic and 
racial conflicts over resources and a lack of business as well as practical farming 
skills. These were in addition to years of unsustainable poor education policies for 
black schools as implemented by South Africa’s apartheid government, which did not 
seem to improve during the former Ciskei rule49. The effect of riparian water rights of 
1956 (Mbatha, 2005) were restricted land developments for business purposes in the 
Middle Kat reaches, with tensions growing between the Middle and Lower Kat 
farmers around water and land resource allocations. The culminating effects of these 
factors were the inefficient irrigation and business practices which contributed 
immensely to the underdevelopment of the whole KRV area as observed between 
2004 and 2006. Hence, it could be argued that, perhaps, in affecting large commercial 
farmers, the remedial redistributive policies presented in the preceding case study, 
which are concerned with agricultural resources like water (e.g. the National Water 
Act (NWA, 36 of 1998)) would be appropriate for the present case study if their main 
aim were to alleviate uncertainties in business decision-making processes. With 
regard to subsistence farmers of the Upper Kat, however, the policies would have 
been more effective if they focussed more on transferring skills through formal and 
informal channels in the form of effectual educational programmes and business 
mentoring schemes. Such mentoring schemes could be achievable through the 
business partnerships proposed in the previous case study. This is the case simply 
because the redistribution of water resources and infrastructure would mean 
technically nothing to emerging farmers who did not have the capacity to exploit the 
resources. 
         
In section 6.3.2, the Physical Externality Model will be presented within the Kat River 
Valley’s geographical context. Past and present water allocation policies and practices 
in the KRV will be described in section 6.3.3. The Upper KRV’s institutional 
challenges to development will be discussed in section 6.3.4. Section 6.3.5 will 
                                                 
48 Alongside explanations from ‘formal hypotheses’. 
49 In the 2004 KRV household survey the reported average time of formal schooling in the Upper KRV 
was four years.  
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identify the themes for further analysis using the institutional framework presented in 
chapters three and four.      
 
6.3.2 The investigation of KRV farmers using the Physical Externality Model  
 
 
The Physical Externality Model (PEM) postulates that geographical positions of farm 
units along a watercourse in which water is diverted individually give rise to technical 
inefficiencies that adversely affect production outputs of downstream farmers, cet. 
par. (Bromley, 1982). Data from various studies in developing countries, for example 
Mexico and Sudan, indicate that farm units, which are located at upstream positions, 
tend to be bigger in size and their owners tend to have a sizable political influence on 
the decision-making institutions that govern water allocations and output market 
prices. Such inefficiencies arise mainly because of uncertainties with regard to how 
much water would be available for the next cycle of production. Over time, the 
culture of water abstractions because of initial uncertainties becomes resistant to 
change (i.e. path dependent), which may be initiated through external intervention. 
They become institutionalised, which is an illustration of path-dependency. Figure 6.5 
illustrates the phenomenon, where in a watercourse uncertainties intensify as one 
moves from the most upstream (A) to the most downstream (B) location.  
   
Figure 6.5 A watercourse with individual water abstractions  
 
According to the PEM, the farmer located at B is economically disadvantaged 
compared to the one at position A. This is because his/her decisions with regard to 
River Basin 
Upstream 
position 
Downstream 
    position 
Low uncertainty 
 A 
B Watercourse 
High uncertainty 
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production inputs, especially water resources, are dependent on how much water is 
abstracted upstream by farmer located at A, hence how much water would be 
available to him/her. In the model it is assumed that farmers are naturally risk averse, 
hence the downstream farmer’s (i.e. B) allocated budget for production inputs - within 
the environment of uncertainty - would be even more conservative and therefore 
incrementally sub-optimal.  
 
In Figure 6.6, these allocative (production) inefficiencies are illustrated using the 
General Equilibrium of Welfare Economics. An Edgeworth Box diagram is used, 
where finite levels of water inputs are represented on the horizontal axis and all other 
inputs on the vertical axis. The figure depicts an abstract 2 x 2 economy with only two 
producers (A and B) and two inputs (water resources and other inputs), however the 
discussion results extend to an n-sector, n-farmer economy.    
 
        
                  B                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Inefficient resource allocations in agricultural production 
Source: Bromley (1982:13) 
 
 
The PE model also postulates that after bargaining processes between the farmers 
(economic actors) and after allocation decisions have been made on production inputs, 
due to prevailing uncertainties, farmer A ends up producing at point K, and B at point 
 
Water used by farmer B                       WB
Water used by farmer A            WA
Other  
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J.  Such positions, as end points, are inefficient, because they lie outside the contract 
line (AB), which in this theory depicts Pareto efficiency (Black, et al. 2005:17-19). 
Moreover, farmer B’s share of total resources ends up being much smaller than 
Farmer A’s, as s/he operates at a much lower isoquant. This is another illustration of 
the economic dominance of upstream farmers, which also translates into (and is being 
reinforced by) political dominance. Once again the institutionalised nature of 
inequitable distribution of resources and power is illustrated.          
 
What in essence the model highlights are the adverse effects of information 
asymmetries that prevent the formation of efficient production markets, leading to 
sustained inequalities. It is the geographical design of the watercourse that lends itself 
to such market failures. In addition, the reliance of farmers on past experiences (past 
production cycles) in decision-making processes with regard to available production 
inputs for future cycles is further illustration of their risk-averse nature. Over time, the 
experiences become part of an ingrained institutional rule, which is also self-
regulating, that govern the behaviour of the whole farming community (Bromley, 
1982). The discussion of such rules conforms to North’s (1990 and 1992) 
conceptualisation of institutions, which were presented in chapter three.   
 
A description of the Kat River Catchment within the PEM framework   
 
In 2005, large individual farmers, small irrigation schemes and household users either 
diverted or abstracted water from the Kat River system, which in Map 6.4 runs from 
the Kat Dam (north-western location) towards the town of Fort Beaufort (south-
central location). The dam itself, located south of Seymour was built in 1969-70 with 
a storage capacity of 24,892 x 10 m3 and an assured yield of 11.88 x 10 m3 per annum 
(Magni in Motteux, 2002). This capacity extended water security to approximately 
1600 hectares of water scheduled50 land over three years (DLA, 1998 and Painter, 
2005). The Kat River was the major watercourse from which water was abstracted for 
various uses in the KRV, however, other streams in quaternary catchments51, for 
example the Blinkwater and Balfour systems in Map 6.4, which are tributaries to the 
                                                 
50 Water scheduling is a system of riparian rights under the Water Act (54) of 1956 where access to 
water rights was given on the basis of land under cultivation. After the rights were conferred to a 
farmer, s/he was not allowed to develop further land for irrigation.       
51 Indicated with various shading in Map 6.4. 
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Kat, formed the secondary water sources from which additional quantities were 
available. 
 
 
Map 6.4: The Kat River and its tributaries (alternative sources of water) 
  
Irrigated citrus farming required the highest share of total abstracted water quantities. 
Other less water intensive irrigation uses, especially by small farmers in the Upper 
reaches, were for staple vegetables like cabbages, potatoes, etc, which was indicated 
in section 6.1. Depending on total land area under irrigation on each farm or scheme, 
various amounts of water were abstracted. Table 6.7 illustrates these agricultural uses, 
by land area and position from the most recent and comprehensive study done in the 
KRV catchment (KDOR, 1989). The reaches in the first column refer to a division of 
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the KRV into seven sections using the most significant water diversions (i.e. weirs) 
from the Kat system, as illustrated in the Appendix 12.  
 
Table 6.7: Areas under cultivation in each river reach (ha), 1989 
Reach Citrus Tobacco Vegetables Pastures Other Total 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
4 
264 
131 
246 
21 
 
 
 
 
185 
127 
47 
37 7 
37 
7 
 
14 
48 
315 
138 
246 
206 
127 
47 
Total 666 359 37 51 14 1127 
Source: KDOR (1989) 
 
From the Table 6.7, citrus cultivation was by far the most prolific agricultural activity, 
covering over 60% of the total land area under cultivation. In 1989, tobacco was the 
second biggest crop cultivated at more than 30%. In 2005, however, some of the land 
uses and the extent to which they were prevalent as presented in Table 6.7 had 
changed. For instance, tobacco was no longer extensively cultivated as it was twenty 
years prior to the research period, and some of the citrus farms in the Upper Kat 
reaches were no longer operational as was presented in the preceding case of black 
citrus farmers. In fact, the total land area of uncultivated or idle farms in the Upper 
Kat reaches was approximately 764 hectares in 2004 (KRV WUA, 2004). On the 
other hand, in the Lower Kat reaches (the section below the town of Fort Beaufort in 
Map 6.4) more land (i.e. 884 hectares) without water scheduling, had been developed 
for citrus production from the time when the Kat River Dam was constructed. Hence, 
Table 6.7 can only be indicative of what could be grown and what has been cultivated 
in the history of the KRV catchment.  
 
Table 6.8 illustrates the 2005 development of land areas for citrus production 
exclusively. The total amount of land areas under citrus cultivation had more than 
doubled from 666 hectares in 1989 to 1142 hectares in 2005. It can also be seen from 
the table that citrus cultivation without water scheduling rights (i.e. water supply 
security) was higher at 884 hectares compared to only 682 hectares of cultivated 
scheduled land. The business and institutional implications of such citrus cultivation, 
without water security, are discussed in detail in the forthcoming sections.    
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Table 6.8: Estimated land areas under citrus cultivation with and without water      
              scheduling (hectares) 
Total land 
with 
scheduling 
Total land 
with 
scheduling 
but not 
cultivated 
Total land 
with 
scheduling 
and 
cultivated  
Total area 
under 
citrus 
cultivation 
Total land 
without 
scheduling 
and 
cultivated  
Communal 
land and 
villages 
with 
scheduling 
*not used 
1600 918 682 1142 884 764 
Note: The information from various sources (e.g. technical government documents, land 
register, KRV WUA reports) used in collating the estimated land sizes was self 
contradictory, hence the table is only indicative of the magnitudes of land used for different 
purposes.  
Adapted from DLA (2005) 
 
The construction of the Kat River Dam, for water security, was itself necessitated by 
problems of intermittent water shortages as experienced at various times in the history 
of the catchment. There were instances of severe water shortages even long after the 
dam had been constructed, for example the droughts of 1983 and 1991 (Roberts, 
2004). Interestingly, the shortages contributed to severe alterations of the dam’s 
operational rules as well as heightened tensions among groups of irrigators over levels 
of water quality and supply. The nature of these tensions is discussed in more detail in 
the forthcoming section.  
 
Located immediately below the Kat River Dam, at upstream positions, small 
irrigation schemes were operated by villagers whose water needs (because of limited 
agricultural activities and scale thereof) were significantly lower than any of the other 
irrigation groups at more downstream locations. The land areas under regular 
irrigation per small scheme in 2005 ranged between five to ten hectares (e.g. Hertzog, 
Fairbain, Stonehage, etc.). In Map 6.4 the area where many of such schemes were 
located is identifiable as the Upper Kat. Below the schemes down to the Middle Kat 
reaches, were the former Ciskei black farmers, whose detailed history of settlement 
into the valley and discussion of potential business opportunities were presented in the 
preceding case study. In any case as indicated there, each of those former Ciskei 
farmers irrigated between ten to forty hectares of land (DLA, 2002). The Middle and 
Lower Kat reaches were populated by large white commercial farmers, who also 
owned most of the scheduled as well as non-scheduled land areas, and controlled the 
allocation operations of most of the water from the Dam (Mbatha, 2005). For 
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instance, the Painters, located in the Middle Kat owned, and/or leased land areas in 
excess of 900 hectares, comprised of eight separate farms, and had the capability of 
pumping to 100 000 litres of water per hour from the Kat River  (Painter, 2005). The 
Middle and Lower reach farmers in varying degrees also controlled the quantities and 
times at which water would be flushed from the Dam (KRV WUA, 2004). The land 
and water registers of the DLA (2002) and DWAF (2005f) listed the distributions of 
land ownership and water resource use by sub-area and by farm owner from which it 
was clear that private access, especially to water resources, was concentrated in the 
Middle and the Lower Kat reaches. Hence, contrary to the PEM postulations, such 
data indicates that most of economic and political power and leverage along the Kat 
system were located at relatively more downstream positions.      
  
Moreover, the distribution of business institutions that governed water resource 
allocations and enabled market access mirrored the economic and political 
distributional patterns. For example, the large commercial farmers in the Middle to 
Lower reaches had direct access and representation in the KRV’s Water User’s 
Association (WUA)52. In 2005, the small schemes in the Upper Kat reaches had 
minimal to no meaningful representation in the KRV’s WUA (Ntsebenza, 2006)53. 
The downstream commercial farmers (including the black citrus farmers) had access 
to the two big and privately and cooperatively run packing and marketing Riverside 
S.A Enterprise54 and Katco. In contrast, the most significant marketing institution 
supportive of the small irrigators was the Hertzog Cooperative (Hacop)55, established 
in 1994 with support from the Department of Agriculture (DoA) and the DLA. 
Between 2004 and 2006, however, some of the members of the scheme reported 
chronic internal leadership conflicts, lack of business skills and financial difficulties 
(Mbatha, 2006).  
 
The conflicts were over access to water resources and quality among big commercial 
farmers, which are elaborately documented in the KRV WUA’s records of meetings 
                                                 
52 The association was transformed from being the KRV Irrigation Board in 2001 (KRV WUA, 2001). 
53 The attendance register in minutes of the KRV WUA (2004) meetings convened in the last three 
years is also evidence for this point  
54 Although the Riverside S.A. Enterprise cooperated with other producers, legally however, it was a 
private firm.  
55 The cooperative, even though it was still operative, had shrunk in actual size and activity. A detailed 
historical study of the cooperative is presented in the next case. 
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from 2002 to 2004. On the other hand, the conflicts were over resources among small 
schemes centred around leadership roles and access to land and not so much on water 
resources (DWAF, 2005e). These observations seem logical in the light of acutely 
varied production activities and outputs from the different sections of the KRV and 
farming groups. Serious conflicts over bulk water supplies could only be expected to 
arise after rights to land resources use had been secured, sound management 
structures put in place, and considerable production outputs achieved. None of these 
variables were positively represented in the Upper Kat.  
 
What is readily relevant to the application of the PE model to the KRV data is that 
small schemes occupied the most advantageous position on the watercourse (i.e. they 
were located just below the Kat Dam in Map 6.4). In that regard, the geographical 
occupation of the most advantageous locations by small farmers, which was 
associated with a lack of economic and political power, contradicted theoretical 
expectations, cet. par. The observation was also inconsistent when compared with 
empirical evidence reported from other developing country cases like Mexico and 
Sudan (Bromley, 1982:7-17). In those cases, small and poorly resourced farmers with 
insignificant political power occupied downstream positions, which would be 
expected in line with theoretical postulations. However, as will be discussed in the 
forthcoming section such inconsistencies only applied to the small schemes and not to 
big commercial farmers in the Middle and Lower KRV.      
 
Given some of the KRV data’s deviation from theoretical expectation and 
international data, the next section lays down a foundation for an institutional 
discussion, which describes the historical developments and associated effects of 
irrigation policies and practices (as observed in the KRV) for fuller and better 
understandable explanations of observable status quo. In addition, the discussion 
forms a basis for presenting and analysing the tensions among large commercial 
farmers (of the Middle and Lower Kat) in attempts to secure permanent water 
allocations (KRV WUA, 2004). It is argued that the tensions, even within a group of 
relatively successful farmers, contributed to sub-optimal utilisations of land and water 
resources and therefore to some extent to the general underdevelopment of the whole 
catchment.                       
 
 131
 
6.3.3  The water allocation policies and practices in the KRV 
 
The idea of constructing the Kat River Dam near Fort Armstrong was first motivated 
in 1940 (Painter, 2005), however, the dam was eventually built below the town of 
Seymour with funds from the DWAF in 1969. Arrangements for the maintenance of 
the construction costs were formalised with farmers who accepted riparian water-
scheduling rights. Such arrangements entailed monthly payments by farmers for the 
rights as well as charges for the dam’s maintenance. When the dam was constructed 
the majority of the valley was already under extensive citrus cultivation and this has 
remained the case as illustrated by Tables 6.7 and 6.8 (DLA, 1998).  
 
As reported in the previous case study, the majority of agricultural land, besides 
commercial forestry in the Upper KRV, before the former Ciskei homeland was 
established in 1971, was owned by white farmers and was also under citrus 
cultivation. Anecdotal data from farmers, for example Roberts (2004) and Palmer 
(2005) presented a picture of relatively successful farms prior to the establishment of 
the homeland system. The establishment led to the relocation of white farmers from 
the areas that were incorporated into the former Ciskei. With high water assurances, 
the Upper KRV prior to 1971 was not as significantly different in economic terms 
from the Middle and Lower reaches as would be observed almost thirty-five years 
later in 2005. The Upper Kat farms, including those that were no longer in operation 
in 2005, still had associated rights to almost half of the initial amounts of water 
scheduling, i.e. 764 of 1600 hectares illustrated in Table 6.8 (KRV WUA, 2004). 
With those political developments, which rearranged the geographical boundaries 
and subsequently the business positioning of farms, the watercourse was itself not 
physically reconfigured to conform to the new physical boundaries of the post 1971 
era. Hence, the early operational rules of the dam applied inside and outside of the 
former Ciskei borders. The DWAF in collaboration with members of the then Kat 
River Irrigation Board were responsible for laying down the rules for allocating water 
releases to scheduled as well as non-scheduled irrigators (De Villiers, 2005; Painter, 
2005). Some aspects of the rules and requirements for meeting the full annual 
irrigation water needs of the valley are summarised in Table 6.9. 
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Table 6.9: Monthly water releases (Mm3) from Kat Dam required to meet the full 
irrigation and domestic requirements  
Water Releases Per Month  
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Year’s 
total 
0.73 0.92 1.81 2.52 1.50 0.91 0.78 0.64 0.54 0.49 0.57 0.61 12.06 
Other components contributing to total annual flows 
Irrigation water requirement 
Domestic water requirement 
River losses 
River flow below Kat Dam 
10.04 
1.72 
4.36 
4.06 
(Source: KDOR, 1989:14) 
 
Table 6.9 indicates that more than sixty percent of water releases were allocated to 
meet irrigation requirements and that higher quantities were released in the early parts 
of the year, i.e. January and February. Because citrus harvesting usually takes place 
between the months of June and August, it makes sense that the lowest releases 
occurred during that period of the year.  
 
De Villiers (2005) emphasised that in 1969 farmers did not know for certain how the 
water scheduling would affect future business operations. Even though the relatively 
high assurances of water supplies seemed attractive, the restrictions on further 
developments of land for citrus production, which came with accepting the scheduling 
rights, were not very attractive. Hence, not all farmers, especially those located 
downstream of Fort Beaufort, applied for such scheduling rights. On the other hand, 
the farmers located above the town of Fort Beaufort did not face the option of 
remaining non-scheduled if they were to continue production, since water abstraction 
and pollution discharges had to be controlled above the town. The idea was to ensure 
that enough water, and of good quality, from the Kat River reached the town of Fort 
Beaufort (De Villiers, 2005). 
 
Farmers located downstream of the town, for example the Jeba Trust farms in Table 
6.10 reported that even though some of their counterparts wanted to be part of water 
scheduling, for instance C. Painter and E. Mildenhall, the nature of the system 
prevented them from doing so, because their upstream neighbours had declined any 
scheduling rights. Such was the case because in a geographical system where 
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irrigators abstract water individually, as illustrated in Figure 6.5 it is impossible for 
farmers located downstream to prevent non-scheduled upstream-located irrigators 
from harvesting any water that was not legally due to them. During 2004 and 2006 
downstream-located farmers, whose forebears had wanted scheduling but could not 
have it, continued to voice their dissatisfaction around the issue of their technical 
exclusion against their preferences (Mildenhall, 2004). The dissatisfaction became 
one of the recurrent themes in many of the tensions and/or conflicts between the 
Middle and the Lower Kat groups of farmers as illustrated in the minutes of the Water 
User’s Association meetings (KRV WUA, 2004).   
 
The reported water allocation tensions/conflicts 
 
Data on the relative sizes of farms in the Middle and Lower Kat reaches, with and 
without water scheduling, above and below the town of Fort Beaufort as well as water 
extraction pumps, boreholes and reservoirs are presented for each identified farm in 
Table 6.10. It seems that while the scheduled farmers opted for lower risks with 
regard to water security as noted in previous sections and Table 6.8, the Lower Kat 
farmers had, over the years, taken the risks of investing vast amounts of resources into 
developing non-scheduled land for citrus production, for example the Bath Farm 
Trust. Such land investments were made with low water assurances. The seemingly 
high-risk behaviour of these non-scheduled irrigators may also have been indicative 
of the high returns in citrus production in general. On the other hand, and as 
illustrated by the availability of secondary streams in Map 6.4, the behaviour may 
also be indicative of the general abundance of water resources and high competition 
in the valley.  
 
These alternative sources of water, which were available to some of the Kat River 
farmers, for example boreholes and other streams, are also presented in Table 6.10. It 
is interesting to note that the number of water storage reservoirs, weirs and boreholes 
was proportionately higher in the Middle Kat, where higher water security was also 
better guaranteed through scheduling rights. It is unclear from the data whether this 
point illustrates a more exaggerated risk-averse nature of this group of farmers, or 
merely their short-term rational economic behaviour in maintaining their competitive 
edge owed to advantageous geographical locations.      
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Farmers from the Lower Kat section confirmed that enough water resources were 
available to irrigators, especially rainwater that was harvested for storage on farms 
(e.g. Mildenhall, 2004). However, it was clear from interviews that such claims, 
despite their untested veracity, formed grounds for this group to argue for higher 
water releases from the dam, which was effectively under the control of scheduled 
farmers.  
 
Table 6.10: Farm ownership and associated water scheduling  
Enterprise name Reach Number of on farm 
reservoirs  
Scheduled 
hectares 
Citrus cultivation Weirs and 
pumps 
Boreholes 
Riverside Middle Kat 4 337 285.7 8 n/a 
Glen Muir Trust Middle Kat  61 50 1 n/a 
Y. Brown Middle Kat 3 5 30 1 4 
Maqoma Middle Kat N/a 24.5 21 n/a n/a 
Knotts Middle Kat 1 N/a 15 and 19 1 2 
D. Smith Middle Kat  11.5 20 0 n/a 
Ronnie Smith Middle Kat 2 N/a 0 0 2 
Total56  10 439 442 11 8 
Bath Farm Trust Lower Kat 3 0 111 2 1 
Umdala Trust Lower Kat N/a 0 0 n/a n/a 
Jeba Trust Lower Kat N/a 0 66 2 n/a 
JP Mildenhall Lower Kat N/a 0 63 n/a n/a 
Charlgrove Trust Lower Kat 3 0 36 2 1 of 3 is used 
Total  3 0 276 6 4 
(Source: KRV WUA, 2004) 
 
Regarding the tensions between the Middle and Lower Kat farmers, most downstream 
farmers argued that the periodical water releases from the dam had become too 
restrictive and as such unwarranted (refer to Figure 6.7). This was also based on the 
perception that water resources were generally in abundance from other sources in the 
valley. Such an argument formed probably the biggest point of contention in water 
allocation issues between the Middle versus Lower Kat groups.   
 
If indeed there were abundant water resources available from secondary sources, it 
did not make sense that scheduled farmers operated and kept the dam at over ninety 
percent capacity, as indicated in Figure 6.7, even with the assumption that the group 
                                                 
56 From the data presented in table 6.10, the Middle Kat farmers have a higher number of reservoirs, 
boreholes, weirs and pumps and land under citrus cultivation than the Lower Kat farmers. However, 
the data cannot be used to conclude that the individual Middle Kat farmers are more economically 
successful than their Lower Kat counterparts, firstly, because the data does not represent all farmers in 
the KRV (i.e. it is incomplete) and, secondly, a higher proportion of Middle Kat farmers is represented 
in the table (i.e. 6.7 to 6.8). However, based on the predictions of the Physical Externality Model, it 
would be expected that the Middle Kat farmers are more successful. What table 4 does show clearly, on 
the other hand, is that without any form of water scheduling (i.e. risk cover), the Lower Kat farmers 
have heavily invested in land development for citrus production.        
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was highly risk averse. However, the complaints from downstream farmers about the 
too stringent releases were also unwarranted at one level. For instance, they claimed 
that they did have enough alternative water available to them from other sources. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the conflicts and tensions surrounding water 
releases may have been, to a large degree, motivated more by future uncertainties, 
and by rational strategic behaviours as opposed to real threats of water shortages. 
Another observation was that, as operated in the period between 2002 and 2005, the 
KRV Dam’s water resources seemed to be in inefficient usage, i.e. far below its 
capacity at sixty percent and hence outside the contract curve, which was depicted in 
the Edgeworth box in Figure 6.6.        
 
In addition, and as supported by Bromley’s (1982) discussion, the past experiences of 
droughts in the area could also be used to explain some of the rational, albeit 
inefficient and risk-averse, behaviour as displayed by the politically powerful farmers. 
Besides the availability of water resources from alternative streams, downstream 
farmers had available to them the option of buying water releases from the Kat River 
Dam whenever they needed to do so. That was the case provided that the dam’s water 
levels remained above some threshold, formally determined at sixty percent in this 
case, as set by scheduled farmers. This threshold and other rules governing the 
flushing of the river per requests from non-scheduled farmers have, however, 
changed57 over time. Such is indicated in the differences between the stipulated rules 
in the KDOR (1989) document versus data obtained from the KRV WUA (2004). 
Mildenhall (2004) and Roberts (2004) reported that the experiences of the two major 
droughts of 1983 and 1991 had contributed immensely in changing the rules 
governing the flushes to becoming more conservative. Prior to 1983, the Kat River 
Dam’s water levels were less restrictive and not as regularly monitored, which was 
the reason why during the drought periods the dam’s capacity easily dropped to an 
alarming five percent (Mildenhall, 2004). Thereafter, scheduled farmers formally 
agreed that the dam would never be allowed to drop below its sixty percent capacity 
represented by the dotted line in Figure 6.7. Nonetheless, all farmers (including the 
scheduled ones) agreed that the dam’s maintained water levels in the recent years, as 
depicted in Figure 6.7 and the decisions on the frequency of flushes in general had 
                                                 
57 If they ever applied that is. 
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become even too cautious. For instance, for the 2002 to 2005 period the dam was 
maintained at an average of close to ninety percent capacity (the solid line in Figure 
6.7).  
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Figure 6.7: Kat River Dam water readings 2002 to 2005   
(Source: DWAF, 2005f) 
 
Upstream farmers (e.g. Roberts, 2004), however, still argued that because of the 
crippling effects of the drought experiences of 1983 and 1991 the formal rules were 
somehow still justifiable, whereas the downstream group (e.g. De Villiers, 2005) as 
expected indeed described the rules as tools used merely for the advancement of 
upstream operations. Bromley’s (1982) assertion that farmers often base their 
production decisions on historical experience is supported by the ‘drought 
explanation’ in this case. However, the severity of actual water restrictions, at ninety 
percent capacity, with its associated production inefficiencies, it seems needed a 
better explanation and could only be explained outside the Physical Externality 
Model’s assumptions.       
 
The foregoing discussion presents cases of conflicts in seemingly deep-rooted mental 
and formalised institutions (rules and practices), whose adoption over time and 
practical application have unfortunately led to an inefficient allocation of resources. 
The Physical Externality Model could explain most of the events and phenomena as 
presented by the KRV data on interactions between the Middle and Lower Kat farmer 
groups. It is clear that in most instances the Lower Kat farmers operated at the mercy 
of the Middle Kat farmers however sub-optimal the production outcomes may have 
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been. In the following section, KRV data from the Upper Kat reaches are presented 
and discussed with institutional explanations on why data from this section of the 
KRV provides deviations from the model’s basic postulations, cet. par., that upstream 
located farmers are bigger both in terms of economic and political indicators.     
 
6.3.4 The Upper KRV’s institutional challenges to development 
 
In the Upper Kat reaches, there were two emerging irrigation schemes that were 
operational in 2005, namely, the Hertzog Agricultural Cooperative (Hacop) and 
Stonehage (Map 6.4). Community members established the Hacop scheme in 1994 
with support from the DoA. The scheme was the bigger of the two and it was located 
at a more upstream position closer to the dam. As mentioned in the background 
section, the schemes predominantly produced staple crops, such as cabbages, 
potatoes, butternuts, etc., for local markets like the Alice Fresh Produce Market as 
well as for local consumption (Ndzotho, 2005). 
 
In 2004, the Fairbain branch of Hacop was the only wing that remained productive ten 
years after the establishment of the scheme. The branch operated as a breakaway 
group due to internal leadership conflicts. On the other hand, the Stonehage scheme 
was relatively new and had been revived by the local Nkonkobe Municipality for 
cotton production58 in collaboration with Da Gama Textiles59 (Ndidwa, 2005). Both 
schemes had a membership that fluctuated between twenty and fifty farmers, 
depending on the level of financial and other type of support offered by external 
agencies such as government departments and NGOs.     
 
The Hacop scheme had held a ten-year lease agreement to use land of 73.8 hectares 
from the DLA between 1994 and 2004. The lease expired during the research period. 
It is also useful to note that in 1994 Hacop was established within an unstable 
environment of South Africa’s political transition, when racial tensions were 
heightened at a national level and at a time when there were no clear indications 
regarding the political direction the country would take as a whole. With the 
emergence of a ‘new democratic’ government there was a vacuum left at a regional 
                                                 
58 In the KRV WUA minutes from the meeting of the 4th of December 2003 a reference is made to the 
proposed Stonehage cotton scheme.  
59 A national textile manufacturer.  
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level because of the 1994 collapse of the former Ciskei homeland. At a local level, 
white farmers who had been hired as agricultural consultants by the former Ciskei 
government were also leaving the area amidst contractual uncertainties, taking away 
with them human resources that had facilitated and sustained some of the Upper 
KRV’s economic activities (Nel et al., 1997). This history would provide some 
explanations for a number of social and leadership tensions that would emerge within 
the scheme at a later stage. In terms of the availability of input resources, the 
scheme’s water rights, like those of the Middle and Lower KRV farmer groups, were 
also registered with the DWAF. However, according to the KRV WUA’s (2004) 
water accounts, the scheme had fallen far behind on its monthly payments. In addition, 
after the time when the land lease had expired, with unsuccessful attempts at being 
renewed, in terms of the law the scheme had begun operating illegally (Loets, 2005). 
 
Hence, during the data collection period, more than ten years after the scheme had 
come into existence, the following challenges were most frequently mentioned;  
a) uncertainties existed pertaining to land use rights and to a lesser degree 
with regard to water access,  
b) broken down irrigation equipment, because of infrequent servicing, were 
reported and observed, 
c) a lack of expansion plans and/or directions for future business operations 
were noted, 
d) internal leadership squabbles presented probably the most frequently cited 
difficulty facing the scheme, but 
e) even more serious was an observed lack of human, technical and business 
skills for expanding future agricultural and business operations (Ndzotho, 
2005; Njobe 2005; Mpevana, 2005, etc.).  
 
In fact, with regard to a lack of human capital, it was reported that the average 
number of school years for subsistence farmers in the Upper KRV was only four 
years, compared to downstream commercial farmers who, on average, reported a 
minimum of some technical training and/or tertiary education (Mbatha, 2005). Such a 
lack of capital resources and human development formed the foundations on which 
most of the institutional constraints facing the Upper KRV farmers were pivoted.     
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The nature of Upper Kat’s institutional inefficiencies  
 
The challenges identified in the Upper Kat were hardly related to water resource 
allocations or access to land resource use (whether illegal or otherwise). Hence these 
could not be directly linked to the postulations and immediate discussion of the 
Physical Externality Model. This meant that the types of economic inefficiencies as 
identified in the Upper KRV had little to do with a physical endowment of natural 
resources like water, but were mostly of a human development nature as discussed by 
Sen (1982) and were also institutional in the form that is described by North (1992) 
where cultural practice dependent on history was observed to have detrimental effects 
on future economic development of the scheme. Even though the Upper Kat had the 
highest share of the water resources in terms of water scheduling and geographical 
positioning, the area remained the most underdeveloped section of the KRV. Hence, it 
was illustrated that even though the Physical Externality Model was quite useful in 
explaining some of the economic and political disparities and suboptimal use of 
resources that characterised the Middle and Lower Kat farmers, the Upper KRV’s 
economic inefficiencies and the gross levels of underdevelopment remained 
somewhat outside of the model’s explanations. This observation also highlighted the 
postulation by McCloskey (1990b) that formal approaches, as often applied in the 
discipline of economics, when required should be supported by other forms of 
explanation grounded on social-science investigative methods for a more complete 
understanding of economic events.  
 
From the PE model’s application in the KRV’s agricultural resource allocations, the 
lack of human skills in the Upper reaches had a predominant negative effect on 
economic development such that most of the external support (e.g. financial) that was 
offered to the schemes in fact counteracted some of the potential gains. For instance, 
an over reliance60 on external support was restricting possible internally initiated 
growth. In these cases, it would be noted that a redistribution of tangible resources, 
such as water resources and infrastructure, as legislated under the NWA (38 of 1998) 
and as promised in provincial departmental policies, which were presented in the case 
                                                 
60 Which could easily become institutionalised. 
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of black citrus farmers or the distribution of agricultural resources as advocated by 
Faysse (2004), on their own, would have minimal impacts on the overall 
empowerment of emerging farmers like these.  
 
Quite simply, the lack of human capital in environments similar to the KRV came 
about because of years of South Africa’s (and the former Ciskei’s) poor 
developmental and educational policies. Their effects could not be investigated 
through simple economic models such as the PEM or remedied overnight merely 
through redistribution policies, but by an historical understanding of the rules and 
practices as influenced by human skills development (or lack thereof), which would 
affect economic outcomes either positively or negatively.  
 
6.3.5 Summary of isolated themes for further analysis using an institutional 
framework  
 
Various historical events in different parts of the KRV led to a development of 
important institutions, not only for the allocation of water resources among farmers 
along the Kat River but also for the economic development of each farming group in 
the valley. These institutions were also central to ensuing tensions and conflicts of 
interests among farmers. Some of the historical events were catalysed by external 
political policies and led to a formation of formal rules and practices, which were 
observed locally. However, some of the events were incidental, for example the 
droughts of the early 1980s and 1990s. These types of events for the main part led to 
an establishment of informal rules and cultural practices, which became 
institutionalised. In this section the various institutions are isolated and highlighted for 
further interrogation and analysis in the forthcoming chapters.   
 
The riparian and water scheduling rights were key in devising formal rules that not 
only facilitated the allocation of water resources between up and downstream farmer 
groups, but access to these rights also guided the land developments for citrus 
production that took place at later stages. The case study illustrated that the economic 
and political characteristics and tensions of the Middle and Lower KRV farmers 
originated and pivoted around the ownership of these rights. The Middle KRV 
farmers were bestowed power to make decisions on water allocations by their access 
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to water scheduling rights, which entailed facing lower water insecurities for business 
as opposed to the Lower KRV farmers who did not have the same power and security 
of the resource. However, the effects of the ownership of rights were twofold. The 
rights also limited the potential land developments of the Middle KRV farmers, and 
hence some of their economic growth relative to their downstream counterparts. 
These contradictory effects added to the rise of many conflictual institutions between 
the two groups.  
 
The effects of the scheduling rights on the postulations of the Physical Externality 
Model were, however, not clear. Even though the KRV data on the Middle versus 
Lower KRV farmers conformed to the theoretical expectations of more politically and 
economically empowered upstream farmers, the contributions to these demographic 
differences by the scheduling rights was not certain. It was, however, apparent that the 
uncertainties that came about because of a lack of water assurances heightened the 
levels of risk aversive behaviours of downstream farmers. However, such potentially 
negative effects on economic growth must have been counteracted by the growing 
high export returns reported in the citrus industry in the late 1990s (Vink and Kirsten, 
2002). The case was clearly illustrated by the vast land developments for citrus 
production that took place in the Lower KRV reaches.  
 
On the other hand, it was also noted that even though the Lower KRV farmers had 
restricted access to the Kat River’s and the Kat Dam’s water resources, secondary 
streams and rainwater were available and formed somewhat adequate alternative 
sources of irrigation water. As such, the growing exports and alternative water sources 
became the driving factors for the land development investments, which were 
observed in the Lower KRV. Ultimately, the tensions and conflicts among the Middle 
and Lower KRV farmers were not only explainable by competition for water 
resources from the Kat River system but also by the strategic behaviours of self-
interested actors in the citrus industry.  
 
Indeed the reported drought experiences modified the rules and practices of especially 
the Middle KRV farmers with regard to the dam’s operations, where the threshold for 
maintaining the dam’s water capacity was increased and set at sixty percent. 
However, the dam’s levels at over ninety percent observed in the recent years seemed 
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too extreme and exaggerated for justification by such experiences alone. Hence, once 
again the strategic rational behaviour hypothesis was readily evocable.              
 
In any case, among other things the case study illustrated that the formal Physical 
Externality Model (on its own) was only partially able to explain the economic and 
political status quo of the KRV social system. In fact, even among the Middle versus 
Lower KRV farmers, the formal and informal institutions that had historically evolved 
to govern the water allocation practises and business operations were much better at 
explaining most of the reported and observed economic events during the research 
period. Ultimately, whatever the explanations and their sources may have been, it was 
apparent that agricultural inputs such as water and land resources were being used 
inefficiently in the KRV. The observation was in support of the PEM’s conclusions 
for this type of a watercourse.          
  
Once again the creation of the former Ciskei homeland, which was an externally 
initiated political event led to the relocation of many of the white farmers who were 
located in the Upper KRV. Their removal did not only have negative economic 
consequences for that section of the valley, but also modified the social and business 
institutions that were prevalent in the presence of white farmers. When these farmers 
relocated they took away with them their relatively successful farming practices, and 
this is one of the important explanations for the reverse in development of the Upper 
KRV farms, which was observed during the research process.       
 
The external interventions which established new political boundaries with the 
establishment of the homeland suddenly created different institutions, which were 
observed on different sides of the political border with regard to the use of agricultural 
resources and business practice. That became the case even though both sides were in 
effect part of the same geographical river basin. Hence, the records of the KRV WUA 
illustrate that different levels of observation and adherence to formal rules existed 
between the Upper versus the Middle and Lower KRV farmers. Not only were the 
Upper KRV farmers under represented at meetings of the WUA, but the records 
revealed that they also did not regularly make their monthly payments for the dam’s 
maintenance and operation in the same way that the Middle and Lower KRV farmers 
did (KRV WUA, 2004).  
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In fact, even though the Upper KRV due to its upstream location was expected to be 
the most prosperous section of the valley (using the PEM postulations) the farming 
business conditions in the area were seriously poor and almost dysfunctional. The 
land usage for irrigation purposes by the schemes was illegal, because the ten-year 
lease they had signed with the DLA had expired and there was no prospect of its 
renewal. Of the three branches, which originally formed part of the Hacop scheme, 
only one was still operational, namely, the Fairbain unit. The chronic lack of human 
skills among farmers ensured that the servicing of equipment and business 
management activities were inadequate, if not nonexistent. Hence, most of the 
marketing of products from the schemes was targeted at low profit local markets. It 
also seemed that in the absence of capital and financial support from external 
agencies, the farming activities would have actually come to a halt. On the other hand, 
it seemed ironic that the very support, which was received from external agents, and 
which sustained any farming activity that took place, was also the reason why 
potential and locally initiated efforts at self-improvement were stifled, because of 
entrenched paternalistic institutions that were established between the locals and 
outside agencies.  
 
The following chapters will discuss and analyse the highlighted themes from the case 
study using an institutional framework as set out in chapter three and four. The 
incorporation of a formal model like the PEM was helpful in explaining only some the 
economic events especially in relation to the Middle and Lower KRV farmers. 
However, for the most part the historical description and outline of political and social 
institutions, which were relevant to the various KRV sections under investigation, 
were more useful in providing fuller explanations of themes isolated for further 
investigation, theoretical discussions and policy recommendations.       
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6.4 A HISTORICAL CASE STUDY OF THE UPPER KRV FARMING 
BUSINESSES 
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6.4.1 Introduction  
 
According to Eicher (1999), small agricultural initiatives in Africa are characterized 
by a history of failure, mostly because the institutions in which the projects are 
established are not favourable for economic sustainability. The case study outlines a 
history of a prototypical African project (the Hertzog Agricultural Cooperative, 
Hacop), from which a number of narratives of successes and failures have been 
documented in past research reports and papers. At its inception in 1994, the project 
displayed a great promise of success that some researchers described as 
uncharacteristic of typical projects in similar contexts (Nel et al. 1997).         
 
In the case study, formal and informal institutions that were identified as having 
affected the economic performance of the initiative are discussed for their respective 
harmful and positive contributions. Even though 1994 was a year of high political 
uncertainty in South Africa, some members of communities in the Upper KRV 
villages, in which the project was located, could still recognise a possibility of 
establishing an economically viable irrigation project. It is ironic but also logical that 
some of the political uncertainties were actually perceived by the founding members 
as opportunities to appropriate farming resources for personal gain. Many of the 
resources were abandoned by the consultancies contracted to the former Ciskei 
government in the collapse of the homeland system in the country.   
 
On the main, however, poor leadership skills and a lack of business acumen, which 
remain a legacy of South Africa’s political history, as well as growing uncertainty 
with regard to the direction of new land public policies and security of tenure, 
eventually led to a gradual decline of the project’s business activities within the ten 
years of its activities, which is documented here.  
 
The study outlines the most notable events, which were thought to have contributed 
significantly to the project’s economic and political challenges. The events were the 
result of actions of either individuals or external agencies, as well as the 
incompatibilities of social and business norms, rules and practices within which the 
scheme was forced to operate. The study also evaluates the efficacy of possible 
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interventions aimed at influencing the project’s performance in the medium and long 
term.  
 
In section two the geographical locations of the irrigation scheme and surrounding 
villages are presented. The early history of Hacop and developing difficulties facing 
the scheme are presented in section three. The scheme’s business operations as 
observed between the years 2004 and 2006 are presented and discussed in section 
four. Section five discusses the political and leadership challenges. Finally, themes are 
isolated for an institutional analysis in section six.          
             
6.4.2 The geographical location  
 
When the Hertzog Agricultural Cooperative (Hacop) was established in 1994, it 
operated in the rural villages of Hertzog and Fairbain. The villages are found in the 
Upper KRV in Map 6.5).  
 
 
Map 6.5 Hacop and its villages in the former Ciskei  
(Source: Binns et al., 1997:863) 
 
The two villages contributed twenty-three and sixty hectares of irrigation land to the 
cooperative respectively. Some forty hectares of land in Fairbain were also identified 
for future development. However, even though only two villages contributed land 
resources, residents from Phillipton (Northwest of Fairbain in Appendix 13) were also 
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invited to be part of the cooperative. These residents worked in Fairbain until 1996 
when more land was acquired for irrigation in Phillipton (Ntsebenza, 2006).   
 
Black and Coloured Africans, some of whose forebears settled in the area during the 
1900s, form the main racial groups in the population of the villages. In 1996, the 
population of Hertzog alone was reported at 1000 individuals in 100 households. 
However, in 2004, the population of six of the upper KRV villages was reported at 
over 5000 individuals. High unemployment rates were also reported throughout the 
1990s, and in 1996 the official figure stood at forty two percent (Nel et al., 1997: 59), 
while in a 2004 research survey the rate was at over sixty percent (using the broad 
definition) (Mbatha, 2005). Hence, the establishment of Hacop with its early success 
was mostly welcome by residents as it provided employment opportunities as well as 
subsistence crops (see Appendix 14).  
 
The following section outlines the history of the cooperative by, a) identifying and 
discussing significant and historical events between 1994 and 2004, and b) by 
discussing marked actions of prominent figures in leadership positions.                               
 
6.4.3 The early history of Hacop  
 
Hacop was established in 1994 with members of the community of Hertzog being the 
most instrumental in the venture. The initiative was remarkable in the perceptions of 
development researchers in light of South Africa’s political and economic history, 
where rural communities, like Hertzog, were subject to repressive economic policies 
under the homeland system (Nel et al., 1997:273-274)61. In the same year, the 
cooperative was expanded to include members of the nearby villages of Fairbain and 
Phillipton in Map 6.5 and 6.6.   
 
It is useful to note that it was mainly two members of Hertzog community that were 
key figures in the project’s establishment and in its early success62. The two helped in 
the drafting of the project’s constitution in Appendix 3, and with assistance from 
                                                 
61 South Africa’s new political dispensation and the available land and irrigation resources are believed 
to have provided some motivation for residents to pursue locally based agricultural solutions to high 
levels of poverty (Nel et al., 1997). 
62 These were Mr E. N. Nkayi and the late Mr C. Meyer 
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Ulimocor they secured a land lease63 agreement for irrigation purposes from the 
Department of Land Affairs (DLA). In an informal arrangement, Ulimocor allowed 
the scheme members to use the irrigation equipment, which was abandoned by its 
farming consultancies (Ntsebenza, 2006 and Hacop, 2006).  
 
Contrary to Nel et al.’s (1997:274) claims that state land resources around the three 
villages had been fallow from 1979 until 1994 as a consequence of the former 
Ciskei’s lack of sound agricultural policies, the scheme members corrected the 
notions saying that the land, with irrigation equipment, was only finally abandoned in 
1993 (Hacop, 2006). That was only a year before the establishment of Hacop. In fact, 
besides the Ulimocor consultancy run projects, other white South African farmers had 
leased some of the land from the Ciskei government for tobacco and vegetable 
cultivation between 1987 and 1993. However, with the collapse of the former Ciskei 
and the ensuing political uncertainty, precipitated by the country’s first democratic 
election to be held in 1994, those white farmers also abandoned that land, with its 
equipment, without giving notice to workers (Ntsebenza, 2006). 
 
In addition to acquiring the abandoned resources, Hacop was also reported to have 
secured a loan from a commercial bank, whose money was used to develop further 
about sixty one hectare plots in addition to the initial twenty three hectares. This 
brought the total size of land under cultivation to eighty three hectare units (Nel et al., 
1997:275). In any case, since its inception point, the majority of Hacop’s cultivated 
and irrigated land, at over 60 hectares (ref. Map 6.5 and 6.6), and abandoned 
equipment were found in the Fairbain village. That is probably one of the reasons why 
in 2006, the Fairbain unit of Hacop remained the only active branch (Hacop, 2006). 
 
Challenging developments at Hacop between 1994 and 2006  
 
Because no cultivation whatsoever took place in Phillipton prior to 1994 and hence no 
land was abandoned and immediately available to work on, the inclusion of the 
village into Hacop meant that the dwellers would travel daily to work the Fairbain 
                                                 
63 From the 2004 meeting, Hacop members reported that the DLA lease was for ten years; however, at 
a 2006 Hacop workshop some members claimed the lease was for eleven years commencing in 1995.   
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plots. In 1996, however, more land in Phillipton was leased to Hacop from a relative 
of one of the scheme members. This meant that the Phillipton unit would then operate 
as an autonomous body, with its own sub-committee. However, Ntsebenza (2006) 
reported that the Phillipton land lease was withdrawn when the member whose 
relative had owned the leased land left the scheme. Hence, by 2006 the unit was no 
longer operational. Moreover, even though the Hertzog community members were at 
the forefront of the scheme’s establishment, by 2006 Hertzog was also out of 
operation (Hacop, 2006).  
 
Nonetheless, although a number of researchers have written about the Hacop initiative 
as a great story of success (e.g. Nel et al., 1997; Binns et al., 1998), the reported 
emergence of dictatorial tendencies in leadership, community clashes over restitution 
claims (Hacop, 2004 and 2006), etc., have contributed to its demise. In fact, contrary 
to the guidelines of the scheme’s constitution, which provided for elected 
representatives in committees to stand only for a year, E.N. Nkayi, had remained the 
chairperson since 1994. It was reported that several attempts, for example to hold 
democratic elections, to remove him from office had failed (Hacop, 2004 and 2006). 
More detail on Hacop’s leadership problems is given in forthcoming sections.   
   
In the backdrop of the early good research reports, and with increasing membership, 
the demand for resources (especially irrigation equipment) also increased. With the 
help of an extension officer64, assigned by the government, the scheme received new 
equipment donated by ‘Micro Projects’65 (a US based Non Governmental 
Organisation - NGO). The NGO also donated seedlings and sent its additional 
extension officer to oversee operations. Around 2000, however, ‘Micro Projects’ 
stopped operating in South Africa, which meant that the visits from the extension 
officer had to stop. That signalled the start of a period of reduced levels of external 
support to farmers (Hacop, 2004; Nstebenza, 2006). Notwithstanding the period of 
noted decrease in support, it was discovered in interviews that in 2004 the scheme 
                                                 
64 Mr Phansi was based in East London and acted as the scheme’s extension officer. At a meeting held 
in 2004 with Hacop (Fairbain) the members present stated that the officer also advised and supported 
the scheme in securing new markets for their production. In 2001, Mr Phansi was redeployed without a 
replacement (Hacop, 2004).  
    
65 The NGO has a mission of supporting rural and agricultural development projects in various regions 
of the world. 
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received further equipment a tractor and seedlings from the local district municipality. 
There was also allusion that the scheme might be included for support in the 
municipality’s 2006 budget (Mbi, 2006). That served as an indication that, even 
though it was in reduced format, some level of external support was still offered for 
the scheme’s survival.        
 
With regard to financial management it was reported that until 1999, Hacop had a 
single account in which all production proceeds were deposited as stipulated in the 
constitution (Sec. 6 Appendix 3). “All proceeds will be deposited into the Hacop 
account , and transferred into plot holders’ accounts on three predetermined dates 
annually, subject to provisions 6.4; 6.5; 6.5” (Constitution, 1994). However, due to 
poor leadership and alleged financial irregularities, in 1999 separate bank accounts 
were opened by each of the branches, without amendment to the constitution (Hacop, 
2006). That was indicative of an emergence of a breakdown in financial 
accountability that would characterise the scheme’s operations from that period 
onwards.    
 
In the setting up of the structure of Fairbain’s management body, which is illustrated 
in Figure 6.8, it is clear that once again the members disregarded explicitly stipulated 
constitutional provisions. The constitution stated that only two representatives from 
each branch would be elected to form Hacop’s umbrella committee. In practice, 
however, five representatives from each unit composed the fifteen member committee 
that was not even functional (Hacop, 2004).               
 
Two conflicting statements were given by members in 2004 and 2006 regarding the 
length of the DLA land lease. At a 2004 meeting in Fairbain (Appendix 15), the 
chairperson of the unit mentioned that the 1994 lease was only going to expire at the 
end of that year, as it was only valid for ten years. However, in 2006, during a 
workshop held in Fairbain (Appendix 4), farmers offered a different statement; they 
agreed that the lease was actually valid for eleven years. It was also stated that the 
lease’s year of commencement was not 1994 as had been reported previously, but was 
in fact 1995. On the other hand, what was surprising was that not a single one of the 
Fairbain members present at the workshop had actually seen the copy of the lease 
agreement. Members stated that all copies of important documents governing the 
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functioning of Hacop were kept by the chairperson (i.e. Nkayi), with the original 
documents kept at the regional offices of the DoA in Bhisho. It was also disclosed that 
failed attempts had been made in 2003 to renew the land lease. A request for renewal 
was written to the DLA but no response had been received to date. Therefore, it was 
understood that by 2006 the scheme operated illegally in terms of land resource 
access. The realisation was confusing in the light of continued recent and potential 
external support from the local government. If anything this was an illustration of the 
unfortunate complex nature of non-coordinated support policies from various wings 
of government with regard to the scheme’s sustainability.                   
 
In the late 1990s the DLA had commissioned extensive research projects on land 
redistribution and restitution challenges in the Mpofu Magisterial District, in which all 
three villages were also located (see Map 6.6). The research outputs included a 
revised Register of Land Title Deeds of 1998 (DLA, 1998) and specific to Hertzog, 
was the 2002 Hertzog Agricultural Project Business Plan. That plan was divided into 
three parts, namely, a) the Situational Assessment and Development Framework, b) 
the Communal Land Use Plan (residential and grazing), and c) the Irrigation Farming 
Plan. The latter incorporated a discussion on the use of land previously leased to 
Hacop in Hertzog.  
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Map 6.6 The Mpofu Magisterial District  
(Source, Nel, 1997:278)  
 
In the Irrigation Farming Plan, the villages of Hertzog and Tamboekiesvlei (see 
Appendix 13) would share irrigation resources for the development of 73.8 and 111.4 
hectares of land respectively. It was clear from the plan that the new approach 
encouraged and supported by the DLA with regard to the use of the communal land 
resources was that of individual use and ownership, as opposed to collective or family 
use (Loets, 2005), which happened to be the unfortunate case with Hacop. A total of 
147 residents lodged individual applications for the land to be sub-divided into half 
hectare plots. Of the total applications, 112 were successful (DLA, 2002:6). Such data 
would be useful in later discussions of the confusing processes surrounding the land 
reform programme in the villages as well as the additional uncertainty and negative 
contributions the processes afforded to the operations of agricultural projects. From 
the discussion it is clear that while the emerging farmers at Hacop were in the dark 
with regard to guaranteed future land access, the DLA had proceeded in instituting its 
own policies and plans in distributing the land resources away from communal to 
private use, access and ownership (Loets, 2005), without adequately transmitting such 
information.       
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It is fair to conclude that the developments with regard to the use of communal land, 
the lapse as well as the non-renewal of the land lease, compounded by internal 
leadership and financial challenges all culminated in a situation where in 2006 only 
the Fairbain unit of Hacop was the only one in operation. These developments may 
have also contributed to the confusion surrounding the question of whether the 
scheme’s constitution was still binding on each unit. A more important institutional 
question, however, was whether or not the scheme still existed in its original and 
legally binding format. Moreover, unlike the reported Hertzog members’ willingness 
to have subdivided land resources for private use (DLA, 2002), farmers in the 
Fairbain branch insisted that they were not in support of moves to have communal 
land subdivided and/or sold to individuals. These developments showed, if anything, 
that the biggest challenges that the scheme was faced with were clearly grounded 
within an institutional realm.  Hence, one of the resolutions taken at Fairbain’s 
January 2006 workshop was that the scheme would seek legal advice on their 
standing with regard to access to land and equipment usage inherited from Hacop’s 
1994 arrangements. The legal clarity and solutions on those and similar issues would 
have to be found before the problems surrounding leadership issues and business 
operations could be tackled. Nevertheless, the following section discusses the specific 
business operations of the Fairbain unit, as prescribed formally and as performed 
informally, (Hacop, 2006) which would need a radical modification if the scheme 
were to grow and expand from its state in 2006.   
 
6.4.4 The current business operations of Hacop in Fairbain  
 
Hacop had a total of twenty-two registered members in 2006, almost half the number, 
i.e. fifty-two, that joined in 1994. Of the twenty-two members, fourteen were non-
pensioners and thirteen were females. Any member of the community could join the 
scheme by paying a fee of hundred rands. Every month, each member was required to 
pay an additional seventy rands towards a bill for electricity used by the water-pump 
(see Appendix 16 and 17) (Mbi66, 2005). The land was subdivided among members 
according to each farmer’s ability to properly manage an allocated plot (see allocation 
                                                 
66 Secretary of Hacop in 2005  
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in Appendix 16). Mpevana67 (2005) stated that “normally, each hectare of land is 
subdivided into four quarters per member, but those who can work harder have close 
to a full hectare of land”. It should follow that with a decrease in membership over the 
past ten years, more land plots have potentially become available to each member.      
Management and human resource skills   
 
When new members joined the scheme, the committee as a whole, including 
individuals who continuously received agricultural training, (e.g. Mr Mpevana) were 
responsible for overseeing operational practices on all plots. The committee offered 
extra advice to unskilled members on request (Mbi, 2005). Considering the size of the 
scheme, it has to be noted that in the management structure, as illustrated in Figure 
6.8, almost half of the scheme’s total membership had designated positions with 
responsibilities. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the responsible members, 
with the exception of the secretary, were all male even though the number of females 
in the whole scheme was higher at more than sixty percent. Hence, it is clear that the 
distribution of serious responsibilities was biased against females.    
 
On the surface, the management structure looked well organized. The management 
was divided into three teams and three supporting individuals. Such a structure 
seemed to present a picture of a professionally run business organization. However, 
whether all members who were assigned responsibilities performed their respective 
duties accordingly was not certain. It was established during interviews68 that some of 
the designated persons in the structure were actually no longer members of the 
scheme. For instance, N.A. Hans had joined another project at the end of 2005, which 
was reported to be in competition with Hacop.  
                                                 
67 A former chairperson of the scheme. 
68 The secretary indicated that most of the figures and charts used in the scheme were produced through 
workshops run by external agencies for the scheme. In that regard the committee was trying its best to 
ensure that all members adhere to policies and rules that were stipulated in the official charts and 
diagrams (figures) of the scheme. This does not rule out that some of the rules that were actually 
followed in the field may have been very different from those officially presented.       
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Figure 6.8 Management Structure: 2005/2006 Fairbain Branch (Hacop)  
(Source: Hacop, 2005) 
 
All committee members in the top block were, on the other hand, active with the 
exception of the vice secretary (number four). It could also be seen from the Planning 
and Marketing Team box that the inclusion of an extension officer was not a 
representation of what happened in reality, because in the last section it was 
established that the scheme had not had any visits from an extension officer since 
2001. The designated position of a Diesel and Electric Officer was also vacant as 
indicated in the figure, most probably because of a lack of relevant skills.   
 
In addition, many of the members were pensioners, which meant that they were 
relatively physically weak and poorly educated69. Therefore, the scheme was poorly 
                                                 
69 In the 2004 survey (Appendix 19) of the upper KRV villages it was found that younger members of 
the communities had spent more years at school than the older ones.    
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positioned in terms of acquiring new and non-traditional agricultural and business 
skills. In fact, the reported average years of schooling education for members of the 
scheme was only four years (Mpevana, 2005). It must, however, be mentioned that 
even though on paper Hacop’s human skills, and hence its future business prospects, 
did not look impressive, the fact that the scheme had survived eleven years by 
continuously seeking external assistance was a better indicator of how the group could 
sustain itself.     
 
To ensure transparency and fluent information flows among members, the scheme 
documents claimed that a ‘fish-bone’ organisational procedure was followed as 
illustrated in Figure 6.9. According to the procedure, the committee would meet once 
every month, while sub-committees or portfolio groups met twice a week, on 
Mondays and Wednesdays. Each of the portfolio meetings would be headed by a one 
of the assigned committee members (refer to Figure 6.8). Matters arising from weekly 
meetings taking place during the course of the month were channelled to the agenda 
of the committee’s regular monthly meetings, where heads of the portfolio groups 
gave their report back to the committee. It was reported that Mr Mpevana, who had 
past working experience with the cooperative, had motivated for the adoption of the 
‘fish-bone’ organisational structure from Katco. It was hoped the structure would bear 
the same efficiency for Hacop that it had for Katco (Mbi, 2006).  
 
In the two weeks (non interrupted) spent with farmers in December of 2005 as well as 
on two occasions it was, however, noted that only the Monday task group meetings 
were convened. This was slightly different from the formally illustrated procedures. 
The observed meetings appeared to be of a general nature, as opposed to being task 
oriented, and all members (not only the task group) were present at a single venue. 
Such may have further reiterated the observation made earlier that most of the task 
teams represented in the management structure were in effect non-existent, and most 
likely because of a lack of human skills.                   
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Figure 6.9 A fish-bone structured system of communication  
(Source: Hacop, 2005) 
 
 
The formally presented communication procedures in Figure 6.9, as was the case with 
the management structure in Figure 6.8, seemed effective and sensible on paper; but, 
as already pointed out, these were not strictly followed. From field observations, it 
seemed that the sketches merely provided ideal management models which the 
scheme, at best, wished to emulate. Such models may have been taught to the scheme 
in the many workshops that Mbi (2005) claimed were facilitated by supporting 
external agencies. Their true application, however, seemed to be limited.    
  
The production operations  
 
The specific crops that were being cultivated by the scheme were cabbages, beetroot, 
butternut, carrot, lettuce, potatoes and maize. It was also reported that an arrangement 
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between the Amatole District Municipality, Hacop and Da Gama Textiles Industries 
had also been reached for the cultivation of cotton to begin in 2006 (Mbi, 2005).  
 
For such a relatively small scheme, with only twenty-two members, it seemed that the 
number of crops that were being produced was rather large, even though some of the 
crops were only seasonally produced. This may indicate that, a) the scheme had 
acquired effective agricultural skills from the extensive experience of eleven years of 
being in production, b) members had also taken seriously the knowledge that may 
have been gained from various agricultural workshops that were organized by 
external agents in the past, and c) the donations of seedlings, especially from the local 
municipality, were being used effectively (Mbi, 2005).  
 
To manage a good quality output of as many listed crops would certainly require a 
system that would also have to be vigilantly followed. In that regard, the scheme 
followed a planting routine where members, divided into three groups, planted at one 
month intervals, one group after another. Such was done to ensure that a variety of 
fresh vegetables were always available to consumers throughout all seasons (Mbi, 
2005). This planting system is illustrated in Figure 6.10 for the cultivation of one 
hectare of land for cabbages.  According to the illustration, a hectare of land would be 
divided into four quarters, with seedlings planted in the first quarter for four weeks. 
Thereafter, the seedlings were transferred into the second quarter to grow for three 
months. The same procedure would be applied to the remaining quarters (three and 
four, respectively).  
 
 
¼ 
Number 1 
 
¼ 
Number 2 
 
¼ 
Number 3 
 
¼ 
Number 4 
Crop: Cabbage: 
*Time of planting: all the year round 
*Three months to bloom 
 
Procedure: 
*Divide one hectare into four quarters 
*Prepare the land ½ hectare (quarter number 1 and 2) 
*After four weeks transplant from quarter 1 into 2 
(In the first three months) 
*The same procedure is repeated for quarter 3 and 4 
 
                               [A division of a hectare of land for growing cabbages] 
Figure 6.10 A system for cabbage production  
(Source: Hacop, 2005) 
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However, once again, not all farmers followed to its entirety the outlined set of 
planting procedures in Figure 6.10. The former chairman70 of the scheme, for 
instance, followed his own rules when deciding what crops to grow and when to plant 
on his plots. 
 
“In deciding what to plant I look at the gap in the market and attempt 
to fill it. I do not want to over flood it with one crop that is being 
produced by every farmer, say cabbages for instance. I also use the 
climate information from previous years as well as future weather 
forecasts [to get] a good idea of what crop would do well” (Mpevana, 
2005). 
 
At the time of this interview the farmer had planted beetroot, butternut and maize on 
his plot. This is further illustration of how the official and formally coded rules were 
often completely disregarded or partially followed by the members, and replaced by 
informal practices.  
 
Water supplies  
 
Even though these emerging farmers reported that they had never experienced any 
water supply71 shortages in the history of their scheme (largely thanks to the scheme’s 
upstream position they occupied along the Kat River system), their irrigation 
operations followed a formal set of stringent rules to be followed by members in 
assigned groups. For the rules to work, members were grouped according to their plot 
positions as is illustrated in Appendix 16. Table 6.11 represents a real life irrigation 
roster for the months of November, December 2005 and January 2006. The roster 
consisted of five groups with five to seven members each. Each group was allowed to 
irrigate from Monday to Friday. In the table the three groups are assigned specified 
time slots given in units of hours, days and weeks for a given month. The members of 
the group had to have their plots in close proximity to each other for effectiveness 
since the irrigation equipment required to be physically moved around the field. For 
example Messers N.E. Makhayi, Dwani and Mgwali were members of the first group, 
                                                 
70 Mr Mpevana 
 
71 In numerous case studies of irrigation schemes water supply shortages are highlighted as the most 
prolific source of farmer conflicts (see Bromley, 1982; Letsoalo and van Averbeke, 2004; Mbatha, 
2005, etc.). 
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which irrigated on Mondays. It is also important to note in the roster is that not all the 
scheme members are listed on the example roaster, but those who worked the land on 
a full time basis72 (Njobe, 2005). Each member was allowed three hours of irrigation 
water per time slot. The roster also indicated members whose turn it was to move the 
irrigation equipment from different locations on the field (Mbi, 2005).    
 
Table 6.11 Irrigation roster (three hours per person or nine hours per day)  
Date Members` Name Week of month/group of farmers 
21-11-05 1.N.E.Mankayi I 
28-11-05 2.C.Mayekiso II 
05-12-05 3. N.A.Hans III 
12-12-05 4. M.Lexe IV 
20-12-05 5.W.Mpevana V 
26-12-05   
03-01-06   
10-01-06   
17-01-06   
24-01-06   
31-01-06   
(Whole group) Whole Group  
22-11-05   
29-11-05 1.I.Dwani I 
06-12-05 2.M..Pezisa II 
13-12-05 3.T.Dasa III 
21-12-05 4.M.Njobe IV 
27-12-05 5.M.Gebenga V 
04-01-06   
11-01-06 6.M.P.Mbuse  
18-01-06   
25-01-06   
01-02-06   
Whole Group   
23-11-05 1.S.J.Mgwali I 
30-11-05   
07-12-05 2.Z.P.Mbi II 
14-12-05 3.B.Siyazi III 
21-12-05   
28-12-05 4.M.Hans IV 
05-01-06 5.G.R.Fanaphi V 
12-01-06   
(Source: Hacop, 2005) 
 
When comparing the roster to the field layout in Appendix 16, it is clear that some 
names were mismatched and not all the names on the layout were present on the 
roster and vice versa. As was mentioned in the previous section, some of the people 
with names listed on the figures and table lists no longer farmed with Hacop. Hence, 
it seemed the scheme’s documents had not been updated at the time of the study. On 
the other hand, whether the members assigned to the respective groups did perform 
their share of irrigation tasks in an equitable manner could not be verified.  
                                                 
 
72 Mrs Gebenga (2005) an old pensioner and ex-farmer of Hacop related her troubles with the moving 
of pipes around the fields as a woman and senior person. She highlighted the problems brought about 
by age and gender in the type of work women were expected to be involved in at Hacop.     
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Equipment and machinery      
 
The equipment used by farmers seemed to be adequate for the scheme’s production 
output in 2006. A new tractor had been donated to the scheme by the municipality in 
2004. In addition, Mpevana owned and used his own tractor. Not all of the water 
pipes were old heavy metal; some were light plastic, which made them easy to move 
around. At least three water-pump engines were available; one run on electricity and 
the other two on diesel. It was reported that the diesel pumps were always on stand-by 
and ready for use in times of electricity cuts (Mpevana, 2005 and Mbi, 2005).  
 
However, all interviewed members complained that there was no available vehicle to 
deliver the scheme’s produce to buyers and to promote products in untapped markets. 
The tractor could not be used for deliveries because it was no longer roadworthy73. 
The lack of transport was highlighted as probably the biggest source of failed 
marketing ventures. What was also conspicuously missing to farmers was a packing 
shed, although the secretary reported that the municipality had promised to build one 
in the near future (Mbi, 2005). Overall, it appeared that if a vehicle to transport 
products to potentially new markets was acquired and a shed to store the crops was 
built, the scheme would have more than the basic necessary resources required to run 
an emerging but sustainable business.    
 
The management of finances  
 
It was mentioned that the scheme raised some of its income by charging a joining fee 
of R100, 00 to new members and collected a monthly fee of R70, 00 for the electricity 
bill (see Appendix 17) from the 2004 to 2005 records. A shared pool of income was 
generated through the sale of crops and divided according to the share of crops sold 
from plots of individual members. A predetermined schedule was used to sell 
products to customers74. However, customers were also given a chance to choose the 
plots from which they wanted to buy, based on the quality of crops. This explicitly 
                                                 
73 It was, however, reported that the same non-roadworthy tractor was also hired out to the community 
for an extra income to the scheme’s coffers.   
 
74 Mainly vegetable-store owners who often drove themselves to Hacop plots to buy and pick up stock.        
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competitive system, it was hoped, would ensure that good quality productions were 
maintained (Mbi, 2005). All the quantities sold by each member would then be 
entered in a logbook as illustrated in Table 6.12 for cabbages sold in the month of 
October 2005. 
 
Table 6.12 Cabbage log for October 2005  
 Date Number of loose 
cabbages 
Price in Rands Total in Rands 
10-10-05 15  2,00 30-00 
21-10-05 25  1,50 37-00 
27-10-05 60  1,50 90-00 
27-10-05 50 1,50 75-00 
31-10-05 100  1,50 150-00 
31-10-05 35  1,50 52-00 
03-11-05 100  1,50 150-00 
04-11-05 147 1,50 220-50 
12-11-05 25  1,50 40-00 
18-11-05 60  1,50 90-00 
18-11-05 25  1,50 37-50 
17-11-05 179 1,00 179-00 
16-11-05 50 1,00 50-00 
24-11-05 275  1,00 275-00 
29-11-05 155 1,00 155-00 
29-11-05 100  1,00 100-00 
25-11-05 20  1,00 20-00 
30-11-05 220  0,50 110-00 
Total 1641  1861,50 
Deductions in Rands 
For previous month’s expense 
Water  -240 
Operations  
(Refer to Table 6.13)  
-425 
Total 665 
Grand Total 
 
1,196-50 
      (Source: Hacop, 2005) 
 
Table 6.12 illustrates how a member sold 1641 cabbages in one month for a profit of 
R1861, 50 and had to pay the scheme for water (R240, 00) and operations (R425, 00) 
provided, resulting in a net profit of R1196, 50. The operational expenses due to the 
member are illustrated in Table 6.13. The table illustrates the type of services 
provided by the scheme’s tractor to the member as well as the specific charges. For 
example, ‘bush-cutting’ for half a hectare cost R100, 00 . 
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Table 6.13 Hacop Income from land activities by each member in 2005  
Month  Operations 
(Tractor services) 
Area size in 
Hectares  
Amount in Rands 
April Bush cutting 0.5 100,00 
 Ploughing 0.5 150,00 
 Disc harrow 0.5 100,00 
 Ridge 0.25 75,00 
    
Total operations  1.75 R425-00 
Amount of seedling Cabbages 5000 for 0.5 ha Free/donated by 
municipality 
May Planting 0.5 Performed by 
member 
Totals (Refer to previous Table 6.12) 
  
Harvesting  1,861-50 
Deductions  
(operations and water) 
-(425 + 200 = 665) 
 
 1,196-50 
Monies owed scheme -76-00 
 1,126-50 
Late harvest income 140-00 
Grand Total profit to 
member 
 
1,266-50 
(Source: Hacop, 2005) 
 
 
From the example as illustrated in Table 6.13 each member of Hacop (Fairbain) was 
paid from seasonal farming activities. In Stonehenge, however, it was reported that 
the municipality paid the scheme’s committee a lump sum for preparing the land for 
cotton cultivation. The money was then divided among members based on their 
individual time contributions, which was a bit different to how Hacop operated. In 
any case, the same municipality had instituted a similar incentive scheme for Fairbain 
farmers, bearing in mind the fact that a cotton producing arrangement had also been 
proposed for Hacop (Mbi, 2005). 
 
It was clear that the scheme’s total income was perceived to be too low by the 
Fairbain community, because the membership levels had dropped over the years. This 
formed one of the explanations, which included old age and poor health that were 
offered for the drop in membership, especially of younger former members. Hence, 
money income was one of the pertinent reasons why members needed the scheme to 
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grow as a business. To achieve the goal Njobe (2005) stated that members were 
discussing the possibility of establishing a Trust Fund as an official body that would 
look after the business interests of the scheme.  
 
“This fund would help in growing the scheme in the future and help … 
with the everyday maintenance. The fund would also help deal with 
problems such as arrears in payment of the electricity bill for the water-
pump” (Njobe, 2005).  
 
He also revealed that the scheme had once tried to raise collectively owned funds by 
retaining an amount of R200-00 from each member’s share of profit. However, 
because farmers felt that they did not receive the same benefit as from the actual sales 
of crops, the method was perceived to be inequitable. Consequently, owing to the 
complaints the committee could not collect the individual contributions properly, 
which meant that the method had to be revised or abandoned completely (Njobe, 
2005). However, it was reported that in the forthcoming meetings the committee 
would still propose that at least twenty percent of members’ contributions be deducted 
for the creation a central Trust Fund. Nevertheless, interviews with some of the 
farmers indicated that there were strong objections75 to the proposal. The opposition 
also came from the most productive members of the scheme, for example Mpevana. 
Despite the opposition, the committee proceeded to invite the research team to 
facilitate a workshop aimed at assisting the scheme in drafting its Business Plan as 
well as to shed some light on the legal requirements for establishing the Trust Fund. 
During the workshop held in January 2006, it was remarkable to note that no 
objections were raised against the establishment of such a fund and/or the revised 
system to support it financially. Such was an illustration of unspoken internal power 
struggles that characterised the scheme. Hence, in the following section internal and 
external political challenges as well as explicit and underlying problems regarding 
Hacop’s leadership struggles are discussed. Some of these challenges have already 
been alluded to in the preceding sections. 
 
                                                 
75 In individual interviews Mpevana (2005) expressed very strong and negative opinions about the 
current leadership and their ideas, stating that when he was chairman things were run better. Not 
surprisingly the current Chairman (Njobe, 2005) stated that the former chairman had not been effective, 
hence changes had to be instituted. However, there was resistance to the needed change, but he did not 
mention from where the resistance came.      
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6.4.5 Political and leadership challenges  
External challenges: 
 
Hacop was established within an environment of political transition and racial 
conflict. The vacuum left by the collapse of the former Ciskei government and the 
departure of white farmers, who were important economic drivers in the villages, 
forced the community to take charge of their own affairs (Nel, 1997).  
 
The political transition in the country as a whole meant that the issue of land tenure 
could not be finalized. In fact, eleven years after the transition, land tenure remained 
highly contested. Therefore, Hacop existed in an environment of great uncertainty, 
where grounds conducive for sound business operations were improbable to achieve. 
The developments in land redistribution and restitution programmes initiated by the 
DLA in the late 1990s directly influenced the evolution of the scheme. Because the 
residents of Hertzog village opted for different land rights management solutions76 
compared to the Fairbain farmers meant that Hacop could not exist as a single unit in 
the two villages while using a different set of rules. It was therefore clear that as much 
as Hacop members wanted to reconfigure and protect their future business prospects, 
the external political developments affected most of their decisions as a unit in a 
negative manner.                          
 
Internal challenges: 
 
As reported earlier, the biggest challenge that confronted Hacop in its eleven-year 
history was poor leadership. In section 6.3, it was reported that two key members of 
the Hertzog community took the initiative to establish Hacop. Since 1994, Nkayi had 
remained the officially elected chairperson of the scheme. During which time he 
deliberately avoided actions that would have him removed from the position. Current 
and former members quoted him as saying that because he co-founded the scheme, he 
owned it (Mpevana, 2005 and Ntsebenza, 2006). The statement was supported by his 
                                                 
76 The Hertzog Business Plan of 2002, which was discussed in section four, indicates that the Hertzog 
residents preferred private land ownership as a solution to their land claims, whereas the residents of 
Fairbain (including Hacop members) indicated that they would resist a similar solution (Ntsebenza, 
2006; Hacop, 2006).    
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reported behaviour. Besides his avoidance actions to be removed from office, it was 
clear that at the later stages of his effective time as chairperson the scheme 
experienced negative growth. In addition, because of these (leadership associated) 
challenges and reported financial mismanagement, the village branches were forced to 
open separate bank accounts (Hacop, 2006). These events give weight to an argument 
that when leadership is vested in a single person for too long, it is most likely that it 
would lead to undemocratic and economically inefficient outcomes.  
 
It was established from interviews that Blaik’s77 departure in 2001 spelled more 
disaster for Hacop’s marketing efforts. The extension officer was reported to have had 
“many connections and managed to get customers for the scheme from as far away as 
uMthatha and Bloemfontein” (Mbi, 2005). Once again, it appeared that some of the 
important business marketing skills were not effectively transferred to most members. 
The skills remained centred around individuals. Hence when the individuals departed 
or behaved in a manner that negatively affected the group, the scheme suffered on the 
whole. 
                               
During the workshop (January 2006), it was established that the challenges of setting 
up a Business Trust Fund partly stemmed from a lack of information concerning the 
Fairbain unit’s legal position with regard to access rights to land resources and 
irrigation equipment. It was also noted that because Nkayi had kept all business 
related documents, the farmers did not know, for instance, the contents of the DLA-
Hacop land lease (Hacop, 2006). As the former chairperson of the Fairbain branch of 
Hacop, Ntsebenza (2006) summed up the problem by stating that not only did the 
members not have enough legal information, but also they were actually unwilling to 
approach and upset the man who founded the project. Hence it seemed that even 
acquiring the relevant information to make the most crucial business decisions would 
be hard.    
Within the Fairbain branch itself, it seemed that tensions were also high between the 
former and current chairmen (i.e. Mpevana and Njobe respectively). Njobe (2005) 
was direct in mentioning that the former chairperson had instigated a rebellion against 
him and his business ideas as well as style of leadership. For example, he pointed out 
                                                 
77 Mr Blaik was the scheme’s long serving extension officer. 
 167
that while members were supposed to plant crops according to a plan agreed upon by 
the committee, Mpevana had followed his own plan in defiance. The idea of 
supporting the proposed Business Trust Fund through a proportional levy on profits 
was also a point of heated debate between the former and current chairmen. Mpevana 
(2005) felt that the ideas put in place during his tenure had been undermined, even 
though the new ideas were impossible to implement78. It was, however logical that 
Mpevana, who was the most productive farmer in the scheme, naturally would be 
opposed to a levy system that would force him to contribute more money than would 
other less productive farmers. In any case, the debate on the issue resulted in some 
members of the scheme describing the meeting at which the issues were raised as 
heated and very sensitive, while others plainly refused to comment on the proceedings 
(Mbi, 2005). Such were clear illustrations of existing internal tensions and leadership 
challenges, which negatively affected the scheme in its current and future form. The 
following section isolates the important themes from the case study for an institutional 
discussion and analysis in the forthcoming chapter.           
 
6.4.6 Isolated themes for analysis within an institutional framework   
 
The unstable and uncertain political climate in which Hacop was established had its 
pros and cons. The departure of Ulimocor contracted consultants from the villages 
was spotted by some community members as an opportunity to establish the scheme, 
and was a typical bottom-up developmental project. However, without enough 
resources, human and capital, the sustainability of the scheme was always going to be 
suspect. Moreover, because there was a new government in power at a national level, 
only a temporary land lease agreement could be signed between the DLA and Hacop. 
Moreover, the permanent use of irrigation equipment abandoned by the farming 
consultants could not be guaranteed. Such factors would only sustain the pervasive 
and negative uncertainties with regard to access rights to land and other resources 
with which the scheme was faced.         
 
                                                 
78  Njobe (2005) also stated on the record that, “Mpevana did not want to face up to own mistakes as a 
leader. He is running his own ‘program’ within the scheme that differed from the programme of the 
scheme”. 
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The fact that Hacop’s operations were conducted in three villages with members 
spread out over a relatively large geographical area may have also been a recipe for 
failure. As it turned out in the late 1990s, the DLA (2002) report showed that 
members of the Hertzog community were happy with the division of their land plots 
(which were previously cultivated collectively) for individual use or ownership. 
However, there was resistance to this system of land use in the Fairbain village, which 
would then entail that Hacop would find it difficult to operate as a single entity across 
the two villages, which used different rules. On the other hand, the fact that most land 
and equipment resources were located in the Fairbain village was probably the reason 
why when difficulties such as financial challenges emerged the operations in other 
villages, where fewer resources were located in comparison, stopped completely.  
 
The departure of Ulimocor contracted consultancies and extension officers from the 
area left a skills-vacuum, for example marketing business skills, which would only be 
filled through a continuous external support system that may have created what 
seemed like unproductive paternalistic relationships between the locals and outsiders. 
However, the external support was often uncoordinated between these agencies to an 
extent that some policy objectives from various wings of government seemed to be in 
conflict. Notable of those were the local municipality’s infrastructural support for the 
scheme whose legal standing on the use of land resources was considered no longer 
valid by the DLA (Loets, 2005).   
 
The leadership challenges from the time when Hacop was established could be traced 
back to a state in which power was centralised on only two individuals, who were the 
founding members of the scheme. The situation led to a lack of flows in information 
and access to important legal documents that governed the scheme’s operations for 
the rest of the members. The dictatorial leadership style of the first chairperson not 
only promoted continuous violations of constitutional provisions for regular elections 
to be held, but it also inculcated a culture of transgressing other formally written rules 
and it promoted a state of sustained tensions between farmers and those in leadership 
positions at branch levels. It was clear from data that there was a lack of respect for 
persons in leadership and there was a lack of full observation of formal operational 
procedures by the individual members as well as by the scheme as a whole.   
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Nevertheless, not all of Hacop’s operational activities were unsound. The planting 
roaster and division of plots for the rotation of crops, which was presented in Figure 
6.10, seemed to be well managed and effective. The management of irrigation 
equipment (illustrated by the roster in Table 6.11) also seemed efficient.  
 
On the other hand, however, whether the scheme would have continued to operate 
without any of the external support it received continuously is questionable. Hence, 
even though such support may have fostered attitudes of dependency on the part of 
farmers, it could still be argued that the external assistance was good for the scheme 
overall, if its lack had meant that the scheme would not exist. In fact, the potential 
partnership between Hacop, the local government and Da Gama textile industries to 
produce cotton may have been one of the possible ways through which the scheme 
could expand its business. Moreover, despite the reported internal conflicts regarding 
the establishment of a business Trust Fund, if the venture were to be successfully 
established it would most likely contribute to efforts through which the scheme could 
further grow in the future.  
 
6.4.7 Summary and way forward   
 
The chapter presented and discussed historical, geographical and demographic 
background information of the Kat River Valley (KRV) as well as cases studies on 
irrigation farming practices and business activities of three distinct community 
systems located along the Kat River. The first case study presented the case of black 
citrus farmers who were settled in the KRV by the former Ciskei government. The 
business challenges facing the farmers, for example the insecurity of land tenure, were 
described and proposals from various private and public origins for resolving the 
difficulties of farmers were discussed in the backdrop of supportive and irrelevant 
public policies formulated at a national and local levels. In the second case study, the 
Physical Externality Model was presented as a framework for discussing tensions and 
conflicts arising from water resource abstraction practices among farmers located at 
various positions along the river. The case study illustrated an argument for an 
analysis of institutions of most of the reported conflicts and development challenges 
that faced the various groups from the Upper to the Lower reaches of the KRV. The 
third and last case study documented a history and present business status of emerging 
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farmers of the Hertzog Cooperative (Hacop) located in the Upper KRV. The case 
focussed on the internal politics, leadership challenges and vast human skills 
shortages, which characterised the scheme’s struggles in local and external attempts to 
achieve business growth and agricultural development of the area.  
 
From each case study important institutional and economic themes, which recurred 
most frequently in explanations of the developmental challenges facing each group of 
farmers were highlighted for a later analysis using developmental and institutional 
frameworks presented in chapters two, three and four. Hence, these themes will form 
the foundation of discussions and analyses in the forthcoming chapters. The next 
chapter will revisit the most salient arguments made in literature reviews and 
presentation of a theoretical framework, in chapters two and three, for a deliberate 
discussion and analysis of isolated themes from each case. Theoretical arguments for 
a broader and deeper application of institutional frameworks of analysis within the 
kind of economic research presented in the thesis will be made. Research results, 
lessons and limitations identified from other reviewed irrigated agricultural case 
studies with a formal approach inclination will be presented as evidence and grounds 
for arguing a case advocating the primary inclusion of the New Classical Institutional 
approaches to economic research (e.g. North, 1992, Hodgson, 1998 and 2006, 
McCloskey, 1985 and Evensky, 2004) which investigates socio-economic systems 
similar to the KRV. Finally, lessons and recommendations for public policies aimed at 
rural economic development within irrigated agriculture will be presented from the 
opposing theories in development economics, which were presented in chapter two.                             
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CHAPTER SEVEN – ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION  
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As argued in chapter three, formal and informal institutions have varying 
contributions towards the process of economic development. These contributions 
depend on their associated economic transaction costs and dominance over time. The 
longevity and resilience of institutions to be replaced by new ones enables them to act 
effectively as tools for resource allocations in societies (Hodgson, 1998). However, 
there is no inherent relationship between the dominance of institutions and the nature 
of their contributions to the process of development. As argued by North (1992), often 
in developing countries, the most socially costly institutions can be the most dominant 
and resilient ones. Small corrupt cliques that hold powerful political positions in 
societies may keep such institutions operational. The presence of widespread 
corruption in developing countries is such point in case. Therefore, a discussion and 
analysis of institutions and their contributions to development initiatives are not 
simple and straightforward endeavours. In cases where some institutions, especially 
the informal ones, may be hard to detect by researchers who have been not been 
properly assimilated into environments in which their research is conducted the 
investigations and analyses may be further compromised.  
 
Hence the discussion and analysis of institutions from the Kat River Valley (KRV) 
case studies in the present chapter are carefully confined to the theoretical parameters 
of Williamson’s (2000) hierarchies and Saleth’s (2004) evolutionary framework, 
which were presented in chapter three. The two frameworks are not exhaustive of all 
possible perspectives of analysis, however they allow for a clear and logical 
discussion and analysis of the KRV’s institutions for the main purpose of discovering 
solutions to challenges of economic development in the valley.  
 
Section two presents a discussion and analysis of KRV institutions using 
Williamson’s (2000) hierarchies. In section three, Saleth’s (2004) framework is 
applied to the conclusions reached in section two. The institutional implications from 
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the discussions and analyses are summarised in section four. The proposed framework 
for an integrated approach for economic research is presented in section five. A 
comparative review of recent quantitative and agricultural papers in a reviewed 
journal publication is presented in section six. Section seven presents the final 
implications for the theoretical debates and economic research methods, which were 
reviewed in chapter two and three.  
 
7.2 AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE KRV CASE STUDIES  
 
For greater clarity it must be mentioned that the section analyses and discusses, 
firstly, the isolated themes from each of the three KRV case studies by employing, a) 
the institutional hierarchical frame proposed by Williamson (2000), and b) the 
topographical framework proposed by Saleth (2004), which explores the evolutionary 
path of institutions. Secondly, Ramstad’s (1986) framework for identifying the 
linkages and similarities between themes, which were isolated within and across each 
case study is employed for a holistic understating of the KRV system. These two 
frameworks were presented and discussed in detail in chapter three. In essence, in the 
initial phase of analysis in this chapter, the evolutionary framework forms a more 
foundational base for an understanding of the path dependence of institutional themes, 
and at a more peripheral level and for simplification, the themes are analysed within 
their hierarchical groups as suggested by Williamson (2000). After separate analyses 
and discussions of all three case studies using the evolutionary and hierarchical 
frameworks, the thematic linkages across case studies would be traced using 
Ramstad’s (1986) framework.           
 
Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy suggested that, a) informal institutions, which are not 
readily observable such as norms and customs, form the foundations of social and 
economic behaviour, especially in traditional societies, b) formal and written rules 
and practices, in the form of constitutions and laws, form a second set of institutions, 
which even though readily identifiable is, however, not always observed by actors to 
the same degree in various societies, and c) the explicit rules which govern resource 
allocations, such as rules of trade are placed at the top of the hierarchy as illustrated 
by Figure 7.1.     
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                                 Figure 7.1: Williamson’s (2000) Institutional hierarchy  
 
Secondly, the evolutionary framework (Saleth, 2004) suggested that institutional 
themes be explored, a) at their emergence phases using theoretical postulations similar 
to those proposed by Quiggin (1988), b) in their natural selection processes through, 
for example, theories of transaction costs (e.g. North, 1992), and, c) for their 
dominance, which is often reflected during bargaining processes similar to those 
discussed by Ostrom (1990). The ultimate purpose of such an analysis is to identify 
and discuss the likely developmental paths of social systems, which are governed by 
the most prolific institutions as observed in case studies. In the forthcoming 
subsections, these analytical frameworks are applied to the KRV case studies of, a) 
the black citrus farmers, b) the water allocation conflicts among commercial 
irrigators, and c) the internal business functioning of the emerging agricultural 
scheme, i.e. Hacop, in the Upper KRV. The discussion of these institutional themes in 
all the cases is centred around their contribution to economic development of the 
investigated social systems.      
 
7.2.1 The case of black citrus farmers                  
 
In Table 7.1 isolated institutional themes for discussion in this subsection are 
presented using the classification framework illustrated in Figure 7.1. 
 
 
 
1. Foundational institutions 
2. Constitutional rules 
3. Rules of Trade
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Table 7.1 Institutional themes from the case of black citrus farmer 
Foundational institutions Constitutional or 
contract rules 
Trading rules 
1. Political corruption, 
2. Absentee landlords,  
3. Commitments to outside 
of farming interests, 
4. Inter-group conflicts  
1. The insecurity of tenure, 
2. The debt records of 
black farmers  
3. Government policies for 
developing emerging 
farmers  
4. Proposals for new 
business ventures, 
5. The historical legacy of 
former Ciskei’s legislation  
1. Export demands for 
citrus products* 
2. The local marketing 
strategies  
3. Diverse voices in future 
business planning at 
Katco* 
4 Singular and cohesive 
business planning at 
Riverside S.A. 
 
 
In Table 7.1 only the institutions thought to have been the most critical and ones fitted 
most neatly into Williamson’s (2000) frame are presented. The institutions are 
discussed systematically and per given category in the following subsections. 
 
Informal institutions  
 
Using Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy of institutions, it was obvious that many 
unwritten and informal rules governed some of the past and present practices of 
members of this group, with a mixture of positive and negative outcomes regarding 
economic development. However, as expected of such institutions they were not 
always readily observable, in fact in some cases their likely existence was only 
inferred from observed but consistent behavioural trends within the group. 
 
At least four of such influential institutional themes, some with dire impacts on the 
potential development prospect of the black farmers, could be isolated from the case 
study. These were:  
a) Political corruption, which was a pervasive mode of conducting businesses in 
the former Ciskei, for example political patronage,  
b) Absent landlord-ism presently from occupied farms,  
c) Economic commitments to outside of farming interests, and 
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d) Inter-group conflicts between farms and ex farm labourers.  
 
From the list it can be seen that all the institutions were interrelated and had strong 
historical origins. Some of them were inherited from the former Ciskei rule, for 
example, the corrupt business practices reliant on political patronage. Some emerged 
from the 1994 political transition in South Africa, for example, the inter-group 
conflicts between former labourers and on farmers. Nevertheless their negative effects 
to the economic development of the group were perceptively immense, which meant 
that their net contributions to social transaction costs, which are discussed by North 
(1990 and 1992) was also huge. A direct discussion of social transactions costs is 
presented later in the section. 
 
The level of absenteeism from farms was arguably related to external employment 
commitments outside the farming businesses. Once again, these practices were factors 
that could be traced to the way in which farm units were handed out by the former 
Ciskei government, based on political connections. As a result the new occupants 
were not only ill-equipped in terms of farming expertise but in economic terms, but 
their incentives to ensure that the farms were successfully run as businesses were 
compromised. Hence, the observations of neglected and abandoned farms bore 
testimony to the lack of the right economic incentives. In that sense, not only were the 
farms sustained at an underdeveloped level, but also many were actually left to ruin. 
Such an outcome, it could be argued, was once again related to the political and 
corrupt manner in which the farmers obtained access to the farms. 
 
The reported tensions and conflicts between the landlords and former labourers may 
have emerged when the former Ciskei government handed out the farms to new 
owners originating from locations outside the KRV. However, the tensions were 
deepened post 1994 with an enactment of land restitution and redistribution reform 
processes through which the former labourers could lay historical ownership claims79 
or right of occupation80 to the land. Hence, even though new landlords were 
recognised to be legally designated occupants of the farms by the new government, 
                                                 
79 Under the Restitution of Land Rights Act (22 of 1994), which aims to compensate people who were 
forcibly removed from land before 1913.   
80 Under the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (62 1997), which is aimed at protecting labourers, 
with a long service record, from farm evictions  
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the labourers could be forcibly removed without equal compensation. Hundreds of 
such households have been reported to reside on the farm units under discussion 
(DLA, 2002), with reported cases of untameable crop thefts as a result. The situation 
of dual occupation must have been challenging for both groups, where a) the former 
labourers must have felt vulnerable at impending threats of removal from the land, 
and b) farmers reported that they could not fully operate as private businesses with 
insecure tenure complicated by legal prohibitions and technical difficulties to exclude 
the former labourers from illegally accessing citrus products. The impacts of these 
two factors could only be detrimental to normal running business operations. 
 
The biggest challenges for actions or policies aimed at remedying these institutional 
factors is that they are not readily identifiable, even though their associated and 
negative impacts on economic development prospects are enormous. It would 
primarily take an ethnographic or institutional approach to research to detect and 
identify such informal and unwritten institutions or practices similar to the ones 
observed in the case of black citrus farmers. Hence, it would be expected to be even 
more difficult to formulate technical solutions to remedy sources to problems that are 
themselves difficult to isolate in the first instance. Such is largely the case because, as 
Saleth (2004:8-9) argues, the economic costs associated with these institutions would 
be hard to measure using both qualitative and quantitative methods. However, 
indicative and comparative estimates of such costs could be made when valuating the 
likely trajectories of developmental paths of social systems under investigations. Such 
a valuation of costs to the economic development of the KRV is performed in 
forthcoming sections two and three.              
The formal and written constitutional practices  
 
A number of written and/or formally recorded contracts governed the political and 
business operations of black citrus farmers. However, in some cases clear distinctions, 
within the in/formal definitional continuum, could not be conclusively made with 
respect to the identified institutions. For example, the pervasive culture of 
accumulating debt had its legitimacy contested by the opposing sides, because of 
Ulimocor’s missing records. In other cases, the formal rules emanated from outside 
the black farming group, for instance the proposed plans for business ventures came 
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from large commercial farmers. Furthermore in some cases, written contracts, for 
example the public policies, which were imposed by external public agencies to the 
KRV system. However, most of these rules could be identifiable as forming the 
second tier of Williamson’s (2000) hierarchy of institutions. This also entailed that, 
even when they could be distinguished, in some instances they were not strictly 
observed by the groups they affected. Some of the formal institutions that were 
identified from the case study were the following: 
a) The insecurity of tenure, ironically stemmed from a lack of title deed 
documents, 
b) The records (in most cases a lack thereof) of debt owed by black citrus farmers 
to local organisations and to government, 
c) Proposed plans for new business ventures, for example, from Riverside S.A.,  
d) The historical legacy of the former Ciskei’s statutes, which were propagated 
by parastatal organisations like Ulimocor, and 
e) A map of mostly uncoordinated policies from various provincial government 
departments, whose general aims are to economically develop emerging 
farmers. 
 
The way in which the lack of tenure was pervasive in the promotion of 
underdevelopment in the whole KRV was not only acknowledged by the affected 
farmers but by government officials (Loets, 2005) and researchers like Motteux 
(2002). Well-defined property rights are foundational tools for establishing efficient 
market economies, at least within the classical economic thought, e.g. the Coase 
(1960) theorem. Hence, their lack is often a clear indication of market failure. It can 
be argued that not only did the lack of tenure make it impossible for farmers to pursue 
business growth, but it also reinforced a vicious circle of a culture of despondency 
within the group, which countered the emergence of economic incentive schemes that 
could have been introduced to promote self-reliance. Hence, the insecurity of tenure 
as an institution within which all black citrus farmers operated would have huge 
social transaction costs associated with it. 
 
There were strong commitments from neighbouring farmers, for example, the 
Riverside S.A. Enterprise to develop new contract agreements for business 
partnerships with emerging black farmers with identifiable benefits for parties 
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involved. Even though the contracts were being negotiated during the time of 
research, they nonetheless had an effect on the business behaviours of farmers. The 
proposals were notably locally initiated and driven, and due to their perceived positive 
future benefits had received support from external agencies such as government (the 
DLA) and investors (e.g. the IDC). The fruition of their benefits, if successful as 
planned, would no doubt contribute positively to the development of the whole KRV. 
 
On the other hand, however, the development of business partnership proposals 
between local farmers and the private sector also highlighted the inadequacies or even 
inappropriateness of many of the public policies formulated within various 
government departments to develop emerging actors like those from the KRV. For 
instance, even though the DLA was the caretaker of the negotiation processes, it 
seemed that other departments were inappropriately left out, notably the DWAF. 
Firstly, it seemed that many of the policies, which were outlined in the case study, 
were on the whole mute insofar as they could be directly related to the local 
challenges of the KRV communities in practical terms. Secondly, the non-
participation of other government departments in locally initiated solutions may have 
illustrated the extent to which there was a lack of a well coordinated policy approach 
or activity at a provincial government level. The direct, short and long run effects of 
these factors on the KRV’s development process without a doubt would be negative.  
 
Although the Ciskei government no longer existed at the time of research, it is true 
that both black and white farmers still felt the institutional effects of its formal laws. 
For example, the legal establishment and operations of parastatals like Ulimocor, had 
remained residual, especially in the minds and practices of black citrus farmers. At the 
most fundamental level, the fact that these farmers found themselves being residents 
of the KRV was by virtue of the lasting effects of the former Ciskei government 
alongside its positive and negative practices for the future development of the valley. 
Obviously the arguments thus far have mostly highlighted the negative net 
contributions of the former Ciskei government to the KRV and other areas, especially 
with regard to its corrupt practices. Nonetheless, balanced research should also 
highlight that not of all of the former Ciskei government’s institutions were 
detrimental to its citizens, even though conclusions could be drawn that the net effects 
were most likely negative, from the economic state in which the former Ciskei areas 
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found themselves. In any case, as argued by North (1992), all institutions have 
associated social costs; what sometimes makes other institutions better or more 
preferred economically by various societies are the magnitudes of these costs. 
Minimum transaction costs are normally preferred, unless there are various other 
mitigating political factors, through which institutions with high costs are maintained.  
The argument will become clearer in the forthcoming discussion of the application of 
Saleth’s (2004) framework in analysing the evolution of KRV relevant institutions 
from the 20th century in section 7.3.  
The rules of trade 
 
It seemed that not as many institutions that were relevant to trade were found in the 
case study in comparison to other two categories when using Williamson’s (2000) 
hierarchies. It is proposed that such was probably the case because many of these 
farmers had struggling businesses with limited marketing opportunities for their 
output, when compared to commercial white farmers. Nonetheless, the following 
institutions were isolated for discussion: 
a) The growing export markets, which affected the citrus industry in general, 
b) The strategies for serving local markets, which were readily accessible with 
immediate returns, 
c) The diverse or competing voices at Katco with regard to the directions the 
cooperative should take with regard to its black members, and 
d) The more cohesive voice found at Riverside S.A., which had the potential to 
affect the future business prospects of not only the black citrus farmers in the 
KRV, but in other catchments as well. 
 
The growth of export demands for citrus products was, without a doubt, the most 
positive development for black farmers, not only in the KRV. However, it seemed 
from the case study that the markets were not fully exploited by the group, most likely 
because of a lack of good quality outputs and financial resource constraints. Hence, 
the primary motivation for Riverside S.A. was to draw new plans in attempts to 
involve black farmers. Therefore, the transaction costs associated with these 
institutional factors, it seemed, were probably the lowest and also the most 
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encouraging to the development of black farmers. Even more important, the plans had 
the potential to ensure that black farmers would escape their debt trap.  
 
However, before external markets could be explored within the new proposed plans, 
local markets were available and were being exploited by the farmers. Most of the 
business marketing that took place during the time of research was directed at local 
markets, which were attractive especially for their associated immediate returns. 
Hence, the local markets, though lacking in high profits, formed part of positive 
contributions towards the sustainability of black citrus farming activities as observed.  
 
While Riverside S.A. had very clear and cohesive plans of engaging black farmers for 
business opportunities, it seemed that Katco lacked a similar initiative. It appeared 
such was the case because of cooperative’s organisational limitations. Riverside S.A. 
was small in comparison to Katco, and hence it was easier for the management to 
make decisions on what plans to execute. On the other hand, Katco was bigger with 
many internal competing voices, which were a potential contribution towards in 
decisiveness with regard to how they would engage its black members. The result was 
that of untapped and lost opportunities. Hence, this institution had some associated 
transaction costs, in terms of North’s (1990 and 1992) postulations about institutions. 
 
7.2.2 The case of water allocation tensions among irrigators 
 
The case of water allocations was approached from a more formal perspective, where 
a hypothesis was postulated a priori in the form of the simple Physical Externality 
Model, which was used as framework for collecting and discussing data. The model 
itself was developed on social data, geographical and physical constraints as well as 
institutional thinking. In Table 7.2 the most important institutional factors, which 
affected the behaviours of actors and observed events in the system are once again 
presented using the Williamson (2000) framework.  
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Table 7.2 Institutional themes from the case of water allocations  
Foundational 
institutions 
Constitutional or contract 
rules 
Trading rules 
1. Stringent water 
releases in post-drought 
periods 
2. Strategic behaviours 
3. Risk aversion 
4. Abstraction of water 
from alternative sources  
1. Riparian water rights 
2. Scheduling land rights 
3. Relocation of white 
farmers 
4. Non payment by Upper 
KRV 
5. Geographical boundaries 
6. Technical exclusion of 
the Lower KRV 
7. High endowment of 
physical resources in the 
Upper KRV  
1. Payments for releases  
2. Inefficient water uses 
3. Allocation tensions 
4.Lack of marketing plans 
or skills in the Upper KRV 
5. Proposed water licenses 
 
 
It can be seen from the table that most of the institutional practices, which affected the 
irrigators, were mostly of a formal nature. Such was the case because of the non-
traditional economic status of most of the actors in the system. In addition, because 
the case study was mainly concerned with water abstractions (where water markets 
were not yet developed81) relatively fewer institutions pertaining to water trading 
rules could be identified or solicited. Nevertheless, the study showed that even the 
formal rules that were established for water allocations along the river were 
technically inefficient as postulated by the Physical Externality Model. The extent to 
which identified institutions may have been costly to the economic development of 
the KRV as a whole is proposed in the following sections and for each of the 
categories listed in Table 7.2. 
Informal institutions 
 
It is clear from the case that the two droughts of 1983 and 1991 formed a bad 
experience that led to very risk averse and inefficient practices in terms of water 
levels kept for cautionary measures in the dam. Officially, the levels were set at a 
minimum of sixty percent, however, in practice and as reflected in the data from 2001 
to 2005 the levels were maintained at ninety percent, meaning that the vast amount of 
the water resources were not being used optimally. In terms of the Edgeworth Box in 
                                                 
81 The National Water Act (NWA) (No. 36 1998) was in the process of implementation during the time 
of research. 
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Figure 6.6, the production point for the system was outside the efficiency curve. The 
case was a political climate characterized by practices of high economic costs. 
Nevertheless, as discussed in the case study, the drought experiences may have 
introduced the inefficient practices, however what sustained them and in fact allowed 
them to grow even more inefficient, were the strategic behaviours on the part of the 
Middle KRV farmers. These farmers had most of the political power in the system. 
Hence, even though strategic behaviour of self-maximising actors may have rewarded 
the Middle KRV in the short, on the whole the KRV suffered from the practices.  
 
On the other hand, what may explain the reason why the Lower KRV farmers could 
still tolerate the stringent practices on water releases, even though they strongly 
complained about the poor water quality levels allowed in Kat River, were the 
reported available alternative sources of water from other streams from the sub-
catchments as illustrated in Map 6.4. The exploitation of alternative water sources was 
itself an efficient practice. In fact this water allowed the Lower KRV farmers to 
develop their land for citrus irrigation at quite a high rate to an extent that the Middle 
KRV farmers expressed worries about the land developments. The worries were 
enhanced by uncertainties of how the future water rules would affect water 
distributions with the implementation of the NWA (No. 36) of 1998. In this sense, it 
seemed that the isolated institutions were highly interdependent in their positive and 
negative contributions towards the development efforts in the KRV. To some degree, 
the effects appeared to be distributive, where the Middle KRV farmers were 
restrained from growing (due to land scheduling) whereas the Lower KRV farmers 
could grow their production aided by exploitations of alternative water sources.  
 
The constitutional rules 
 
Most of the formal rules for the allocation of water resources were historical and 
based on the geographical and political structure of the river basin. For instance, the 
riparian water rights, as promulgated by the Water Act (No. 54) of 1956, formed the 
foundations for the formalised future practices in the valley. The water-land 
scheduling system, which was instituted after the construction of the Kat Dam in 
1970, was easy to introduce onto the riparian rights system, which were already in 
place. The major problems of the scheduling system in the KRV, however, was in 
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terms of, a) its unavailability to all actors (e.g. Lower KRV farmers), due to the nature 
of the watercourse as well as, b) the limitations it imposed with regard to land 
developments on those who had no choice but to adopt it (i.e. some of the Upper and 
Middle KRV farmers). Needless to say that any system, which limits choices in such a 
crude manner (i.e. technical exclusion), would only enhance economic efficiencies. 
Nonetheless, the case study illustrates how these inefficiencies were inherited from 
historical policies and thereafter amplified by later developments in the KRV. It is for 
these types of inefficiencies that the current national policies, which are aimed at 
promoting freer water trades, have been formulated, e.g. the National Water Policy 
(NWP, 1997). It is apparent that the historical policies and subsequent developments 
in the KRV introduced and sustained huge social costs.  
 
The creation of the former Ciskei entailed a relocation of white farmers from the 
Upper KRV and a creation of new political boundaries. Hence, it could be imagined 
that the water allocation rules in the Upper versus Middle and Lower KRV would be 
formally different. However, data from the Water Users’ Association (WUA) records 
illustrated that the same rules applied, at least in principle, across the KRV. It was 
argued, however, that the state of underdevelopment in the Upper KRV ensured that 
different informal rules applied to the case of emerging farmers in small irrigation 
schemes. For example, even though it was expected of the Upper KRV to pay for 
water scheduling of around 700 hectares of land, the records of the KRV WUA 
indicated that they did not keep up with these payments. In fact, the emerging farmers 
did not even use half the amount of officially scheduled land that they were officially 
expected to pay for by the WUA. This was a classical case where socio-economic 
conditions ensured that the formally coded rules were completely ignored by some 
sectors, in this case the poorer sections of the community. Moreover, the only effect 
that the political boundary had on the different sections of the KRV was a propagation 
of economic inequalities, which also led to different applicable rules. From the case 
study it was not clear how the different application of formal rules affected the 
development of the KRV as a whole. Hence, the transactional cost-contributions to 
development in the KRV, associated with the discriminatory application of formal 
rules regarding allocations, could not be immediately inferred. However, the Coase 
(1960) theorem would conclude that the non-enforceability of rights or formal 
institutions should have associated social costs. Politically, the downstream farmers 
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voiced complaints about the non-payments from the Upper KRV, as reflected in the 
WUA records. However, it did not seem that actions would be taken to recover the 
payments, because of the non-politically correct implications these actions might 
have. Nonetheless, a classical economic conclusion would be that such institutions 
would have high cost contributions to the development of the valley. 
 
What was also particularly intriguing or significant with regard to the postulations of 
the PE model and the economic conditions of the Upper KRV was that even though 
the location was well endowed with land and water resources, owing to its upstream 
position, it still lacked productivity. The case illustrated how the model was 
inadequate in explaining or predicting the low productivity based only on 
geographical location and natural resource endowment. It seemed, however that there 
was a circular relationship between the economic conditions of the area, the observed 
inefficient institutions and their historical origins. Some kind of a poverty trap, it 
appeared, had been established, whose escape would only come through external 
intervention. Nevertheless, a conclusion was reached that because of the nature of 
most institutions that were observed in the Upper KRV, redistributive policies 
pertaining to tangible resources such as access to water rights, irrigation infrastructure 
and land resources would not be effective in the short term. That was if the 
institutions themselves remained unchanged.  
 
The rules of trade 
 
As already mentioned, not too many institutions in the case study were concerned 
with water trade. The lower KRV farmers, however, had to pay a fee to have water 
releases from the dam, for reasons that included the flushing of the river to reduce 
pollution. Payments for the flushes were made to the KRV WUA. However, in 2006 
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) through the NWP (1997) and 
Water Research Commission were in the process of implementation a system of water 
licences, not only in the KRV but also in catchments in other parts of the country as 
well. The water licence system, which was primarily based on free market principles, 
would be more efficient given the principles’ lower associated transactional costs. 
However, this would also depend on appropriate institutional frameworks being in 
place. During the time of research the NWP’s (1997) implementation process, 
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however, had proved itself to be quite cumbersome, which meant that the inefficient 
current institutions would remain unchanged for some time. The current institutions 
had high transaction costs, whose contribution to development was clearly negative. 
 
In the Upper KRV, on the other hand, there simply were no applicable water 
allocation rules. Water was mainly thought of as a free communal resource. Emerging 
farmers were prepared to pay for irrigation infrastructure such as water pumps and 
electricity, but not the actual water for irrigation purposes. As argued earlier the 
accepted practice was inefficient. However, it could not be concluded that if the 
emerging farmers were forced to pay for their irrigation water the enforcement would 
lead towards better business practices or any economic development, or whether it 
would lead to their exit from the farming sector. An evaluation of many of the 
dominant institutions, and their perceived economic contributions to development, 
with regard to emerging farmers is carried out in the next section. 
 
7.2.3 The case of emerging schemes 
 
Of the three documented KRV studies, it seemed that the case of emerging farmers 
was the one characterised by the biggest institutional challenges to development. In 
line with Sen’s (1983:754) argument, discussed in chapter two, of ‘entitlements’ and 
the political ‘capabilities’ that they generate to achieve development, the case best 
illustrated how being incapable of empowering oneself, because of a lack of skills and 
an environment conducive to the use of those skills would lead to a situation where an 
acquisition of physical resources, e.g. irrigation infrastructure and water resources, 
would not make a significant impact. Table 7.3 presents the political and business 
institutions at Hacop using Williamson’s (2000) framework. From the table, it can be 
seen that the majority of applicable rules were informal, which would be expected 
from a business entity based within a rural and traditional economy. The few trading 
rules that were identified were only at their proposal stages. The evaluations of a 
majority of Hacop’s business practices concluded that they were highly costly to the 
survival of the scheme and its growth.  
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Table 7.3 Institutional themes from the case of emerging farmers  
Foundational 
institutions 
Constitutional or contract 
rules 
Trading rules 
1. Unstable historical 
political climate 
2. Bottom-up 
development initiative 
3. Collaboration between 
three villages 
4. Loose agreement on 
use of irrigation 
equipment 
5. Separate financial 
accounts  
6. Flouting of 
constitutional provisions 
7. Flouting of 
management systems 
8. Continuous external 
support 
9. Centralised 
power/dictatorship 
10. Information 
asymmetries  
1. Temporary land lease 
agreements  and later 
insecurity of tenure 
2. Ineffective constitution 
3. Adoption of two land 
management systems  
4. Planting roaster system 
5. Management system of 
irrigation equipment 
6.Seemingly uncoordinated 
government policies  
 
1. Lack of marketing plans 
2. Proposed Da Gama 
partnership 
3. Proposed business Trust 
 
Foundational institutions  
 
It was significant that the Hacop scheme was established within a politically unstable 
environment in 1994. Businesses are generally not expected to prosper within such 
political climates. Hence the political uncertainties should have signalled that the 
scheme would have a difficult life span. That is the principal reason why the DLA 
land lease was only of a temporary nature and as pointed out in the preceding chapter 
led to a situation where the farmers were exposed to further insecurities to land 
resource access, which proved to be detrimental to business.  
 
The bottom-up approach to the establishment of the scheme was another significant 
development in the Upper KRV area. The fact that individuals within the community 
took the initiative to establish the business was encouraging in the sense that the 
scheme was then most likely to have been established to serve local needs. Such an 
approach would be less likely to have high associated social transaction costs when 
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compared to externally imposed initiatives. However in the specific case of Hacop, 
the negative aspect of this localized initiative was  that only two individuals drove the 
process. This factor later led to a centralised form of leadership, with dictatorial 
tendencies, which also became the root of many reported challenges that 
unfortunately led to the scheme’s hardships, which were observed during the research 
period.  
 
The dictatorial tendencies also led to a flouting of the scheme’s constitutional 
provisions with regard to holding regular elections for leadership posts. This further 
deteriorated into flouting many of the scheme’s formally written rules, such as its 
financial management system, and eventually led to the establishment of separate 
accounts for the three branches. The developments signalled a breakdown of a 
cohesively run organisation and contributed negatively to sustainability and growth.  
 
At a historical level, the agreements between the now defunct Ulimocor and the 
farmers with regard to the use of irrigation equipment also created future 
uncertainties. The Fairbain branch members were not sure whether they could have 
any legal claim to the equipment they had inherited. Such was especially problematic 
in the light of the branch’s intentions to formally register a Business Trust. The 
registration of the Trust would be delayed while attempts were made to establish the 
scheme’s legal position with regard to the equipment. That other villages, e.g. 
Hertzog, were no longer actively farming further complicated the legal issue. These 
factors negatively contributed to any envisioned business growth.  
 
With regard to cooperative governance, even though the external support received by 
the scheme had decreased in comparison to the early periods, the continued support 
from government agencies may have actually ensured that a relationship of 
dependency on outside assistance was created. The lasting effects would be 
detrimental to the scheme’s sense of self-reliance. These were made obvious when 
extension officers, who had provided marketing support for the scheme’s products, 
left the scheme taking away with them their established networks and skills and 
leaving the farmers without market channels. The relationships of high dependency on 
external assistance contributed high associated costs to the business. 
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Constitutional rules  
 
Besides the challenges of the insecurity stemming from an expired lease to land 
access and poor leadership problems, which led to the flouting of the constitutional 
and financial management systems, it was however encouraging, and expected, that 
the farmers continued to observe some of their formal operational management rules. 
These included the planting roaster system and the management of irrigation 
equipment. As discussed in the case study in chapter six, the observation of these 
systems may have been indicative of the positive outcomes from skills workshops 
conducted for the scheme by external agencies. Without a doubt the contributions, 
however limited they may have been, to the scheme’s sustainability from a strict 
adherence to these rules were positive. 
 
With regard to land management rights regimes, on the other hand, by the late 1990s 
the DLA (2002) reports demonstrated that the Hertzog and Fairbain communities had 
each embraced two different types of management systems. While members of the 
Hertzog community were happy to have their land subdivided into smaller plots for 
private access and management, the Fairbain farmers were opposed to such a system 
and preferred communal access. Hence chances of having an organisation cohesively 
run, as an effective business, by the two farming communities would be slim. 
Fortunately by the time the difference preferences for management styles were 
adopted the villages were already no longer operating as a unit, especially in financial 
terms. Nonetheless, what this may have also signalled was that it would be difficult if 
not impossible for the villages to ever operate within a single umbrella body in future. 
Hence, Hacop would never exist in the manner in which it was once envisioned and 
configured in 1994. One important implication from the development could be that 
the old Hacop needs to be disbanded. The farmers in various braches need to establish 
new business entities for separate growth prospects.  
 
Trading rules  
 
As already mentioned there were hardly any formal trading practices to speak of in 
the case of emerging farmers. The observation illustrated the poor formal nature of 
Hacop’s business. For instance, the lack of marketing plans was reported by members 
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to have been the greatest challenge facing the scheme. The departure of extension 
officers was central to the problem. However, the two proposals to a) develop a 
business partnership with Da Gama Textiles, and b) establish a Business Trust were 
two future developments that would be able to assist the scheme to create a formal 
platform for business trade and expansion. If successful the proposals, to varying 
degrees, would have welcomed positive contributions to economic development. 
 
The following subsection, based on the foregoing discussions, qualitatively evaluates 
the institutional factor contributions to the economic development from each of the 
KRV cases. The summaries of the social transactional costs associated with each 
factor are presented in Table 7.4 for the KRV as a whole. 
 
7.2.4 A qualitative evaluation of social transaction costs of institutional factors 
 
North’s (1992) conclusions, which were presented in chapter three, were that 
inefficient institutions have high associated transaction costs. Normally, institutions 
that have the highest costs are least likely to survive in a competitive market process 
of natural selection. In cases where inefficient and socially expensive institutions 
remain dominant over time, and where the least costly institutions are not selected in 
societies, explanations for these choices are usually political. Nonetheless, Tables 7.4a 
to 7.4c use an economic market approach to qualitatively valuate the contributions to 
the development process of the institutions discussed from each of the KRV cases. 
The valuations enable conclusions to be made on the cases’ most likely paths to 
development. The conclusions are purely based on the socio-economic efficiencies 
stemming from the various institutions as well as how these would indicate the 
potential developmental paths of social systems. In section 7.3, the historical 
evolutions of the same institutions are mapped out using Saleth’s (2004) framework to 
evaluate their historical robustness, which is also important in determining the 
potential developmental paths of systems.  
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In the Tables (7.4a to c) an incremental and qualitative contribution ranking system is 
used to compare each institution’s potential contributions to social transaction costs 
following the Williamson’s (2000) discussion. That is; 
‘minimum =1 point’;  
‘medium=2 points’ and  
‘high=3 points’.  
Institutions that were consistently argued to have hugely contributed to the state of 
underdevelopment in each of the cases and hence high social costs are assigned a high 
ranking of ‘3 points’, while those which were argued to have had little contributions 
to socio-economic transaction costs are assigned no ranking, which implicitly signals 
a ‘zero point’ value assignment. Based on the sum of ranking points assigned to each 
category of institutions, deductive judgments are made on their contributions to the 
state of underdevelopment. For instance, in each of the tables, if a total sum of points 
for each category is greater than the average of an associated and given range, the 
total values are increasingly shaded to indicate their rising significant contributions to 
underdevelopment. In Table 7.4a, for instance, from the ranking point system82 as 
well as the level of shading, the contributions to underdevelopment from informal 
institutions practiced in the case of black citrus farmers are above average83 and 
therefore highest relative to other categories. Put differently, among other things, the 
conclusion indicates that the informal practices of black citrus farmers have high 
negative contributions to the group’s development and hence should be discontinued. 
The various research and policy implications from the conclusions are discussed in 
the last section and forthcoming chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
82 A total of 8 points, within a possible range of 0 to 12 points  
83 For instance the greater the deviation from the mean is, on the right hand side of a given distribution 
curve, would indicate a higher institutional contribution to transactional costs.  
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Table 7.4a A qualitative evaluation of the case of Black Citrus Farmers’ institutions to 
social transaction costs and development 
Institutions  
  
Qualitative evaluation 
of contributions to 
transaction costs from 
discussion 
(No contribution=0) 
Foundational  Min=1 Med=2 High=3 
The case black citrus 
farmers 
1. Political corruption 
2.Absent landlords 
3. Commitments to outside 
of farming interests 
4. Inter-group conflicts & occupations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
   X? 
X 
 
 
 
X 
Total points  
Index points: 
 
 1 4 3 8 (above average) 
(possible range of: 0 to 12) 
Constitutional  Min=1 Med=2 High=3  
1.The insecurity of tenure,  
2. The debt records of black farmers  
3. Implementation of public policies for 
developing emerging farmers  
4. Proposals for new business ventures, 
5. The historical legacy of former 
Ciskie’s legislation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
X? 
X 
 
Index points: 
          
                                                                       1                4               3 8 (~average) 
(possible range: 0 to 15) 
Trading rules Min=1 Med=2 High=3  
1. Export demands for citrus products* 
2. The local marketing 
strategies  
3. Diverse voices in future business 
planning at Katco* 
4 Singular and cohesive business 
planning at Riverside S.A. 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
Index points: 
   
 1 2 0 3 (below average) 
(Possible range: 0 to 12) 
Total points for the case 
study 
(?) contradictory evidence meant that it was difficult to make a decision  
*a positive contribution to development (zero costs) 
19 (~average) 
(Possible range: 0 to 39 
 
 
Besides the relatively high contributions of informal institutions to social transaction 
costs in the case of black citrus farmers, the total sum of ‘19 points’ within a ‘0 to 39’ 
range (the bottom row of Table 7.4a) indicates that, on average, considerably less 
negative contributions to the group’s economic development, stemmed from other 
institutional factors and interventions. Such factors, with little or zero transaction 
costs to development, would include the growing citrus export demands coupled with 
business proposals from organizations like Riverside S.A. 
 
In Table 7.4 (b) the same valuation process is applied to the case of water allocations 
among irrigators along the Kat River. Among other things, the results illustrate the 
validity of selected postulations of the Physical Externality model, which concluded 
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that in this type of a geographical watercourse undesirable inefficiencies stemming 
from production input uncertainties would exist.         
 
 
Table 7.4b A qualitative evaluation of the case of Water Allocation institutions to 
social transaction costs and development 
The case of water 
allocations 
Institutions 
 
Qualitative evaluation 
of contributions to 
transaction costs from 
discussion 
(No contribution=0)* 
Foundational Min=1 Med=2 High=3 
Total points 
 
1. Stringent water releases post the 
drought periods 
2. Strategic behaviours 
3. Risk aversion 
4. Abstraction of water from alternative 
sources 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
X  
Index points  1 2 3 6 (average) 
(Possible range: 0 to 12) 
Constitutional Min=1 Med=2 High=3  
1. Riparian water rights 
2. Scheduling land rights 
3. Relocation of white farmers 
4. Non payment by Upper KRV 
5. Geographical boundaries 
6. Technical exclusion of the Lower 
KRV 
7. High endowment of physical 
resources in the Upper KRV 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X? 
X 
X 
X 
 
 
X 
 
Index points  1  15 16 (above average) 
(Possible range: 0 to21 
Trading rules Min=1 Med=2 High=3  
1. Payments for releases  
2. Inefficient water uses 
3. Allocation tensions 
4.Lack of marketing plans or skills in the 
Upper KRV 
5. Proposed water licenses 
X  
 
X? 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Index points 
   
 1 2 6 9 (above average) 
(Possible range: 0 to 15) 
  
Total points for the case study 
(?) contradictory evidence meant that it was difficult to make a decision 
*a positive contribution to development (zero costs) 31 (above average) 
(Range: 0 to 48) 
 
 
In the case summarised in Table 7.4b the highest contributions towards inefficiencies 
or social transaction costs originated from formal institutions and trading rules 
respectively. A total of ‘16 points ranking’ was well above the mean given the range 
of ‘0 to 21’ for the constitutional/formal institutions. It was discussed in chapter six 
that most of the formal institutions in this system were inherited from pre-1994 water 
policies, for example the riparian water rights as promulgated by the Water Act (54) 
of 1956 and the land scheduling system, which was applied to the KRV after the 
construction of the Kat Dam in 1970. The total points ranking for the whole case 
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study (the bottom row of Table 7.4 b)84 indicate a poor assessment of how the 
observed water allocation practices in the KRV have negatively contributed to the 
process of development.  
 
Results and conclusions that logically follow from the discussions of the case of 
emerging farmers in the Upper KRV are presented in Table 7.4 (c). 
 
Table 7.4c A qualitative evaluation of the case of the Upper KRV’s Emerging 
Farmers’ to social transaction costs and development 
Institutions 
 
Qualitative evaluation 
of contributions to 
transaction costs from 
discussion 
(No contribution=0)* 
The case of emerging 
farmers 
Foundational  Min=1 Med=2 High=3 
Total points 
 1. Unstable historical political climate 
2. Bottom-up development initiative 
3. Collaboration between three villages 
4. Loose agreement on use of irrigation 
equipment 
5. Separate financial accounts  
6. Flouting of constitutional provisions 
7. Flouting of management systems 
8. Continuous external support 
9. Centralised power/dictatorship 
10. Information asymmetries 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
X? 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
X 
 
Index point  1 6 15 22 (above average) 
(Possibly range:0 to 30)  
Constitutional rules Min=1 Med=2 High=3  
1. Temporary land lease agreements  & 
later insecurity of tenure 
2. Ineffective constitution/rules 
3. Adoption of two land management 
systems  
4. Planting roaster system 
5. Management system of irrigation 
equipment 
6.Seemingly uncoordinated government 
policies 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
X 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
Index points   2 9 11 (`average) 
(Possible range: 0 to 18) 
Trading rules Min=1 Med=2 High=3  
1. Lack of marketing plans and skills 
2. Proposed Da Gama partnership 
3. Proposed Business Trust 
 
X 
X 
 X 
 
Index points    3 3 
(Possible range: 0 to 9) 
  
Total points for the case 
study 
(?) contradictory evidence meant that it was difficult to make a decision  
*a positive contribution to development (zero costs) 36 (above average) 
(Possible range 0 to 57) 
 
For instance, the majority of institutions that were relevant to emerging farmers were 
informal and most had high economic contributions to social transaction costs. That is 
illustrated by the well above average deviation of ‘22 point total’ within a ‘0 to 30’ 
                                                 
84 A  ‘31 points’ total in the range of ‘0 to 48’ is well above a possible average 
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possible range for foundational institutions. The assessment of all the institutions 
observed by subsistence farmers (bottom row of Table 7.4 c) also illustrates how 
likely it was that the area, without any meaningful intervention, would not be headed 
towards growth and development. The ‘36 points total’ for all institutions was also 
well above average given the ‘0 to 57 point range’. 
 
The institutional valuation of social costs from all the three case studies, using 
Williamson’s (2000) hierarchies, shows that the two most economically inefficient 
cases were those of the emerging farmers followed by the case of water allocations. 
The most obvious implication from the observation is that the two systems would 
obviously require a higher level of policy attention aimed at eliminating institutions 
with the highest social costs and replacing them with the most appropriate ones. On 
the other hand, the case of black farmers appeared to be the most promising in 
attempts to achieve development, at least in the long run, again if costly institutions 
were eradicated.  
 
Nonetheless it was proposed in chapter one that for economic research in general to 
have a real social meaning and more accuracy in its results and conclusions; over and 
above a qualitative valuation of socio-economic effects of institutions on economic 
systems (as illustrated in Tables 7.4 (a to c) quantitative estimations of the same 
transactional costs could be to be undertaken, using more formal tools. For example, 
in the presented case of the water allocations, a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) could be 
employed to estimate the actual monetary value of social costs associated with the 
implementation of the land scheduling system after the Kat Dam’s construction in 
1970. However, and very important to stress is that the analysis cannot take place in 
an institutional vacuum, which appears to be common practice in some published 
research whose examples are reviewed later in section 7.6. Otherwise an illustrative 
presentation of an appropriate methodological role and usage of complementary 
formal tools to institutional research is undertaken in section 7.5.  
 
However before an illustration of a formal treatment is presented, the institutions with 
the strongest historical origins are identified as those that would be the most difficult 
to eliminate using external interventions. The identification and conclusion are based 
on the basic institutional thesis that the trajectory of well-established institutions is 
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path dependent85. These institutions are resilient to change. The evolutionary 
framework by Saleth (2004) in this case is used to determine which ones of the 
institutions presented in Tables 7.4 (a to c) would be the most likely to challenge 
external policy interventions aimed at their elimination. The evolutionary evaluation 
sheds light in answering questions surrounding the most probable developmental 
trajectories in the KRV, with as well as without policy interventions.  
 
7.3 EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENTAL PATH IMPLICATIONS  
 
In chapter one and three it was proposed that the hierarchical (Williamson, 2000) and 
evolutionary (Saleth, 2004) analyses of institutions as frameworks for economic 
research should precede any usage of formal methods, for example econometric or 
statistical methods, which require hypothetical questions to research be stated a 
priori. The institutional analyses should provide the foundations for these formal 
hypotheses and subsequent investigations. An understanding of institutional impacts 
and contributions to socio-economic systems and costs, respectively, enforces a deep 
and broad appreciation of the economic system Only from the broad understanding of 
the system can meaningful hypothetical and formal questions be postulated. In 
simplified terms, quantitative and/or statistical estimates of economic costs and/or 
benefits in given social systems could only be undertaken following institutional 
research presentations of summaries similar to those presented in Tables 7.4 (a to c) 
and Table 7.5 of the present section.  
 
As already mentioned an evolutionary framework following Saleth (2004) provides an 
added understanding and insight into the progression and robustness of institutions 
based on their history. A long history of institutions therefore indicates the high 
robustness of particular institutions, which in turn becomes an indication of the 
resilience to policy interventions of both good and/or bad institutions. Faced with 
robust institutions, policy interventions have trouble influencing the course of 
development in given systems. More specifically, in the KRV cases for instance, over 
and above the valuations of transactional costs, which were summarised using 
Williamson’s (2000) framework, the evolutionary analysis enables an identification of 
                                                 
85 A detailed discussion of the thesis was presented in the review of institutionalism in chapter three 
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institutions with long and strong historical origins, as the most useful in predicting 
potential (under) development paths. Hence, strategic policy formulation should pay 
special attention to these types of institutions.  
 
What an evolutionary investigation should achieve are the following,  
a) a presentation of an historical account of economic transactions involved in 
preserving socially dominant institutions,  
b) a discussion of the political processes through which societies negotiate the 
rules and practices that culminate in the preservation of the most robust 
institutions, and  
c) an analysis of the strategies used by individual actors and/or groups in market 
competition games played within socially agreed upon rules (e.g. market 
engagement rules or agreements like business contracts).  
 
7.3.1 An historical account of economic transactions 
 
From the presentation of the KRV cases, various institutions were identified as having 
emerged at different times in the 20th century history of each social system that they 
affected. In Table 7.5, the time frames around which the most significant or dominant 
institutions (based on the cost valuation from the preceding subsection) became 
effective are indicated alongside the agents or events leading to their emergence as 
well as the extent of their effects in the KRV. The institutions with the highest and 
lowest contribution costs to economic development are identified as the most 
significant. In applicable instances specific events and/or public policies are linked to 
the emergence and entrenchment of these institutions. For instance, the growth of 
citrus export markets in the late 1990s could be linked to trade liberalisation policies 
of the early 1990s, while the technical exclusion of the Lower KRV farmers in water 
allocations from the Kat River owes its emergence to the Dam’s construction in the 
early 1970s. 
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Table 7.5 A summary of significant institutions and their history  
Institutions Agents and event/s 
leading to emergence 
Period of emergence 
* 
Affected social systems 
of the three case 
studies  
Insecurity of tenure Colonial settlements and 
conflicts, traditional 
systems during homeland 
rule  
Late 1800s and 
reinforced in the early 
1970s  
All cases (-ve) 
Riparian water rights National policy 1950s All (-ve) 
Scheduling land rights Provincial and local 
policies  
Early 1970s All  
(-ve) 
Relocation of white farmers National policy 1970s  All (-ve) 
Technical exclusion of the Lower KRV Provincial. Policy  1970s Two (-ve) 
High endowment of physical resources in 
the Upper KRV (e.g. water) 
National and provincial. 
policy 
1970s Three and potentially all 
(-ve) 
The legacy of political corruption  Creation of Ciskei  Early 1970s All (-ve) 
Inter-group conflicts Relocation of black Citrus 
farmers through Ulimocor 
Early 1980s One (-ve) 
Export demands for citrus products Trade liberalisation/ 
National government 
Late 1990s One and two (+ve) 
Stringent water releases post the drought 
periods 
Middle KRV farmers Early 1990s Two (-ve) 
Singular and cohesive business planning Riverside S.A. Late 1990s One (+ve) 
Inefficient water uses Risk aversion and business 
strategies 
Early 1990s* One and two (-ve) 
Unstable political climate /political 
transition 
National government Early 1990s Three (-ve?) 
Bottom-up development initiatives Local agents  Early 1990s Three 
(+ve) 
Proposed water licenses by new water 
legislation 
National policy 1997 All  (+ ve ?) 
Flouting of constitutional provisions and 
management procedures 
Local leadership Late 1990s and 2000s Three (-ve) 
Centralised power/dictatorship Local leadership Late 1990s and 2000s Three (-ve)  
Information asymmetries Local leadership Late 1990s and 2000s Three and potentially 
one  (-ve) 
Adoption of two land management systems National policy 2000s Three (-ve) 
Seemingly uncoordinated government 
policies 
Provincial/National 
policies  
2000s One and three (-ve) 
Lack of marketing plans or skills  Historical legacy of 
Apartheid and paternalism 
2000s Two and three (-ve) 
Proposals of new business ventures  Riverside S.A. 2004 Directly one and 
potentially three (-ve)  
• The institutions are presented as chronologically as possible using column three 
• Often, institutions of the same time period have some relationship or interaction 
• In the last column, the graded shading indicates the extent to which a particular institution affects more than 
one case studies (the darkest shading indicates effect across all three systems)    
• The +ve and / or – ve signs indicate the-institutional contributions to development from valuations  
        in section 7.2 
 
Of these dominant institutions a number of them had long histories of over twenty 
years, for example the state of insecurity of land tenure and riparian rights policies. 
These institutions, whose emergence period is in bold fonts, according to Saleth’s 
(2004) evolutionary framework would be the most resilient to agents and/or activities 
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aimed at encouraging their replacement or change. From the table at least eight of 
such institutions can be identified, namely: 
a) insecurity of tenure, which was first propagated by the colonial settlements 
and conflicts of the mid to late 1800s, and later reinforced through traditional 
governance systems after the creation of former homelands, 
b) legislation of riparian water rights, which were promoted by the Water Act (54 
of 1956),  
c) political corruption, which was propagated by the former Ciskei government, 
d) land scheduling system, which was adopted after the construction of the Kat 
Dam in 1970 
e) the relocation of white farmers from the Upper KRV by the South African 
government, 
f) conflicts among black citrus farmers and former farm labourers, propagated by 
the Ulimocor’s projects, 
g) the technical exclusion of Lower KRV farmers, which stemmed from the 
adoption of the land scheduling system , and 
h) the under utilisation of high water resource endowment in the Upper KRV 
after the construction of the Kat Dam. 
 
The most striking feature of the institutions is that, for the most part, the agents and/or 
events to which they owe their promulgation are formal government policies. In cases 
where they may have emerged or were encouraged by social and/or political events, 
for example the case of land insecurity86, once deeply entrenched the institutions 
themselves led to subsequent formulations of other public policies, which then 
ensured their long term sustainability. The formalisation of the homeland systems in 
the 1960s and early 1970s87 was in most parts enabled by the early colonial conflicts 
and related legislation, which promoted racial segregations, for example the Natives 
Land Act (27 of 1913). Other examples of this circular and self-reinforcing process 
could be observed in the direct relationships between, a) the effects of adopting land 
scheduling system which in turn allowed for an exclusion of the Lower KRV farmers 
from formal access rights to water resources, and b) the political corrupt practices of 
the former Ciskei which led to formal arrangements that enabled the KRV settlement 
                                                 
86 Which was promulgated by colonial conflicts and traditional systems 
87 For example through the enactment of the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (26 of 1970) 
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of black citrus farmers, which in turn led to conflictual relations between the farmers 
and former labourers. It is clear that whether the initial institutional agents were 
formal or informal, over relatively long periods of time the institutions tended to 
either reproduce or protect themselves in the form creating a self-supporting 
environment filled with other similar institutions. The institutions may emerge as 
informal cultural practices or beliefs but over time and depending on how strongly 
accepted they were, would become formalised. This is a particular illustration of the 
path-dependency hypothesis, which has been recurring throughout the thesis (also 
refer to North, 1992 and Williamson, 2000, Evensky, 2004, etc.). Hence, the long 
histories or resilience of most institutions, which are presented in Table 7.5, have 
links that could be traced to more recent practices and events. Such institutional links 
are depicted as ‘the wave’ of old institutions, whose emergence appears to be from the 
late 1800s in Figure 7.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The ‘old’ institutional wave has remained dominant even after 1994. Moreover, from 
the table, it can be observed that very few of the dominant ‘new’ institutions (whose 
manifestations do not have long histories) have their emergence rooted in the ‘old’ 
institutional wave. The examples include the obvious linkages between the presently 
observed shortages of black technical and business skills (which are part of the ‘new’ 
institutional wave) to the ‘old’ development policies of racial segregation. In fact, a 
sharp distinction could be drawn between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ institutions as depicted 
in Figure 7.2. Most of the institutions whose emergence began in the 1990s do not 
Institutional
intensity 
Figure 7.2 The self reinforcing institutional waves 
Old wave agents and 
institutions  
High 
Low 
Medium 
         Late 1800s     1900s                               1950s                          1970s           Early 1990s 
A new wave of agents 
and institutions
Self-reinforcement by other 
in/formal agents & institutions 
Time
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seem to have strong connections to the older set. A ‘new’ wave of interrelated 
in/formal institutions appears to have begun its evolution in the early 1990s. 
Moreover, like the older set, the new institutions are also self-sustaining. For instance, 
throughout the discussion, there were strong linkages between poor leadership and 
informational asymmetries, which were portrayed in the case of subsistence farmers, 
and there were connections between the uncoordinated provincial policies and lack of 
information flows concerning policy objectives, which were discussed in the case of 
black citrus farmers. Nevertheless, the level of the effect of the new institutions on all 
KRV systems (also owing to their short histories) appeared to be of a low intensity. 
This is also depicted in Figure 7.2. While the effects of the old institutions remained 
strong, the impacts of the new set were growing, and in some instances they appeared 
to be replacing the effects of the old. For example, at a national level, the formal 
water licences (e.g. the National Water Act (NWA), 36 of 1998) have been 
formulated as deliberate measures to replace the dominance of old riparian based 
water rights (Water Act 54 of 1956), and the redistributive policies from various 
provincial departments, which were discussed in the case of black citrus farmers, as 
well as the proposed business ventures have been proposed to eliminate the negative 
effects of land tenure insecurities. However, whether such objectives will actually be 
achieved, at this point and with the current regime of policies, remains indeterminate, 
especially in the light of the valuations and conclusions (pertaining transactional 
costs), which were reached in the last section. In those discussions as well as in the 
summary presented in Table 7.5, most of the institutions (old and new) have negative 
contributions towards the development process with an exception of a few.  
 
Nonetheless, what is clear from the historical trajectories of the dominant institutions 
in the KRV, which are depicted in Figure 7.2, is that there are forces often with 
political leverages, which propagate the growth as well as the formalisation process of 
particular rules and practices. Obviously in traditional societies and prior to colonial 
settlements most, if not all, institutions were informally coded. The proliferation of 
formal institutions only intensified with the colonial settlements. In the political 
selection process of institutions, which would later become dominant, it was often the 
military supremacy of settler groups that was an important factor in racial conflicts 
and/or negotiations around whose rules and practices would be socially acceptable. It 
appears that little or no economic considerations played a significant role in those 
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bargaining and selection processes, because most of the institutions that became the 
order of the day would eventually prove themselves to have been quite economically 
inefficient (refer to Table 7.5 summary).  
 
7.3.2 The political process of negotiating rules for engagement  
 
Although Ostrom’s (1990:1-23) game theoretic assertions (illustrated by the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma model), and to some extent North’s (1992) transactional cost 
theory, postulate that the most sustainable institutional arrangements are those that 
present minimum transactional costs to bargaining groups and/or societies, the 
conclusions reached in the preceding sections indicate otherwise, at least from the 
long-term perspectives. In the historical conflicts between bargaining groups in the 
KRV, economic efficiency does not seem to have played a significant role in the 
selection of dominant institutions. Nevertheless, North (1990) did also suggest that in 
various developing country contexts (similar to the KRV and South Africa in general) 
it was possible that inefficient institutions (with high costs) could be sustained for the 
sole benefit of politically powerful ‘clicks’, which exercised their power for political 
ends. In the KRV cases, the colonial settler groups, backed by the growing political 
power of the South African white controlled state and its policies possessed this type 
of power. Hence, the informal and formal wave of institutions prior to the early 1990s 
supported an environment, which benefited the colonial groups. At the same time the 
political environment must have only encouraged the sustainability of complementary 
traditional institutions, for example the system of common access to land and other 
resources, which were deepened in homeland systems. Moreover, it appears that 
formal and informal institutions that emerged and were embraced by groups other 
than the colonial settlers within a politically repressive environment would themselves 
become inefficient. For instance, the formation of homeland systems promoted a 
number of corrupt economic transactions, which were discussed at length in preceding 
sections and in chapter six. Among other things, what the discussion demonstrates is 
that a culture based on inefficiency has to breed more inefficiency to be sustainable. 
Within a non-democratic environment, where free bargaining is not encouraged and 
political power is not evenly distributed, it may be naïve to imagine that it is likely to 
have an emergence of a set of politically and economically efficient institutions, 
which could minimise administrative and economic transactional costs.    
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From the discussion, two important theoretical postulations arise. Firstly, given the 
strong historical dependency of institutional evolution, which has been illustrated, it is 
questionable to imagine that there may have even been a free bargaining process or 
processes, in line with Saleth’s (2004) framework, that took place in the history of the 
cases studies. The KRV’s history in fact casts doubt to the prudence of even 
attempting to apply the bargaining process aspect of Saleth’s (2004) analytical 
framework in a manner that ignores the external political and powerful environment 
created by state agents with agendas, which were not economically based. Secondly, 
given the strong role of an external environment and political agents in the shaping, 
strengthening and formalisation of the KRV dominant institutions it appears that for 
similar contexts (in political and socio economic terms) it would be non-prudent (if 
not futile) to ignore the role of state interventions in influencing the developmental 
process. The second postulation is most relevant to the presentations of debates in the 
review of development economics in chapter two. The conclusion is that the state is at 
the centre of a developmental process in contexts similar to the Kat River Valley.  
 
7.4  THE IMPLICATIONS FROM INSTITUTIONAL DISCUSSIONS 
 
In sections 7.2 and 7.3, the Williamson (2000) and Saleth (2004) frameworks of 
analysis were applied to the KRV cases. Several observations and conclusions were 
reached concerning the nature and contributions to social transactional costs, and path 
dependencies of identified institutions respectively. Tables 7.4 (a to c) summarised 
the qualitative valuations of the transactional costs (and lack thereof) to contributions 
towards the process of development for each of the social systems investigated in the 
KRV. Based on the valuations, Saleth’s (2004) evolutionary framework was used to 
identify institutions whose long histories signalled their robustness and dominances 
overtime alongside their important contributions towards social costs. In Table 7.5 
and Figure 7.2, the findings were summarised.  
 
These findings not only provided a historical presentation for an understanding of an 
institutional picture from the KRV, but they also provided a framework for designing 
policy intervention tools, based on qualitative research with objectives of promoting 
economic development. Moreover and relevant to the primary argument of the thesis, 
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the findings provide a framework for presenting formalised questions and designing 
tools for further quantitative research. A detailed presentation of implications for 
policy, based on the current research, is presented in chapter eight. A framework for 
designing and illustrating an appropriate and meaningful place for an application of 
formal tools founded on institutional work (as proposed in chapter one for the main 
argument in the thesis) is presented in section 7.5.  
 
A comprehensive understanding of institutions, which was outlined in preceding 
sections and was summarised in various tables would most definitely provide a policy 
maker with a useful framework as a substrate to formulate socially appropriate 
policies to intervene in each of the KRV systems for development purposes. 
Following North’s (1992) proposals for an encouragement to sustain institutions, 
which minimise social and economic transaction costs, it should be easy to realise that 
effective policy interventions in the KRV would, among other possibilities: 
a) Prioritise the Upper KRV, and the case of water allocations (among farmers) 
in the establishment of economically sound institutional arrangements. The 
most costly institutions were found to be in these two cases, with ranking 
points well above the mean values.  
b) In the case of emerging Upper KRV farmers, public policy would have to 
target the informal institutions in attempts to overhaul or eliminate socially 
costly practices, for instance the lack of compliance with collectively agreed 
upon rules like business constitutions.  
c)  In the case of water allocations, most of the formal rules applicable to current 
water resources distributions (which also stem from past water and land 
policies) were socially costly and economically inefficient. Hence, it should 
not be surprising that the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) 
was in the process of implementing the National Water Act (NWA, 36 of 
1998) during the time of research (Lotz-Sisitka and Burt, 2006).  
d) Once again, the case of black citrus farmers illustrated that the most socially 
costly institutions in the KRV were the informal unwritten ones. Hence, policy 
interventions could be directed at creating incentives to reduce corrupt 
dispositions and to relocate the former farm labourers from the citrus farm 
units in order to achieve higher productivity levels and to eliminate the inter-
group conflicts. 
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These are only some of the policy implications specifically based on the 
investigations of the KRV cases. What is also important for policy formulation is an 
understanding that the implementation of solutions would have to be holistic, 
targeting the most crucial aspects of the social costs, which are highlighted from the 
preceding discussions and summaries. However, it is likely that for policy 
considerations too many institutional variables were highlighted, especially in section 
7.2, with high budgetary implications for interventions. Therefore, an understanding 
of the historical origins and robustness of institutional factors, which were presented 
in section 7.3, should provide further insight in strategies aimed at cost effective 
interventions. Table 7.5, provided not only the relative histories of dominant 
institutions, but also the extent of their effects on each of the case studies. A well 
thought out strategy therefore would be one that accounts for these histories, extent of 
effect on systems over and above the positive and/or negative transactional cost 
contributions of each institutional variable.  
 
From the discussion of potential policy interventions, a broad understanding of how 
such policies could be identified, formulated and implemented is achievable. A more 
accurate understanding of budgetary implications, however, could still be attained 
through additional quantitative research. The quantitative research would only have 
meaning, however, if it were firmly grounded (and therefore only valid and 
economically significant) on the institutional findings presented thus far. Otherwise, 
any formal applications of quantitative economic tools conducted without a strong 
institutional base would have the shortcomings of the nature presented in the 
criticisms levelled against formal economic methods, which were discussed in chapter 
three. To reiterate these critical sentiments in the words of Coase (1998:73): such 
formal economic exercises only “become the study of blood circulation without a 
body”. In that analogy, the economists’ box of formal tools would only form ‘the 
study of the blood circulation’, while the institutional foundations as presented for the 
KRV in this research would form the ‘body’. An illustrative review of selected 
economic studies with these inherent shortcomings is presented in section 7.6. 
 
Therefore, with all the debates and arguments presented in previous chapters and 
theoretical postulations made in the present chapter, the following section presents the 
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appropriate framework for conducting economic research, based on institutional 
investigations. In line with the primary objective of the thesis, which was presented in 
chapter one, the following section presents that important and logical interface 
between institutional and formal economic tools and its illustrative application. The 
framework demonstrates that the debates and seemingly opposing views between the 
various schools of thought, which were reviewed in chapter three, would be menial if 
the contributions of institutional investigations to economic research and 
methodology were understood within an appropriate context. The usefulness of 
formal methods in economic research should be that of a validating nature to the 
qualitative and institutional findings. Formal methods should provide institutional 
conclusions with quantitatively derived evidence. Moreover, one other benefit from 
such research would be a quantitative estimation of public budgetary costs required 
for appropriate policy interventions.  
 
7.5 A FRAMEWORK FOR HOLISTIC ECONOMIC RESEARCH  
 
It was argued throughout the current chapter that institutional investigations should 
form the foundations on which formal research tools could be employed. The 
discussions in sections 7.2 and 7.3 provided these institutional foundations. The 
generic formal econometric methodology (e.g. Gujarati, 2003:3-14), on the other 
hand, proposes that researchers should start the research process by postulating a 
statement of theory or hypothesis for investigation. However, the present discussion 
proposes that such advice is mainly relevant in physical scientific research, in social 
science (which includes economics), it is highly difficult (if not impossible) to 
formulate a meaningful hypothesis concerning dynamic social systems that are not 
institutionally understood. Hypotheses about social and economic behaviour as well 
as relationships between socio-economic variables can only be discovered from the 
findings of institutional investigations. They cannot be conjured up even from the 
brilliant minds that have not been adequately exposed to social systems under 
investigations. For example, the findings, which were summarised in Tables 7.4 (a to 
c) and 7.5, would be most suitable for enabling a discovery pf hypotheses that could 
be formally or statistically investigated in a manner that is depicted in the shaded 
interface column of Figure 7.2. The figure illustrates the methods of research that are 
most appropriate for social science investigations. To a degree the proposal seems 
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similar to some of the criticisms labelled against the new classical economics 
presented by institutionalists like Evensky (2004) in chapter three. The difference, 
however, is that those arguments did not provide a theoretical framework, which 
clearly specifies the meaningful roles, in a methodological sequence, of institutional 
and formal methods in economic research processes. The framework with primarily 
linearly depicted stages (and possible feedback loops) for economic research is 
illustrated in Figure 7.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 The institutional-neoclassical economic research methodology interface 
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The figure illustrates the proposition of a holistic research process, which integrates 
institutional and formal economic methods. Moving from column A on the left hand 
side, an economic researcher identifies social systems (e.g. the case of black citrus 
farmers) with particular socio-economic attributes for an institutional investigation 
within a geographical space (e.g. the Kat River Valley). Various methods of data 
collection and analysis (for instance case study methods) are chosen and then used, 
which leads to a presentation of institutional findings similar to those presented and 
summarised in sections 7.2 and 7.3 and relevant tables and figures. From discussions 
and analysis of the findings from institutional data, qualitative conclusions and 
recommendations are reached for policy considerations. Depending on the theoretical 
needs and further policy requirements, institutional findings are then used to 
formulate the various hypothetical questions, which need to be further investigated 
using appropriately chosen formal tools for quantitative investigations. It is important 
to note that at this point of the research process the hypothetical questions are readily 
identifiable from the findings of institutional investigations in column D of Figure 7.3. 
They do not exist in a researcher’s mind as implicated in some economic research 
recommendations (e.g. Gujarati, 2003:3-14). Depending on the nature of formal 
questions that need to be answered, appropriate tools are chosen from what Coase 
(1998:73) calls ‘a box of economic formal tools’ for quantitative research methods. 
These methods include the Cost Benefit Analysis, Contingent Valuation studies, 
Regression model specification, etc. Hence a move from column C to E in Figure 7.2 
depicts a transition from qualitative to quantitative research methods for specific 
research questions and policy needs. The interface between the two types of methods 
is depicted in column D. Moreover, a continuous dialogue between the various 
research findings, theories and methods is also illustrated by the feedback arrows, 
which connect the various columns in the figure. The connections imply that even 
though the research process is predominantly linear, it also acknowledges a presence 
of a number of dynamic features in real social research. 
 
In an illustration of a possible departure and transition from the institutional findings, 
which were presented in preceding sections 7.2 and 7.3, to an application of formal 
methods, selected findings from Table 7.5 could be used to formulate a research 
hypothesis. The next subsection uses an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) regression 
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model to investigate the effects of ownership of private land rights on economic 
development status.  
 
The ANOVA illustration uses cross-sectional data from the 2004 KRV’s household 
survey, one of whose questions required the heads of households to indicate whether 
or not they were in possession of a private land title deed (refer to Appendix 19). 
Their responses were either ‘yes’ or ‘no’, with coding of ‘1’ or a ‘0’, which means the 
variable is a dummy. A research statement for investigation is posed in the next sub-
section 7.5.1.  
 
7.5.1 The possession of private land rights leads to a higher status of economic 
development 
 
To investigate whether or not the statement is true for the purposes of this 
investigation, a higher state of economic development for individuals could be 
defined as possessing, among many other important attributes, a higher level of 
income earnings and years of formal education. Since the holders of land title deeds 
are normally the heads of households, the present investigation is limited to these 
members (n =192)88 from the 2004 KRV sample (Appendix 19).  
 
For purposes of simplicity the formal investigation is divided into two parts. The 
effects of possessing private land rights on average levels of income earnings are 
separated from an investigation of the rights’ effects on the years of formal education. 
Separate linear functions for the two variables are specified89. 
 
The formal statement for average incomes of heads 
 
The average income levels (μ1) of household heads, which possess land rights (n = 
52) are higher than those (μ2) who do not possess them (n = 125): 
H0: μ1 = or < μ2 
                                                 
88 Not all of the 192 heads answered the questions, which is indicated by the number of respondents 
reported in each of the regression analyses. For example n=52 for heads with rights and n= 125 for 
those without rights. 
 
89 The same statistical observations could have been achieved either by looking at scatter diagrams or 
by exploring the relevant means, without specifying the equations. But for illustrative purposes of the 
use of regression linear models, including multi variable models, the equations are specified.     
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H1: μ1 > μ2 
 
The null hypothesis will be rejected if μ1 > μ2 and the difference between the means 
is statistically significant at a specified level of confidence. If the second condition is 
not met the possibility that H0 may be true in another KRV sample cannot be rejected. 
 
 
A specification of the ANOVA model for the formal question is: 
 
INCi = β1 + β2 LANi + ui……………………………(eqn. 1) 
 
Where: 
INCi = average income earning levels of heads of households 
β1 = constant 
β2 = the coefficient of the dummy variable if the heads possess private land rights  
(i.e. LANi=1) 
LANi = dummy variable, indicating the (non) possession of land rights  
ui= error term 
 
Assuming that the error term satisfies the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumptions, 
the estimates of the means (income earning averages of the two groups) are as 
follows: 
E (INCi|LANi=1) = β1 + β2              (heads with land rights) 
E (INCi|LANi=0) = β1                      (heads without land rights) 
 
The formal statements for average years of formal education of heads 
 
The average years of formal education (μ3) of heads, which possess land rights are 
higher than the averages (μ4) of those who do not possess them: 
H0: μ3 = or < μ4 
H1: μ3 > μ4 
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The null hypothesis will be rejected if μ3 > μ4 and the difference between the means 
is statistically significant. Again if the second condition is not met the possibility that 
H0 may be true for another KRV sample cannot be rejected. 
 
 
A specification of the ANOVA model for the question is: 
 
EDUj = β3 + β4 LANj + νj……………………………(eqn. 2) 
Where: 
EDUj = average years of formal education of heads 
β3 = constant 
β4 = coefficient of the dummy variable if the heads possess private land rights (i.e. 
LANj = 1) 
LANj: the dummy variable indicating the (non) possession of land rights 
νj = error term 
 
Again, assuming that the error term satisfies the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
assumptions the estimates of the means (average years of formal education of the two 
groups) are as follows: 
 
E (EDUj|LANj = 1) = β3 + β4 
E (EDUj|LANj = 0) = β3 
 
The results of regressing eqn. 1 and test of significance of mean difference  
 
For: INCi = β1 + β2LANi + ui…………………………………(eqn. 1) 
 
The estimated results: 
INCi = 411 + 344 (LANi = 1)  
i.e. β1 = 411 and β2 = 344 
 
Hence:  
             the mean incomes earnings of heads with rights: 
           = E (INCi|LANi = 1) = β1 + β2= R756, and 
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            the mean income earnings of heads without: 
           = E (INCi|LANi = 0) = β1 = R411 
 
From the estimated means, which indicate that the hypothesis that the average income 
earnings of heads with land rights is greater than for those without the rights (R756> 
R411, i.e. μ1 > μ2) is true. However, the null hypothesis (i.e. H0: μ1 = or < μ2) can 
only be rejected if the difference between the two means is statistically significant 
within a specified 90% confidence interval.  
 
The output estimates corresponding to β1 and β2: 
INCi  =                          β1                             +                                   β2  (LANi  = 1)  
Std. error:                (100.4212)                                                       (185.2722) 
t:                              (4.1)                                                                    (1.86)  
p values                  (0.0000)                                                              (0.065) 
 
From the computation results, the mean difference is statistically significant with the 
p-value lower than 0.10, in a one-tail test. The implication is that the null hypothesis 
can be rejected at a 90% probability. In any case, even though from the 2004 KRV 
sample the average incomes of heads with land rights was higher than those without 
(i.e. H1), there still remained a 6.5% chance that in another KRV sample the means of 
average income earnings of heads with land rights might be equal to or lower than μ2 
(i.e. H0) and in this case R411. The point once again illustrates the assertion by 
McCloskey (1985) that the test of significance is a sampling challenge and not of 
economic significance or even the validity of the model specification, which she 
argued some researchers believe to be the case. In the case of the KRV survey, a 
bigger sample would most likely reduce the 6.5% probability of the null hypothesis 
being true by allowing a higher confidence interval (e.g. 95 to 99 %) in which the 
estimates may be significant90. 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 McCloskey (2008) noted that perhaps the turbulent history of South Africa and the relatively short 
period (of several years) in which this study was completed, could have blurred these findings. In good 
50 years time, perhaps, the true effects of missing land tenure would be even more readily observable 
also by using statistical methods.        
 212
The results of regressing eqn. 2 and test of significance of mean difference  
 
EDUj = β3 + β4 LANj + νj……………………………..………………(eqn. 2) 
 
The estimated results: 
EDUj = 8+0.96 (LANj = 1)  
i.e. β3 = 8 years and β4 = 0.96 years 
 
Hence: the mean years of formal education of heads with rights: 
             = E (EDUj|LANj = 1) = β3 + β4 = 8.96 years, and 
            the mean years of formal education of heads without rights: 
           = E (EDUj|LANj = 0) = β3=8 years 
 
From the mean estimates the hypothesis that the average years of formal education of 
heads with land rights are higher than those without (i.e. H1: μ3 > μ 4) is true for the 
KRV sample (i.e. 8.96 > 8 years). However, once again the null hypothesis (i.e. H0: 
μ3 = or < μ4) can only be rejected if the difference between the two means is 
statistically significant within some specified confidence interval.  
 
The computed estimates corresponding to β3 and β4: 
 
EDUj =                       β3                                 +                               β2 (LANj = 1)  
Std. error:             (0.5706)                                                             (0.3061) 
t:                              (1.69)                                                                (1.69)  
p values                 0.0000)                                                               (0.093) 
 
From the estimates, the mean difference is again statistically significant at a 90% 
confidence interval with the p-value lower than 0.10, in a one-tail test. With regard to 
the mean years of formal education there still remained a 9.3% chance that in another 
KRV sample the means of years of formal education of heads with land rights (μ4) 
might be equal to or lower than μ3 (i.e. H0). 
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Implications of the discussion 
 
The preceding interrogation of the 2004 KRV survey data was simple and 
straightforward because it served as an illustration of one of the many possible formal 
procedures that could be employed when analysing quantitative data. The chosen 
model specifications were simple and only used a single dummy variable for 
explanation purposes. However, according to the institutional findings in sections 7.2 
and 7.3, the explanatory variable (i.e. private land tenure) was very dominant with 
regard to its valuated transactional costs. Hence the decision to analyse its impacts on 
the chosen determinants of economic development was economically significant. The 
negative impacts of insecurity of tenure on the process of development were reflected 
in lower income earning powers as well as in acquisition of formal education by heads 
of households. These effects were most robust with regard to incomes as they ensured 
that the average earning powers of heads, which were not in possession of land rights 
were almost half of those who held such rights. More importantly however, the 
illustration indicated the usefulness of relying on institutional data in formulating 
economically significant hypothetical questions and how the outputs from formal 
research should be able to validate and/or enhance an understanding of institutional 
factors. In the following section, evidence from case study reviews is presented to 
show how formal research, which lacks an adequate institutional foundation, could 
lead to socially costly and sometimes meaningless conclusions to policymaking. 
 
7.6 COMPARATIVE CASE REVIEWS 
 
In the preceding section an integrated research framework for conducting economic 
research was presented with an illustration of how formal tools could be used to 
complement institutional findings. Throughout the thesis it has been argued that the 
use of formal tools offers little social and policy meaning if hypothetical questions for 
investigation are not informed by institutional findings in the manner similar to one 
presented in section 7.5. To further support the argument, two recent agricultural 
studies in developing country contexts, which were heavily based on quantitative 
analytical tools and a glaring dearth of institutional grounding, are reviewed with their 
policy limitations outlined.  
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7.6.1 Review of a study on the land reform policy in Zimbabwe 
 
In a journal paper entitled ‘A quantitative analysis of Zimbabwe’s land reform policy: 
An application of Zimbabwe SAM multipliers’, Juana (2006) applied a formal 
treatment to one of the most contentious economic research questions in southern 
Africa. A review of the paper’s methods, conclusions and policy recommendations, 
however, points out a number of methodological shortcomings and hence policy 
dangers inherent in mostly purely mathematical approaches to research subjects, 
which are as complex as the political and economy-wide systems found in developing 
countries like Zimbabwe.  
 
In an attempt to indicate and quantify the costs and benefits associated with the land 
reform process in Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2003, the paper exclusively explored 
quantitative data from secondary sources like the Central Statistics Office (CSO, 
1998) of Zimbabwe and employed a modified version of the Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) used by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPR) 
(Baustista and Thomas, 2000). The aim of the research was to investigate the 
hypothetical effects of a government policy transfer of land resources from mostly 
white and large-scale commercial farmers to mostly black and small-scale farmers 
since Zimbabwe’s political independence in 1980. From the results, conclusions were 
drawn and policy recommendations offered with regard to the following variable 
effects: 
a) Agricultural output from all land resources in specified time periods, 
b) Gross value added, i.e. output minus immediate consumption, representing 
“payments to the factors of production, which include wages, rents on land and 
interest/profits on capital” (Juana, 2006:305), and 
c) Household income generation at a farm unit level. 
 
In 1980 Zimbabwe had a skewed distribution of income and land ownership, with 
eighty and twenty four percent of land resources in the hands of the state and large 
scale commercial farmers respectively. Hence one of the aims of Zimbabwe’s land 
reform process was to resettle around 162000 families onto 8.3 million hectares of 
land. The majority of the land resources targeted for resettlements would be bought 
from large-scale farmers within a market framework of ‘the willing buyer-willing 
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seller’. However, in 1997, almost twenty years after the formulation of the policy, 
only 71 000 families had been resettled onto 3.6 million hectares signalling the 
emergence of the well documented economic and political crises facing the reform 
process in Zimbabwe. In Table 7.6 the slow redistribution is illustrated for various 
land categories. The table shows that only twenty three percent (in bold) of transfers 
had been achieved from large-scale commercial farmers.  
 
 
Table 7.6 Land distribution at and after independence  
Land category 1980 
(million ha) 
1997 
(million ha) 
Increase/decrease 
in land 
(million ha) 
Percentage change 
Communal areas 
Resettlement areas 
Smallholder areas 
Large scale commercial areas 
State farms 
National parks, wild life and 
urban settlements 
16.4 
0.0 
1.0 
14.8 
0.3 
6.0 
 
16.4 
3.6 
1.1 
11.3 
0.1 
6.0 
0.0 
3.6 
0.1 
-3.5 
-0.2 
0.0 
0 
- 
- 
23.68 
66.7 
0 
Total 38.5 38.5 0 0 
(Adapted from CSO in Juana, 2006:297) 
 
The most cited reason by government for the failure of the reform process was the 
non willingness of commercial farmers to sell at prices offered by the state, which 
farmers claimed were below market prices (Juana, 2006). In essence this is an 
indication of a breakdown of the ‘willing buyer willing seller’ market framework, 
which was adopted to enable the process.  
 
Nonetheless, the paper attempts to identify the economic impacts with regard to the 
outlined variables from the reform process, given the following assumptions (or 
hypothetical cases) for a computational experimentation of the SAM: 
a) A case where the resettlement programme was successfully implemented, with 
8.3 million hectares transferred from large scale commercial farmers, 
however, with compensation amounts lower than fair market prices as 
determined in the model, 
b)  An actual case, where only 3.5 million hectares of land (i.e. twenty three 
percent in Table 7.6) were transferred to smallholders in 1997. It is assumed, 
however, that this transfer occurred at lower than market prices.  
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c) A simulation where cases (a) and (b) were repeated with fair and adequate 
compensations for commercial farmers, offered by the state as well as outside 
agencies. 
 
To determine the hypothetical net benefits of the reform process from the four 
scenarios, the paper employed the SAM multipliers and used the material balance 
equation91 from Sadoulet and De Janvry (1995) and Baustista et al. (2002) cited in 
Juana (2006). From the computational results the paper had the following 
conclusions about the land reform process in Zimbabwe: 
a) Output could increase if commercial large-scale farmers were adequately 
compensated and in cases where they were not fairly compensated output 
would decrease. In cases where adequate compensation was offered, an overall 
increase in output was observed. On the other hand, with or without adequate 
compensation, a decrease in output for large-scale farmers was observed 
against an increase for small-scale agriculture. However, in the case where 
there was adequate compensation an overall net increase was observed, 
b) The gross value added showed a net increase to varying degrees for all the 
case scenarios. However, without adequate compensation, the labour and 
capital components showed a net decrease in the value added. These 
components showed a positive net increase for adequate compensation, 
whereas the land component to value added showed a net increase in all case 
scenarios. 
c) A net increase in household incomes was observed for all case scenarios, 
however, with negative impacts on large-scale farmer’s incomes. The 
conclusion from this simulation was that the land reform process, in its current 
and ideal form, has the potential to improve households’ welfare, i.e. the gains 
outweighed the losses irrespective of whether the large scale farmers were 
adequately compensated or not. The net benefits were only larger in cases with 
fair compensation. 
 
The computer-simulated results were mostly positive for the land reform process, even 
in its present status where commercial farmers were not compensated for state 
                                                 
91 Y1 = AY1 + F, where Y1 is an nx1 column vector of total sectoral output, A an n x n matrix of direct 
technical coefficients for endogenous factors and F an nx1 column vector of final demand.  
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acquired land resources. Hence, in the light of the huge economic challenges facing 
Zimbabwe, especially beginning from the year 2000 and mostly stemming from its 
land reform policies, these findings are astonishing. Some of the reported economic 
challenges in the last seven years show that the Zimbabwean economy has contracted 
by more than forty percent, the average farm workers’ wage has decreased to under 
US$ 5.00 per month, inflation has increased by more than 3000 percent, there is zero 
direct foreign investment, price controls have been imposed on all agricultural 
products, the unemployment rate has increased to an estimated eighty percent, etc. 
(CIA, 2007). Hence to have research findings indicating that there are a great number 
of economically positive impacts associated with the land reform policy process 
should a huge worry for economic research in general.  
 
Nevertheless, in what appears to be an after thought remark, the research’s concluding 
paragraphs placed the blame and responsibility for the country’s economic challenges, 
squarely on, a) the commercial farmers’ unwillingness to sell their most productive 
land areas to the state, and b) the governments’ transfers of acquired land resources to 
corrupt officials. The conclusions were made without any reference to in-depth 
investigation of these institutional factors. Moreover, the land reform challenges were 
not reported as having had the dire economic consequences, which are reported from 
various quarters.  
 
The study failed to mention or factor in any institutional and/or historical impacts in 
reaching the results and conclusions. There was no investigation of the political and 
social factors, which have had a significant bearing on the actual outcomes of 
Zimbabwe’s land reform process and current economic conditions. No investigations 
were reported about the actual micro-economic and farming activities or institutional 
practices on the reported twenty three percent of acquired farm land resources. There 
were no investigations or mention of how other related agricultural policies have 
affected the land reform process, for example the agricultural trade and marketing 
policies. Therefore it should not be a surprise that what seem to be a set of absurd 
conclusions have been reached by the research. The review illustrates and reiterates 
the validity of arguments put forth by institutional economists (e.g. Coase, 1998) 
about the potentially meaningless applications of formal tools (without ‘the 
institutional body’) in economic research. As argued throughout the thesis and 
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illustrated in the last two sections; the application of formal tools in economic 
research should and can only be useful within an institutionally informed foundation. 
In the case of Zimbabwe’s land reform policy investigations, the integrated research 
framework, which was presented in the present chapter, would have been the most 
suited and sensible approach.  
 
7.6.2 A review of a study of the productivity effects of farming techniques in the 
former homeland of Bophuthatswana  
 
A review of a paper entitled “Quantifying the impact of in-field rainwater harvesting 
(IRWH) production techniques on household food security for communal farmers in 
Thaba Nchu, Free State Province” by Baiphethi et al., (2006), offers additional 
support and insight into the research methods proposed in the thesis. The paper 
claimed to contribute technical knowledge by proposing more efficient irrigation 
techniques to increase the levels of production in subsistence farming conducted in 
semi arid villages in Thaba Nchu (58 km east of Bloemfontein). Some of the history 
and institutions of the Thaba Nchu villages are similar to those of the KRV, in the 
sense that in the 1970s to 1980s they also formed part of a homeland system. In this 
case it was the former government of Bophuthatswana in the Orange Free State 
province. Nevertheless, the study’s proposed harvesting techniques were said to 
improve water availability, which then increased production outputs to improve the 
levels of food security for farming households.  
 
The research approach and methods used in the study were largely scientific. To 
prove that various forms of IRWH techniques indeed contributed to poverty reduction 
and improved food security, the study defined and specified a number of variables for 
investigation. In broad terms the variables explored the required levels of household 
incomes per year, which would enable an average household to achieve its food 
security requirements. From the breakdown of household incomes, minimum amounts 
of land areas, which would be required for the implementation of a particular type of 
IRWH technique, were defined. The extrapolated conclusions on the contributions of 
various IRWH techniques to food security in the villages were based on test site 
observations, which investigated the levels at which crop production output levels 
increased per implementation of seven different techniques. The increases in crop 
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production were then linked to estimated household incomes in the villages to reach 
the conclusions. 
 
The study formally defined the Average Household Adult Equivalent (ADEQ) as 
follows: 
 
ADEQ = (A +0.5C)0.9 ……………………………………………………………..(1) 
 
Where A and C represented the number of adults and children in the household 
(Aliber in Baipheti et al., 2006:284). From the ADEQ, the household’s income 
requirement for a year to secure food security was formally defined as: 
 
HHIRy = ADMIR *ADEQ*12……………………………………………….…(2) 
 
Where ADMIR was the adult monthly income requirement estimate for rural South 
Africa (May in Baipheth et al., 2006:284).  
 
Two assumptions were made: 
 a) The total amount of household’s yearly incomes in the villages, came from various 
sources like, crop and livestock sales, wage income from non-farming activities, 
remittances and social grants, and  
b) The minimum area of land, which would be required for the IRWH, would equal 
the difference between HHIRy and incomes from other sources (HIos) divided by the 
average per hectare income from production of a typical crop mix in these villages. 
 
Meaning that: 
 
Wm = (HHIRy – HIos)/ FIcm………………………………………………..(3) 
Where 
Wm:       Minimum area of land required 
HHIRy: Household income required per year 
HIos:     Household income from other sources 
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FIcm:    Net farm income from typical crop mix92 
 
From a 2001 demographic survey the villages’ average household sizes and incomes 
from other sources were estimated and these are presented in Table 7.7. 
 
Table 7.7 Socio economic characteristics of an average household in the study area, 
2001  
Household characteristics Average values 
Household size 
Adults 
Children 
Adult equivalent 
5 
2 
3 
3 
Income sources In Rands 
Adult income requirement (per month) 
Household income requirement (per year) 
Social grants (per month) 
Remittances (per month) 
Total off farm income (per year) 
353 
12 539 
328 
236 
6 767 
(Source: Baiphethi et al., 2006:287)  
 
The study also assumed that to afford and/or achieve the required levels of nutrition, 
estimated at 2500 kilocalories per day per adult (Hoddinott in Baiphethi et al., 2006), 
an average income of R12 539 per year had to be obtained by an average household. 
The assumptions enabled researchers to estimate areas of land that would be required, 
firstly for farming using conventional methods, and subsequently for farming using 
the various IRWH techniques, which are illustrated in Table 7.8. The land areas 
would be determined by the differences between incomes from others sources (off 
farm) against incomes required from farming activities in order to achieve the average 
HHIRy levels and the required kilocalories per day per adult.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
92 A crop mix of maize (40%), sunflower (30%) and dry beans (30%) was assumed in the test. 
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Table 7.8 Minimum area of land required to ensure food security for an average 
household in the study area for different production     
Type of techniques93 Minimum area based on 
income (HHIRy) 
requirement (ha) 
Minimum area based on 
caloric (nutrition) 
requirement (ha) 
1. Conventional farming 
2. BbBr 
3. ObBr 
4. ObOr 
5. SbOr 
6. SbSr 
7. ObSr 
11.49 
5.18 
4.87 
3.64 
3.51 
3.37 
3.21 
8.45 
3.02 
2.84 
2.12 
2.05 
1.97 
1.87 
(Source: Baiphethi et al., 2006:289)  
 
From Table 7.8 the introduction of the each type of IRWH technique reduces the 
required size of land for farming to achieve the required levels of HHIRy and 
nutrition per household. The effects from more efficient techniques are progressively 
greater relative those less efficient, for example in terms of both HHIRy and nutrition 
the ObSr technique (7) is by more efficient than the BbBr technique (1). The 
discrepancy in terms of required land areas to achieve the income (HHIRy) versus 
caloric (nutrition) requirements, however, could not be easily explained by the study. 
Nonetheless, the research concluded that:  
a) The IRWH techniques remarkably reduced the amounts of land requirement 
for cultivation by average households to meet their food requirements,  
b)  Where other sources of incomes were available to households, the caloric 
estimates were relevant, and  
c) The impact of social grants and remittances on land requirements were also 
important because these sources contributed more that fifty percent to total 
household incomes (refer to Table 7.7). Hence their removal would mean that 
more land resources would be required for cultivation to meet adequate levels 
of food security, however land resources may be scarce. 
 
                                                 
93 BbBr is mulch bare basins and bare runoff area, ObBr is organic mulch in the basins and bare runoff 
area, ObOr is organic mulch in the basins and organic mulch in the runoff area, SbOr is stone mulch in 
the basin and organic mulch in the runoff area, SbSr is stone mulch in the basins and runoff area, and 
ObSr is organic mulch in the basins and stone mulch in the runoff area.  
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On the surface, the conclusions appear quite reasonable based on the methods adopted 
in the study. However, a number of criticisms need to be discussed. Throughout the 
study, the research methods were confined at an experimental level. The confinement 
would prove problematic if the results and conclusions were to inform public policy 
implementation purposes. The assumptions made with regard to the general crop 
production mixes in the villages, which are forty percent maize, thirty percent 
sunflower, and beans, without actually conducting research to determine the mixes 
may prove to be a source of serious inaccuracies in the estimated values presented in 
Table 7.7 and 7.8 and the conclusions that were reached. The fact that the study was 
unable to explain the discrepancies between land requirement estimates for incomes 
(HHIRy) versus calories (nutrition), with respect to Table 7.8 results, should be 
worrying in terms of the applicability of results. In fact the discrepancies may have 
flown from a number of inaccurate assumptions, which were made by researchers 
from the various conclusions from secondary studies cited throughout the research, 
for example the poverty line estimates (May in Baiphethi et al., 2006) and daily 
caloric requirements values for adults (Hoddinott in Baiphethi et al., 2006).  
 
In her critical discussion of the misapplication of formal and statistical methods in 
economics, McCloskey (1985) quipped that if economists were so smart how come 
they were not as equally rich? The point, like Coase’s (1998) criticism of economics 
as having become a study of a blood circulation without the body, is aimed at 
illustrating the dangers of conducting experimental research that offers little insight 
into the actual economy. Experimental tests “show that certain equations describing a 
certain blackboard economy (or problem) have a solution, but they do not give the 
solution to the…extent economy” (McCloskey’s, 1990b:12). There is no evidence of 
research conducted in the study illustrating that the conclusions reached in the test 
experiments were readily applicable to the Thaba Nchu villages for which the study 
was formulated in the first place. No evidence is provided signalling that an 
understanding of the farming history and institutional factors that govern the activity 
was sought before and/or after the research was conducted to ground the mathematical 
results. Hence, whether or not the techniques, for whose efficiency improvements 
were so eloquently argued, would be understood even prior to being implemented by 
the villagers remains an unanswered serious question for the study and policy makers. 
It is not known whether the ‘experimental’ techniques would in fact complement or 
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be in conflict with the dominant farming practices in the Thaba Nchu villages. 
Answers to these questions would be crucial if the results were to be adopted for 
policy considerations, which often require high public budgets. In the end, due to the 
non-researched political and institutional factors, the attempts at implementing the 
techniques proposed by the study may prove to be more costly than efficient.  
 
The primary argument presented here, however, should be interpreted as implying 
that the study results could not be useful to policy by any means. Since the study has 
already been conducted, a supporting follow up study could be conducted to 
investigate the real life application of the advocated techniques in selected villages. 
The process would not only determine whether a broad public policy adoption of the 
techniques presented by Baiphethi et al. (2006) would be necessary in achieving food 
security, but it would also determine or map out (admittedly as an after effect) an 
institutional framework ripe for the adoption of similar techniques in well understood 
social contexts. The research possibility further illustrates the circularity of the 
research method framework, which has been proposed in the thesis and illustrated in 
Figure 7.3.  
 
7.7 THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DEBATES ON METHODS 
 
From the discussion and analysis of the KRV institutions as well as the presentation 
of an integrated research framework in this chapter it is clear that the thesis has 
embraced the ‘new’ institutionalism over the ‘old’. In line with arguments made by 
North (1992:3) that “in contrast to the many earlier attempts to overturn or replace 
neoclassical theory (for example Veblen, 1904) the new institutional economics 
builds on, modifies and extends (the) theory to permit it to come to grips and deal 
with an entire range of issues heretofore beyond its ken”. The proposed framework for 
economic research does not discard the importance and usefulness of some of the 
philosophical underpinnings of the new classical economics with its formal models. It 
ameliorates their position instead. Most institutionalists have correctly argued that it is 
the misuse of formal or mathematical methods, for example the specification of 
regression models and axiom and proofs in economic social systems that have led to 
methodological discrepancies and exclusion of the discipline of economics from the 
social science inquiry (Evensky, 2004:197-211 and McCloskey, 1990b:1127-1130). 
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The institutionalist contention, however, does not mean that sensible formalisations of 
substantive economic thoughts or arguments should be replaced by non-rigorous 
methods, which is incorrectly argued by Weintraub (2006).  
 
What has been the challenge to institutional and to new classical economic thought is 
finding a unifying theory. Such a challenge was explicitly admitted by Williamson 
(2000:595) when he confessed that economists in general have remained ignorant 
about institutions. He also remarked that even though the past quarter century had 
witnessed enormous progress in the study of institutions, the sub-discipline, however, 
still awaited a unified theoretical framework acknowledging of pluralism, where such 
a theory would contribute to economics’ reintegration to social science. As a 
contribution to the search for this theory, the thesis has presented a unifying 
methodological framework for economic research, which in a primarily linear manner 
specifies the relative positions and contributions of institutional as well as formal 
methods to dynamic and holistic research endeavours. Admittedly, the framework has 
deliberately afforded a foundational importance to institutional work. However, the 
position and importance of axiomatisation in economic arguments have been clearly 
identified and as a result their value in social and political discourse has been much 
enhanced.  
 
The implications of the framework regarding economic research methodology are 
straightforward. Most of the reviewed debates pertaining to methods especially 
between the ‘new’ institutional and classical economic writers are of a serious nature. 
It is true that the neglect of and ignorance about institutions in some economic 
research activities, for example those reviewed in the last section, have contributed to 
methodological murkiness and discrepancies in mainstream economics. The results 
from such research have often led to socially costly public policy actions. However, 
the costs have not risen because of the non-importance of the use of formal tools. 
What is evident is that some economic studies do not intelligently use formal tools 
within an understanding of the most appropriate institutional factors. Therefore, what 
has been a recurring and primary conclusion from this research is that there cannot be 
any significant economic research that could intelligently claim to have a meaningful 
social contribution, especially towards improving development prospects, without a 
strong institutional foundation. Hence, the integrated framework presented earlier in 
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the chapter encourages an avoidance of methodological discrepancies and consequent 
policy errors that may arise from research that is ignorant about the roles of 
institutions. In the following chapter a summary of the main policy implications at a 
national and local levels from the discussions and analyses of preceding chapters are 
carefully outlined.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT – SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO POLICY 
AND RESEARCH 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the opening chapter it was discussed that since the early 1970s many African 
countries have experienced chronic levels of poverty and that the explanations given 
for the food crises are varied and present a complex web of factors. Numerous public 
policy attempts in the form of agricultural projects aimed at curbing the food crises, in 
both Africa and other developing countries, have also been marred with repeated 
policy failures (Eicher, 1999:10-11). With regard to economic research activities and 
subsequent policy formulation, which are aimed at alleviating the high levels of 
poverty, the thesis argued and demonstrated that a lack of adequate investigations into 
institutional factors has immensely contributed to some of the failures in searches of 
the right solutions. The history of South Africa’s agricultural sector and policies 
together with case studies from the Kat River Valley (KRV) in the Eastern Cape were 
used in presenting evidence to support that argument. In addition, the thesis developed 
a framework to conduct economic research, which enables an integration of 
institutional investigations to be used as an appropriate foundation upon which 
formalised research questions could be based. This chapter presents the most pertinent 
implications of the research work to public policy formulation processes at national 
and local levels, and concludes by reiterating the primary thesis argument with its 
implication for future research in the sector.  
 
In section two, the research implications for national policy with regard to the 
marketing of agricultural products, the management of land and water resources are 
presented. A selected set of policy implications for the KRV are discussed in section 
three with specific reference made to the insecurity of land tenure and other 
significant institutional findings, which were presented in chapters six and seven. 
Section four presents the research implications and recommendations for future 
research in general as well as for the KRV social system in particular. Section five 
summarises the main thesis argument with a concluding note. 
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8.2 SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AT A NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
The marketing of agricultural products  
  
In chapter five it was argued that South Africa’s biggest challenge in an attempt to 
eradicate poverty and inequalities depends on the growth and improvement of the 
agricultural sector, because the majority of the poor still live in rural and undeveloped 
areas, especially of the former homelands. Three pieces of national legislation, which 
were identified as being key in government’s efforts to overcome the challenges of 
poverty and inequalities in the agricultural sector, were the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act (22 of 1994), the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act (47 of 1996) and the 
National Water Act (NWA, 36 of 1998). Among other objectives, the Acts are 
focused at improving the efficient and equitable use of the most important agricultural 
resources. Throughout the thesis it was demonstrated that because of South Africa’s 
history of institutionalised racial discrimination, the current regime of national 
legislation has to cope with huge backlogs in the redress of historical effects (refer to 
Table 5.3 in chapter five).  
 
It was discussed that the current legislation has had mixed levels of success and some 
serious failures. Even though the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act (47 of 1996) 
has led to a drop of many tariff and price controls as well as growth of agricultural 
export markets, the majority of the benefits have accrued to farmers who already had 
market access. The exclusion of ‘outsiders’, who in many cases were subsistence and 
emerging farmers, has intensified (Vink and Kirsten, 2002). It was argued that the 
unintended exclusions have been the result of oversight and ignorance about the deep 
effects of past institutional factors in current policy formulation processes. The new 
policies have not paid adequate attention to the strong and resilient negative effects 
from the old marketing institutions and the powers that they still bestow on groups 
that were historically favoured and benefited. At a micro level, the KRV cases 
demonstrated how the old marketing institutions were still robust and also 
promulgated the underdevelopment status of the excluded groups, such as subsistence 
farmers in the upper KRV. In fact ‘the lack of marketing plans and skills’ within the 
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group ranked highly on the list of dominant institutions, which contributed high costs 
to development efforts (refer to Table 7.5).  
 
As argued by a number of local economists (e.g. Vink and Kirsten, 2002, Magingxa, 
2004) effective public policies with the sole aim of not only opening up market access 
opportunities to subsistence and emerging farmers, but of creating these markets and 
of assisting farmers in utilising them should receive agent attention. Again in the 
KRV’s case of subsistence farmers it was reported that the withdrawal of extension 
officers, who were once effective in the marketing of agricultural products in the mid 
1990s, negatively affected the farmers’ efforts in recent years. Part of the reasons for 
these developments had to do with a lack of localised pool of skills. Hence, while 
direct support was being offered to emerging farmers, a large portion of the policy 
effort should also be directed at imparting the right set of skills. This would ensure 
that if at some point the state were to withdraw its direct support, say for economic 
efficiency considerations, the farmers would still remain self-reliant. The latter 
argument entails an establishment of economic incentives to ensure that paternalistic 
relationships and a culture of dependency on the state (or other external) agencies be 
avoided. Based on the discussions of the importance of local institutions, which were 
discussed in preceding chapters, the incentive structures should not be of a generic 
kind across the country if they were to work. However, context specific studies aimed 
at investigating a history of pervasive institutions should inform an identification or 
formulation of a practical set of incentive structures that would work sustainably. The 
discussion in section 8.3 of local policy implications for the KRV context further 
illustrates the point.  
 
The management of land resources  
 
The thesis demonstrated that the Restitution of Land Rights Act (22 of 1994) together 
with other related land legislation; have been faced with probably the biggest 
challenges and the worst failures in the last ten to thirteen years. For example, the 
historical negative effects of insecurity of tenure in the development status of 
communities and individuals (e.g. in the KRV) were discussed and quantified in terms 
of average income earnings and acquisition of formal education. The land market 
framework of ‘willing buyers and sellers’ is currently imbued with legal difficulties. It 
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was reported in chapter five that in recent years a number of court cases between 
commercial farmers and government agencies have increased (Independent Papers, 
2006). Conflicting claims within the land restitution process have stalled some of the 
crucial agricultural projects in various areas including the KRV (e.g. DWAF, 2005b). 
The developments have resulted in vast amounts of land resources earmarked for 
restitution and redistribution process becoming under-utilised. At the core of some of 
the conflicts, are the tensions and confusions regarding the choices of appropriate 
property rights regime to implement in the post homeland era. While communal 
access and use of land resources are still widespread and seemingly more culturally 
acceptable, especially in traditional contexts, the government’s land policies (DLA, 
2002) have embraced private land ownership as the vehicle to more economic 
efficient use of the resources. While the common access regime has entrenched the 
institutions of land insecurity as probably the biggest hurdle to overcome to achieve 
economic development, the rural communities, based on strong cultural values, still 
prefer this regime. Hence, government policies have not found innovative ways to 
negotiate the common versus private ownership tensions. Following the discussion by 
Hirschman (1960), it is clear that in the KRV’s rural communities, common access 
and use form the right ‘images of society’, which means that public policy attempting 
to impose other ‘images’, which are not as acceptable, would only exacerbate local 
conflicts. Therefore, any ambitious government policy drives aimed at promoting 
private ownership of land resources at the expense of deeply rooted cultural values 
have to be abandoned, at least for the time being. The policy formulation process 
should aim to strike a delicate but sustainable balance in fostering private and/or 
common ownership rights. The policies should be aimed at achieving economic 
efficiency alongside community solidarity for sustainability. How the balance is 
struck would have to be context specific. An in-depth knowledge of local institutions, 
which promote the values of community solidarity, has to be acquired. Thereafter the 
institutions would inform the formulation of appropriate policies, with the right 
incentives. For example, the formation of culturally representative community forums 
to oversee, regulate and govern the use of and access to common resources within a 
business framework would be a sensible policy attempt. To be sustainable, the 
organisational structures of these forums would have to be founded on a mix of 
principles that promote significant local cultural values alongside effective business 
practices.  
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In any case, the experiences of the last ten years in the water policy sector have shown 
that government attempts at establishing community based management forums are 
very difficult processes. In this sector, the establishment of Catchment Management 
Agencies (CMAs) (which are community forums) has presented great challenges 
(Motteux, 2002; Lotz-Sisitka and Burt, 2006, etc.). Nevertheless, if the forums were 
successfully established, the lessons from the process would benefit attempts at 
establishing local forums for land management. The land policy programmes would 
not have to reinvent the whole wheel in formulating such structures. In fact it could 
also be further argued that perhaps in attempts to capture benefits from economies of 
scale, the best option may be to establish forums that would be responsible for the 
management of both land and water resources. If the approach were adopted, the 
implication for the DWAF and DLA would be to establish stronger working relations. 
At the moment, however, the two departments as illustrated by the case of black citrus 
farmers in the KRV, do not have such an effective working relationship.  
 
The management of water resources 
 
In chapter five it was discussed that the process to implement the National Water Act 
(36 of 1998) has been slow and difficult. The process to establish local water 
management forums (CMAs) has mostly struggled with trying to achieve the 
participation of local stakeholders (Motteux, 2002; Mbatha, 2005; Lotz-Sisitka and 
Burt, 2006). While in theory the national water policy has sound political and 
economic objectives, with attempts to find a balance between equity and efficiency 
outcomes, the DWAF’s (2004) implementation strategies have not been as effective. 
In the preceding chapter (refer to Table 7.5), the national water policies were 
identified as having some of the highest potential benefits for the process of economic 
development in the KRV. Such was the case partly because the policies were 
formulated with an aim to replace the old and inefficient but still dominant policies of 
the past (e.g. the riparian water rights from the 1950s). Moreover the new policies are 
founded on sound economic grounds of creating water markets through the use 
tradable water licences (NWA, 1998). However, once again the challenge of 
overcoming the exclusions of previously discriminated groups in the water sector has 
arisen. Often the exclusions stem from various historical factors and current 
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institutions, which determine the distributions of skills and resources. For instance the 
equitable participatory management to be achieved, stakeholders need to be equally 
empowered in terms of resources and human skills. From the discussions in chapter 
five and seven it was concluded that the empowerment objectives are far from being 
achieved. Since true empowerment cannot be achieved overnight, it is clear that the 
process would take time to unfold and DWAF cannot be ignorant about that fact.  
 
At a national level, the conflicts between commercial farmers, government agencies 
and environmentalists have contributed negatively to the implementation process. 
Issues of water distributions and quality have been at the core of most of the conflicts. 
The commercial farmers’ fear of losing water allocations because of redistributions 
and environmental concerns have led to non-cooperative attitudes on the part of 
farmers (DWAF, 2005). This has imposed difficulties to government agencies 
primarily because commercial farmers still hold a lot of commercial power and have 
the best technical skills, which they use as leverage at bargaining processes. Hence, it 
would be short-sighted for national policy not to figure strategies to allay the fears or 
in cases where they are real to compensate losers to ensure a smoother and 
cooperative implementation process takes place.  
 
Regarding emerging farmers’ lack of empowerment and their subsequent low levels 
of participation in policy implementation processes, it could be argued that even if all 
water users were equally resourced, it still could not be assumed that a generic 
structure of CMAs could be established across the country. As argued in the proposed 
case of land management forums, the given communities have to understand the 
nature and functioning of these agencies to those that enhance their own cultural 
values before they could be adopted effectively. Undoubtedly, a true understanding of 
how in various contexts the newly established CMAs could compliment the local 
norms and values could only be achieved through institutional research. The same 
argument was proposed in the reviewed case of Thaba Nchu in chapter seven. 
Moreover, as much as an understanding of the institutions that govern the activities of 
marginalised stakeholders’ matters to policy-making, the formal practices and 
attitudes of commercial farmers are as important to that understanding. In the KRV 
cases, it was fortunate that the attitudes of commercial farmers were not as much in 
conflict with the new water policies. However the situation is not the same in other 
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water catchments, which means that context specific approaches are crucial. Some of 
the KRV commercial farmers were actively figuring out ways in which to use the new 
policies to their own future benefits, and hence their participation and attitudes were 
often useful to the process of establishing forums. These are the types of institutional 
mindsets that the implementation process needs to discover for each area where 
CMAs are proposed. The work would require that adequate institutional research be 
conducted beforehand. 
 
8.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AT A KAT RIVER VALLEY LEVEL 
 
The discussion and analysis of case studies from the KRV, in the preceding chapter 
(refer to summaries in Table 7.5 and Figure 7.2), indicated that the most important 
institutions currently dominating the activities of various groups of farmers could be 
divided into two historical waves or categories. A group of self-reinforcing 
institutions, whose prominence was supported by the old regime of policies prior to 
1994, was the ‘old’ wave and the current set (post-1994) of informal and formal 
institutions formed the new wave. Most of the institutions in the latter category have 
been initiated by the present government. The current institutions, in the form of 
public policies, have been instigated as reactionary measures to counter the 
inefficiency and inequality effects of the old wave, which evidently still highly 
dominate the local practices. Essentially what this means is that: just because a new 
set of policies have been enacted into pieces of legislation that does not necessarily 
mean that the effects of the ‘old’ policies with their deeply entrenched practices have 
disappeared at a local level, even though they may be on a decline as illustrated in 
Figure 7.2. On the other hand, the contributions of institutions to the process of 
economic development were found to be both negative and positive within the two 
sets of historical waves. In addition, a number of institutions were found to have had 
effects across all three case studies94, while some had effects that were only confined 
to particular cases. For example, the negative effects of insecurity of tenure were 
pervasive in all three social systems that were investigated in the KRV, while 
authoritarian leadership practices were only identified in the case of subsistence 
farmers. Therefore, such observations would entail that classification by (a) ‘history’, 
                                                 
94 More than six of the identified twenty one (above fifty percent) affected all three systems  
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(b) ‘contribution to development’ and (c) ‘prevalence across the three systems’ would 
form a sensible framework for presenting policy recommendations for the institutional 
factors identified in Table 7.5.  
8.3.1 Selected recommendations by history, contribution and prevalence 
 
It was made clear that the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) had an important and 
urgent role to play in implementing the land reform process in the KRV. For instance, 
it was illustrated that the acquisition of properly defined rights to land had the 
potential to increase the average incomes and formal education levels of heads of 
households in the area. The process of allocating water rights to users in an equitable 
manner could not be successful if land claims were not resolved. Any efforts directed 
at enhancing market access to excluded groups could not be complete without an 
understanding of current and potential farming activities, because these would 
impinge on the final outcomes of the land reform process. The process insofar as it 
was affected by restitution claims was a legal operation, while its redistribution aspect 
was more economic and technical in nature. Hence, the DLA’s redistribution of land, 
which it was argued aims to achieve an economically efficient use and access to the 
resources, was part of the reform process that should carefully negotiate the tensions 
between private versus common access and use rights. It was demonstrated that a lack 
of private land ownership has negatively affected the economic development 
indicators in the villages, however, the acceptableness and dominance of common 
access and still use remained a strong cultural institution that could not be wished 
away in the KRV. It the preceding section it was proposed that the establishment of 
land management forums would form a logical compromise between these conflicting 
values. The same principle would also apply to upper KRV. If the forums were to be 
established a practical balance would be struck between the effectiveness and 
acceptableness of private versus common property rights regimes. However, the 
formation of such a forum in the KRV would require time investments in a thorough 
consultative process. Moreover, the composition of socially acceptable representative 
structures in the forum would need to be investigated for equity and cultural 
considerations as well as economic efficiency. In any case, it seems logical that the 
forums should be prioritized for establishment to manage land resources in instances 
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where heightened community tensions already exist regarding the DLA’s imposition 
of private ownership rights for redistributive purposes. 
 
The countrywide implementation process of the National Water Act (NWA, 36 of 
1998) was underway during the time of research, with potential benefits for a) 
proposals made to the land reform process in the preceding chapter, and b) economic 
efficiency in water management in areas like the KRV. There were however other 
problems, which were identified in the KRV regarding the process. The KRV 
catchment management group (composed of scientific and social researchers as well 
as the members of the Water Users’ Association (WUA) and Catchment Forum (CF)) 
was in the process of determining the ecological and social reserves of the basin. 
Unfortunately since the process started there had not been any involvement of the 
DLA. Hence, the group could not determine how much land had the potential to be 
developed in the upper KRV in order to accurately determining the reserves (Burt, 
2007). Ultimately the DWAF and WRC research efforts conducted without 
consultation with the DLA would undoubtedly prove to have been wasteful in the 
long term. Hence it is recommended that provincial government departments the 
DWAF, DLA, DoA and the local municipality form a working or steering group to 
coordinate the KRV research and policy implementation efforts. The formation of the 
group would reduce a number of identified information asymmetries in the KRV and 
their associated transactional costs.  
 
Coordination failure in the implementation of provincial government policies, which 
were formulated for purposes of developing emerging was another big challenge 
discussed in the case of black citrus farmers in chapter six and seven. The discussions 
illustrated how various provincial policies did not fully complement the local initiated 
development ideas and efforts. The primary reason for this was that the policies did 
not account for local institutional factors. The DWAF, DoA and DLA had funding 
programmes, with mathematical formulae in place for a ‘fair’ distribution of resources 
to emerging farmers. However, the funds were not being accessed or used by targeted 
groups. The discussions showed that in many instances the farmers did not have the 
information about the availability of these funds. In some cases the conditions to be 
met and requirements from projects to access the funds did not match local situations 
and needs. In other cases the policies formulated at the municipal level were in 
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conflict with objectives of some provincial departments, for example those of the 
DLA with regard to land rights access. To avoid the under-spending of policy funds 
the formulation process should only take place with informational feedbacks firmly 
established with local communities. The ‘top down’ approach, which often yields 
non-useful policies, has to be replaced with bottom up approaches. Ultimately more 
intensively consultative approaches to policy formulation processes need to be 
adopted. The communication channels between the various provincial departments 
(e.g. the DWAF, DLA and DoA) and local municipalities need to be improved to 
avoid conflicting objectives.  
 
The foregoing summaries and recommendations have not exhausted the list of 
institutional factors presented in chapter six and seven. However, a clear recurring 
theme is that more research with a strong institutional orientation needs to be 
conducted when implementing new policy ideas. The adoption of generically 
formulated policies by local agencies is inefficient as it provides little meaning for 
communities. A development of a deep understanding of institutional factors, similar 
or better than the one summarised in chapter seven for the KRV is recommended for 
public policy processes.  
 
8.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
Throughout the thesis, the main proposal to mainstream economic research was that 
an understanding of institutions and their effects on transactional costs is foundational 
in attempts to achieve development. Hence, researchers have to find more effective 
ways in which they could integrate institutional and new classical economics for 
meaningful results. The integrated research framework, which was presented in 
chapter seven, could only be improved upon its wide applications. The framework 
was developed and discussed for agricultural economic research and its application in 
other sub-disciplines of economics (for example in labour economics) could only 
provide further insights into the institutional versus new classical economics debates. 
 
At a KRV level, the tabulated lists of dominant institutional factors, with significant 
contributions to transactional costs could not be exhausted in the presentation of 
policy recommendations in the present chapter. However, what the lists indicated are 
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the vast research opportunities and topics that need further investigations, especially 
by using formal tools like the Cost Benefit Analysis and others. The estimations of 
costs and benefits using quantitative methods would especially support budgetary 
decisions regarding public policy interventions.  
 
The land reform process was identified as one of the most important topic for current 
and future research in the agricultural sector. For instance, future research could 
investigate the potential benefits that could be had from establishing land 
management forums in support of South Africa’s reform programmes.  
 
A tabulated summary of the most crucial recommendations to research and policy 
from the study is presented in Table 8.1. Some of these recommendations were 
presented in chapter seven. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 237
Table 8.1 Summary of pertinent policy and research recommendations 
Level of policy/research 
relevance 
Institutional challenge Recommended actions and/or 
agents 
National, marketing Exclusion of emerging farmers from 
access 
Create markets and assist farmers in 
utilisation by fostering skills     
National, land management Adoption/imposition of in/appropriate 
ownership rights system 
Establish community forums which 
integrate common and private ownership 
management values based on institutional 
research 
National, land management Proposed forums that integrate 
common/private rights  
Source useful lessons from current 
National Water Policy (NWP, 1997) 
implementation process 
National, water management  Conflicts of interests between 
commercial farmers versus public and 
environmentalist needs  
Discover the right contextual incentives 
for commercial farmers to support new 
policy 
National, water management  Difficulties with CMA establishment  Discover the rights norms, values and 
incentive per location to complement the 
new CMA organisation and operations 
KRV, emerging farmers  Costly informal institutions Encourage compliance with collectively 
formulated written rules by exposing and 
expanding the social & economic benefits 
KRV, agricultural resource management Provincial policy coordination failures 
and conflict of policy objectives 
a. Create steering group comprised of 
DWAF, DLA, DoA and municipality and 
local stakeholders 
b. Funding policies must employ ‘bottom 
up’ approach 
General economic research Lack of universal theoretical methods 
for integrated research methods  
Adoption and improvement of proposed 
integrated framework  
National research priority The land reform process and land 
tenure challenges 
Research dedicated to finding costs and 
benefits to establishment of community 
forums  
KRV socio-economic research Institutionally informed formal 
research  
Formal research questions need to be 
investigated from present institutional 
summarised findings  
 
 
8.5 CONCLUDING NOTE AND THE WAY FORWARD  
 
The primary theoretical argument of this work was that most contemporary economic 
thought lacks a methodological and paradigmatic integration of institutional and new 
classical economic perspectives. The lack of integration has resulted in a generally 
skewed selection of methods and tools employed in mainstream economic research 
without an adequate foundation supported by an in-depth understanding of 
institutional factors. Hence, a balance had to be found in selecting appropriate 
institutional methods and formal tools when conducting research that has socially 
meaningful results, especially in developing country contexts. A framework for 
economic research, which amplified the importance of institutional research in the 
design of formal research questions was developed and presented. With this integrated 
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framework, the research demonstrated that the perception that there exists two 
extremely opposed views from the institutional and new classical economic schools of 
thought pertaining to what may be considered to be the most appropriate research 
tools and methods for economic research is actually misplaced. In the proposed 
framework these schools of thought are highly complementary.  
 
A contextualised application of the integrated research framework in the KRV was 
useful in identifying the most significant institutions in terms of their transactional 
costs and benefits to the development process and policy issues in irrigated 
agriculture. A selected number of recommendations to policy aimed at eliminating 
especially costly institutions and at improving opportunities for the economic 
development for the whole KRV system were presented. Recommendations were also 
discussed for potential future research based on the institutional and theoretical 
economic research findings.  
 
In addition, the thesis concluded that future research designs should adopt similar 
integrated approaches to benefit a deeper understanding of how various socio-
economic methods may contribute towards growth in economic knowledge. The 
approaches would also improve an understanding of how various frames of thought 
are interfaced with one another at a theoretical level.  
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10. APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
Guideline questions for recorded interviews with KRV (commercial) citrus farmers: 
September 2005 
 
 
Name 
 
Name and Location of farm  
 
Position 
Owner 
group 
Manager 
 
Lessee Date 
Phone & cell  
 
Address 
  
 
A2. Water access and availability 
i) What type of access/rights 
(Un/scheduled)  
scheduled 
Per ha. ii) Water cost. 
Per volume 
iii) Is this sufficient for 
current needs 
 
iv) Quality problems 
 
 
Problem solving  
v) Availability  
 
vi) Quality 
 
 
comments 
 
 
Section A1.  Current status of the farmer: 
Land availability 
 
How much land  (ha)  
i) Total land owned and/or 
leased). 
 
ii) Citrus under irrigation  
iii) Not under irrigation  
iv) Possible for 
development 
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A3. Irrigation systems  (including water storage) 
 
 
 
Weirs 
1. River name and height of wall 
 
Water obtained from Kat river by 
pump due to scheduling on 
Blinkwater plots but also from 
boreholes, fountain and 
Blinkwater river. 
 
 
 
2. How many pumps  
3. Size an number reservoirs  
4. Size and number storage tanks  
5. How much water is stored 
today 
 
 6. Number of boreholes  
7. How much water per month  
8. Rain water (precise 
contribution to water 
availability as a whole-this 
past year) 
 
9. Type of irrigation used Drip  Micro-
jet 
 
10. Admixes into water Pesticides  Fertilizer Y 
  
Section B. History of the individual farmer (or family if applicable): 
a) How long has farmer been in the system? 
 
 
b) NB When and why was land (farm/s) bought (if known)? 
c). Why was Dam built? And who contributed financially? 
d). What contributed to current scheduling position AND water availability? 
e) NB. How were the rules for operating the dam laid out: by whom and when? 
NB            
f) How fair (in respondent’s opinion) have the rules been in the past and now?  
If the rules have changed what contributed to the change?  
If the degree of fairness has changed what has led to the change?  
Comments 
 
Section C.  Business prospects of the Farmer as seen by the farmer 
1. What is the total production output?  
Ask Riverside 
2. What is the current production demand?  
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3. NB Any future investment plans?  
4. NB Any future land development plans for irrigation 
5. Any current and proposed business partnerships?  
6. Does respondent have any fears of land invasions (explain)?  
7. Agri-BEE policies.  Have you looked at the legislation? What do you think 
8. What are the implications for citrus?  
9. Any plans for acquiring more water from future water allocation system? (explain)  
 
 
Section D  Challenges faced with in the following areas 
1. Water availability (explain) 
 
2. Business constraints (explain) 
 
3. Institutional constraints (Important subsection give priority): 
  
a) What is the respondents’ understanding of the NWA (1997) licensing procedures?  
 
 
 
……………………………… 
b) Is the currently formulated Catchment Management Plan (Rhodes facilitated 
water/social yield study) going in the right direction in the opinion of the respondents?  
c) What are the reservations about the process?  
d) How effective is the WUA in the system? 
e). What is its capacity as judged against the constitutional mandate? (Can it do what 
it must do?)  
 
e) What is DWAF involvement in the Kat system?  
f) Does the member know and/or understand the vision of DWAF?  
g) In the respondent’s opinion has things gotten simpler or more complicated in the last 
five years-explain) 
h) What has the role of Rhodes University been in the system as a whole in the 
respondent’s opinion?  
j) What are the marketing (Katco/Riverside/Other) difficulties?  
Section E. Topical issues (Important section-give priority) 
1. What should happen to the non-paying Upper Kat farmers (including the farms) in the 
respondent’s opinion? 
 
2.  What should happen to water scheduling in the future? 
3. Who should pay for Upper Kat training (e.g. WUA?, DWAF, Rhodes, individuals)?  
4. Who should pay the Upper Kat arrears?  
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5. Why has the dam limit been set at 60% for non-scheduled farm flushes? 
6. Are there adequate quantities of water outside the Kat River system in the 
respondent’s opinion? (from where)  
Section F 
1 Comments from respondent not asked: 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………… 
2 Interviewer- comments on observations- may not be done in front of respondent)    
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix 2 
Guide questions for emerging farmers (new  and old irrigation schemes): 
 
1. History of the scheme 
 
History of the area and present occupants 
Where is the scheme? 
What is being produced? And why? 
How big land and personnel?  
Whose initiative it was to get it started? 
How did they do things previously? 
What problems they were faced with? 
How they overcame them? Who were involved? 
Are members dependent on the scheme for livelihoods? 
 
2. The old and new vision of the scheme 
 
Business-wise 
Does the scheme make enough money?  
Does the scheme aim to grow big? What Future crops do they want to plant? And 
how do they think they will get there? With whose support? 
 
     3. Resources 
 
Land (how many hectares how far from the river)  
Water (Is there available irrigation equipment? Provided and maintained by 
whom?) 
Water irrigation arrangements (when is the land irrigated and why? Who makes 
the decisions?)  
 
4. The institutional issues 
 
Who is supporting the scheme at present? 
For business (inputs, capital, etc) 
Skills support (e.g. when to irrigate) 
Level of education of members and status on the land (e.g. the head of a 
homestead or household) Does s/he have another job or income from pension? 
What is the members’ involvement in their communities?  
 
5. Access to institutions  
 
Agricultural education (e.g. do they attend Mpofu training courses? Or other) 
For business (e.g. marketing ventures) 
Is there a written constitution or business plan? Who was involved in drawing it 
up? Is it understood by members? Are they happy with it?  
Do they want to work with other commercial farmers? 
 
6. Conflict resolutions: 
How do farmers resolve disputes? 
What does the constitution (if present) say or other agreed upon rules?  
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Do they follow these rules?  
Land restitutions issues and land tenure 
Are members or the schemes entitled to the land or is it borrowed from the state 
(please ask for proof and write down what the doc says) 
Are people fighting for land rights or are there land restitution conflicts? 
(e.g. between blacks and coloureds)  
 
Section B 
Additional information to be collected 
GUIDELINES TO BE FOLLOWED:  
Make sure notes are written on the following points: in the Black book for 
each scheme. 
  
Make sure that all these topics or Areas (over and above the ones already 
mentioned) are covered in the interviews with the scheme members:  
 
1. Level of literacy of members 
2. Irrigation farming experience 
3. Irrigation farming training 
4. Note attitude of farmer towards the scheme 
5. Geographic location 
6. Suitability of climate for the crop planted (if not sure mention the crop 
and put question mark) 
7. Size of operation: hectares planted, output per cycle and price of units 
(e.g. 20 hectares for 1000 bags of cabbages per cycle at R20 each bag) 
Also, describe the cycle (is it year or six months, etc) 
8. Land ownership  
9. degree of dependency- on farm income (is there another source of income 
(e.g. pension) available to each member? 
10. Amount of irrigation water available 
11. Reliability of water supply system  
12. Quality of irrigation water (is it clean or dirty) Are there leakages in pipes 
or oil leaks into the water from equipment? 
13. Degree of responsibility of the farmer for the supply of water to the land 
(is it piped and pumped for the whole area or each member irrigates 
separately? 
      What are the rules applicable here? 
14. Management of water (rate this do you think it’s v.good good or bad or v. 
bad and write why you think so. 
15. Is the distribution of water on the land good? 
16. Is the irrigation equipment suitable for the type of crops or for some and 
not for all (write notes on this point) 
17. Are fertilisers applied at all and if so is it correctly 
18. Who installed the irrigation equipment 
19. Is the scheme with its equipment looked after properly? Have there been 
cases of theft or vandalism? How frequent (do they occur all the time?) 
20. Is this scheme better than other schemes? Mention those you are doing 
the comparison with. And mention in what aspect are they worse or 
better   
21.  Ways of resolving problems 
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22. Irrigation scheduling practices (What are they?) 
23. Crop management (how are the crops looked after?) 
24. Labour requirements (How many people are required over how big a 
land and for what crop) 
- from preparing land 
- to planting 
- to maintenance  
- to harvesting 
25.    Record keeping (of stock and of finances, etc.) 
26.    Physical infrastructure availability 
27.    Extension service from Dept of Agriculture (do the officials come to 
offer help of any kind) 
28. Social standing of each farmer (are farmers respected in the community?) 
29. Cost of running the whole system 
- break it down to a) cost of inputs: seeds, water, labour b) maintaining of 
infrastructure c) running costs (e.g. electricity, renting of shed, transport 
etc.) per month - d) marketing of goods per harvest cycle.   
30. Cost of water supply 
31. Scale of production: e.g. fifty tons of cotton per cycle of harvest 
32. Access to and use of finance and credit support (can farmers borrow 
money from bank or other place and do they do this?) 
33.  How is the marketing done? 
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Appendix 3 
The constitution of Hacop 
 
 
1. Name of the project 
 
 The project will be called Hertzog Agricultural Co-operative, with understanding 
that it includes the following areas, which form part of this zone: Herztog, Fairbain, 
Phillipton. 
 
2. Structure 
 
2.1. The project will be owned by individual plot holders 
2.2. The plot holders will appoint a committee consisting of two representatives of 
each of the three communities as in 1.1., which will serve for one year. 
2.3. Hacop will be affiliated to the Hertzog Reconstruction and Development 
Program (Hertzog R.D.P.) 
2.4. Hertzog R.D.P. will on its turn be affiliated to Mpofu R.D.P. 
 
3. Status 
 
 Hacop will be an Agricultural Community Project 
 
4. Aims 
 
Hacop will: 
 
4.1. Educate and empower its members to operate a sustainable and economically 
viable agricultural operation on one hectare of land (per member?) 
4.2.    Put to optimum use all the available land in our area. 
4.3.    Cultivate an agricultural culture in our community. 
4.4. Encourage and empower our people to improve their own living conditions. 
 
5. Objectives 
 
Hacop will: 
 
 Produce three crops per year 
 Repay all input costs after  each crop 
 Generate a liveable income for each of its members 
 Follow a strict VIABILITY plan (6) 
 Empower each of its members to be: 
 Self-supporting. 
 Economically viable. 
 Job creators. 
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6. Viability plan 
 
6.1. Production will be done according to a very carefully worked out plan, under 
the supervision of an experienced commercial farmer (amended to = agricultural 
officer) 
6.2 Will have a very strict and efficient administration  
6.3 All the marketing will be done by the Management Committee 
6.4. All proceeds will be deposited into the Hacop account, and transferred into 
plot holders’ accounts on three predetermined dates annually, subject to provision 
6.4, 6.5, and 6.6. 
6.5 signatories to this account will be any two of the three signatories appointed 
by the committee (one from each area as in (1.1) 
6.6 The proceeds will be administered by the administration of Hacop as follows: 
6.6.1 All input costs will be re-imbursed. 
6.6.2 25% of balance will be put into Capacity Building Fund. 
6.6.3 This account will only be used for capacity building and in the event of crop 
failure 
6.6.4 In the event of the balance in this account exceeding R10000,00, the general 
meeting can, with two-thirds majority, decide to pay the access (excess?) to the 
plot holders as a bonus 
6.6.5 50% of balance will be transferred into the plot holders’ account as a 
plotholders’ divided    . 
6.6.6  The remaining 50% will be paid out to the plotholders as a monthly salary 
over next four months. 
 
7.  Duties and responsibilities 
 
7.1 Optimum use will be made of each plot. 
7.2 Each member will undertake to maintain and look after all equipment 
entrusted to or her care. 
7.3 Plotholdership will be subject to renewal annually, and plotholders will strive 
to prove themselves as worthy of the ideals of the organization. 
7.4 This renewal will be done annually by the annual general meeting, based on 
the performance of the plotholders and on the recommendations of the committee. 
7.5 The H.A.C.O.P will ensure that annual audited reports are made available to 
all relevant persons and organizations. 
7.6 All its members will receive all the help they may need to make a success of 
their involvement. 
7.7  Training programs as well as on job training will be organized to ensure 
above. 
7.8  H.A.C.O.P  will ensure that total community involvement and empowerment 
is achieved, without discrimination of whatever  kind. 
7.9 H.A.C.O.P will do all in its power to ensure that the whole Mpofu District 
benefits as much as is possible from this project. 
7.10 H.A.C.O.P will ensure that no funds are misused in any way. 
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8. Discipline  
 
8.1 All members will honour the conditions and stipulations of the constitution. 
8.2 All members will honour any disciplinary action (non-violent) imposed on 
them by the joint A.G.M. or the interim committee. 
8.3 Suspension of plotholdership will only be considered after three written 
warnings have been given. 
8.4 Suspension will only be imposed by a two-thirds majority of all the 
plotholders. 
8.5 Disciplinary action will be considered in event of the following: 
     8.5.1  Any action which will endanger the sustainability ideal of the project. 
     8.5.2  Sustained drunkenness on duty. 
     8.5.3  Assault of or fighting with fellow members of the project, on the project. 
8.6 If disciplinary action should result in termination of membership, full 
compensation of all shares that are due to the member shall be adhered to e.g. 
share of salary retention fund and unharvested crops on plot. 
 
9. Affiliation  
 
9.1 H.A.C.O.P, together with all other development projects that may exist or be 
initiated will be affiliated to Hertzog R.D.P, which in turn will be affiliated to 
Mpofu R.D.P. 
9.2 H.A.C.O.P will seek to co-operate with all other projects with similar aims 
where this will strengthen development in the district. 
 
10. Amendments to the constitution  
 
10.1 Only by a two-thirds majority of the A.G.M. 
 
11. Meetings  
 
11.1 There will be at least three general meetings annually (of which one will be 
the A.G.M), at which plotholders dividends will be paid out. 
11.2 All other meetings will be subject to local arrangement. 
 
12. Dissolution of the project  
 
12.1 Dissolution of project can only take place if agreed to by a two-thirds 
majority of the general meeting. 
12.2 All assets shall be made available to other organization with a similar 
objective, preferably in the same district.  
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Appendix 4 
Agenda for the Hacop workshop held on the 20th of January 2006 
 
The HACOP (Fairbain) Workshop Programme: 20th Jan 2006 
 
Sessions: 
 
08:30 - 10:00 
1. Understanding the scheme: (1 - 1 1/2 hours)  
a. What is the legal standing of the scheme in terms of its land and water 
leases? 
b. What are the needs of the scheme that could be supported by the workshop? 
 
 
Break for tea (10:00-10:30) 
 
10:30 - 12:00 
2. Understanding the Basic Business Plan (Notes from Centre for 
Entrepreneurship) (1 - 1 1/2 hours) 
 
12: 00 - 13:00 
3. Understanding the priorities, requirements and guidelines for applying 
for DWAF bulk-water funding (1 hour) 
 
Break for lunch (13:00 14:00) 
 
14:00 - 14:30 
4. Illustrate/highlight the features and  details of the DLA business plan (30 
mins) 
 
14:30 - 15:30 
5. A discussion of what may be done concerning the establishment of a Trust 
Fund & summary review of the Trust Property Control Act of 1988 (1 
hour) 
 
Break for tea: (15:30-16:00) 
   
16:00-17:00 
6. Way forward programme and appointment of responsible persons to 
facilitate it  (1 hours)   
 
 
Estimated Total Time for presentations: 4 ½ to 5 ½ hours 
 
 
 
 
 
 265
 
 Appendix 5 
             The Katco Enterprise Budget  
 
PRICING Packout % 
   Year 
TYPE GRADE R/TON 3 and 4 5 6+ 
Lemons Export 1267 50 55 65
 Seconds 630 20 20 15
 Local 0 30 25 20
 Average R/ton 760 823 918
Nova Export 1333 50 60 65
 Seconds 400 0 0 15
 Local 0 50 40 20
 Average R/ton 667 800 926
Clems Export 1333 50 60 65
 Seconds 400 0 0 15
 Local 0 50 40 20
 Average R/ton 667 800 926
Midnight Export 1066 50 55 65
 Seconds 530 20 20 15
 Local 0 30 25 20
 Average R/ton 639 692 772
Navels Export 1272 40 50 55
 Seconds 630 30 25 15
 Local 0 30 25 30
 Average R/ton 698 794 794
Cara Cara Export 1386 40 50 55
 Seconds 703 30 25 15
 Local 0 30 25 30
 Average R/ton 698 794 794
Mandarins Export 3000 50 60 70
 Seconds 600 25 20 15
 Local 0 25 20 15
 Average R/ton 1650 1920 2190
Terrocco Export 1667 50 55 65
 Seconds 435 20 20 15
 Local 0 30 25 20
 Average R/ton 921 1004 1149
Late Navel Export 1575 40 50 60
 Seconds 788 30 25 15
 Local 0 30 25 25
 Average R/ton 866 985 1063
Cara Cara Export 1550 40 50 60
 Seconds 650 30 25 15
 Local 0 30 25 25
PRODUCTION 
COSTS 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2013 2014 
TOTAL 800332 762064 888789 939543 939543 939543 939543 939543 939543
          
TOTAL R/ha 16343 15562 18173 19210 19210 19210 19210 19210 19210
          
TOTAL (less 
Picking) R/ha 12297 11009 12527 13290 13290 13290 13290 13290 13290
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 Average R/ton 866 985 1063
PRODUCTION YEAR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Lemons tons 0 0 12 25 45 60 75 75 75 75 75
Nova tons 0 0 1 12 25 45 60 60 60 60 60
Clems tons 0 0 1 12 25 45 60 60 60 60 60
Midnight tons 0 0 0 10 25 35 50 60 60 60 60
Navels tons 0 0 0 10 20 30 45 55 55 55 55
Cara Cara tons 0 0 0 10 20 30 45 55 55 55 55
Mandarins 0 0 1 12 25 45 60 60 60 65 65
Tarrocco 0 0 0 8 20 30 40 60 60 60 60
Mandarins High Density 0 0 2 20 41 65 65 65 65 65 65
Late Navel 0 0 0 10 20 30 45 55 55 55 55
Cara Cara 0 0 0 10 20 30 45 55 55 55 55
 
(Source: Katco, 2005) 
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Appendix 6 
Riverside’s estimated production output of different citrus fruit (over the next ten 
years) from black citrus farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Grower 20042 20052 20062 20072 20082 20092 20102 20112 20122
Clems    
 Futuse 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247 247
 Nahamba 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
 Torties 428 428 428 428 428 428 428 428 428
 Mpukane 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Clems Total   840 841 841 841 841 841 841 841 841
    
Navel    
 Futuse 783 783 783 763 742 742 717 698 657
 Mfecane 694 694 694 657 651 651 636 599 556
 Phambane 578 578 554 533 530 530 505 461 437
 Eric JV 475 475 475 475 475 426 426 426 426
 Gonzana 691 691 662 647 634 634 604 560 532
 Nahamba 363 363 339 372 411 495 569 610 668
 Torties 637 637 637 637 637 637 637 637 637
 Mbelashe 691 691 643 617 638 701 763 801 813
 Mpukane 858 858 818 802 785 785 746 706 706
 Ndlangalavhu 1018 1018 1018 964 909 909 909 877 813
 Clifford 323 323 316 308 327 381 443 474 497
Navel Total   7110 7110 6938 6775 6737 6890 6956 6849 6743
    
Satsuma    
 Phambane 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
 Eric JV 0 0 0 0 24 49 98 196 269
Satsuma 
Total   130 130 130 130 155 179 228 326 399
    
Grand Total   8081 8082 7909 7746 7733 7910 8025 8016 7983
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Appendix 7 
The total debt of the KRV black farms by 1999 and their topographic representation 
along the Kat River  
No. 
(refers to map 
overleaf) 
Farm Citrus 
ha 
Ciskei Agric 
Bank/CAC 
total loan 
in rands 
KATCO 
loan 
In rands 
1 Lidell 21.8 1 403.560 57.596 
2 Leta’s 17.5 966.881 52.310 
3 Topkat 21.8 1 579.760 55.146 
4 O/Grange 19.8 1 683.789 11.487 
5 Cranford 23.7 122.656 0 
6 Jerusalem 26.1 1 160.938 71.892 
7 Eden 17.6 560.933 0 
8 Konzi 25.9 685.966 305 
9 Jerico 19.1 870.812 15.285 
10 Krila 27.3 1 504.985 39.882 
11 Jordan 21.8 703.237 0 
12 Whites 23.2 650.359 0 
13 Torties 36.0 1 607.492 0 
14 Oakdene 21.3 775.684 138.320 
15 Gonzana 22.5 771.895 0 
(Source: DLA, 1999) 
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The farm in Picardy (red dot) has been abandoned 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
Map of the Kat River Valley indicating the location of the black farms under discussion 
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Appendix 8 
Neglected and abandoned black farms (refer to map in Appendix 7 for farm locations) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ruined orchards at Orange Grange (4), left and right of regional road R67  
Abandoned farms at Tidbury Toll (No. 14) (left).    Picardy (red dot) (right) on which Local 
Government (Nkonkobe) has established a cheese factory 
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Appendix 9 
Good versus poor farm management 
Top left and right photos taken from Skotile’s farm (Torties) (next page Riverside good 
management) (refer to map in Appendix 7 for farm locations)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bottom. Left, Whites Farm (12) (lessee-Mr. Mpukane, privately run) and right, 
poorly managed orchards at Oakdene (14) (lessee- Mr. Siko, Katco). 
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Riverside owned orchards, and pack house, in Fort Beaufort   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Citrus production operations at Riverside.  Top. Immaculate 
orchards north of the R67 near Fort Beaufort (Appendix 7 map) on 
the farm Riverside. Middle. Outside the pack shed, loading produce 
for export. Bottom. Interior view of pack shed. (July 2005) 
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Appendix 10 
 
Abbreviated Agenda of the Alice Kat Riverside Workshop 13 July 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Purpose 
a. Revitalise the Alice Kat Citrus 
b. To prepare for 28 July follow up at ECDC 
c.  Present a unified approach 
2. Participants 
Colin –Riverside 
Mericks – Tyumie 
Fly-upper Kat 
Daniel Cape 
Spencer- lona 
Xolile-observer 
Cornelius-AgriSA 
Harry-chair 
Hambile-Lower Kei 
Bruce-Katco 
3. Time and place 13 July 2005 
10 AM 
Riverside pack shed 
4. Agenda 
a. Technical, from filled in by weeks end, follow up    
       lines drift, structure 
      b.   sec21 co decided on 
      c.    side shows considered later 
      d.   eco-tourism 
      e.    transport 
f. Cattle 
g. Services 
h. access funds 
i. try for grant money 
j. rehabilitate & establish citrus 
k. skills transfer 
l. master development plan 
m. 22 bus plans 
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Appendix 11 
The Department of Water Affairs and Forestry’s  application form for grants to 
emerging farmers  
 
 
DEPARTMENT:  WATER AFFAIRS AND FORESTRY 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
185 Schoeman Street, Sedibeng Building, Pretoria, 0001 
Private Bag X313, Pretoria, 0001 
Tel:  (012) 336 8066 Fax: (012) 323 4472   / (012) 326-2715 
 
 
APPLICATION FORM FOR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO 
RESOURCE POOR FARMERS SUBMITTED INDIVIDUAL 
BENEFICIARIES 
 
Particulars of the applicant 
Title  Surname 
 
First names in full 
 
Date of birth Y Y Y Y M M D D 
Occupation  
Identity number              Home tel. no. & code 
 
 
Work tel. no. & 
code 
 
 
Fax no. & code 
 
Postal address 
 Postal Code     Cellphone no.  
 
Are you a member of a Water User Association or any legal entity? 
 
Yes 
  
No 
 
 
If yes, Name of a WUA or Legal Entity 
 
 
  
What kind of agricultural activities are you engaged in? 
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Appendix 12 
Map of KRV weirs and boundary river reaches  
 
 
 
 
Seven main water abstraction points are illustrated between the Kat River Dam and 
the Lower Kat  
(Source: KDOR, 1989) 
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Appendix 13 
Map of the three Upper KRV villages   
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Appendix 14 
Successful Hacop irrigation farms in 1996  
 
 
 
Successful vegetable farming in Fairbain 1996 
 
Successful farming in Hertzog 1996 
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Appendix 15 
Pictures of Hacop meeting/workshop  
 
 
The first meeting between Hacop member in Fairbain and researchers  
Held on 30th November 2004  
 
 
A business and debrief workshop facilitated by Rhodes University  
Department of Economics in 20th January 2006   
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Appendix 16 
Layout of division of land plots in Fairbain (vegetable side): Hacop (2005) 
                       
 
 
(Source: Hacop, 2005) 
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Appendix 17 
Table of electricity payments: contributions September 2004 to 2005 
 
 
(Source,:Hacop, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Memb
er’s 
name 
Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sept Oct  Nov Dec 
L.Baba 70-00 70-00           
I. 
Dwani 
70-00 70-00     70-0 30-00 70-00 40-00   
N.Bebe
nga  
         70-00   
T.F.Gw
ayi 
         70-00   
N.A.Ha
ns 
     70-0 30-0 40-00 70-00 20-00 80-
00 
  
M.T.Le
ve 
70-00 70-00 70-00    70-00  70-00    
N.E.Ma
kanyi 
70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00  70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00   
C.Maye
kiso 
70-00 70-00 70-00 30-00    30-00 70-00    
Z.P.Mbi 70-00 70-00     70-00 30-00     
N.P.Mb
use 
70-00      70-00 30-00 70-00    
S.J.Mg
wali 
70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00   70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00   
N.C.Mg
wali 
            
N.V.Mg
wali 
70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00 40-00 
30-00 
70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00    
W.P.M
pevana 
70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00   
T.V.Nd
evu 
70-00 70-00 70-00 ? *  70-00  70-00 70-00   
N.Ndzi
weni 
70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00 30-00        
M.Njob
e 
70-00 70-00 70-00 70-00  70-00 50-00 70-00 70-00 70-00   
B.Siyazi 70-00 70-00 70-00 30-00   70-00      
N.Wayi
za 
            
M.Hans             
L.Mank
ayi 
        
T.Daba  
SHOULD  STRART IN APR 
2005 
 70-00  70-00     
             
M.Phezi
sa 
     70-00 50-00 20-00     
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Appendix 18 
Discussion review of Ostrom (1990), Dales (1994) 
 
COLLECTIVE ACTION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF COMMON 
PROPERTY 
 
The three influential models on collective action in the management of common 
resources chosen for the discussion are: a) Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the commons’, 
b) the prisoner’s dilemma (game theory) (Dawes, 1973, 1975 cited in Ostrom, 1990:3) 
and c) the logic of collective action (Olson, 1965). What these models have in 
common is their acceptance and use of neoclassical economic assumptions of self 
interested and rational individuals (Fryer, 2003:1-15), whose opportunistic behaviour 
in the use of common pool resources leads to inefficient social welfare outcomes. 
Extreme inefficient outcomes can be the degradation of the common pool resources 
and their extinction (Ostrom, 1990:8 and Dales, 1968:50-59). 
 
The tragedy of the commons 
 
The tragedy of the commons thesis asks the reader to imagine a hypothetical grazing 
pasture open to all community herders. It should be assumed that zero property rights, 
to the use of the pasture (open access), exists, which is the same as Dales’ (1994) 
definition of common property rights. “Each herder is motivated to add more and 
more animals (to the pasture) because he receives the direct benefit of his own 
animals (private benefit) and bears only a share of the costs resulting from 
overgrazing” (Ostrom, 1990:2). This is the root of a negative externality, where 
resource consumption, as illustrated in fig 3.1, occurs at Ea and where Marginal 
Social Costs (MSC) are higher than Marginal Private Costs (MPC) (Black et al., 
1999:27). 
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Negative Externality (MSC-MPC) 
(Source: Black et al., 2005:27) 
 
When the quantity of resources consumed is at Ea, over time the resource will be 
depleted because what individuals are paying for the resource use is less than what 
they are supposed to pay as a community. Therefore, “(t)herein is the tragedy. Each 
man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a 
world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing 
his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons” 
(Hardin, 1968: 1244). The same model was envisioned in Aristotle’s (Politics book ii) 
and Hobbes’s theory of ‘the state of nature’ (cited in Ostrom, 1990:2-3) where in 
pursuit of self-interests individuals fight one another to survive. In some 
environmental economics literature (Cropper and Griffiths, 1994; Norman, 1984 and 
Thomson, 1977 cited in Ostrom, 1990:3) evidence of diminishing tropical forests for 
firewood and other uses with increasing global populations is cited as proof of the 
pervasive nature of  ‘the tragedy of the commons’ (Ostrom, 1990:23).         
        
 
 
 
Ea MPC
MEB
MSC
Resource Quantity
Price 
Qa
 Pa   
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The prisoner’s dilemma 
 
The prisoner’s dilemma encapsulates benefits and costs for self-interested individual 
behaviour (Ostrom, 1990:1-23 and Kuhn, 2003).  If the private individual gains from 
acting in a selfish manner outweigh the gains from acting cooperatively, individuals 
will act selfishly. In the prisoner’s dilemma, the constraints to two herders or 
prisoners are that they cannot predict the actions of the other herder and they cannot 
leave the pasture (immobility). However, they both have information about the private 
and collective gains that could be made from either cooperating towards or defecting 
from a socially efficient use of the pasture (Kuhn, 2003).  
 
To help explain the prisoner’s dilemma, Ostrom (1990:3-5) asks the reader to assume 
that the grazing capacity of some pasture is L. Therefore each herder, with equal 
power distribution, must use L/2 capacity for the pasture to be maintained at an 
efficient and sustainable level (i.e. cooperation). Defection would happen when either 
one of the herders uses more than the agreed upon L/2 capacity. In the long run, this 
defection strategy will lead to overgrazing. On the other hand, if both herders 
cooperate and use their L/2 rations they would each make a ten point profit, but if 
they both defect they gain zero point profits. The defection strategy is a dominant 
strategy for the two herders because each self interested herder cannot predict the 
other’s strategy but hopes the other would cooperate, and when only one of the 
herders cooperates the defector makes 11 point profits where the cooperator makes 
only 1 point profits. Therefore, in comparison, defection pays more than cooperation 
to individuals and this makes the defection strategy dominant for self-interested 
herders, as illustrated in table 3.1. Each herder hopes to make the highest gains from 
free-riding the pastoral arrangement (i.e. gains without pay). In table 3.1, the four 
possible gains and/or losses from two possible actions from the herders are depicted 
(Ostrom, 1990). Another representation of this game as described by Kuhn (2003) 
was presented in chapter two. 
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The prisoner’s dilemma 
                                                                PROFITS   
Herders’ actions Both    Cooperate One Defects / One  
Cooperate 
Both Defect 
Herder one 10 -1       or      11 0 
Herder two 10 11        or     -1 0 
(Adapted from Ostrom, 1990:4) 
 
From the table, it pays more to defect while the other player cooperates (11 point 
profits). The game’s outcomes are insightful because it depicts neoclassical 
assumptions about rational selfish behaviour leading to irrational outcomes for the 
collective (Ostrom, 1990:5). However, this is the case, as discussed in chapter two, 
because of the nature of public goods, for which market failures are prevalent.  
 
The logic of collective action 
 
Olson (1965) in the logic of collective action thesis challenges Truman’s (1958 in 
Ostrom 1990:5-6) group theory “that individuals with common interests would 
voluntarily act so as to try to further those interests”. Olson’s (1965) challenge shares 
the same pessimistic conclusions of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and ‘the prisoner’s 
dilemma’, that self interested individuals’ use of common property lead to inefficient 
social outcomes.  
 
“The idea that groups tend to act in support of their group interests is 
supposed to follow logically from this widely accepted premise of rational, 
self interested behaviour. In other words, if the members of some group 
have a common interest or object, and if they would all be better off if that 
objective were achieved, it has been thought to follow that the individuals 
in that group would, if they were rational and self interested, act to achieve 
that objective” (Olson, 1965:1).      
 
However, for Olson (1965:2), the conclusion is not true unless the group in question is 
small, or some external authority coerces individuals to act in their collective interest. 
Olson’s (1965) mention of a coercive force advocates government intervention as 
another effective measure in common pool resource management.  
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Reflection on the three models 
 
The central theme in the three models is that the free rider problem always exists in 
the use of common pool resources. “Whenever one person cannot be excluded from 
the benefits that others provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint 
effort, the collective benefit will not be produced” (Ostrom, 1990:6).  
 
Importantly, for government policy formulation, the ‘metaphoric’ use of discussed 
models or theses, applying generically to all situations where common pool resources 
exist may lead to unintended and/or unwelcome consequences. If no empirical 
evidence or data are gathered on what institutional and socio-economic conditions 
prevail in different settings, application of policy using the models unquestioned may 
lead to inefficient social outcomes (Ostrom, 1990:10-23). It was earlier pointed out 
that the models assume as their premise that common property rights are equivalent to 
open access for all (Dales, 1994:174-187). However, this is not always true (Ostrom, 
1990:1-23 and Quiggin, 1988). In the case of the prisoner’s dilemma, the immobility 
constraint is also assumed without questioning, but this assumption is not always 
relevant or even realistic in some real life contexts.  
 
In real life policy applications, the metaphorical application of the theories has led to 
extreme policies that either advocate central government control of common resource 
use, especially in developing countries (Heilbroner, 1974) or, at the other extreme, the 
imposition of private property rights and the creation of full pseudo-markets 
(Demsetz, 1967: 347-359). The fallibility of these extreme policy measures are 
discussed in the following section.  
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Appendix 19 
The 2004 KRV Household Survey Tool 
ADULTS (18 YEARS AND ABOVE) 
 
    [WRITE WITH PENCIL!] 
To be filled in by Interviewer: 
 
1. HOUSEHOLD ID:…………………….  
 
2. NAME OF PRIMARY RESPONDENT……………………CODE….………….. 
3. ENUMERATION AREA….…..…….         NAME OF PLACE………………… 
4. DATE OF VISIT …….................…... 
    DATE OF SECOND VISIT (if necessary)…..………………. 
5. INTERVIEWER NAME/CODE......……………. 
6. INTERVIEW START TIME………………….… 
8. FAMILY POSITION OF PRIMARYRESPONDENT………………………………   
9. YOUR PHONE NUMBER OR CELL………………………………………………. 
9. INTERVIEW END TIME………….……………….……………………………..…  
 
To be filled in by checker 
 
CHECK BACK 
1. NAME OF CHECKER….…………………………. 
2. DATE CHECKED……….………………………… 
 
To be filled in by capturer 
 
DATA CAPTURE 
 
1. NAME OF CAPTURER…………………… 
2. DATE CAPTURED………………………... 
 
 
LIST OF MODULES 
SECTION 1 
 
1. DEMOGRAPHICS: 
 
 FAMILY DWELLING 
 FAMILY HISTORY 
 HOUSEHOLD MEMBER CHARACTERISTICS 
 ENVIRONMENTAL EDUCATION/AWARENESS AND WORK 
EXPERIENCE  
 LANGUAGE COMPETENCY 
 WATER SOURCE AND USE 
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2. WATER POLICY INDIVIDUAL ATTITUDES ON ASPECTS OF THE 
LAW 
 
  KNOWLEDGE OF AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE WATER LAW 
 KNOWLEDGE/ATTITUDE TOWARDS WATER ORGANISATIONS IN KRV 
 
3. LONG TERM PROPERTY INVESTMENTS (IMMOVABLE PROPERTY 
BUT INCLUDING LIVESTOCK) (LEGAL AND PERCEIVED) 
 
3.1 ATTITUDE TOWARDS COMMON, PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND    
      OPEN ACCESS 
3.2 CURRENT COMMON, PRIVATE AND PERCEIVED PROPERTY RIGHTS   
3.3 FUTURE EXPECTED COMMON, PRIVATE AND PERCEIVED PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
3.4 HISTORICAL/CULTURAL/SOCIAL ATTACHMENTS 
 
4. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
4.1 GENERAL PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (i.e. NOT ENVIRONMENT RELATED) 
4.2 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
  COMMUNITY MEETINGS 
4.3 LANGUAGE ISSUES IN PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
SECTION 2 
 
5. INDIVIDUAL ENVIRONMENTAL USES AND VALUES 
 
5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL USES 
5.2 BACKGROUND POLICY INFORMATION TO RESPONDENT 
5.3 INDIVIDUAL ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 
 
A. DEMOGRAPHICS: 
 
 Family dwelling (mark before entering the house) 
                                                  FORMAL   T 
I
C
K
Brick house on a separate stand   1  
Detached Brick house in backyard 2  
Flat/room on separate stand  3  
Flat/room in backyard 4  
Other specify 5  
                                                INFORMAL   
Traditional mud house on separate stand 6  
Traditional mud house on common stand 7  
Informal structure/ e.g. shack in squatter settlement 8  
Informal structure/ e.g. shack in the backyard of formal house 9  
Other specify 10  
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 WATER SOURCE/USE 
 
1.2.1  Where does your family find its water for HOUSEHOLD use? 
  
 WATER SOURCE  T
I
C
K
Directly from The Kat River  1  
Directly from another stream in the valley 2  
Piped from the Kat River 3  
Piped from another stream in the valley 4  
Piped and purified from the Kat River (e.g. Seymour Dam) 5  
Piped and purified from another stream in the valley (another dam) 6  
Boreholes / Groundwater 7  
Rain water 8  
Don’t know 9  
 
1.2.2 Where does your family find its water for other uses E.G. IRRIGATION 
etc.? 
 
 WATER SOURCE  T
I
C
K
Directly from The Kat River  1  
Directly from another stream in the valley 2  
Piped from the Kat River 3  
Piped from another stream in the valley 4  
Piped and purified from the Kat River (e.g. Seymour Dam) 5  
Piped and purified from another stream in the valley (another dam) 6  
Boreholes /Groundwater 7  
Rain water 8  
Don’t know 9  
 
1.2.3 (instruction to interviewer!) Write in full any other information not 
captured by the above questions (1.2): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 FAMILY HISTORY (to be answered by head or wife or other responsible 
member of household)  
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1.3.1 Did this family move from somewhere else before settling in this area?  
 
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t know 
 
1.3.2  
If yes, how long ago did the family settle here? (If answer 1.3.1 is No (2) tick 7 
in 1.3.2)  
 
Over 50 years  7  
Over 40 years  6  
Over 30 years 5  
Over 20 years 4  
Over 10 years 3  
Over 5 years  2  
Less than 5 years  1  
Don’t know 0  
 
1.3.3 If yes, why did the family move from old area to this area? 
(If answer 1.3.1 is No (2) tick 99 in 1.3.3)  
 
Moved by government 1  Pensioned from old job 8  
Moved for a job 2  Not allowed to stay in old area 9  
Moved to join other 
family 
3  Wanted my own place 10  
Could not afford to 
rent 
4  Evicted from old area 11  
Married and wanted 
own area 
5  Moved because of violence 12  
Was retrenched / fired 
in old job 
6  Other specify 13  
Moved to start a 
business 
7  Don’t know 0  
   Not applicable 99  
 
 
1.3.4 Does this family have other relatives present in the Kat River Valley? 
  
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t know 
e. If Yes to 1.3.4 who are they and what is your relationship to them? 
 
Family Surname Relationship 
1.  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
 
 290
1.3.5 (instruction to interviewer!) Write in full any other information not 
captured by the above questions (1.3): 
 
 
 
 
 
1.4 House member characteristics (INSTRUCTION! Ask HEAD or WIFE or 
other RESPONSIBLE MEMBER) 
1.4.1 
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
 
 
 
 
1.4.2 
 
N 
A 
M 
E 
 
 
1.
4.
3 
 
A 
G 
E 
 
1.4.
4 
 
G 
E 
N 
D 
E 
R 
 
M=
1 
F=2 
O=3  
 
1.4.5 
 
R 
E 
L 
A 
S 
H 
I 
P 
 
TO 
Head 
 
1-head 
2-husband or 
wife 
3-son/daughter 
4-brother/sister 
5-
father/mother 
6-grand parent 
7-grand child 
8-other relative 
9-non relative 
 
1.4.6 
 
RACE 
 
1. Black 
2. Colou 
3. Indian 
4. White 
5. Other 
6. N/A 
1.4.7 
 
LAB- 
OUR 
ACTIVITY 
 
1. Professional 
eg teacher/police 
 
2. Farming for 
others/market-
commercial 
3. Farming for 
family-
subsistence 
4. Animal 
Husbandry/herdi
ng 
5. Processing 
food for storage 
(for a farmer)   
6. Other work on 
farm (specify) 
7.Domestic 
8.Weaving/Sawi
ng 
9. Family 
Business-other 
than farming 
10. Self-
employment/spe
cify 
11. Non 
Agricultural 
wage 
12. Community 
project 
13. Water/land 
project 
14. Other cash 
earning activity  
15. Free 
gathering of fruit 
and food 
16 no labour 
activity 
17 
school/colleg 
1.4.8 
 
Monthly 
INCMON 
 
1.No income 
 
2.R1-500 
 
3.501-800 
 
4.801-1500 
 
5.1501-2500 
 
6.2501-3500 
 
7.3501-6000 
 
8. 6001-10000 
 
9. above 10000 
1.4.9 
 
Highest 
level of 
education 
 
1. none 
2. Sub A-B 
3. Std1 
4. Std2 
5.Std3 
6.Std4 
7.Std5 
8.Std6 
9.Std7 
10.Std8 
11.Std9 
12.St10 
 
13. 
Post-
Matric-Dip 
 
14. 
Tech 
Degree 
 
15. Unive-
Degree 
 
16. 
Other 
1.4.10 
 
Governm
ent Grant 
 
1. pension 
 
2.disability 
 
3.child 
 
4. other  
(specify) 
1. 
head 
         
2.          
3.          
4.          
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1.4.11 (instruction to interviewer!) Write in full any other information not 
captured by the above questions (1.4) and write to which family member the 
information applies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.5    Environmental education / awareness and work experience 
 
 
1.5.1 
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
 
 
 
 
1.5.2a 
 
ENVIRONMENT
AL EDUCATION 
 
1. formal- 
registered-at 
school/college/
university) 
 
2. formal 
workshops 
(by NGO e.g. 
Rhodes/other 
 
3. informal 
workshop/s 
by NGO 
 
4. Private 
reading of 
journals 
 
5. Media-
Print/Visual/
Radio 
6. 
(Combination 
of 2-6)* 
7. Zero 
education 
1.5.2.b 
 
NUMBER OF 
TIMES OR 
DAYS in 
programme 
 
1. one year and 
above 
 
2.  six months 
and above 
 
3. one month and 
above 
 
4. one week and 
above 
 
5. less than a 
week 
 
6. less than a day 
7. zero time 
1.5.3a 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
WORK 
EXPERIENCE 
 
1. formal and 
permanent 
work 
experience 
 
2. formal part 
time work 
experience 
 
3. informal 
work 
experience 
 
4. 
(combination 
of 2 and 3)* 
 
5. Zero work 
experience 
1.5.3.b 
 
NUMBER OF TIMES OR 
DAYS in programme 
 
1. one year and above 
 
2.  six months and above 
 
3. one month and above 
 
4. one week and above 
 
5. less than a week 
 
6. less than a day 
7. zero time 
 
1. (head)     
2.     
3.     
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4.     
5.     
6.     
1.5.3 (instruction to interviewer!) Write in full any other information not 
captured by the above questions (1.5) and write to which family member the 
information applies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6 Linguistic competency 
 
 
1.6.1 
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
 
 
 
 
1.6.2 
 
ENGLISH 
 
1. SPEAK  
 AND READ  
AND WRITE 
WELL 
 
2.SPEAK AND 
READ WELL 
 
3.EITHER 
SPEAK OR 
READ WELL 
 
 
4. SPEAK  
 AND READ  
AND WRITE 
NOT V. WELL 
 
5.SPEAK AND 
READ NOT V 
WELL 
 
 
6.EITHER 
SPEAK OR 
READ NOT V. 
WELL 
 
7. ZERO 
COMPETENCY 
 
1.6.3 
 
AFRIKAANS 
 
1. SPEAK  
 AND READ  
AND WRITE 
WELL 
 
2.SPEAK 
AND READ 
WELL 
 
3.EITHER 
SPEAK OR 
READ WELL 
 
 
4. SPEAK  
 AND READ  
AND WRITE 
NOT V. 
WELL 
 
5.SPEAK 
AND READ 
NOT V WELL 
 
 
6.EITHER 
SPEAK OR 
READ NOT 
V. WELL 
 
7. ZERO 
COMPETENCY 
1.6.4 
 
XHOSA 
 
1. SPEAK  
 AND READ  
AND WRITE 
WELL 
 
2.SPEAK AND 
READ WELL 
 
3.EITHER 
SPEAK OR 
READ WELL 
 
 
4. SPEAK  
 AND READ  
AND WRITE 
NOT V. WELL 
 
5.SPEAK AND 
READ NOT V 
WELL 
 
 
6.EITHER 
SPEAK OR 
READ NOT V. 
WELL 
 
7. ZERO 
COMPETENCY 
1.6.5 
 
OTHER (SPECIFY) 
 
1. SPEAK  
 AND READ  
AND WRITE 
WELL 
 
2.SPEAK AND 
READ WELL 
 
3.EITHER SPEAK 
OR READ WELL 
 
 
4. SPEAK  
 AND READ  
AND WRITE 
NOT V. WELL 
 
5.SPEAK AND 
READ NOT V 
WELL 
 
 
6.EITHER SPEAK 
OR READ NOT V. 
WELL 
 
7. ZERO 
COMPETENCY 
1. (head)     
2.     
3.     
4.     
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5.     
6.     
7.     
8.     
1.6.6 (instruction to interviewer!) Write in full any other information not 
captured by the above questions (1.6) and write to which family member the 
information applies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Individual Attitudes on aspects of the New Water Law 
 
2.1 Knowledge of and attitude towards the New Water Law (1997) 
2.1.1 
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
 
 
 
 
2.1.2 
 
KNOWLEDGE 
OF THE NEW 
WATER LAW 
 
 
HOW WELL DO 
YOU KNOW THE 
NWP? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. VERY WELL 
 
2. FAMILIAR 
 
3. NOT  
FAMILIAR 
 
4. NO ANSWER 
AVAILABLE OR 
PREFER NOT TO 
ANSWER 
2.1.3 
 
FEELINGS  
ABOUT THE 
PARTICIPATIO
-N OBJECTIVE 
 
HOW DO YOU 
FEEL ABOUT 
EVERYONE 
PARTICIPATIN
G IN 
MANAGING 
THE 
CATCHMENT? 
 
 
1. IT IS A VERY 
GOOD IDEA 
 
2. IT IS O.K. 
 
3. DON’T 
KNOW 
 
4. IT IS NOT A 
GOOD IDEA 
 
5. NO ANSWER 
OR PREFER 
NOT TO 
ANSWER 
 
2.1.4 
 
FEELINGS ABOUT 
THE EQUITY 
OBJCETIVE  
 
 
HOW DO YOU 
FEEL ABOUT 
ALLOWING 
EVERYONE A 
RIGHT TO USE 
WATER? 
 
 
 
 
1. IT IS A VERY 
GOOD IDEA 
 
2. IT IS O.K. 
 
3. DON’T KNOW 
 
4. IT IS NOT A 
GOOD IDEA 
 
5. NO ANSWER OR 
PREFER NOT TO 
ANSWER 
 
2.1.5 
 
FEELINGS ABOUT 
CONSERVATION /RESERVE 
PROTECTIN OBJECTIVE 
 
 
HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT 
SETTING A MAXIMUM 
LEVEL OF  WATER THAT 
EVERYONE (TOGETHER) 
CAN USE FROM THE KAT 
RIVER? 
 
1. IT IS A VERY GOOD IDEA 
 
2. IT IS O.K. 
 
3. DON’T KNOW 
 
4. IT IS NOT A GOOD IDEA 
 
5. NO ANSWER OR PREFER 
NOT TO ANSWER 
 
1. (head)     
2.     
3.     
4.     
5.     
6.     
7.     
8.     
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2.1.6 (instruction to interviewer!) Write in full any other information not 
captured by the above questions (2.1) and write to which family member the 
information applies: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Knowledge of and attitude towards water related organisations operating in 
the KRV 
2.2.1 
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE CATCHMENT 
FORUM 
 
HOW WELL DO 
YOU KNOW THE 
ACTIVITIES  OF 
THE CF?  
 
 
 
1. VERY WELL 
 
2. FAMILIAR 
 
3. NOT  
FAMILIAR 
 
4. NO ANSWER 
AVAILABLE OR 
PREFER NOT TO 
ANSWER 
2.2.3 
 
KNOWLEDGE 
OF THE WATER 
USER 
ASSOCIATION 
 
HOW WELL DO 
YOU KNOW THE 
ACTIVITIES OR 
CONSTITUTION 
OF THE WUA?  
 
 
 
1. VERY WELL 
 
2. FAMILIAR 
 
3. NOT  
FAMILIAR 
 
4. NO ANSWER 
AVAILABLE OR 
PREFER NOT TO 
ANSWER 
2.2.4 
 
FEELINGS 
ABOUT THE CF 
ACTIVITIES 
 
 
HOW DO YOU 
FEEL ABOUT 
THE WORK OR 
FUNCTIONS OF 
THE CF? 
 
 
 
1. IT IS DOING A 
VERY GOOD JOB 
 
2. IT’S WORK IS 
O.K.  
 
3. DON’T KNOW 
 
4. IT IS NOT 
DOING  GOOD 
WORK 
 
5. NO ANSWER 
OR PREFER NOT 
TO ANSWER 
 
2.2.5 
 
FEELINGS ABOUT 
THE WUA 
ACTIVITIES 
 
 
HOW DO YOU 
FEEL ABOUT THE 
WORK OR 
FUNCTIONS OF 
THE WUA? 
 
 
 
 
1. IT IS DOING A 
VERY GOOD JOB 
 
2. IT’S WORK IS 
O.K.  
 
3. DON’T KNOW 
 
4. IT IS NOT 
DOING  GOOD 
WORK 
 
5. NO ANSWER OR 
PREFER NOT TO 
ANSWER 
 
 
2.2.6 
 
FEELINGS ABOUT 
THE PROPOSED 
CMA 
 
 
HOW DO YOU FEEL 
ABOUT THE 
PROPOSED CMA TO 
MANAGE ALL THE 
KAT RIVER WATER 
MANAGEMENT?   
 
 
1. IT IS A VERY 
GOOD IDEA 
 
2. IT IS O.K. 
 
3. DON’T KNOW 
 
4. IT IS NOT A 
GOOD IDEA 
 
5. I DON’T KNOW 
ABOUT THE CMA 
 
6. NO ANSWER OR 
PREFER NOT TO 
ANSWER 
 
1. 
(head) 
     
2.      
3.      
4.      
5.      
6.      
    2.2.7 (instruction to interviewer!) Write in full any other information not captured 
by the above questions (2.2) and write to which family member the information 
applies: 
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2. Long term property investments (immovable but include livestock) - 
(legal and perceived)  
 
(INSTRUCTION TO INTEVIWER! INDICATE ALL OF THE RIGHTS OF EACH Hh MEMBER 
 
3.1 ATTITUDES TOWARDS COMMON, PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND OPEN ACCESS:  
Note for interviewer and interviewee: In this survey tool, property rights in 
general relate to the following; a possession of a title-deed, a receipt, a lease or 
some other proof document that a property or some resource/object can be used by 
you or those you have chosen. If only you are the exclusive owner or user, then 
you should have private/individual rights to the property, if the document names 
you and somebody else as owners of the property then you have 
common/communal property rights to the property. However, if you (alone or as a 
group) don’t have any title deed or proof document, however you still feel that 
you own some property or some object, then you only have perceived (common or 
private) property rights to the property.        
 
3.1.1 
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
3.1.2 
 
COMMON PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE 
COMMUNAL  OWNERSHIP OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES? 
 
1. IT IS A VERY GOOD THING 
 
2. IT IS O.K I HAVE NO PROBLEM 
WITH THAT 
 
3. IT IS NOT A GOOD THING 
 
4. I DON’T KNOW 
 
5. RATHER NOT SAY  
(TO INTERVIEWER! WRITE 
REASONS WHY AFTER CHOICE 
NUMBER)  
3.1.3 
 
PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT 
INDIVIDUAL ENVIRONMENTAL  
RESOURCE OWNERSHIP? 
 
1. IT IS A VERY GOOD THING 
 
2. IT IS O.K I HAVE NO 
PROBLEM WITH THAT 
 
3. IT IS NOT A GOOD THING 
 
4. I DON’T KNOW 
 
5. RATHER NOT SAY 
 
TO INTERVIEWER! WRITE 
REASONS WHY AFTER CHOICE 
NUMBER) 
3.1.4 
 
NO PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 
HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCES THAT NOBODY 
OWNS? 
 
1. IT IS A VERY GOOD THING 
 
2. IT IS O.K I HAVE NO 
PROBLEM WITH THAT 
 
3. IT IS NOT A GOOD THING 
 
4. I DON’T KNOW 
 
5. RATHER NOT SAY 
TO INTERVIEWER! WRITE 
REASONS WHY AFTER 
CHOICE NUMBER) 
1. 
head 
   
2.    
3.    
4.    
 
3.2 Current private, common and perceived property rights  
3.2.1 
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
3.2.2 
LEGALLY DEFINED 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
 
DO YOU HAVE LEGAL 
PRIVATE RIGHTS TO THE 
3.2.3 
LEGALLY DEFINED 
COMMON PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
 
DO YOU HAVE LEGAL 
COMMON RIGHTS TO 
3.2.4 
PERCEIVED-(COMMON 
LAW) COMMON 
PROPERTY 
 
DO YOU FEEL LIKE 
YOU HAVE RIGHTS TO 
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S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
 
 
 
 
FOLLOWING: 
TITLE DEED –(PERMANENT)  
TO: 
1. LAND 
2. BUSINESS 
3. HOUSE/ BLD STRUCT  
4. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
5. SCHEDULED WATER USER 
RIGHTS (OLD WATER LAW) 
6. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT 
7. POLLUTION RIGHTS  
8. LIVESTOCK  
9. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
 
LEASE  
(TEMPORARY/RENEWABLE) 
TO: 
10. TO LAND 
11. BUSINESS 
12. HOUSE/BLG STRUCT 
13. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
14. SCHEDULED WATER USER 
RIGHTS 
15. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT  
16. POLLUTION RIGHTS 
17. LIVESTOCK  
18. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
THE FOLLOWING:  
TITLE DEED –(PERMANENT)  
TO: 
1. LAND 
2. BUSINESS 
3. HOUSE/ BLD STRUCT  
4. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
5. SCHEDULED WATER USER 
RIGHTS (OLD WATER LAW) 
6. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT 
7. POLLUTION RIGHTS  
8. LIVESTOCK 
9. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
 
LEASE  
(TEMPORARY/RENEWABLE) 
TO: 
10. TO LAND 
11. BUSINESS 
12. HOUSE/BLG STRUCT 
13. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
14. SCHEDULED WATER USER 
RIGHTS 
15. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT 
16. POLLUTION RIGHTS 
17. LIVESTOCK 
18. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
THE FOLLOWING 
(THOUGH YOU DON’T 
HAVE LEGAL PAPERS) 
PERMANENT TO: 
1. LAND 
2. BUSINESS 
3. HOUSE/ BLD STRUCT  
4. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
5. SCHEDULED WATER 
USER RIGHTS (OLD 
WATER LAW) 
6. OTHER 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT 
7. POLLUTION RIGHTS  
8. LIVESTOCK 
9. OTHER (SPECIFY) 
 
 (TEMPORARY) TO: 
10. TO LAND 
11. BUSINESS 
12. HOUSE/BLG STRUCT 
13. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
14. SCHEDULED WATER 
USER RIGHTS 
15. OTHER 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT 
16. POLLUTION RIGHTS 
17. LIVESTOCK 
18.OTHER (SPECIFY) 
1. (head)    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.     
6.    
7.    
8.    
 
 
  3.3 Future expected private, common and perceived property rights  
3.3.1 
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
3.3.2 
LEGALLY DEFINED 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
 
DO YOU EXPECT TO HAVE 
LEGAL PRIVATE RIGHTS 
IN THE FUTURE TO THE 
FOLLOWING: 
 
TITLE DEED –(PERMANENT)  
TO: 
1. LAND 
2. BUSINESS 
3. HOUSE/ BLD STRUCT  
4. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
5. SCHEDULED WATER USER 
3.3.3 
LEGALLY DEFINED 
COMMON PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
 
DO YOU EXPECT TO 
HAVE LEGAL COMMON 
RIGHTS IN THE FUTURE 
TO THE FOLLOWING:  
 
TITLE DEED –(PERMANENT) 
TO: 
1. LAND 
2. BUSINESS 
3. HOUSE/ BLD STRUCT  
4. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
5. SCHEDULED WATER USER 
3.3.4 
PERCEIVED-(COMMON 
LAW) COMMON 
PROPERTY 
 
DO YOU EXPECT, AT 
SOME POINT, TO FEEL 
LIKE HAVE RIGHTS TO 
THE FOLLOWING 
(THOUGH YOU WONT 
HAVE LEGAL PAPERS) 
TO: 
1. LAND 
2. BUSINESS 
3. HOUSE/ BLD STRUCT  
4. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
5. SCHEDULED WATER 
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RIGHTS (OLD WATER LAW) 
6. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT 
7. POLLUTION RIGHTS  
8. LIVESTOCK 
9. OTHER RIGHTS (SPECIFY) 
 
LEASE  
(TEMPORARY/RENEWABLE) 
TO: 
10. TO LAND 
11. BUSINESS 
12. HOUSE/BLG STRUCT 
13. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
14. SCHEDULED WATER USER 
RIGHTS 
15. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT  
16. POLLUTION RIGHTS 
17. LIVESTOCK 
18. OTHERS (SPECIFY) 
 
 
RIGHTS (OLD WATER LAW) 
6. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT 
7. POLLUTION RIGHTS  
8. LIVESTOCK 
9. OTHER RIGHTS (SPECIFY) 
 
LEASE  
(TEMPORARY/RENEWABLE) 
TO: 
10. TO LAND 
11. BUSINESS 
12. HOUSE/BLG STRUCT 
13. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
14. SCHEDULED WATER USER 
RIGHTS 
15. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT  
16. POLLUTION RIGHTS 
17. LIVESTOCK 
18. OTHERS (SPECIFY) 
USER RIGHTS (OLD WATER 
LAW) 
6. OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT 
7. POLLUTION RIGHTS  
8. LIVESTOCK 
9. OTHER RIGHTS (SPECIFY) 
 
LEASE  
(TEMPORARY/RENEWABLE) 
TO: 
10. TO LAND 
11. BUSINESS 
12. HOUSE/BLG STRUCT 
13. IRRIGATION EQUIP 
14. SCHEDULED WATER 
USER RIGHTS 
15. OTHER 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCE RIGHT  
16. POLLUTION RIGHTS 
17. LIVESTOCK 
18. OTHERS (SPECIFY) 
1. head)    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.     
6.    
7.    
 
3.4 Historical, cultural, social attachments   
3.4.1 
 
 
 
Is there a reason/s why you would never want to leave the Kat River area 
for good?   
 
1 YES                               2 NO                 3 DON’T KNOW 
1. (head)  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
8.  
 
3.4.2 
 
 
If you answered yes (1) above, give the most important reason or 
explanation to why you don’t want to leave the KRV  
1. (head) …………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………… 
2. …………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
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………………………………………… 
3. …………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………… 
4. …………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………… 
5. …………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………… 
6. …………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………… 
7. …………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………… 
8. …………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………… 
 
 
4.  PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
4.1 General public participation EXCLUDE participation in environmental 
resource organisations (DO NOT INCLUDE WUA, CF OR LAND CARE participation) 
4.1.1 
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
 
 
 
 
4.1.2 
 
GENERAL 
PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION 
 
DO YOU FEEL IT 
IS A GOOD THING 
FOR ONE TO BE 
INVOLVED IN 
PUBLIC MATTERS 
(E.G. ATTENDING 
COMMUNITY 
MEETINGS)? 
 
1. IT IS A VERY 
GOOD THING TO 
DO 
 
2. IT IS O.K. TO DO 
THAT 
 
3. IT IS NOT A 
GOOD THING TO 
DO 
 
4. DON’T KNOW 
 
5. PREFER NOT TO 
SAY 
 
4.1.3 
 
KNOWLEDGE 
ABOUT 
PUBLIC 
EVENTS 
 
DO YOU OFTEN 
KNOW WHEN 
THERE ARE 
GOING TO BE 
COMMUNITY 
MEETINGS etc 
IN THE  KRV?  
 
 
1.   I ALWAYS 
KNOW 
 
2. SOMETIMES I 
KNOW 
 
3. I AM NOT 
SURE 
 
4. I NEVER 
KNOW 
 
5. PREFER NOT 
TO SAY 
4.1.4 
 
CULTURE OF 
ATTENDING 
PUBLIC 
EVENTS 
 
 
HOW OFTEN 
DO YOU 
ATTEND 
PUBLIC 
EVENTS IN THE 
KRV? 
 
1. I ALWAYS 
ATTEND 
 
2. SOMETIMES I 
ATTEND 
 
3.  I  DON’T 
KNOW 
 
4. I NEVER 
ATTEND 
 
5. I PREFER 
NOT TO SAY 
 
4.1.5 
 
PUBLIC ORG. 
MEMBERSHIP 
 
 
ARE YOU A 
MEMBER TO 
ANY 
COMMUNITY 
ORG IN THE 
KRV? 
 
1. YES 
 
2. I DON’T KNOW 
 
3. NO 
 
4. PREFER NOT 
TO SAY 
4.1.6 
 
PERSONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
IN COMMUNITY 
ORGANISATION 
 
 
DO YOU HOLD 
ANY COMMITTEE 
POSITION/S IN 
ANY COMMUNITY 
ORG? 
 
1. YES 
 
2. I DON’T KNOW 
 
3. NO 
 
4. PREFERE NOT 
TO SAY 
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1. 
(head) 
     
2.      
3.      
4.      
5.      
6.      
7.      
8.      
 
 
4.2 Public participation with reference to ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES 
(INCLUDING WATER AND LAND RESOURCES) (E.G. WUA, CF, LAND CARE ETC) 
 
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
 
 
 
 
4.1.1 
 
ENVIRO-
RESOURCE  
PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION 
 
DO YOU FEEL IT 
IS A GOOD THING 
FOR ONE TO BE 
INVOLVED IN 
PUBLIC 
RESOURCES 
MATTERS (E.G. 
ATTENDING 
MEETINGS)? 
 
1. IT IS A VERY 
GOOD THING TO 
DO 
 
2. IT IS O.K. TO DO 
THAT 
 
3. IT IS NOT A 
GOOD THING TO 
DO 
 
4. DON’T KNOW 
 
5. PREFER NOT TO 
SAY 
 
4.1.2 
 
KNOWLEDGE 
ABOUT 
PUBLIC 
RESOURCE 
EVENTS 
 
DO YOU OFTEN 
KNOW WHEN 
THERE ARE 
GOING TO BE 
COMMUNITY 
MEETINGS etc 
IN THE  KRV?  
 
 
1.   I ALWAYS 
KNOW 
 
2. SOMETIMES I 
KNOW 
 
3. I AM NOT 
SURE 
 
4. I NEVER 
KNOW 
 
5. PREFER NOT 
TO SAY 
4.1.3 
 
CULTURE OF 
ATTENDING 
PUBLIC 
RESOURCE 
EVENTS 
 
 
HOW OFTEN 
DO YOU 
ATTEND 
PUBLIC 
EVENTS IN THE 
KRV? 
 
1. I ALWAYS 
ATTEND 
 
2. SOMETIMES I 
ATTEND 
 
3.  I  DON’T 
KNOW 
 
4. I NEVER 
ATTEND 
 
5. I PREFER 
NOT TO SAY 
 
4.1.4 
 
PUBLIC 
RESOURCE 
ORG. 
MEMBERSHIP 
(EG. LAND 
CARE, CF, WUA) 
 
 
ARE YOU A 
MEMBER TO 
ANY 
COMMUNITY 
ORG IN THE 
KRV? 
 
1. YES 
 
2. I DON’T KNOW 
 
3. NO 
 
4. PREFER NOT 
TO SAY 
4.1.5 
 
PERSONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
IN COMMUNITY 
RESOURCE 
ORGANISATION 
 
 
DO YOU HOLD 
ANY COMMITTEE 
POSITION/S IN 
ANY COMMUNITY 
ORG WITH OR 
WITHOUT PAY 
 
1. YES 
 
2. I DON’T KNOW 
 
3. NO 
 
4. PREFERE NOT 
TO SAY 
1. 
(head) 
     
2.      
3.      
4.      
5.      
6.      
7.      
8.      
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4.3 Language issues in public meetings  
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
4.3.1 
 
WHAT IS THE 
PROCEEDING 
LANGUAGE USED IN 
THE PUBLIC 
MEETINGS YOU 
NORMALLY ATTEND? 
 
1. MOSTLY ENGLISH 
2. MOSTLY XHOSA 
3. MOSTLY OTHER 
4. A MIX OF 
LANGUAGES 
5. NOT SURE 
6. PREFER NOT TO 
SAY 
 
4.3.2 
 
HOW WELL DO YOU FOLLOW 
/ UNDERSTAND THE 
PROCEEDINGS (CONTENT 
AND LANGUAGE) IN 
MEETINGS YOU NORMALLY 
ATTEND? 
 
 
 
1. I FOLLOW VERY WELL 
2. SOMETIMES I DON’T 
FOLLOW 
3. I NEVER FOLLOW 
4. NOT SURE 
5. PREFER NOT TO SAY 
4.3.3 
 
HOW MUCH DO YOU 
THINK YOU 
CONTRIBUTE IN THE 
MEETING PROCEDINGS 
YOU NORMALLY 
ATTEND? 
 
1. I CONTRIBUTE A LOT 
2. SOMETIMES I 
CONTRIBUTE 
3. I  NEVER 
CONTRIBUTE 
4. NOT SURE 
5. PREFER NOT TO SAY 
1. (head)    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
6.    
7.    
8.    
 
SECTION 2 
Environmental uses and values 
 
5. 1 ENVIRONMENTAL USES (INSTRUCTION TO INTERVIEWR!-indicate all uses of 
each member) 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
5.1.1 
DO YOU USE (IN ANY WAY -E.G. SPIRITUAL, HOUSEHOLD 
CONSUMPTION,  BUSINESS) THE FOLLOWING RESOURCES   
1. RIVER WATER ABSTRACTION AND RECREATION 
2. GROUND WATER ABSTRACTION 
3. WETLANDS (WATER ABSTRACTION AND RECREATION)  
4. GRAZING PASTURE 
5. FOREST WOOD HARVESTING 
6. FOREST MEDICINE HARVESTING 
7. FOREST FLOWERS ABSTRACTION 
8. RIVER SAND ABSTRACTION 
9. BUILDING STONES ABSTRACTION 
10. ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHESTICS APPRECIATION 
11. SPIRITUAL USES: BAPTISM ETC.   
12. FISHING 
13. WASTE DISPOSAL 
14. WASHING: PEOPLE, CARS, CLOTHES 
15. OTHER USES OF ENVIRO RESOURCES (SPECIFY) 
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1. (head)  
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
8.  
 
5.2 INSTRUCTION TO THE INTERVIEWER! Read out and explain the 
following information to respondents 
 
BACKGROUND ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION  
 
 
1. Water is a scarce resource in South Africa.  
2. Prior to 1994 access to water resources were distributed unequally among 
water users of different economic and racial backgrounds 
3. Therefore in 1997 the South African government formulated a new 
National Water Policy (NWP) whose objectives are to protect and equally 
distribute water resources among all its users in a sustainable manner.  
4. To achieve this the government divided the country into 19 Water 
Management Areas (WMA) to be managed by local people in a 
representative way 
5. The management requires that licences to use water be issued to big users 
of water (like farmers with over 5 hectares of irrigation land).  
6.  The Kat River Valley is in one of the 19 WMAs. 
7. The government needs local people to participate fully in creating a water 
management body and in deciding the state (quality and quantity) in 
which local people want the river to be maintained.    
8. By doing this, the government believes the KRV will be sustained for a 
long time and for the coming generations to use it. 
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5.3. Individual environmental values for 3 aspects of the NWP 
 
 Hh 
 
R 
O 
S 
T 
E 
R 
 
N 
U 
M 
B 
E 
R 
5.2.1 
 
WATER LICENCE  
 
HOW MUCH  
 
1. MONEY  
OR  
2. LABOUR TIME 
OR 
3. LIVESTOCK (INCL 
BIRDS) 
       OR 
4. A BAG OF: 
POTATOES OR 
CABBAGE OR 
OTHER  
(SPECIFY) OR 
       
5. OTHER UNIT 
 
 
ARE YOU WILLING 
TO PAY/SPEND TO 
OBTAIN A WATER 
LICENCE TO USE A 
CUBIC METER OF 
WATER?  
 
5.2.2 
 
RESERVE -
CONSERVATION 
 
HOW MUCH  
 
1. MONEY  
OR  
2. LABOUR TIME 
OR 
3. LIVESTOCK (INCL 
BIRDS) 
       OR 
4. A BAG OF: 
POTATOES OR 
CABBAGE OR 
OTHER  
(SPECIFY) OR 
       
5. OTHER UNIT 
 
ARE YOU WILLING TO 
PAY/SPEND TO PREVENT 
THE RIVER FROM 
BECOMING UNUSABLE  
(e.g. BECAUSE OF pollution, 
overuse etc.?  
 
5.2.3 
 
CATCHMENT 
MANAGEMENT 
 
HOW MUCH  
 
1. MONEY  
OR  
2.    LABOUR TIME 
OR 
        3.    LIVESTOCK 
(INCL BIRDS) 
       OR 
4 A BAG OF: 
POTATOES OR 
CABBAGE OR 
OTHER  
(SPECIFY) OR 
       
         5.   OTHER UNIT 
 
ARE YOU WILLING 
TO PAY/SPEND TO 
HAVE A WELL 
RUNNING CMA IN 
THE KRV?  
 
1. (head)    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
6.    
7.    
8.    
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME, WE HAVE COME TO THE END OF THE 
INTERVIEW 
 
WRITE DOWN THE TIME YOU FINISHED…….………………….. 
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Appendix 20 
 
A technical explanation of the Lewis Two-Sector Model of development  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the technical effects of the assumptions, which were presented in 
Chapter two (Section 2.4.1), on the production functions of rural and urban sectors. 
The graphs on the left hand side represent the urban production process with 
increasing capital investments and technological advances, while graphs juxtaposed 
on the right hand side represent the production functions of the rural sectors with zero 
capital investments and constant technology.  
 
The top right diagram (C) illustrates diminishing returns to total food output (Fei and 
Ranis, 1964:10. In the agricultural sector, the wage rate (Wa) is determined by total 
product (TP) over total quantity of labour (La) (i.e. Wa = TPa/La). The determination 
of the wage rate is also illustrated by the bottom curves on the right hand side which 
represent the marginal (MP) and average (AP) production functions as derived from 
the total production function above.  Since La, on the horizontal axis, represents the 
quantity of labour for maximum food production output, the MP curve indicates that 
labour surplus in the rural sector exists beyond the point where marginal product 
equals zero. The AP curve indicates the wage level Wa at La where MP=0.  
Compared to the urban sector, i.e. the graphs on the left hand side, it can be seen that 
the agricultural wage is lower than the urban wage (i.e. Wa < Wm)95, and this acts as 
an incentive for labour migrations out of the rural sector.   
 
In the urban sector, diagram A illustrates upward sloping total product (TPu) curves. 
The TPu curves are also variable with labour inputs at different levels of technology. 
The increasing local investments of capital stock (Km) contribute to increasing levels 
of technology, which in turn lead to overall growth in the sector. For instance, TPu1 
output is produced by L1 labour inputs at Km1 capital stock, but the increase of 
capital stock investments shifts the TP curves upward enabling a higher output with 
the same labour inputs.  
                                                 
95 Lewis (1954:146) argued that rural wages set the floor and they are normally 30% lower than urban 
wages.   
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Figure 2.1 The Lewis Two Sector Model (Adapted from Todaro, 1997:77)  
 
Diagram B illustrates marginal product (MP) curves as derived from the 
corresponding top TPu curves.  These MP curves also represent sector demand (D) 
schedules, because of the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets in the 
modern sector (Lewis, 1954:135 and Fei and Ranis, 1964:119). At the higher urban 
wage (Wm), the supply (S) of labour is horizontal or perfectly elastic due to the 
assumption of unlimited supplies from the rural sector. Therefore, for a given capital 
stock (e.g. Km1) production occurs at MP=Wm (i.e. D=S). The total output for the 
whole sector, at a given stock of capital, equals the area under a corresponding 
demand schedule. Therefore, total profits to producers equal the area above supply 
curve, but below the demand curve. Hence, at Km1, the shaded area represents total 
profits. It the model it assumed that these profits are re-invested back into the local 
D3-Km3 
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D1-Km1 
 
Wm 
 
Wa 
Quantity of labour 
(a) Modern sector Quantity of labour  
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product 
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A. P. 
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TPu-Km2 
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B 
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economy (Lewis, 1954:147; Todaro, 1997: 78 and Fei and Ranis, 1964:19). The 
increase in reinvested capital ensures increases of total outputs in modern sector (i.e. 
from TPu1 to TPu2 or TPu3). 
